JUDGMENT 1. A suit was instituted by respondents 3 to 6 against the petitioner and respondents 7 to 9 for their ejectment from shop and for recovery of arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation. The suit was contested by the petitioner, but was decreed by the Judge, Small causes insofar as the relief for ejectment of defendants was concerned. It was, however, dismissed insofar as the relief for recovery of arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation was concerned. A revision was preferred by respondents 3 to 6 against the decree of the Judge, Small causes insofar as it had gone against them under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act (hereinafter to be referred as 'the Act'). This revision has been allowed by the III Addl. District & Sessions Judge, Deoria, respondent no 1 and the suit for recovery of arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation also has been decreed. It is these two orders passed by the Judge, Small Causes and the Addl. District Judge which are sought to be quashed in the present writ petition. 2. It was urged that respondent no. 1 had no jurisdiction to reverse the finding of fact recorded by the Judge, Small Causes on a reappraisal of evidence under section 25 of the Act. In order to deal with this submission it would be necessary to give certain relevant facts. Along with the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents 3 to 6, copy of the plaint and of the deposition of P.W. 1 have been attached as Annexures 1 & 5 respectively. Their perusal indicates that the case of respondents 3 to 6 was that the petitioner was in Government service and respondent no. 7, Smt. Raj Kumari was his wife and respondent no. 8 Vinai Kumar Singh was their minor son and that the shop in question had been taken on rent by the petitioner and his wife respondent no. 7 but since the petitioner was in Government service and was not entitled to carry on any business, a memorandum was executed by respondent no. 7 purporting to take the shop in question on rent on behalf of her minor son, respondent no. 8. The case of respondent nos. 3 to 6 further was that it was really the petitioner and his wife, respondent no. 7 purporting to take the shop in question on rent on behalf of her minor son, respondent no. 8. The case of respondent nos. 3 to 6 further was that it was really the petitioner and his wife, respondent no. 7, who were the tenants of the accommodation in question and that the rent was paid by them, but subsequently they made default in payment of rent. 3. It is apparent both from the order of the Judge, Small Causes as well as the order of the Additional District Judge that respondents 3 to 6, apart from producing documentary evidence in respect of their case, also examined Indra Deo Gaur, father of respondents 3 to 5 and husband of respondent no. 6 as P W. 1. These orders also indicate that none of the defendants entered the witness box nor did they produce any other oral evidence to controvert the statement of P.W. 1. The Judge, Small Causes even without taking into consideration the statement of P.W. 1, which really constituted one way evidence, in the absence of any oral evidence having been produced on behalf of the defendants, dismissed the suit for recovery of arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation, on the short ground that since the memorandum, which was in the nature of a rentnote, had been executed by respondent no. 7 in the name of a minor, it was invalid and, therefore, no decree for arrears of rent or damages for use and occupation could be passed either against the minor or against any of the other defendants. It is, thus, apparent that there was no finding of fact recorded by the Judge, Small Causes on the basis of evidence produced by the respondents 3 to 6, which can be said to have been reappraised by respondent no. l. 4. In support of his submission that the Additional District Judge could not reappraise the evidence and reverse the finding of fact recorded by the Judge, Small Causes in the exercise of his revisional jurisdiction under section 25 of the Act, reliance was placed by counsel for the petitioner on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Laxmi Kishore and others v. Har Prasad Shukla (1979 Allahabad Civil Journal 473). In my opinion, the decision in the case of Laxmi Kishore (supra) in no way supports the submission made by the counsel for the petitioner. Dealing with the scope of the power of a revisional court under section 25 of the Act it was held: If it finds that there is no evidence to sustain a finding on a particular issue of fact, it can ignore that finding. Same will be the case where the finding is based only on inadmissible evidence. In such cases the court will be justified in deciding the question of fact itself, because the evidence is all one way. No assessment is needed. As seen above, the statement on oath, of P. W.I, remained uncontroverted and as such it was a case where evidence was really one way. The finding recorded by the Additional District Judge, on the basis of such uncontroverted evidence cannot be challenged on the ground that it amounts to reappraisal of evidence, particularly when the Judge, Small Causes had not at all even considered the uncontroverted statement of P. W. 1. and had recorded his finding on the technical ground pointed out above. Even in regard to the technical ground, the Additional District Judge has, on the basis of statement of P. W. 1., recorded a finding, and in my opinion rightly, that it was really the petitioner and respondent no. 7 who had taken the shop in question on rent from respondents 3 to 6 but the rent note was executed in the name of the son and not in the name of the petitioner in as much as he was in Government service and was thus debarred from carrying on business. On merits, the finding recorded by the Additional District Judge does not suffer from any such error which may justly interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 5. It was then urged by the counsel for the petitioner that since the title of respondents 3 to 6 had been denied by the petitioner, the Judge, Small Causes had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and he should have returned the plaint for presentation to proper court. I find it difficult to agree with this submission either. 5. It was then urged by the counsel for the petitioner that since the title of respondents 3 to 6 had been denied by the petitioner, the Judge, Small Causes had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and he should have returned the plaint for presentation to proper court. I find it difficult to agree with this submission either. Firstly, in view of the finding recorded by the Additional District Judge, on the basis of one way evidence, that the petitioner was the tenant of the shop in question on behalf of respondents 3 to 6, he was barred from disputing the title of his landlords in view of the clear provision contained in this behalf in section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act Secondly, the suit in which the impugned orders had been passed was filed not on the basis of a contract of tenancy. It was a suit by a lessor against the lessee. It is settled law that in such a suit even the question of the title can be incidentally gone into. 6. Lastly, it was urged by counsel for the petitioner that the suit being for possession over an immovable property and the case of the petitioner being that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between him and respondents 3 to 6, it was not cognizable by the Judge, Small Cause in view of Article 4 to the second schedule of the Act. In my opinion there is no substance in this submission either, in view of the finding recorded by the Additional District Judge, as pointed out above, that relationship of landlord and tenant did exist between the petitioner and respondents 3 to 6. 7. No other point has been pressed. 8. In the result, I find no merit in this writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed with costs. (Petition dismissed)