JUDGMENT O.P. Saxena, J. - This is a second appeal against the judgment and decree dated 18-4-75 passed by the learned III Additional District Judge, Gorakhpur dismissing Civil Appeal No. 218 of 1973 and allowing Civil Appeal No. 210 of 1973 and dismissing the suit with costs on parties. 2. The following pedigree is relevant. 3. It is not disputed that Ram Das and Ram Raj were co-tenure-holders of the disputed plots with half share each. Ram Das died on 4-1-50. He was succeeded by his widow Smt. Barsati. She died in 1955. After the death of Smt. Barsati Ram Raj gave an application for mutation in which the present plaintiff, who was a minor, was impleaded through Mata Badal, guardian. A compromise was filed 2-12-55 as a result of which the mutation was ordered in favour of Ram Raj. 4. On 15-12-67 plaintiff filed the suit for cancellation of the compromise dated 2-12-55 and for possession over her half share of the plot. Her case was that she became major about a year prior to the filing of the suit and the compromise was filed collusively by Mata Badal. 5. The defendants contested the suit with the allegations that the plaintiff had no right to succeed to the cultivation on the death of Smt. Barsati, that she had no right or interest in the disputed land, that she was never in possession, that the court has no jurisdiction to try the suit, that the suit is barred by S. 49, U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, that the suit is barred by S. 11 C.P.C.. and that the suit is barred by time. 6. The learned I Additional Munsif, Gorakhpur, held that the compromise dated 2-12-55 was illegal and ineffective and is not binding on the plaintiff, that the plaintiff was not represented in the mutation proceedings and no guardian was appointed and that the suit is not barred by S. 49, U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. He repelled the other legal pleas raised by the defendants. He decreed the suit for cancellation of the compromise dated 2-12-55 but dismissed the suit for possession. 7. Civil Appeal No. 210 of 1973 was filed by the defendants and Civil Appeal No. 218 of 1973 was filed by the plaintiff against the judgment and decree passed by the learned Munsif. 8. He decreed the suit for cancellation of the compromise dated 2-12-55 but dismissed the suit for possession. 7. Civil Appeal No. 210 of 1973 was filed by the defendants and Civil Appeal No. 218 of 1973 was filed by the plaintiff against the judgment and decree passed by the learned Munsif. 8. The learned III additional District Judge dismissed the appeal filed by the plaintiff and allowed the appeal filed by the defendants. He consequently dismissed the suit with costs on parties. The main finding recorded by him was that the suit is barred by S. 49, Consolidation of Holdings Act. hence this second appeal. 9. The main point for determination in this second appeal is as to whether the suit is barred by S. 49, U.P. consolidation of Holdings Act. 10. In para 14 of the plaint filed on 15-12-67, it was said that the plaintiff became major about a year prior to the filing of the suit. In para 14 of the written statement this plea was not admitted but no specific denial was made in the additional pleas raised in the written statement. In view of the provisions contained in O. 8 R. 5 C. P. C., the defendants shall be deemed to have admitted the allegation made in para 14 of the plaint. 11. The plaintiff gave her age about 20 years on 15-12-67. It will take her date of birth to sometime in December, 1947. She was about 8 years old at the time the compromise was made. It is not disputed that she was a minor when the notification under S. 52, U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, was published. 11. The plaintiff gave her age about 20 years on 15-12-67. It will take her date of birth to sometime in December, 1947. She was about 8 years old at the time the compromise was made. It is not disputed that she was a minor when the notification under S. 52, U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, was published. Section 49, U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, provides as below : "Bar to Civil Court jurisdiction - Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the declaration and adjudication of rights of tenure-holders in respect of land lying in an area, for which a notification has been issued under sub-s. (2), S. 4, or adjudication of any other right arising out of consolidation proceedings and in regard to which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act, shall be done in accordance with the provisions of this Act and no Civil or Revenue Court shall entertain any suit or proceeding with respect to rights in such land or with respect to any other matters for which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act." The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that as the plaintiff was a minor at the time of the consolidation proceedings, she was under disability and she could not have taken proceedings under the Act. He contended that unless it could be said that a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act, the bar of S. 49 would not come into play. He placed reliance on an unreported judgment of this Court in Civil Misc. Writ No. 1846 of 1974, in which it was held that as the petitioner was a minor, he could file an objection after the ceasure of the disability and the bar of S. 49 of the Act would not operate. He also placed reliance on a case reported in Raj Bahadur Singh v. Board of Revenue, 1979 Rev. Dec. 50. It was held that S. 49 merely embodies the principle of res judicata including constructive res judicata. It is well settled that the principle of constructive res judicata applies only where the decision in the earlier proceeding is necessarily inconsistent with the defence subsequently raised. Dec. 50. It was held that S. 49 merely embodies the principle of res judicata including constructive res judicata. It is well settled that the principle of constructive res judicata applies only where the decision in the earlier proceeding is necessarily inconsistent with the defence subsequently raised. The entry of the name of the petitioner alone was not considered inconsistent with the continuance of defendant as co-sharer and it was held that the consolidation proceedings could not operate as res judicata. 12. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the bar of S. 49 is absolute. He laid emphasis on the opening words "notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force." In view of this wide exclusion he contended that a minor could not claim any protection. He placed reliance on the cases of Smt. Kailaso v. Board of Revenue, reported in 1972 Rev Dec 94 and Ram Lal v. Assistant Collector, Sadabad, District Mathura, reported in 1966 Rev Dec 122. 13. I have carefully considered the submissions made before me. I cannot ignore the opening words of S. 49 referred to by the learned counsel for the respondents. There are, however, two requirements of the section : (1) There should have been declaration and adjudication of rights of tenure-holders in respect of land or adjudication of any other rights arising out of consolidation proceedings; and (2) in regard to which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under the Act. 14. I am unable to accept that the "provision and in regard to which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under the Act" has to be read with only "adjudication of any other rights arising out of consolidation proceedings" and does not apply to "declaration and adjudication of rights in respect of land lying in area for which a Notification has been issued." The two clauses are separated by or and the provision referred to above applies to both the clauses. This finds confirmation from the last portion of the section which provides as below : "and no civil or revenue court shall entertain any suit or proceeding with respect to rights in such land or with respect to any other matters for which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act." Section 6(1) of the Limitation Act provides as below : "Legal disability. (1) where a person entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the execution of a decree is at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned, a minor or insane, or an idiot, he may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after the disability has ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time specified there for in the third column of the Schedule. 15. It would thus appear a minor is entitled to institute a suit or make an application within the same period after the disability has ceased as would otherwise have been allowed from the time specified thereof or in the third column of the Schedule. 16. Section 52(1), U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, provides as below : "Close of consolidation operations. (1) As soon as may be after fresh maps and records have been prepared under sub-s. (1). S. 27, the State Government shall issue a notification in the official gazette that the consolidation operations have been closed in the unit and village or villages forming part of the unit shall then cease to be under consolidation operations: ........" 17. The notification under S. 52 was issued during the minority of plaintiff. The consolidation proceedings had closed before she became major. She could not move the consolidation courts for the declaration of her rights as a tenure-holder after the ceasure of her disability. In view of the disability it cannot be said that she could or ought to have taken a proceeding under the Act during the consolidation proceedings. The bar of S. 49 of the Act cannot apply unless the second condition is fulfilled. I, therefore, hold that the bar of S. 49, U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, did not come into play. I decide the point against the respondents. 18. I find that the learned first appellate court has not applied its mind to the other issues raised in this case and has disposed of the two appeals on the question of law only. I, therefore, deem it proper to set aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned first appellate court and remand the case to hint for disposal of the two Civil Appeals. 19. The second appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the learned III Additional District Judge are set aside. I, therefore, deem it proper to set aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned first appellate court and remand the case to hint for disposal of the two Civil Appeals. 19. The second appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the learned III Additional District Judge are set aside. The case is remanded with the direction that Civil Appeals Nos. 210 of 1973 and 218 of 1973 shall be re-admitted to their original numbers and shall be disposed of in accordance with law. The costs of the second appeal shall be easy.