JUDGMENT B.D. Agrawal, J. - The petitioner Giriraj Kishore was appointed Registrar, Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur on Dec.. 1, 1975. On 28th Mar., 1977 he was confirmed with effect from the date of appointment. Charge-sheet was served on him on 28th Feb., 1979. Preliminary reply was given by the petitioner on Mar. 1, 1979. R K. Bawajaa retired member of Judicial Service was appointed Enquiry Officer to conduct the enquiry. Detailed explanation was submitted by the petitioner on June, 17, 1979. Evidence was recorded on both sides and oral submissions made. The enquiry officer submitted his report dated 27th Dec. 1979. A show cause notice was given to the petitioner on 17th Oct., 1981. To this the petitioner replied on 10th Dec., 1981. The Board of Governors resolved to remove the petitioner from the post of the Registrar and order was issued accordingly on April 16, 1982. On compassionate ground, however, the Board offered the appointment to the petitioner on the post of Officer on Special Duty in the same pay scale Aggrieved against the removal from the office of the Registrar, the petitioner has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking that the order dated 16th April, 1982 be quashed and mandamus issued. 2. Before proceeding to consider the points at issue, it is relevant to refer to a few more facts. The Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur (hereinafter referred as the Institute) is a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal created under the Institutes of Technology Act. I%1 (Central Act 59 of 1961). The Institute consists of Chairman, a Director and their members of the Board (S. 4(2) ). The President of India is the Visitor of the Institute. The Board of Governors consists of the Chairman to be nominated by the visitor, the Director (ex-officio), a nominee of the State Government from among the technologists or industrialists of repute, four persons having special knowledge or practical experience in education, engineering or science, to be nominated by the Council and two professors of the Institute (S. 11). In view of S 12, the Board is responsible for the general superintendence, direction and control of the affairs of the Institute. The director is appointed by the council with the prior approval of the Visitor. In view of S 12, the Board is responsible for the general superintendence, direction and control of the affairs of the Institute. The director is appointed by the council with the prior approval of the Visitor. The Registrar is an appointee of the Board of Governors and is responsible to the Director for the discharge of the administrative functions entrusted to him. S. 19 provides : "19. (1) The Registrar of each Institute shall be appointed on such terms and conditions as may be laid down by the Statutes and shall be the custodian of records, the common seal, the funds of the Institute and such other property of the Institute as the Board shall commit to his charge. (2) The Registrar shall act as the Secretary of the Board, the Senate, and such committees as may be prescribed by the Statutes. (3) The Registrar shall be responsible to the director for the proper discharge of his functions. (4) The Registrar shall exercise such other powers and perform such other duties as may be assigned to him by this Act or the Statutes or by the Director." The Statutes framed under S. 26 (g) provide inter alia for the classification, the method of appointment and the determination of the terms and conditions of service of teachers and other staff of the Institute. Cl. Cl. 13(9) of the Statutes in so far as relevant states : " The following penalties may for good and sufficient reasons and as hereinafter provided, be imposed on any member of the staff : (i) Censure; (ii) withholding of increments or promotion; (iii) recovery from the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the Institute by negligence or breach of orders; (iv) reduction to lower service, grade or post or to a lower time-scale, or to a lower stage in a time-scale; (v) compulsory retirement; (vi) removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment under the Institute; (vii) dismissal from service which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future employment under the Institute." " No order imposing on any member of the staff any of the penalties specified at (iv) to (vii) above shall be passed by any authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed and except after an enquiry has been held and the member of the staff has been given reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him". 3. On Sept. 2, 1976 the Board of Governors issued a memorandum in terms of its resolution dated 12th July, 1976 detailing the procedure to be adopted in the matter of disciplinary proceeding as under : "In case, an equiry is to be held, the Registrar, after obtaining the approval of i he appointing authority will issue charge-sheet accompanied with copies of statements of witnesses to be examined against employee concerned along with the copies of the documents against him. The appointing authority shall decide whether to proceed with the enquiry itself or appoint an enquiry officer or committee to conduct the departmental enquiry. The enquiry officer/committee will give his/its findings to the appointing authority and necessary action will be taken against the employee according to law, statutes and prescribed rules. For any procedural guidance, the Classification, Control and Appeal Rules of Government of India as amended from time to time may be used by the enquiry officer/committee. 4. The charge-sheet served upon the petitioner on 28th Feb. 1979, contained several charges divided into four Articles and sub-divided into 26 items in all. Of these the Enquiry Officer found him guilty of the following : Article I (iii)/(iv) partly. 5. 4. The charge-sheet served upon the petitioner on 28th Feb. 1979, contained several charges divided into four Articles and sub-divided into 26 items in all. Of these the Enquiry Officer found him guilty of the following : Article I (iii)/(iv) partly. 5. That the petitioner committed acts of insubordination, showed lack of discipline and violated conduct rules inasmuch as (iii) he addressed letters to his superior officer containing false and malicious allegations and aspersions on him, dated July 28, 1978; July 31, 1978; Oct. 6, 1978; Jan. 25, 1979 and (iv) he absented himself from his duty without prior permission of the competent authority on 18th Jan., 1979; Article III "(ii) he seriously harmed the administration by declaring 422 employees belonging to classes B & C as eligible for assessment on 5-8-1977, whereas, in fact, only 232 of said two classes of employees were eligible for assessment in accordance with the Non-teaching Staff Recruitment and Promotion Rules-1977, approved by the Board of Governors, in Aug., 1977; (iii) he failed to get compiled relevant data and documents for assessment within a reasonable period of time for submission to the Assessment Committee which was constituted in September, 1977. Further the Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) submitted by him were not properly checked and processed before forwarding them to the Assessment Committee. A large number of mistakes were detected therein subsequently further delaying the assessment process; (iv) he committed serious lapses in processing the ACRs of Shri R. C. Adhikari, Senior Technical Assistant in Civil Engineering. Further he communicated adverse entries to Shri J. R. Motiramani, Mech. B. in Aeronautical Engg. on the basis of an ACR which was not even signed by the Reporting Officer;" Article IV : "(i) he failed to circulate to three members of the Senate viz. Dr. V. C. Bhide, Shri D. K. Kapoor and Dr. S. Verma, the written notice regarding the special meeting of the Senate convened on 28-10-1978. The said meeting of the Senate thus became infructuous on account of non-service of the notice on the said three members of the Senate. Thus he violated the provisions of Statute 4(7) of the Statutes;" "(iii) the draft minutes of the 65th meeting of the Board of Governors held on 22nd Nov. 1978 as submitted to the Director by Shri Giriraj Kishore required major and substantive changes in several items. Thus he violated the provisions of Statute 4(7) of the Statutes;" "(iii) the draft minutes of the 65th meeting of the Board of Governors held on 22nd Nov. 1978 as submitted to the Director by Shri Giriraj Kishore required major and substantive changes in several items. He objected to the assistance by the Director from the Deputy Director in correcting the minutes and disputed the proposed changes. Minutes were finalised only after the intervention of the Chairman of Board of Governors. Further, he circulated the minutes of the 65th meeting of the Board of Governors unsigned. The said lapse was pointed out to him by the Director of the Institute. Instead of correcting the lapses he tried to defend his action. Thus he failed to perform his duty as stipulated in statute 2(12) of the statutes". 6. The Board of Governors ultimately agreed with the findings on these charges except Article IV(i). 7. Sri R. K. Garg assisted by Sri K. P. Agrawal, learned counsel for the petitioner raised a number of grounds to assail the impugned order but candidly did not pursue them with the exception of one that relates to validity of the show cause notice. The grounds raised were (i) that the charges were not framed nor was the Enquiry Officer appointed by the appointing authority; (ii) that counsel aid was not provided; (iii) that copies of certain documents were not given nor were they considered; (iv) that the show cause notice given was for reduction to a lower post while the penalty imposed is1 of removal and; (v) that the action taken suffers from mala fides. 8. Sri S.N. Verma, the respondent's learned counsel raised a preliminary objection to the effect that the petitioner has had efficacious remedy in the form of appeal to the Visitor which he has not availed. Statute 13(10) provides that a member of the staff aggrieved by any order passed by the Board against him inflicting a penalty on him shall be entitled to prefer an appeal to the Visitor against the Order. The Visitor, as mentioned above, is none else than the The President of India. Obviously, the petitioner could have appealed against the impugned order to the Visitor but he did not choose to do so. Shri Garg defended the course of action adopted relying the decision in the well known case of State of U.P. v. Mohd. The Visitor, as mentioned above, is none else than the The President of India. Obviously, the petitioner could have appealed against the impugned order to the Visitor but he did not choose to do so. Shri Garg defended the course of action adopted relying the decision in the well known case of State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86 in which it was observed that the rule requiring the exhaustion of statutory remedies before the writ of certiorari will be granted is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law and instances are numerous where a writ of certiorari has been issued in spite of the fact that the aggrieved party had other adequate legal remedy. "If an inferior Court or tribunal of first instance", their Lordships pointed, "acts wholly without jurisdiction or patently in excess of jurisdiction or manifestly conducts the proceedings before it in a manner which is contrary to the rules of natural justice and all accepted rules of procedure and which offends the superior court's sense of fair play the superior Court may, we think, quite properly exercise its power to issue the prerogative writ of certiorari to correct the error of the Court or tribunal of first instance, even if an appeal to another inferior Court or tribunal was available and recourse was not had to it or if recourse was had to it, it confirmed what ex facie was a nullity for reasons aforementioned." These weighty observations were made, it will be noticed, in the background of the glaring facts of that case. It was pointed out that orders made on departmental trial held by an officer in the department without any legal training and orders passed by his superior officers in the same department on appeal or in revision might be regarded as being in the nature of an appeal from Caesar to Caesar, and, further where the error, irregularity or illegality touching jurisdiction or procedure committed by an inferior court or tribunal of first instance is "so patent and loudly obtrusive" that it leaves on its decision an indelible stamp of infirmity or vice which cannot be obliterated or cured on appeal or revision, the existence of alternative remedy does not prevent the exercise the court's power to issue prerogative writ of certiorari. 9. 9. In the instant case, on the other hand, the enquiry was conducted by a non-departmental individual possessed of legal training and experience and the appeal lay to the highest authority namely, the President of India in the capacity of the Visitor. As will presently appear moreover, the infringement alleged of the principles of natural justice herein is at its best only technical in character which has nothing to compare with the gross infirmity noticed in case of Mohd. Nooh, ( AIR 1958 SC 86 ) (supra). The preliminary objection raised for the respondents, therefore, does not lack force but the writ petition having crossed the preliminary hearing and the affidavits for the parties having been exchanged we are not persuaded at this stage to drive the petitioner to the alternative course. We prefer instead to dispose of the petition upon merit. 10. We take up at this stage for a brief discussion the grounds which the petitioner's learned counsel raised but did not pursue (i) It is not in dispute that the appointing authority to the post of the Registrar at the Institute is the Board of Governors. Under Clause`B' of the memorandum dated 2-9-1976 issued on the basis of resolution of the Board dated 12th July 76 (Annexures C.A. l/II) the appointing authority may initiate disciplinary proceedings against any employee either on the recommendation of the Head of the Department/Section concerned or directly on the basis of the evidence and facts available to it. Statute 7(4) empowers the Chairman to exercise the powers of the Board in emergent cases but he has to inform the Board of the action taken by him for its approval. The charge-sheet to the petitioner was issued with the sanction of the Chairman. The Board ratified this action of the Chairman in its meeting dated 7th April, 1979. Dr. Soundararajan was appointed Enquiry Officer. The petitioner objected whereupon the Chairman appointed on 13th April, 1979 R.K. Baweja to enquire in the matter and the Board approved of this in the meeting held on 10th Sept., 1979. Ground No. 1 mentioned above is consequently without substance. (ii) In the course of the enquiry proceeding the petitioner applied to the Enquiry Officer that the aid of counsel be provided. Ground No. 1 mentioned above is consequently without substance. (ii) In the course of the enquiry proceeding the petitioner applied to the Enquiry Officer that the aid of counsel be provided. This was repelled by the Enquiry Officer by a reasoned order dated May 5, 1979 which states : "The third submission made by the respondent is that he has already made a request to the Chairman to permit him to be represented by a lawyer in these proceedings. The Chairman has already turned down his request. But I may add here that an employee has no inherent right to be represented by a lawyer in domestic/departmental proceedings. There is no provision either in the Statutes or the Institutes of Technology Act. 1961 enjoining on the Management to permit an employee in such proceedings to be represented by a lawyer. According to the disciplinary procedure adopted by the Board in its 57th meeting held on July 12, 1976, the CCS Rules have been prescribed as guidelines for disciplinary proceedings against the employees of the Management. Under the said rules (Rule 14) it has been laid down that the Government servant (in the present case the respondent) cannot claim as a matter of right the appointment of a legal practitioner to assist him in the disciplinary proceedings, but if he so desires, he can have the assistance of another employee of his employer. I can visualise a case in which the management is represented by a lawyer and in the interest of justice and fair play and with a view not to place an employee under a handicap, the permission to be represented by a lawyer may be accorded. But in the instant case this is not so. So this request of the respondent in my view, cannot be held to have been unreasonably rejected by the disciplinary authority, and it does not require any further reconsideration on my part." 11. The charges formulated against the petitioner were factual relating to matters within his knowledge pertaining to the period when he functioned as the Registrar of the Institute. The Enquiry Officer was a retired member of Judicial Service. The petitioner submitted his reply in 40 closely typed pages (English) to the charges (Annexure `U'). The management examined six witnesses who were cross-examined at length by the petitioner. The Enquiry Officer was a retired member of Judicial Service. The petitioner submitted his reply in 40 closely typed pages (English) to the charges (Annexure `U'). The management examined six witnesses who were cross-examined at length by the petitioner. Equal number of witnesses were examined by the petitioner besides documents on both sides being filed. To the show cause notice, the petitioner again submitted elaborate reply covering 80 typed pages. The management too was not represented by any lawyer throughout the entire proceeding. Dr. N. C. Nigama member of the Board was made the Presenting Officer, but he was not a lawyer. The rejection of the petitioner's request for aid of counsel by the Enquiry Officer was based on relevant considerations (See Krishna Chandra v. Union of India, AIR 1974 SC 1589 : 1974 Lab IC 1010). In C.L. Subramaniam v. Collector of Customs, Cochin, AIR 1972 SC 2178 : 1972 Lab IC 1049 the Supreme Court held that the fact that the case against the appellant was being handled by a trained prosecutor was by itself a good ground for allowing the appellant to engage a legal practitioner to defend him lest the scales should be weighed against him. This was also the consideration which weighed with their Lordships in the Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Dilipkumar, AIR 1983 SC 109 : 1983 Lab IC 419 where the employer was represented by legally trained officers in the enquiry. In Jyoti Swarup Agrawal v. State of U.P., 1979 (5) All LR 403 : 1979 Lab IC 1028 a Full Bench of this Court held that in the absence of a specific rule, requiring Government to permit a Government servant to engage a lawyer, refusal to grant permission would not necessarily result in the deprivation of opportunity guaranteed by Article 311(2) of the Constitution since it is not a constituent or componert part of the reasonable opportunity. This was followed by a Division Bench of this Court in Pratap Singh Jain v. State of U.P., 1982 (8) All LR 421 : 1982 Lab IC 1725. In the absence of special circumstances procedural unfairness cannot be attributed to the enquiry in the instant case on this account. 12. This was followed by a Division Bench of this Court in Pratap Singh Jain v. State of U.P., 1982 (8) All LR 421 : 1982 Lab IC 1725. In the absence of special circumstances procedural unfairness cannot be attributed to the enquiry in the instant case on this account. 12. As regards ground No. (iii) the petitioner's learned counsel did not point to any particular document of which copy was not made available to the petitioner for defence purposes nor is our attention invited to any document which may have escaped consideration by the Enquiry Officer though material in its contents or effect. We also do not find any such specification made in the petition. 13. This leads us to ground No. (iv) upon which stress was chiefly laid by the petitioner's learned counsel. On October 17, 1981 S. Sampath, Director for and on behalf of the Board of Governors issued notice to show cause to the petitioner which, in so far as material reads : " On a careful consideration of the enquiry report aforesaid and all the evidence on record, the Board of Governors of the Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur agrees with the findings of the Inquiry Officer and holds that the following Articles of charges are proved : Charge 1 by Item (iii) Partly, and item(iv) Charge III by Items (ii) and (iii), and item (iv) (partly) Charge IV by items (i) and (iii). The Board of Governors has, therefore, provisionally come to the conclusion that Shri Giriraj Kishore is not a fit person to be retained as Registrar of the Institute in the time scale of pay of Rs. 1500-60-1800-100-2000 and so the Board of Governors proposes to impose on him the penalty of reduction to the post of Deputy Registrar in the time scale of Rs. 1200-50-1600. 3. Shri Girraj Kishore is hereby given an opportunity of making representation against the penalty proposed but only on the basis of the evidence adduced during the inquiry. Any representation which he may wish to make against the penalty proposed will be considered by the Board of Governors. Such representation, if any, should be made in writing and submitted so as to reach the undersigned not later than fifteen days from the date ol receipt of this memorandum by Shri Giriraj Kishore." 14. Copy of the enquiry report was annexed to this notice. Such representation, if any, should be made in writing and submitted so as to reach the undersigned not later than fifteen days from the date ol receipt of this memorandum by Shri Giriraj Kishore." 14. Copy of the enquiry report was annexed to this notice. The penalty imposed was decided upon in a special meeting of the Board on 12th April, 1982 and communicated on 16th April. 1982 to the petitioner as under : " Resolved that in view of the following articles of charge held to be proved in the disciplinary proceedings in the case of Sri Giriraj Kishore: Article I Item (iii) (Partly) and Item (iv) Article III Items (ii) and (iii) and item (iv) partly. Article IV Item (iii) partly. and in view of the conclusion reached by the Board that it will not be in the best interest of the Institute to permit him to hold the post of Registrar of the Institute and in supersession of Memorandum No. Estt. tC)/3507/ii-III-K-397 dated March 28, 1977, Shri Giriraj Kishore is re-designated as Officer on special duty and he will hold this post, in the grade of Rs. 1500-60-1800-100-2000, on a permanent basis, without affecting his present salary. Further resolved, that in view of the serious nature of the charges held to be proved against Sri Giriraj Kishore his increments in the scale of pay be stopped for two years, with cumulative effect, and that his performance be reviewed by the Board after this period." 15. Statute 13(9) quoted above envisages that enquiry be held and reasonable opportunity of showing cause given against the action proposed to be taken before any of the major penalties is imposed. Statute 13(9) quoted above envisages that enquiry be held and reasonable opportunity of showing cause given against the action proposed to be taken before any of the major penalties is imposed. In the context of Article 311(2) of the Constitution, it was held in Khem Chand v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 300 that "reasonable opportunity" includes "an opportunity to make his representation as to why the proposed punishment should not be inflicted on him, which he can only do if the competent authority, after the enquiry is over and after applying his mind to the gravity or otherwise of the charges proposes to inflict one of the three punishments and communicates the same to the Government servant." At page 308 in reference to the decision of the Privy Council in I. M. Lall's case ( AIR 1948 PC 121 ) it was observed that "the decision in that case did not proceed on the ground that an opportunity had not been given to I. M. Lall against the proposed punishment merely because in the notice several punishments were included, but the decision proceeded really on the ground that this opportunity should have been given after a stage had been reached where the charges had been established and the competent authority had applied its mind to the gravity or otherwise of the proved charge tentatively and proposed a particular punishment". The purpose of the issue of a show cause notice at the second stage is "to give the Government servant concerned a reasonable opportunity of showing cause why the proposed punishment should not be inflicted on him" vide Hukum Chand Malhotra v. Union of India, AIR 1959 SC 536 . In that case the notice to show cause proposed the three major penalties viz. dismissal, removal or reduction in rank in the alternative. It was held that the appellant had reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. The proposition put forward in such notice is only tentative or provisional. In that case the notice to show cause proposed the three major penalties viz. dismissal, removal or reduction in rank in the alternative. It was held that the appellant had reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. The proposition put forward in such notice is only tentative or provisional. This is intended to enable the charged officer to cover the whole ground and to plead "that no case had been made out against him for taking any disciplinary action and then to urge that if he fails in substantiating his innocence, the action proposed to be taken against him is either severe or not called for" (See State of Assam v. Bismal Kumar, AIR 1963 SC 1612 ). The settled law thus is that in disciplinary proceedings the notice is integral part of reasonable opportunity to show cause; that this is given upon tentative or provisional decision being arrived at by the disciplinary authority, with regard to penalty and that in reply the charged officer may put forward his contention both in respect of innocence and the nature or quantum of punishment proposed. We are-conscious that as a result of the amendment in Article 311(2) of the Constitution by the Constitution (42 Amendment) Act 1976 the requirement of show cause notice at the second stage stands dispensed with. But no such amendment has been carried out in the mode for disciplinary enquiry adopted by the Institute as is clear from statute 13(9) read with the Board's memorandum dated 2nd Sept., 1976 quoted above. The Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules as amended from time to time have been adopted under this memorandum for use by the Enquiry Officer/Enquiry Committee, but so far as the question of giving reasonable opportunity by the appointing authority of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken is concerned, the show cause notice has not been eliminated by amending the Statutes. 16. The question arising is what was the action proposed to be taken in regard to the petitioner within the meaning of Statute 13(9) in the present case? Sri Verma, the respondent's learned counsel urged that the notice recites that the petitioner "is not a fit person to be retained as Registrar of the Institute," and therefore, it should be taken as implicit that he was being removed. Sri Verma, the respondent's learned counsel urged that the notice recites that the petitioner "is not a fit person to be retained as Registrar of the Institute," and therefore, it should be taken as implicit that he was being removed. Referring to Statute 13(9)(iv) it was pointed out that the Board could reduce the petitioner to lower service, grade or post or to a lower time scale, or to a lower stage in a time scale. The submission made, therefore, is three- fold, namely, that the notice be taken as that of removal: in the alternative, it may be deemed as being under Statute 13(9)(iv) and in the third alternative, this may be regarded as both of removal and reduction to lower post. We have given careful thought to these submissions but are unable to agree. It is true that the notice recites that the petitioner is not a fit person to be retained as Registrar of the Institute but this only constitutes in sum and substance the reasoning or the motive for the action proposed. In its operative part the notice does not propose removal; on the contrary, in explicit terms the Board "proposes to impose on him the penalty of reduction to the post of Deputy Registrar " This was in conformity with the resolution of the Board dated 21-9-1981 which is cited in para 11 of the counter-affidavit and speaks eloquently of its intention : "the Board authorised the Chairman to take steps, on behalf of the Board, to issue to Shri Giriraj Kishore a notice asking him to show cause within a period of 15 days from the date of the receipt of the notice, why he should not be reduced from the post of Registrar to that of the Deputy Registrar in the time scale of........ 17. The matter can be viewed from another angle also. The text of the notice created impression on the other side in the mind of the petitioner to whom it was directed that the action proposed was reduction to the lower post. This is manifest from the petitioner's reply dated 10th Dec., 1981 to the notice. 17. The matter can be viewed from another angle also. The text of the notice created impression on the other side in the mind of the petitioner to whom it was directed that the action proposed was reduction to the lower post. This is manifest from the petitioner's reply dated 10th Dec., 1981 to the notice. The petitioner maintained in defence that the penalty of reduction prescribed in Statute 13(9) was applicable only to those cases where an employer is promoted to a higher post, whether officiating or substantively but that this penalty cannot be imposed on a employee who continues to hold his initial post of appointment. To put in other words, the petitioner did not get the? opportunity to put forward his contention against the penalty of `removal' as such. The object underlying the issuance of the show cause notice lay unfulfilled because the action proposed was that of reduction to a lower post while the penalty inflicted is higher being removal. In any case of reduction in rank, moreover, there is for the time being dislodging of the incumbent from the post that he holds. It cannot be said that in such a case the notice is impliedly that of removal. We are not inclined consequently to treat this as notice of removal. 18. The appointment of the petitioner was to a specific post, namely, the post of the Registrar. The post is statutory carrying the duties and responsibilities referred to in S. 19 of the Institutes of Technology Act, 1961. The appointment was not to a cadre nor was this by promotion from any other post in the Institute. Therefore, Statute 13(9)( iv) could not be made applicable to the petitioner's case. The Board seems to have laboured under an impression though erroneous that any or all of the penalties enumerated under Statute 13(9) could be invoked irrespective of the nature or character of the appointment. This was incorrect. Subsequent to the petitioner's reply, the Board took a different stand in the final order passed on 16th April, 1982. Instead of being reduced to a lower post of Deputy Registrar in lower time scale, it was provided that the petitioner be posted as officer on special duty in the same pay scale as that of the Registrar. Subsequent to the petitioner's reply, the Board took a different stand in the final order passed on 16th April, 1982. Instead of being reduced to a lower post of Deputy Registrar in lower time scale, it was provided that the petitioner be posted as officer on special duty in the same pay scale as that of the Registrar. The post of Officer of Special Duty is not statutory; it does not carry the duties and responsibilities attached to the office of the Registrar under S. 19 of the Act. True, it carries the same time scale but on this account, as the petitioner's learned counsel rightly urged, that would not be regarded as equivalent to the post of the Registrar. At its best this amounts to an offer by the Institute to the petitioner to retain him in the alternative post (which is higher than that of the Deputy Registrar); the fact remains that the notice did not propose removal from the office of the Registrar while the order dated 16-4-1982 does bring this about. The nature and responsibilities of the functions and duties attached to the office of the officer on Special Duty proposed to be created on the one hand and those attached to the existing statutory post of Registrar must have to be borne in mind in determining their equivalence (E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555 at p. 580 : 1974 Lab IC 427 at pp.s. 452-453). In the counter affidavit there is no mention of the nature of duties or responsibilities proposed to be assigned to the post of the Officer on Special Duty. The contention of the respondent's learned counsel, therefore, that the notice be regarded as valid because the post of officer on Special Duty is on higher pay scale than that of Deputy Registrar does not avail because the petitioner's appointment being on a Specific post the provision contained in Statute 13(9)(iv) could not be invoked vide Babaji Charan Rout v. State of Orissa, 1982-1 Serv LJ 496 : 1982 Lab IC 603 (Orissa)) and, secondly, the impugned order dated 16-4-1982 does have the effect to remove the petitioner from the statutory post to which he was appointed. 19. 19. There is no denial that as held in the case of Hukum Chand Malhotra ( AIR 1959 SC 536 ) (Supra) cited for the respondents, a notice is not vitiated due to dismissal, removal or reduction in rank being proposed in the alternative. In the instant case, however, the action proposed was neither removal nor dismissal; it was solely for reduction to a lower post under an impression that Statute 13(9)(iv) applied which really speaking does not, as revealed from the analysis made above. It is clear that being dissatisfied with the performance of the petitioner as Registrar, the Board did not desire that he should continue to discharge those functions though upon compassionate grounds it did not intend to cause him pecuniary loss. In the process, it is equally clear, the petitioner was not afforded opportunity to lead his case against the penalty of removal. All that he could contend in reply to the notice was that he being an appointee against a specific post, he could not be reduced to a lower post. 20. Lastly, the petitioner's learned counsel contended that the penalty of removal imposed on the petitioner is out of proportion to the charges established against him, and hence the action taken is mala fide. This may not be said to require decision in view of our finding recorded in regard to ground no. (iv) above. Suffice it to say, that it is only where the quantum of punishment inflicted is such that no reasonable person could have arrived at that the Court may in its decision, interfere with the same, vide K.M. Agrahari v. Lt. Governor. Delhi Administration, 1980 Lab IC 1133 (Delhi) (DB). The findings of the Enquiry Officer on charges established are not such as to warrant an inference that no authority could reasonably impose the penalty of removal. The authorities were solicitous also to ward off pecuniary loss to the petitioner as far as possible. Therefore, mala fides does not appear to be made out. 21. In view of the discussion made above since there was denial of reasonable opportunity to the petitioner inasmuch as the show cause notice did not propose removal but a lesser penalty than that inflicted, the petition succeeds and. is, accordingly, allowed. The orders dated April 14 and April 16, 1982 are quashed. 21. In view of the discussion made above since there was denial of reasonable opportunity to the petitioner inasmuch as the show cause notice did not propose removal but a lesser penalty than that inflicted, the petition succeeds and. is, accordingly, allowed. The orders dated April 14 and April 16, 1982 are quashed. The Board of Governors (respondent No. 2) is directed to treat the petitioner as continuing on the post of the Registrar and entitled as such to benefits thereof. There will be no order as to costs.