Judgment :- 1. This revision comes before us on reference by a learned Single Judge. The petitioner is the decree holder. Execution was resisted by the judgment-debtors/respondents with the plea that they were debtors entitled to the benefits of Act 17 of 1977 The Court below dismissed the execution petition with the following observation: "The burden is on the decree-holder to prove that the J.D. is not a debtor entitled to benefits under Act 17/1977 which controls the provisions of Ordinances 1 and 9 of 1977. The decree holder has not cared to adduce any evidence to prove that the J.D. is not a debtor entitled to benefits under Act 17/77. Hence I find that that the J.D. is a debtor entitled to benefits under Act 17/77.". It is this order that is under challenge in this revision. 2. S.9 of the Act reads as follows: "Burden of proof. Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, in any suit or other proceeding, the burden of proving that a debtor is not entitled to protection under the provisions of this Act shall be on the creditor." A reading of the section makes it abundantly clear that the normal rules applicable to burden of proof are not applicable so far as the provisions of this Act are concerned. S.9 imposes an obligation on the debtor to initially prove that he is a debtor under the Act. The creditor is obliged to prove that the debtor is not entitled to protection under the provisions of the Act only when the initial burden is discharged by the debtor. This, according to us, will be the interpretation to be put on the phraseology used in S.9. This is the manner in which Janaki Amma, J. read S.9 in Cheramangalam Financing Institution v. Neelakandan Nambeesan & others (1978 KLT. 587). The learned judge observed as follows: "If the above principles are to govern in the instant case, the burden of proof is on the defendant to establish that he is a debtor as defined in the Ordinance and that the liability incurred by him falls under the definition of debt. He should fail if no evidence is adduced by him. The learned judge observed as follows: "If the above principles are to govern in the instant case, the burden of proof is on the defendant to establish that he is a debtor as defined in the Ordinance and that the liability incurred by him falls under the definition of debt. He should fail if no evidence is adduced by him. It is by virtue of S.9 that the above rules of evidence are given the go by and the burden is cast on the creditor to show that a person who owes him amounts is not entitled to relief under the Ordinance. Prima facie, it looks unfair and inequitable that a person who claims that he has been conferred some privilege under a Statute can sit mum and call upon his opponent to adduce evidence to contra and on matters which are exclusively within the knowledge of the former. No doubt, if the language of the Statute is clear and unambiguous, Courts are bound to administer its provisions. But when there is scope for doubt, it is the duty of Courts to presume that the Legislature did not intend that unjust and absurd consequences should flow as a result of a Statute enacted by it." We respectfully agree with the above observations. 3. The Court below committed an error of jurisdiction in holding that the execution petition should fail because the decree-holder did not establish that the judgment-debtors were not entitled to the protection of the Act. The Court below did not properly understand the scope of S.9. The order is therefore liable to be set aside and we do so. We would like to observe that the manner of discharging the initial burden by the debtor is either by examining himself on oath or by swearing to an affidavit. The creditor could be called upon to prove the contrary only if this initial burden is discharged in the manner mentioned above. 4. We remit the case back to the execution Court to give an opportunity to both sides to re-agitate their case in accordance with the directions given above. The CRP. is allowed. No order as to costs. Allowed.