JUDGMENT : P.C. Misra, J. - This revision is directed against an order dated 3-10-1983 passed by the Munsif. First Court. Cuttack, in T.S. No. 129 of 1983 rejecting an application filed by the Defendant u/s 4(4) of the Orissa Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation of Land Act, 1972. The facts relevant for the purpose of this revision are as follows: 2. The Opposite party in this revision Kamal Kumar Agarwalla filed T.S. No. 129 of 1983 in the court of the First' Munsif. Cuttack against the present Petitioner praying for permanent injunction restraining him from going over the suit land or to make any construction thereon. It was also prayed that if, any construction has been made over the suit land the same be demolished by the Defendant Petitioner in this revisional within the period to be fixed by the court failing which the Plaintiff be permitted to demolish the construction and recover the costs: of demolition from the Defendant. 3. The Plaintiffs case in short is that one Kali Krushna Sarkar and Sasanka Sekhar Sarkar were the co-sharer proprietors of Touzi No. 4043 of village Torala to which the disputed land appertains. The said Kali Krushna Sarkar had 12 annas interest in the said Touzi and the remaining 4 annas belong to one Sasanka Sekhar Sarkar. According to the Plaintiff the Touzi stood recorded in the name of Sudhansu Sekhar, the adopted son of Kali Krushna Sarkar in the record of-rights of the year, 1930, Smt. Chandan Bilasini Devi, mother of Sudhansu Sekhar was appointed as an administrattix of the estate and with the Permission of the District Judge, Cuttack-Sambalpur, she leased out the suit land to Nihal Ch. Agarwalla, the ancestor of the Plaintiff and some other co-sharers by a registered lease deed dated 12-3-1943. The sale deed was executed by Chandan Bilasini and Sasanka Sekhar. It is alleged that the lease land was acquired out of the joint family funds of the family of the Plaintiff and that of his co-sharers and all of them remained in possession of the same including the suit land. The Plaintiff and other successors of the aforesaid original lessees have been continuing in possession of the suit land by growing seasonal vegetables and other crops and they have been arranging to erect a jute factory on a portion of the lease hold property. The Plaintiff and other successors of the aforesaid original lessees have been continuing in possession of the suit land by growing seasonal vegetables and other crops and they have been arranging to erect a jute factory on a portion of the lease hold property. After the vesting of the Touzi the father of the Plaintiff and his co-sharers were recorded as raiyats in the record-of-rights finally published in the year 1973 According to the Plaintiff he and his co-sharers have been paying rent to the State after vesting and have been duly recognised as tenants, in respect of the suit land. The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant has no manner of right, tide and interest over the suit land and he is trying to lay a false claim over the same. In pursuance of the mala fide motive of grabing the suit properties the Defendant filed revision before the Board of Revenue u/s 15 of the Orissa Survey and Settlement Act, claiming title over the suit-land on the basis of sale deed under which he purchased the same from one Anant Kumar Routray. The said revision was rejected by the Board of Revenue on 12-12-1977 and a review petition filed thereafter was also rejected. It has been further alleged that the Defendant filed mutation case before the Tahasildar Sadar, for mutating his name in respect of the suit-land and-obtained an ex parte order on 9-6-1980 without any notice to the Plaintiff and his co-sharers who after coming to know of the same filed an appeal before the Subdivisional, Officer, Sadar, Cuttack. The Subdivisional Officer, Sadar by his order dated 20-1982 set aside the order of the Tahasildar and remanded the case to the Tahasildar. During the pendency of the aforesaid appeal before the Sub-divisional Officer, the Defendant had managed to get his name recorded in the consolidation proceeding by virtue of the ex parte order passed by the Tahasildar on 9-6-1980 which was again without notice to the Plaintiff and his co-sharers. The Plaintiff when, came to know about the recording the name of the Defendant by consolidation authorities filed an objection before the Consolidation Officer, Palasa and the case is pending for hearing. The Plaintiff when, came to know about the recording the name of the Defendant by consolidation authorities filed an objection before the Consolidation Officer, Palasa and the case is pending for hearing. It is further alleged by the Plaintiff that in order to create evidence of possession the Defendant is making brisk preparation for construction of a pucca building and boundary was over the suit land for which foundation has been dug and stores have been stacked for raising the wall. According to the Plaintiff, he and his co-sharers have been in continuous possession of the disputed land since 1945 and the Defendant has never been in possession thereof at any point of time. The present suit has been filed for permanent injunction and for demolition of any construction if made by the Defendant on the suit-land. 4. The Defendant filed his written statement in which he had denied all the plaint allegations. According to the Defendant, Chandan Bilasini widow of Kali Krushna Sarkar was not appointed as the administratrix in respect of the property which was covered by the will executed by late Kali Krushna Sarkar. There were five executors appointed in the will arid the probate granted appended a list of properties to be administered by the executors. The Defendant further alleged that the disputed land was not the subject matter of the probate and therefore, Chandan Bilasini had no right to deal with or transfer the disputed land whether with or without permission of the District Judge. It was further stated in the written statement that in the will itself late Kali Krushna Sarkar imposed a restriction on Chandan Bilasini from transferring any property out of the estate left behind by him and, therefore, the lease, deed executed by Chandan Bilasini in favour of the predecessor-in-interest of the Plaintiff and his co-sharers is void a b initio. It was further pleaded that Sudhansu Sekhar Sarkar, the recorded proprietor of the Touzi had granted a permanent lease in favour of one Mahendra Swain in respect of Ac.4.60 decimals of land including the suit-land who in his turn sold the same to one Ananta Kumar Routaray by a registered sale deed dated 23-1-1962. It was further pleaded that Sudhansu Sekhar Sarkar, the recorded proprietor of the Touzi had granted a permanent lease in favour of one Mahendra Swain in respect of Ac.4.60 decimals of land including the suit-land who in his turn sold the same to one Ananta Kumar Routaray by a registered sale deed dated 23-1-1962. According to the Defendant the said Ananta Kumar Routaray has sold Ac 3.50 decimals of land including the suit-land to the Defendant under a registered sate deed dated 4-2-1967 and the Defendant has been in peaceful possession of the aforesaid land with effect from the date of his purchase and has been paying rent till date. It is alleged by the Defendant that he has got his land demarcated by stone pillars and the Tahasildar got the same measured by an A min whose report and map have been accepted after due publication of public notice. The Defendant has decided to start a factory on the suit-land for which he has secured loan from the Government and is proceeding with the construction of the factory building, which is scheduled to be completed by December, 1983 according to the target fixed by the Government. He has got his name recorded in the consolidation proceeding and this suit has been filed by the Plaintiff who has no semblance of tight, title, interest or possession over the suit-land. 5. There is no dispute that the area within which the suit-land situate has been brought under consolidation operation by issue of a notification to that effect by the State Government. The Defendant filed an application u/s 4(4) of the Orissa Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation of Land Act, 1972 for an order that the suit now pending in the court of the Munsif, First Court Cuttack, shall stand abated. The learned Munsif after hearing the parties on the said application has by the impugned order rejected the prayer by holding that the suit being one for permanent injunction shall not abate. The learned Munsif after hearing the parties on the said application has by the impugned order rejected the prayer by holding that the suit being one for permanent injunction shall not abate. The Petitioner challenges the aforesaid order of the learned Munsif on the ground that a suit for permanent injunction involves a decision on the question of title and is hit by the provisions of the Orissa consolidation of Holdings and prevention of Fragmentation of land Act, 1972 and that though the suit is on the face of it one for permanent injunction it is essentially a suit for tide and therefore, it must abate under the provisions of Section 4(4) of the Act. The aforesaid contention of the Petitioner requires careful consideration. 6. u/s 3 of the Act, the Government may issue a notification to the effect that any area specified in the notification may be brought under consolidation operations Section 4 of the Act enumerates the consequences and the effect of the said notification. Abatement of suit is one of the effects of the notification u/s 3(1) of the Act as provided in Sub-section (4) thereof. Abatement of suit is one of the effects of the notification u/s 3(1) of the Act as provided in Sub-section (4) thereof. Sub-section (4) of Section 4 are in the following language: 4 xx xx xx (4) every suit and proceedings for declaration of any light or interest in any land situate within the consolidation area in regard to which proceeding could be or ought to be started under this Act, which is pending before any Civil Court, whether of the first instance or appeal, reference or revision shall on an order being passed in that behalf by the Court before within such suit or proceeding is pending, stand abated: Provided that no such order shall be passed without giving the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard: Provided further that on the issue of a notification under Sub-section (1) of Section 5 in respect of the said area or part thereof, (a) every order passed by the Court under Clause (4) in relation to the lands situate in such area or part thereof, as the case may be shall stand vacated; and (b) all such suits and proceedings as are referred to in Clause (3) or Clause (4) which relate to lands situate in such area or part thereof, as the case may be shall be proceeded with and disposed of in accordance with the law as if they had never abated: Provided also that such abatement shall be wit bout prejudice to the right of the person affected to agitate the right or interest which formed the subject matter of the said suit or proceedings, before the proper consolidation authority in accordance with the provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder. The only other section which requires consideration in this connection is Section 51 of the Act which is quoted below for ready reference: 51. The only other section which requires consideration in this connection is Section 51 of the Act which is quoted below for ready reference: 51. Bar of jurisdiction of Civil Courts: Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, but subject to the provisions contained in Clause (3) of Section 4 and Sub-section (1) of Section 7 (1) all questions relating to right title interest and liability in land laying in the Consolidation area except those coming within the jurisdiction of Revenue Courts or authorities under any local law for the time being in force, shall be decided under the provisions of this Act by the appropriate authority during the consolidation operations: and (2) no Civil Court shall entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which an officer or authority empowered under this Act is competent to decide. A plain reading of both the aforesaid sections would lead to the conclusion that if a matter can be gone into by the consolidation authorities, then the suit in respect of the same would abate u/s 4(4) of the Act. The legislative intention is in conformity with the well recognised principle that two forums for the same reliefs should not deal with the matter in which case in consistent consequences and situations are likely to arise. There has been a large number of decisions of this Court holding the same view and therefore. It is not necessary to be discussed about reasonableness and validity of the said provisions. In some of the decisions of this Court namely; decisions reported in Puni Bewa and Anr. v. Ananta Sahoo and Ors. 47(1979) C.L.T. 494, Bhagaban Prasad Das Vs. Narayan Prasad Das Rahas Bewa Vs. Kanduri Charan Sutar and Others it has been held that a suit for injunction simpliciter would not abate u/s 4(4) of the Act inasmuch as the consolidation authorities have no jurisdiction to grant the relief for injunction. The decision taking a contrary view has been held not to have been correctly decided. It has been contended on behalf of the Petitioner in this revision that an express grant of power to any authority by a statute carries with it by necessary implication the jurisdiction to use all reasonable measures to make such grant effective. The decision taking a contrary view has been held not to have been correctly decided. It has been contended on behalf of the Petitioner in this revision that an express grant of power to any authority by a statute carries with it by necessary implication the jurisdiction to use all reasonable measures to make such grant effective. In other words it was contended that when the Consolidation Act conferred jurisdiction on the authorities created under the said statute it shall be deemed that the statute impliedly grants the power of doing all such acts and employing all such means as are essentially necessary for the exercise of the jurisdiction expressly conferred by the Act. It has been argued that this power of the consolidation authorities is implied and is incidental for exercise of the powers expressly granted. It is, therefore, argued that the consolidation authorities would have jurisdiction to grant an injunction where it is necessary in the interest of justice and, therefore, the suit for injunction stated above. Two decisions namely the decision reported in State of Orissa represented by State of Orissa Vs. Member, Sales Tax Tribunal and Another, and Income Tax Officer, Cannanore, v. M.K. Mohammed Kunhi AIR 1969 S.C. 430 , (which has been referred to and relied in the former) have been relied upon on behalf of the Petitioner. Decision reported in State of Orissa Vs. Member, Sales Tax Tribunal and Another, deals with the question as to whether the Sales Tax Tribunal had the implied authority to grant stay after legislature conferred express power on the Commissioner to grant stay during the pendency of second appeal. Their Lordships having relied upon the decision reported in Income Tax Officer's case AIR 1969 S.C. 430 , came to a conclusion that where an Act confers jurisdiction it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts or employing such means as are essentially necessary to its execution. This implied power is incidental and ancillary to the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction. It has also been held that if the statute confers express power on any authority to deal with a particular contingency, then by necessary implication that particular power is to be taken as excluded from the ambit of implied power. In the same decision their Lordships have expressed a clear opinion that only courts having general jurisdiction like civil courts have inherent power. In the same decision their Lordships have expressed a clear opinion that only courts having general jurisdiction like civil courts have inherent power. Courts or Tribunals of limited jurisdiction created under special statutes have no inherent power. Reliance has also been placed on a decision reported in Bhramrabar Santra and Ors. v. The State of Orissa and Ors. 36 (1970) C.L.T. 897, where this Court observed that the Assistant Commissioner of Endowments in a proceeding u/s 41 of the Hindu Religious Endowments Act has got jurisdiction to pass interim order for the preservation of the religious institutions though the Act did not confer such power in the Assistant Commissioner expressly. The aforesaid cases are distinguishable inasmuch as the Consolidation Act takes away the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in respect of all matters in respect of which an officer or authority empowered under that Act, is competent to decide. Besides the abatement of the suit u/s 4(4) of the Act is not automatic but depends on an order being passed to that effect by the Court. It is well established in law that an exclusion of jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not readily to be inferred unless such exclusion is either expressly spelt out in the special statute or clearly implied. There is no express provision in the Consolidation Act giving jurisdiction to the consolidation authorities to grant relief of injunction and, therefore, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court cannot be taken to have been ousted. If the special statute does not provide adequate remedy, which the Civil Court could grant, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court cannot be taken to have been ousted by necessary implication The Bench decision of this Court reported in Rahas Bewa Vs. Kanduri Charan Sutar and Others directly dealing with this point had expressed their view in the following term: It becomes difficult for us, therefore, to accept the submission that a suit for permanent injunction pending at common la w would stand abated as a result of the notification under the Orissa Act 21 of 1972 even though the relief of injunction is not available under the Act. As a matter of fact their Lordships indicated that the legislatute should step in and confer the jurisdiction on the consolidation authorities to grant injunction both temporary and permanent in regard to the lands which are subject matter of consolidation proceeding, so that the inconvenience which arises at present may not continue and the legislative intention would be effectively worked out. Their Lordships further observed that until that has been done, it becomes difficult to hold that the remedy at common law of permanent injunction is no more available in the Civil Court by mere construction of the scheme under Orissa Act 21 of 1972, because there is a notification u/s 3 of the Act. I agree with the aforesaid observations of the learned Judges. It was next contended that the impugned order to decide as to whether a suit would abate u/s 4(4) of the Consolidation Act the totality of the pleadings of the parties should be looked into and not merely the prayer made by the Plaintiff. It was argued that it is not permissible under law to obtain the prohibited reliefs from the Civil Court in the garb of a Suit for permanent injunction. This argument has substantial force. In suits relating to land a suit for permanent injunction restraining interference with possession cannot be maintained if the Plaintiff had no legal possession of the property. Thus where the grant of injunction depends upon the determination of the title suit for mere injunction may not be maintainable. It is not possible to lay down any formula or an exhaustive list of the nature of cases where a suit for injunction simpliciter is maintainable. Each case is to be decided in the facts of its own keeping in view the judicial precedence and guidelines given in cases dealing with the subject. It is equally true that merely because the question of title or possession may be required to be gone into incidentally would not make the suit for injunction simpliciter incompetent. Therefore, in order to determine whether the suit for injunction simpliciter is maintainable or not the substance of the pleadings has to be looked into and not merely the form of pleadings of the Plaintiff alone or the prayer made by him. Their Lordships in a decision reported in Jagardeo Shukla and Ors. v. Chandradeo Singh and Ors. 1981 All. Therefore, in order to determine whether the suit for injunction simpliciter is maintainable or not the substance of the pleadings has to be looked into and not merely the form of pleadings of the Plaintiff alone or the prayer made by him. Their Lordships in a decision reported in Jagardeo Shukla and Ors. v. Chandradeo Singh and Ors. 1981 All. L.J. 936, in dealing with such a question have held that notwithstanding the form in which the relief is couched in the plaint the suit would abate as the grant for relief for injunction claimed by the Plaintiff was dependant squarely upon the conclusion that the Plaintiff was Bhumidar of the plot. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decision reported in Gorakh Nath Dube Vs. Hari Narain Singh and Others while approved the view of the Allahabad High Court in Jagardeo Shukla's case 1969 All. L.J. 768, that it is the substance of the claim and not its form, which is decisive. Now coming to the pleadings of the parties in the plaint and the written statement it is apparent that the legal title and possession claimed by the Plaintiff would depend upon as to whether Chandan Bilasini had the authority to create a lease and as to whether the Plaintiff by virtue of the alleged possession of the original leses and his successor-in-interest are entitled to be in possession of the suit-land, This is not a case where the question of title and possession would be gone into by the Court incidentally. From the pleadings of the parties one of the questions which is essential to be determined in the suit is as to whether Chandan Bilasini had any authority to grant the lease as claimed by the Plaintiff, According to the Defendants the deed of lease of the year 1945 relied upon by the Plaintiff is void ab initio and the predecessors of the Plaintiff and their co-sharers could not have acquired any title under the said deed of lease. It is not a case where a document is required to be set aside being voidable in nature. It is not a case where a document is required to be set aside being voidable in nature. The Supreme Court in a decision reported in Gorakh Nath Dube's case (supra) have laid down that the consolidation authorities have no power to cancel or set aside document and it is the Civil Court which is to adjudicate upon as to whether a document is required to be set aside. An alienations a person without any authority is void and not voidable and therefore, the consolidation authorities would be deemed to be invested with jurisdiction by necessary implication of their statutory powers to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties either ignoring the document if it is void or relying upon the document if it is found to be valid. 7. In the conclusion, I would hold that the suit would abate u/s 4(4) of the Consolidation Act. The impugned order of the learned Munsif is, therefore, set aside and this revision is allowed, but there would be no order as to costs. Final Result : Allowed