JUDGMENT C.P. Singh, J. The accused-respondent Devendra Kunar Pandya (whom shall for brevity call as accused), was charged with and tried for the offence punishable under section 406 or 420 of the Indian Penal Code before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Sarangpur, (in Criminal Trial No. 545 of 1977) who finding him not guilty, has acquitted him. The State, with the permission of this Court, appeals. Poonamchand (PW-1) is the proprietor of Poonamchand Bhagirath firm carrying among others, the business of selling peanuts (monkeynuts or groundnuts), at Sarangpur. Premnarayan (PW-2) is his Munim. Banwarilal being a partner of one 'Rajkumar & Company' is a commission agent at Indore where the accused had his Chandan Oil Mills. Poonamchand (PW-1) on 1-12-1976 and 13-12-1976 vide his bill No. 10 (Rs. 15,165.91 Paisa) and No. 12 (Rs. 8,939.60 Paisa) sold peanuts worth Rs. 27,105.51 paisa through Banwarilal (PVV-5) to the accused. Premnarayan (PW-2) took these two instalments of peanuts in truck Nos. MPI 3777 and MPF 6368 to Indore where the accused instead of paying him in cash the price of the peanuts bought, drew two crossed cheques on 1-12-1976 Nos. MVW 003184 and MVW 003194 in the sums of Rs. 17,000/- and Rs. 8,939.60 paisa respectively on the Union Bank of India, Mahatma Gandhi Road Branch, Indore, payee being M/s Poonamchand Bhagirath, Sarangpur. Premnarayan (PW-2) took these cheques to Poonamchand (PW-1) who deposited them in the Bank of India Branch Sarangpur. These cheques, when sent to Indore Union Bank for encashment, it was found that the accused did not have the balance in his account. The cheques came dishonoured back to Sarangpur. On its knowledge, Poonamchand (PW-1) with the help of Banwarilal (PW-5) went to the accused who told him that he would pay back the amount within two or four days. He went again and again to get the payment but the accused kept on continually avoiding payment with the result that he was compelled to lodge a report in writing before the Station Officer, Sarangpur. It appears that though the cheques in question during investigation were seized by the Investigating Officer, they were in spite of opportunities given to the prosecution, were not produced at the trial. Poonamchand (PW-1), however, produced their photostat copies (Articles A and B). It appears that though the cheques in question during investigation were seized by the Investigating Officer, they were in spite of opportunities given to the prosecution, were not produced at the trial. Poonamchand (PW-1), however, produced their photostat copies (Articles A and B). On these facts,' when charged with and tried for the specified offences (punishable under sections 406 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code), the accused denied his guilt, but did not dispute that the peanuts in question had been sold to him on two occasions, that Premnarayan (PW-2) was the Munim of Poonamchand (PW-1) and Banwarilal (PW-5) was a partner of Dalai Rajkurmr & Company. He by his typed submissions, explained that not only the goods were to be delivered at Indore but also that the payment was to be made there, but it was not to be made in cask The cheques which he had given were with the understanding that he was thereby to save the extra amount which he would have been otherwise obliged to pay for a delayed payment. The complainant (Poonamchand PW-1) would not have got this extra amount had he got the two cheques encashed then and there. The complainant did not present the cheques for encashment on the dates in question but on 14-12-1976 and 15-12-1976 respectively. The transactions of sale of peanuts and delivery of cheques were through Banwarilal (PW-5). Banwarilal (PW-5) with the consent of Poonamchand (PW-1) on 10-1-1977 after acknowledging the receipt of payment in instalments on that day, had received Rs. 2,000/-. and on 11-1-1977 Rs. 1,000/-. The complainant Poonamchand, however, turning back on his agreement after a lapse of about seven and a half months lodged a false complaint. The learned Magistrate though finding that the First Information Report by the complainant was not unduly delayed, there being sufficient reason for him to lodge it on 19-6-1977, and that the Court at Sarangpur had jurisdiction to try the same, but also finding that the documents (Ex. The learned Magistrate though finding that the First Information Report by the complainant was not unduly delayed, there being sufficient reason for him to lodge it on 19-6-1977, and that the Court at Sarangpur had jurisdiction to try the same, but also finding that the documents (Ex. P/5, P/6, D/l and D/2) did not presumably have the condition of payment of cash for the goods sold at the time those documents were made (but it came to be added later on), that the prosecution had failed to exhibit the original cheques, that the accused had drawn cheques to save the extra amount which he otherwise would have been called upon to pay and that Banwarilal (PW-5) could have engaged himself in a settlement of the claim (between the complainant and the accused), holding the accused not guilty of the offences charged, acquitted him. As regards there being sufficient reason for the delayed report and the Court at Sarangpur having jurisdiction to try the case, the findings are for the State and rightly so considering that there was apparently sufficient cause for the complainant to lodge a report only on 19-6-1977 because, as established by Poonamchand (PW-1) and Premnarayan (PW-2) the accused kept on promising the payment of the price of peanuts to them from time to time but never to keep his promise, and that the payments were to be made at Sarangpur. Indeed the learned counsel for the accused has also not challenged these findings. The accused has rightly been held not guilty of the offence punishable under section 406 of the Indian Penal Code, The notion of trust ordinarily speaking presupposes the existence of a person who is a trustee or to whom some property is entrusted in confidence reposed by another. This relationship presupposes that the confidence has been freely given. But a person who tricks another into delivering him property does not partake of the nature of a trustee. His intention from the beginning is to trick the person, who entrusts him that property. The gravaman of criminal breach of trust is dishonest conversion of the property entrusted; whereas the act of cheating itself involves conversion. By 'conversion' is meant depriving the owner of the use and possession of his property. 'Entrustment'' entails the handing over of the property by-lawful means. The gravaman of criminal breach of trust is dishonest conversion of the property entrusted; whereas the act of cheating itself involves conversion. By 'conversion' is meant depriving the owner of the use and possession of his property. 'Entrustment'' entails the handing over of the property by-lawful means. If, therefore, the property is acquired by trick or by any other unlawful means, there is no "entrustment and if the acquirer in these circumstances appropriates that property to his own use (or consents to any other person retaining that property) cannot be said to have-committed an offence of criminal breach of trust because in that case there is practically no trust created by the owner of the property; he commits, cheating. The contents of the report itself and so also the evidence of Poonamchand (PW-1) and Premnarayan (PW-2) nowhere indicate that the goods had been entrusted to the accused. The crucial question is whether the accused has committed the offence punishable under section 420 of the Indian Penal Code. The offence of cheating is defined in section 415 of the Indian Penal Code laying down as follows:- Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he-would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to "cheat. There is no doubt that there is distinction between merely deceiving and deceiving with intent to commit fraud. 'Deceit' carries a wider nation. By it is meant to induce one to believe that a thing is true, which is false and which the person practising the deceit knows to be so or believes to be false or makes the statement recklessly whether it is true or false. 'Defrauding' is a kind of deceit, it means causing some kind of injury or loss by deceit, but the nature of the injury or loss may sometime be difficult to define. The intent need not necessarily be to obtain property, an intent to obtain employment, or a professional qualification, may also be sufficient. 'Defrauding' is a kind of deceit, it means causing some kind of injury or loss by deceit, but the nature of the injury or loss may sometime be difficult to define. The intent need not necessarily be to obtain property, an intent to obtain employment, or a professional qualification, may also be sufficient. By defrauding is meant to induce a course of action (or inaction), while deceiving merely includes inducing a state of mind. Section 24 of the Indian Penal Code defines 'dishonestly: whoever does anything with intent to cause wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another person, is said to do that thing 'dishonestly'. Under section 25 of the Indian Penal Code, a person is said to do a thing fraudulently if he does that, thing with intent to defraud but not otherwise. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Dr. Vimla v. The Delhi Administration AIR 1963 SC 1572 laid down that "the expression 'defraud' involves two elements, namely, deceit and injury to the person deceived. Injury is something other than economic loss that is, deprivation of property, whether movable or immovable, or of money, and it will include any harm whatever caused to any person in body, mind, reputation or such others. In short it is a non-economic or non-pecuniary loss. A. benefit or advantage to the deceiver will almost always cause loss or detriment to the deceived. Even in those rare cases where there is a benefit or advantage to the deceiver but no corresponding loss to the deceived, the second condition is satisfied." From the combined reading of the evidence of Poonamchand (PW-1) and Premnarayan (PW-2), there is no doubt that the two cheques, the photostat copies of which are Articles A and B, were drawn by ; he accused. Although the accused while being examined under section 318 of the Code of Criminal Procedure appears to have pretended the ignorance about their existence, he himself in his typed submissions acknowledges the drawing of cheques. Indeed in para 6 of his submissions, in conformity with the trend of his cross-examination of Banwarilal (PW-5) with reference to the documents (Ex. D-4-C, D-5-C and D-6-C) (with which I intend dealing with in some detail later en) he presupposes the drawing of the two cheques in question. Indeed in para 6 of his submissions, in conformity with the trend of his cross-examination of Banwarilal (PW-5) with reference to the documents (Ex. D-4-C, D-5-C and D-6-C) (with which I intend dealing with in some detail later en) he presupposes the drawing of the two cheques in question. A mere visual comparison by me of the signatures of the accused at the conclusion of his examination under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and his written submissions with those on Articles A and B leaves me in no doubt that they are by one and the same person. The argument by the learned counsel for the accused that the Articles A and B are not receivable in evidence, is not tenable. Clause (2) of section 62 of the Indian Evidence Act includes in secondary evidence: Copies made from the original by mechanical processes which in themselves insure the accuracy of the copy, and copies campared with such copies. Then illustration (a) of that section lays down that: A photograph of an original is secondary evidence of its contents, though the two have not been compared, if it is proved that the thing photographed was the original. The complainant Poonamchand (PW-1) in para. 7 clearly deposes that he had got the cheques photographed and those photographs are Articles A and B. Premnarayan (PW-2) proves that during investigation, among other articles the original cheques had been seized by the police. He is corrobo-rated by Badriprasad Shanrta (PW-4). There is proof that the originals could not be produced and hence, secondary evidence in nature of production of Articles A and B is admissible. A cheque has been defined to be a bill of exchange drawn on a specified banker and not expressed to be payable otherwise on demand. (Section 6 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1981). A bill of exchange is-defined in section 5 of that Act : A bill of exchange' is an instrument in writing containing an unconditional order, signed by the maker, directing a certain person to pay a certain sum of money only to, or to the order of a certain person; or to the bearer of the instrument. A bill of exchange is-defined in section 5 of that Act : A bill of exchange' is an instrument in writing containing an unconditional order, signed by the maker, directing a certain person to pay a certain sum of money only to, or to the order of a certain person; or to the bearer of the instrument. The law, therefore, is clear than when a person draws a cheque., be can be taken as impliedly representing that his cheque is a valid order for the payment of the amount stated, that is to say, that there is in existence of state of facts that in the ordinary course the cheque would be met. This representation could be true only if his account at the bank is in sufficient credit from which he does not intend to draw out before the presentation of the cheque or that for overdrawing, his bank authorised him to do so or that from his previous dealings with the bank he expects that his cheque would be honoured. In this case, as proved by Poonarachand (PW-1), and Premnarayan (PW-2), the cheques when presented, were not honoured as the accused did not have sufficient credit at his bank to meet those cheques; and as he has not shown that he had authority to overdraw the amount from the bank or that he had expected from his past dealings that his bank would honour his cheques in question, his representation was false. It was dishonest also as he had already received the goods from the complainant. The learned Magistrate referring to Ex. P/5 and Ex. P/6 on the one hand and the documents Ex. D/1 and Ex. D/2 on the other hand had suspected that the parts 3 to B and C to C in the documents Ex. P-5 and P-6 and A to A in the documents Ex. D-l and D-2 might have been written later on. Assuming they were written later on at Indore they are insignificant, because of the definition of a cheque with reference to that of bill of exchange. If the accused hid drawn the two cheques and about that there is no doubt as already seen, he had intentionally misrepresented by drawing these cheques that he had sufficient funds in his bank to meet the price of the goods he had already received. If the accused hid drawn the two cheques and about that there is no doubt as already seen, he had intentionally misrepresented by drawing these cheques that he had sufficient funds in his bank to meet the price of the goods he had already received. His misrepresentation was dishonest because he, in spite of repeated promises to pay, did not keep them. Finally the documents Ex. D-4, D-5 and D-6 appear to have influenced the learned Magistrate to come to the conclusion that the entire matter had been settled. But this is not so. It may be noted that Banwarilal (PW-5) nowhere claims to be a partner of the complainant Poonamchand (PW-1) or his firm Poonamchand Bhagirath. His evidence is merely that on 15-12-1976 he was a partner of Rajkumar & Company (The Commission Agents). The learned Magistrate appears to have put-the question; to the accused under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on misreading of the evidence. Indeed the accused rightly replied that Banwarilal (PW-5) was a partner of Rajkumar & Company and not of Pbonamchand Bhagirath firm. Banwarilal (PW-5) apparently was only concerned with arranging the sale of peanuts by Poonamchand (PW-1). He was not a person employed to do any act for Poonamchand (PW-1) with regard to the payment part of the transaction which was a concern, between him and the accused, he acting either himself or through his Munim Premnarayan. No doubt, an agent having an authority to do an act has also authority to do every lawful thing which is necessary for doing that particular act. An agent for example appointed to get a bill discounted has authority to warrant it as a good bill, but cannot endorse it in the principal's name. No question was put either to Poonamchand (PW-1) or Premnarayan (PW-2) suggesting even remotely that Banwarilal (PW-5) had been constituted as an agent to bring about the settlement with the accused in the name of the firm or in the name of Poonamchand. A custom for art agent to receive payment by way of set off for settlement of account between him and the person making the payment had been regarded as unreasonable and is not binding on the principal unless he was aware of it and agreed to be bound by it at the time when he authorised him to receive payment. A custom for art agent to receive payment by way of set off for settlement of account between him and the person making the payment had been regarded as unreasonable and is not binding on the principal unless he was aware of it and agreed to be bound by it at the time when he authorised him to receive payment. There is no evidence that the complainant had later on ratified the doings of Banwarilal (PW-5). Banwarilal (PW-5) in para. 12 with reference to the documents Ex. D-4 and D-5 clearly deposes that he had attempted to give Rs. 2,000 and Rs. 1,000 respectively to the complainant Poonamchand Bhagirath but he did n(r)t accept the amount saying that he was not prepared to accept only that amount. In these circumstances, I have no doubt that the accused has committed the offence punishable under section 420 of the Indian Penal Code. The argument by his learned counsel that his liability, if any, is only civil, is not sound. He though, no doubt would also be civilly liable, he also has committed criminal wrong in drawing two cheques payable to the complainant containing his implied representation that in the ordinary course his cheques would be met which turned out to be false. He had already received peanuts which the complainant was induced to part with which he otherwise would not have done had the accused not made the fraudulent misrepresentation to him. The conduct of the accused was all along dishonest because he at no time appeared to have sufficient funds to meet the price of the goods he had already received. The accused having wrongly been acquitted of the offence punishable under section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, I set aside that acquittal and finding him guilty, convict him of that offence. The accused having wrongly been acquitted of the offence punishable under section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, I set aside that acquittal and finding him guilty, convict him of that offence. I am aware of the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court from time to time in different cases including the ones made in Bahai Singh v. State of Haryana AIR 1976 SC 2032 , wherein it has been laid down that; Whether the High Court is dealing with one class of appeals or the other, it must actually have regard to the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence that unless the statute provides to the contrary, there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and secondly that the accused is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt. Due regard to the views of the trial Court as to the credibility of witness in matters resting on pure appreciation of evidence and the studied slowness of the appellate Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witness, where such seeing and hearing can be useful to the assessment, of evidence, are well known principles which generally inform the administration of justice and govern the exercise of all appellate jurisdiction. They are self-imposed limitations on a power otherwise plenary and like all voluntary restraints they constitute valuable guidelines. Such regard and slowness must find their reflection in the appellate judgment which can only be if the appellate Court deals with the principal reasons that influenced the order of acquittal and after examining the evidence with care gives its own reasons justifying a contrary view of the evidence. It is implicit in this judicial process that if two views of the evidence are reasonably possible, the finding of acquittal ought not to be disturbed. The evidence in this case is such as leaves me in no doubt that the accused has committed the offence punishable under section 420 of the Indian Penal Code. The offence was committed in December. 1976, i.e., more than six and a half years ago. This is the first offence of the kind committed by him. He is a young man. He has made faint attempts to undo the wrong through Banwarilai (PW-5) who did not have any authority of the complainant to bring about any settlement. The offence was committed in December. 1976, i.e., more than six and a half years ago. This is the first offence of the kind committed by him. He is a young man. He has made faint attempts to undo the wrong through Banwarilai (PW-5) who did not have any authority of the complainant to bring about any settlement. These are extenuating circumstances and 1 feel a sentence till the rising of the Court with Rs.2,000 fine, failing the payment of which rigorous imprisonment for six months and in the event of payment of fine, the entire of it to be given to the complainant Poonamchand as compensation would meet the ends of justice. The appeal, in consequence, is allowed. The acquittal of the accused for the offence punishable under section 406 of the Indian Penal Code is maintained, but his acquittal for the offence punishable under section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is set aside. He having been found guilty of this offence (punishable under section 420 of the Indian Penal Code) is convicted and because of the extenuating circumstances, is sentenced till the rising of the Court with Rs.2,000 fine failing the payment of which he shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months and in the event of payment of it, the entire of it shall be paid as compensation to the complainant Poonamchand (PW-1). Appeal allowed