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Allahabad High Court · body

1983 DIGILAW 204 (ALL)

Kalu v. Deputy Director, Consolidation, Pratapgarh

1983-03-08

K.N.MISRA

body1983
ORDER K.N. Misra, J. - Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the impugned order dated 3-8-1982 passed by Deputy Director of Consolidation by which he allowed the restoration application and recalled order dated 27-2-1982, passed under S. 48 (3) of U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act 1953, in a reference forwarded by the subordinate consolidation authorities. 2. It appears that the Assistant Consolidation Officer had forwarded a reference under Section 48(3) of the Act dated 20-1-1981 after hearing the parties. From a perusal of Annexure-6, which is a referring order, dated 20-1-1981, passed by Assistant Consolidation Officer, it is revealed that the parties were not agreeable to the proposed reference. This reference passed through Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and the parties were directed.to appear before the Deputy Director of Consolidation. This reference came to be heard by Deputy Director of. Consolidation, Pratapgarh and he passed order dated 27-2-1981 by which chaks of opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3, Nanku and Dularey, were also altered. Perusal of this order indicates that before Deputy Director of Consolidation, opposite parties Nos. 4 and 5. Bhagan and Pyarey, and petitioner Kalu appeared and they were heard. Admittedly no notice was issued from the court of Deputy Director of Consolidation for hearing in the reference. It is also evident that opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 were not present at the time of hearing of the said reference by Deputy Director of Consolidation and no notice for hearing in the reference was issued from the court of Deputy Director of Consolidation, nor any such notice was served upon oppostie parties Nos. 2 and 3. An application was moved by opposite party No. 2. Nanku on 15-6-1981 for setting aside the aforesaid ex parte order dated 27-2-1981. This application has been allowed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation by the impugned order dated 3-8-1982. He has accepted the contention of opposite party No. 2 Nanku to the effect that he was not aware of the said order and he came to know of it when the opposite party, i.e.. the petitioner, tried to forcibly take possession over the land in dispute. In support of this application an affidavit was also filed by Nanku. No counter-affidavit was filed by the petitioner controverting the said facts. the petitioner, tried to forcibly take possession over the land in dispute. In support of this application an affidavit was also filed by Nanku. No counter-affidavit was filed by the petitioner controverting the said facts. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has thus recalled the ex parte order dated 27-2-1981 and restored the reference for being heard and decided on merits. 3. The petitioner has challenged this order in this writ petition. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner Sri R. S. Tripathi contended that the said order dated 27-2-1981 cannot be said to be an ex parte order in view of the fact that the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) had directed the parties to appear before Deputy Director of Consolidation for hearing in the reference forwarded to that Court. Learned counsel further submitted that since there was no provision in the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act 1953 or Rules for issuing notice to the parties in a reference proceeding under Section 48(3) of the Act and, as such, no notice was required to be issued by Deputy Director of Consolidation while hearing the reference. He thus urged that since the said order could not be treated to be an ex parte order, and, as such, Deputy Director of Consolidation acted illegally and without jurisdiction in treating the application for restoration and thereby erred in passing the impugned order and in restoring the reference. I am unable to agree with these contentions. 5. It is well-settled that no decision can be rendered by a court without affording opportunity of hearing by it to the concerned parties. Even if the parties were directed to appear before the Deputy Director of Consolidation by the referring Court, the Deputy Director of Consolidation was not absolved of the responsibility of issuing notice to the concerned parties while fixing a date for hearing in the reference. It is not disputed that the reference was not heard on the date on which the parties were directed to appear before Deputy Director of Consolidation. In these circumstances, it was incumbent on the Deputy Director of Consolidation to have directed the notices to be issued to the parties while fixing a date for hearing in the reference. 6. It is not disputed that the reference was not heard on the date on which the parties were directed to appear before Deputy Director of Consolidation. In these circumstances, it was incumbent on the Deputy Director of Consolidation to have directed the notices to be issued to the parties while fixing a date for hearing in the reference. 6. Sub-section (3) of Section 48 of the Act provides that : "Any authority subordinate to the Director of Consolidation, may, after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, refer the record of any case of proceedings to the Director of Consolidation for action under sub- section (1)." Deputy Director of Consolidation, therefore, exercises his jurisdiction, in passing orders in such a reference, under Section 48(1) of the Act, which requires that orders are to be passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard. These provisions are referred to exhibit that the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, to the effect that there is no provision for issuing a notice by Deputy Director of Consolidation while hearing the reference, cannot be accepted. Apart from these, the principles of natural justice require that no order should be passed by a court or authority without giving an opportunity of hearing to the concerned parties. Admittedly, in this case the Deputy Director of Consolidation has not issued any notice to the opposite parties. The order dated 27-2-1981 is, therefore, nothing else but an ex parte order against opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 who had no opportunity of hearing as no notice was issued by Deputy Director of Consolidation. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner next contended that the ex parte order cannot be set aside merely by way of clemency. The party concerned hasto show t hat he had no notice or knowledge of the proceedings. 2 and 3 who had no opportunity of hearing as no notice was issued by Deputy Director of Consolidation. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner next contended that the ex parte order cannot be set aside merely by way of clemency. The party concerned hasto show t hat he had no notice or knowledge of the proceedings. In support of his contention he placed reliance upon a Full Bench decision of this Court in Radha Mohan Datt v. Abbas Ali Biswas (AIR 1931 All 294) wherein it was held that : "The Court has no jurisdiction under O. 9, R. 13, to set aside an ex parte decree against a defendant unless the conditions, viz., (1) that the summons was not duly served, and (2) that he was prevented from appearing on sufficient cause." Referring to this decision learned counsel for the petitioner urged that in the present case, opposite parties have not shown that they were prevented from appearing before the Deputy Director of Consolidation for sufficient reasons. Opposite party No. 2 in his application has indicated that he was not aware about the proceedings in the case before Deputy Director of Consolidation and he came to know about it only when the petitioner had tried to take forcible possession on 10-6-1981 of the land in dispute. No counter-affidavit was filed controverting the said fact. As already observed above no notice was issued by the Deputy Director of Consolidation and, therefore, it cannot be doubted that the opposite party No. 2 was not aware of the date of hearing fixed by opposite party No. 1. It thus cannot be said that the Deputy Director of Consolidation acted illegally and with material irregularity in exercise of his jurisdiction in allowing the application for restoration and in restoring the reference for hearing on merits. 8. Learned Counsel for the petitioner next contended that the opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 had earlier filed an application dated 25-3-1981 for setting aside the said order dated 27-2-1981 and, as such, it cannot be accepted that they were not aware of the said order prior to 10-6-1981 as was asserted by opposite party No. 2 in his application dated 15-6-1981. 2 and 3 had earlier filed an application dated 25-3-1981 for setting aside the said order dated 27-2-1981 and, as such, it cannot be accepted that they were not aware of the said order prior to 10-6-1981 as was asserted by opposite party No. 2 in his application dated 15-6-1981. No such assertion was made before the Deputy Director of Consolidation and, as such, it cannot be said that the Deputy Director of Consolidation omitted to consider the said submission which appears to have been made for the first time before this Court. 9. In this view of the matter, I do not find that any error has been committed by Deputy Director of Consolidation in passing the impugned order which appears to be just and proper, more so, in view of the fact that the parties will now have an opportunity of placing their case before the consolidation authorities on merits. In the proceedings under the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act 1953, no party, against whom an ex parte order has been passed, can be shut out from urging with regard to his claim before the consolidation authorities if he satisfies that no opportunity of being heard was afforded to him and he is not guilty of any laches on his part. In the present case no laches on the part of opposite party No. 2 can be attributed to him in not attending court as no notice appears to have been issued by opposite party No. 1 for hearing in the reference. In these circumstances, the Deputy Director of Consolidation has thus rightly acted in recalling the order dated 27- 2-1981 and giving opportunity to the parties for placing their case before him for being decided on merits. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that the conclusions reached by the Deputy Director of Consolidation could not be reasonably arrived at by him. In my opinion, the Deputy Director of Consolidation has rightly reached to the conclusion that the order dated 27-2-1981, passed by him, was an ex parte order because no notice was served upon opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3. I am, therefore, unable to agree with this contention as well. 11. In the result, I do not find any merit in this writ petition which is accordingly dismissed in limine.