Judgement B. D. AGARWAL, J: - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. On July 31, 1948 the petitioner was granted a prospecting licence under the U.P. Mining Concessions and Mineral Development Rules, 1948. Dispute arose between the parties with respect to the grant of a mining lease. This culminated in a compromise entered into on July 15, 1962. Lease deed was executed by the Stale Government in petitioners favour on 26th August, 1968 for a period of twenty years reckoned from 15th July, 1962. The area covered under the lease lies in district Dehradun and the petitioner was granted therein the right to operate and win limestone, gypsum and dolomite in the leased area. The petitioner had continued to operate in the area during the intervening period of 15th July, 1962 to 25th August, 1968 for which royalties and other charges were also paid. On June 30, 1981 the petitioner applied under Rule 28 (1) of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 for the renewal of lease for another term of 20 years commencing on July 15, 1982. The application not being disposed of by the State Government the petitioner moved this Court in January, 1983 contending that in terms of Rule 31 (2) of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 the 20 years period of the lease is to be deemed as having commenced on 26th August, 1968 when the instrument was executed and not 15th July, 1962 as stipulated therein. The petitioner has sought mandamus directing the respondents to treat the lease as subsisting up to August 25, 1988 and, in the alternative that the lease be renewed in accordance with law. 2. Two questions were raised by the the petitioners learned Counsel in this case - one whether the lease executed on 26th August, 1968 is to be considered as valid up to 25th August, 1988 and, secondly, in the alternative, whether the petitioner is entitled to renewal of the lease as per application made on June 30, 1981. Affidavits have been exchanged and with the consent of the parties learned Counsel we dispose of the petition finally at the preliminary hearing. 3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner referred to Rule 31 (2) of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 in support of his contention that the lease executed on 26th August, 1968 is valid for 20 years commencing from that date. 3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner referred to Rule 31 (2) of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 in support of his contention that the lease executed on 26th August, 1968 is valid for 20 years commencing from that date. Rule 31(2) says - "The date of commencement of the period for which a mining lease is granted shall be the date on which the deed is executed under sub-rule (1)". 3A. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 31 provides that where on an application for the grant of a mining lease, an order has been made for the grant of such lease, a lease deed in Form K or in a form as near thereto as circumstances of each case may require, shall be executed within six months of the order or within such further period as the State Government may allow in this behalf. The petitioners learned counsel argued that Rule 31 (2) is mandatory; in terms thereof the mining lease must be construed as having commenced on the date of its execution and the provision contained therein namely that the period be reckoned as commencing from 15th July, 1962 be discarded since this is in departure from Rule 31 (2) and arbitrary. We have given careful thought to the contention but are unable to agree. 4. The law is settled that the use of the word "shall" is not conclusive. The governing factor is "the meaning and intent of the legislature, which should be gathered not merely from the words used by the legislature but from a variety of other circumstances and considerations." The construction of this expression depends upon the provisions of a particular Act, the setting in which the expression appears, the consequences that would flow from the infringement of the direction and such other considerations: (See Govind Lal Chaggan Lal Patel v. Agriculture Produce Market Committee ( AIR 1976 SC 263 ); Khub Chand v. State of Rajasthan ( AIR 1967 SC 1074 at p. 10771). The same principle was expressed in Haridwar Singh v. Begum Sumbrui (1973) 3 SCC 889 at p. 895: ( AIR 1972 SC 1242 at p. 1247) stating that "In each case one must look to the subject matter and consider the importance of the provision disregarded and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured." 5. In Re. In Re. Presidential Election (19742 SCC 33 at p. 49) : ( AIR 1974 SC 1682 at p. 1686) the principle stated is - "In determining the question whether a provision is mandatory or directory the subject matter, the importance of the provision the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured by the Act will decide whether the provision is directory or mandatory. It is the duty of the Court to get at the real intention of the Legislature by carefully attending the whole scope of the provision to be construed. "The key to the opening of every law is the reason and spirit of the law, it is the animus imponentis, the intention of the law maker expressed in the law itself, taken as a whole. " " 6. This was reiterated in Sharif-ud-Din v. Abdul Gani, ( AIR 1980 SC 303 ) : (at p. 305-6) observing: - "In order to find out the true character of the legislation, the Court has to ascertain the object which the provision of law in question is to subserve and its design and the context in which it is enacted. If the object of the law is to be defeated by non compliance with it, it has to be regarded as mandatory." 7. In the particular context, therefore, the Court has to consider the importance of the provision that had been disregarded, and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured by the statute (Maxwell-Interpretation of Statutes (12th Ed.) page 315). 8. The Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 (in brief, the Act) has for its object the regulation of mines and development of minerals under the control of the Union. The legislative intent is that the mineral wealth of the country is conserved and is worked properly without waste and by persons qualified in that kind of work, vide Mineral Development Ltd. v. Union of India, ( AIR 1960 SC 1373 ). Prospecting or mining operations in any area cannot be undertaken save with the licence or lease granted under the Act and Rules framed thereunder (S.4). S.6 specifies the maximum area for which such licence or lease can be granted. S.7 lays down the maximum period for which prospecting licence may be granted or renewed. Prospecting or mining operations in any area cannot be undertaken save with the licence or lease granted under the Act and Rules framed thereunder (S.4). S.6 specifies the maximum area for which such licence or lease can be granted. S.7 lays down the maximum period for which prospecting licence may be granted or renewed. S.8 (1) (b) provides that in case of a mining lease for mineral other than coal, iron ore or bauxite the lease shall not exceed twenty years. Clause (b) of sub-sec.(2) likewise specifies that the period of renewal shall not exceed twenty years. These are provisions laying down the upper limit; there is no bar absolutely to the grant of the lease being for a period of less than twenty years; the intention is to safeguard against the creation of any lease in perpetuity or of unreasonably long duration. It remains permissible to the parties to stipulate for the grant of lease for a period less than twenty years. 9. The Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 framed under S.13 of the Act prescribe, inter alia, the term on which and the conditions subject to which, a prospecting licence or mining lease may be granted or renewed. As is made clear by Rule 31 (1), a mining lease is executed in Form K or "in a form as near thereto as circumstances of each case may require". This also speaks of the latitude or variance permissible in the contents of the lease depending on the facts or circumstances of each case. A perusal of Form K shows that space is left blank to fill in the date of commencement of the lease and the number of years for which lease is made in any particular case. 10. Where, as in the instant case, the term of the lease is computed from a date anterior to the date of the execution thereof that does not in any manner defeat the object of the Act. The position might vary where the commencement of the term is postponed indefinitely or to some future date. R.31 (2) is designed, in our opinion, to provide against such an even quality. Moreover, the Rules do not provide, expressly or impliedly, that a lease in which the term commences from a date preceding the execution thereof is rendered void or unenforceable on that account. R.31 (2) is designed, in our opinion, to provide against such an even quality. Moreover, the Rules do not provide, expressly or impliedly, that a lease in which the term commences from a date preceding the execution thereof is rendered void or unenforceable on that account. That also reflects against the alleged mandatory character of Rule 31 (2). 11. The petitioners learned Counsel relied on observations of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Ramlal and Sons v. State of Rajasthan ( AIR 1976 SC 54 ) as appearing in para 12 at page 56: - "When in this case grant of the mining lease was envisaged under definite, statutory rules made in exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1948 the State Government was under legal obligation to act in accordance with these rules. It could not exercise a power in the matter of grant of mining lease unknown to these Rules. The State Government could not impose terms and conditions according to its own whims ignoring or disregarding the statutory rules which are binding on it." 12. In that case provision was made for charge of a large sum as premium in a mining lease executed under the Mineral Concesson Rules, 1949. It was found that the Rules did not empower realisation of premium or any sum, for that matter, other than royalty, deadrent, and surface rent and hence the charge of premium was altogether unauthorised. This obviously does not help in determining the scope or effect of Rule 31 (2) with which we are concerned in the present. The Rules are undoubtedly statutory but for that reason every part thereof is not to be regarded. as imperative. 13. In this case lease was made following a compromise dated 15th July, 1962 between the parties. Time was taken in formalising the terms and conditions of the lease. The petitioner does not allege that the lease is in any respect at variance from the terms of the compromise. During the entire period of 15th July, 1962 to 25th August, 1968, the petitioner had operated in the area to win these minerals for which the royalty and other charges were also deposited. The petitioner virtually had the enjoyment of a lessee for this period even though a formal deed had not come into being. During the entire period of 15th July, 1962 to 25th August, 1968, the petitioner had operated in the area to win these minerals for which the royalty and other charges were also deposited. The petitioner virtually had the enjoyment of a lessee for this period even though a formal deed had not come into being. It is not surprising that in this background the petitioner consented to offset this period towards the overall terms of the lease. It is difficult to treat this as arbitrary. Rule 28 (1) envisages that an application for the renewal of a mining lease shall be made to the State Government at least 12 months before the date on which the lease is due to expire. Acting thereunder the petitioner applied for renewal on June 30, 1981 which was 12 months before the expiry of the lease on 14th August, 1982. This too was without demur and without the petitioner contending at that stage that the lease is to subsist up to 25th August, 1988. The deed of lease states in express terms that it was for twenty years commencing on 15th July, 1962 the date on which the parties entered into the compromise. The Court cannot on its own import into this a term of its own and hold that the lease be deemed to have commenced on 26th August, 1968. Even if the period between 15-7-62 to 25-8-1968 were to be excluded (which is not possible in face of express provision in the lease), all that can be said is that the lease came to be for a term of less than 20 years which as discussed above, is not forbidden or contrary to the Act and the Rules. 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner relied also upon the unreported decision of a D.B. of this Court (to which One of us was a party) in Special Appeal 278 of 1976 Union of India v. M/s. Alopi Prasad and Sons dated 10-3-1980 (since reported in ILR (1980) 2 All 428:1980 All LJ NOC 76). The appellants in that case raised a preliminary objection that the dispute arose out of the terms at a contract and hence the proper remedy for the petitioner was to institute a suit in the Civil Court and the writ petition was not maintainable. The appellants in that case raised a preliminary objection that the dispute arose out of the terms at a contract and hence the proper remedy for the petitioner was to institute a suit in the Civil Court and the writ petition was not maintainable. The court analysed the provisions of the Cantonments Act and the Rules and repelled the contention holding that the lease granted was in exercise of statutory powers and the petitioner did not seek to enforce a contractual right. It was observed : - "A survey of the provisions of the Act and the Rules of which Form VIII is part leaves no scope for doubt that the lease is a statutory one. The terms contained in the Form in Schedule VIII including Clause II are also obviously statutory in character and by virtue of S.181 (2) have the same effect as if enacted in the Act. Rule 28 requires a lease under that provision to be executed in Form VIII and it is not open to the parties to such a transaction to create a lease on any terms other than those contained in the Form. They are free only to fill in the blanks in the Form. It is not open to the lessor to terminate a lease in that form except on the basis of powers reserved to it under clause II. In our judgment consequently, the appellants have purported to exercise a statutory power while taking action against the respondent. By means of the writ petition the respondent did not seek to enforce any contractual right. The writ petitioners grievance was that the appellants threatened to dispossess it of land legally held and the building constructed by it at considerable expense in disregard of its statutory powers since Clause II of the lease deed in the form in Schedule VIII itself has the status at a Rule or sub-rule. We consequently hold in agreement with the learned single Judge that the writ petition was maintainable and the preliminary objection raised was without any substance." 15. From these observations we are unable to deduce any principle that should serve to treat R.31 (2) as mandatory. We consequently hold in agreement with the learned single Judge that the writ petition was maintainable and the preliminary objection raised was without any substance." 15. From these observations we are unable to deduce any principle that should serve to treat R.31 (2) as mandatory. The true character thereof is to be adjudged in the setting in which it is placed and so far as Form K prescribed for the mining lease under the Mining (Concession) Rules 1960 is concerned, we have already noticed the laxity contained in Rule 31(1) namely that the lease is executed in Form K or in a Form as near thereto as circumstances of each case may require. We die unhesitatingly of the view considering the above that Rule 31 (2) is not mandatory and that this does permit commencement of a mining lease from a date anterior to the execution of the deed. 16. It was next contended by the petitioners learned Counsel that under the terms and conditions of the mining lease, the petitioner is entitled to renewal: Clause 3 Part VIII of the lease provides that where the mining lease relates to any mineral not specified in the First schedule to the Act, it shall be renewable for one period not exceeding the period specified in sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the Act at the option of the lessee. According to S.3 (2) (b) a mining lease for limestone, gypsum, dolomite may be renewed for one period not exceeding twenty years. In respect of minerals specified in the First Schedule in the Act, the further provision contained in Section 8 (2) is that a mining lease relating to such minerals shall not be renewed except with the previous approval of the Central Government. Gypsum is specified in the. First schedule to the Act but limestone and dolomite are not included therein. The petitioners grievance is that though application for renewal was duly made in the prescribed form on June 30, 1981 the State Government did not pass any order thereon nor did it seek approval of the Central Government with respect to the Scheduled mineral viz. gypsum. 17. Subsequent to this petition being filed in January, 1983, the state Government passed an Order dated February 5, 1983 (Annexure C.A. II). gypsum. 17. Subsequent to this petition being filed in January, 1983, the state Government passed an Order dated February 5, 1983 (Annexure C.A. II). It says that decision could not be taken within the period specified in Rule 24 (2) since reports from concerned departments were not received, that on this account the term of the lease is to be deemed as extended for six months from July 15, 1982 under Rule 28 (6) and that as this too is over, the application for renewal is to be deemed as refused. This Order seems misconceived. Rule 24 in so far as material reads : - (1) "An application for grant of a mining lease shall be disposed of with- in 12 months from the date of its receipt." (2) "An application for the renewal of a mining lease shall be disposed of within six months from the date of its receipt." (3) "If any application is not disposed of within the period specified in sub-rule (1), it shall be deemed to have been refused." 18. Sub-rule (3) was amended by notification G.S.R. 843 dated 6-5-1963. Prior to this amendment this sub-rule said : - "If any application is not disposed of within the period specified in sub-r.(1) or sub-rule (2), it shall be deemed to have been refused." 19. The words and the figure "or sub-rule (2)" were deleted from sub-rule (3) with effect from 6th May, 1963. The result clearly is that subsequent to 6th May, 1963 the provision for deemed refusal contained in sub-rule (3) of R.24 is inapplicable to the case of an application for the renewal of a mining lease. In other words an application for renewal of mining lease is not to be deemed as refused within Rule 22 on account of the fact that it was not disposed of within six months, Rule 28 (6) also does not provide, for deemed refusal. In consequence the petitioners application dated June 30, 1981 for renewal of the mining lease remains pending before the State Government and requires disposal according to law. 20. Learned Standing Counsel urged that if aggrieved against the failure of the State Government to dispose of the application for renewal, the petitioner might apply to the Central Government for revision under Rule 54. 20. Learned Standing Counsel urged that if aggrieved against the failure of the State Government to dispose of the application for renewal, the petitioner might apply to the Central Government for revision under Rule 54. The Explanation to this Rule says that for purposes thereof where the State Government has failed to dispose of an application for renewal of a mining lease, within the period specified in respect thereof, the State Government is to be deemed as having made an Order refusing the renewal. This Rule notwithstanding we have not deemed it fit to drive the petitioner to alternative remedy at this stage. In passing the Order dated 5th February, 1983, the State Government acted under the impression as if this is a case of deemed refusal under Rules 24/28. As discussed above, this is manifestly erroneous. The fact that the period of six months mentioned in Rule 24 (2) or the additional six months of the lease under Rule 28 (6) have expired does not preclude the State Government from disposing of the application for renewal on merit. Secondly, and this is not less important, as submitted for the petitioner, the principles of natural justice would need as well be observed by the State Government in considering the case of renewal. M/s. Raj Restaurant v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi ( AIR 1982 SC 1550 at page 1552), the Supreme Court observed: "Where, in order to carry on business a licence is required, obviously refusal to give licence or cancellation or revocation of licence would be visited with both civil and pecuniary consequences and as the business cannot be carried on without the licence it would also affect the livelihood of the person. In such a situation before either refusing to renew the licence or cancelling or revoking the same, the minimum principle of natural justice of notice and opportunity to represent ones case is a must. It is not disputed that no such opportunity was given before taking the decision not to renew the licence though it is admitted that for the reasons hereinbefore set out the licence was not renewed. Such a decision in violation of the minimum principle of natural justice would be void." 21. In the result thus, the mining lease granted to the petitioner commencing on 15th July, 1962 for a term of twenty years may not be considered as subsisting to date. Such a decision in violation of the minimum principle of natural justice would be void." 21. In the result thus, the mining lease granted to the petitioner commencing on 15th July, 1962 for a term of twenty years may not be considered as subsisting to date. The petitioner is entitled, however, to the application for renewal dated June 30, 1981, being considered by the State Government according to law. 22. The petition succeeds in part and is allowed accordingly. The order of the State Government dated 5th February, 1983 is quashed. Let mandamus issue to the respondent No. 1 (State of Uttar Pradesh) to consider the petitioners application dated June 30, 1981, for renewal of the mining lease expeditiously and in accordance with law. Till the disposal of their application for renewal, the respondents are prohibited from interfering with the petitioners working of the mines and winning the minerals including their removal, sale and disposal in accordance with the terms of the lease dated 26-8-1968. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Petition partly allowed.