Judgment 1. In this application under S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, by the tenant-defendants, an interesting question arises for consideration of this Court, namely, as to whether the court of appeal below has committed any error of jurisdiction in applying the provisions of S.14 (8) of the Bihar Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1983 (Bihar Act IV of 1983) by refusing to admit their appeal in regard to their eviction on the ground of personal necessity of the landlord opposite party. 2. The title suit in question was instituted in the court of the Subordinate Judge, Biharsharif, on the 21st. December, 1982, for eviction of the petitioners, on various grounds, including the ground of personal necessity, from the premises in question. After services of summonses and registered covers, the petitioners appeared in the suit on the 24th January, 1983, with an affidavit. The order of the trial court, recorded on the 24th January, 1983, reads as follows-- From a perusal of the order sheet of the lower court it does nor appear as to what was the ex parte order, which was passed against the defendants, which they wanted to be recalled and that was ultimately allowed to be recalled on payment of costs. Be that as it may, the trial court recalled the order and also granted time till the 1st February, 1983, for filing written statement and settlement of issues. On that date, i.e., the 1st February, 1983, the written statement was filed and accepted. The hearing of the suit commenced on the 9th February, 1983, and it was concluded on the 24th February, 1983, followed by the judgment on the 26th February, 1983, against the petitioners. 3. Against the above judgment, the petitioners filed an appeal before the District Judge of Nalanda, and, in the admission matter, a question arose as to whether any appeal lay against that part of the judgment which related to the personal necessity of the plaintiff, in view of the provisions contained in sub-sec. (8) of S.14 of the Act and the learned District Judge held that in view of the special provision, no appeal lay to that extent. 4. In this application, it has been argued by Mr. (8) of S.14 of the Act and the learned District Judge held that in view of the special provision, no appeal lay to that extent. 4. In this application, it has been argued by Mr. S.S.Asghar Hussain, appearing on behalf of the petitioners that the mischief of sub-sec, (8) of S.14 would apply only if the order for recovery of possession of any premises was made in accordance with the procedure specified in S.14 of the said Act. In other words, the argument is that if the trial court did pass order of eviction of a tenant on the ground of personal necessity without following the new procedure enacted in S.14 of the new Act, then the bar of sub-sec. (8) would have no application. 5. I find myself in agreement with Mr. Hussain, as sub-sec. (8), which reads as follows, clearly stipulated the bar of an appeal or a second appeal against such an order only in cases where the order for eviction has been passed in accordance with the procedure specified in this section. If, however, the court has not followed the procedure prescribed under S.14 for passing an order, then obviously, I have no doubt in my mind that the bar will not be attracted. "(8) No appeal or second appeal shall lie against an order for the recovery of possession of any premises made in accordance with procedure specified in this section : Provided that on an application being made within sixty days of the date of the order of eviction, the High Court may, for the purpose of satisfying itself that an order under the Section is according to law, call for the records of the case and pass such order in respect thereto as it thinks fit." The intention of the Legislature is for a summary and quick disposal of eviction suits, which go on lingering for decades in this State. Hardship of the landlord seeking recovery of possession of premises or buildings for his personal occupation has been taken note of by the Legislature and for that a speedy machinery and procedure has been proscribed for the disposal of the suit as well as for cutting out further delays in the appellate courts. Hardship of the landlord seeking recovery of possession of premises or buildings for his personal occupation has been taken note of by the Legislature and for that a speedy machinery and procedure has been proscribed for the disposal of the suit as well as for cutting out further delays in the appellate courts. A limited jurisdiction has been conferred, however, on the High Court to examine the records of the case for satisfying itself that the order of eviction was in accordance with law. The question, therefore, arises, as to whether the procedure as laid down under S.14 of the Act has been followed in this case or not, as the learned counsel for both the parties were daggers drawn on this issue. 6. The next relevant provisions in this regard would be sub-secs. (4), (5), (6) and (7), which read as follows:- "(4) The tenant on whom summons is duly served (whether by ordinary mail or by registered post) shall not contest the prayer for eviction from the premises unless he files an affidavit stating the ground on which he seeks to make such contest and obtains leave from the Court as hereinafter provided : and in default of the appearance in pursuance of the summons or his obtaining such leave the statement made by the landlord to the suit for eviction shall be deemed to be admitted by the tenant and the landlord shall be entitled to an order for eviction on the ground aforesaid. (5) The Court shall give to the tenant leave to contest the suit if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for eviction on the grounds specified in clauses (c) and (e) of sub-sec.(1) of S.11. (6) When leave is granted to the tenant to contest the suit, the latter may, within fifteen days from the date of the order, pray after filing the requisite Court-fee; required for a written statement that the affidavit may be treated as the written statement or if he chooses to file a separate written statement he may do so within fifteen days of the grant of leave to contest the suit and if he does not file the written statement within the period he shall not be allowed to do so later. The Court shall thereafter commence the hearing of the suit as early as practicable. The Court shall thereafter commence the hearing of the suit as early as practicable. (7) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) or any other law, the Court while hearing a suit under this section shall follow the practice and procedure of a Court of Small Causes, including the recording of evidence." 7. From the scheme the procedure to be followed for the trial of a suit of a landlord for recovery of possession of a premises on the ground of his own need is that on the appearance of the tenant, he has, to make out a case on filing an affidavit that (prima facie) he has got a genuine and substantial ground to contest the claim of the landlord for recovery of possession. On examination of the affidavit, which should contain the grounds of defence, if the court is satisfied, it has to grant leave to the tenant to contest the suit. Otherwise, the leave would be refused, and, an order for eviction should be passed forthwith. In other words, irrelevant and untenable grounds to contest are to be shut out at tee initial stage itself. When the court feels satisfied that there, is some reasonable ground, which could disentitle or defeat the landlord from obtaining an order in his favour for eviction of the tenant, as specified in S.11 (1) of the Act, then only leave has to be granted. In this case, the order sheet of the 24th January, 1983, which has been extracted above, does not indicate that the petitioners had filed an affidavit of this nature. The affidavit, however, being not on the record, the order sheet also does not indicate that the mind of the court was attracted to this relevant procedure and on scrutiny of the grounds in the said affidavit filed by the petitioners any such ground was disclosed, which justified the court to grant leave to the petitioners to contest the claim of the landlord. The order sheet of the 24th January, 1983, does not indicate the application of the mind by the trial court in the least. The order sheet of the 24th January, 1983, does not indicate the application of the mind by the trial court in the least. Rather the permission to file written statement was accorded in the usual and casual manner, inasmuch as, after the leave is granted to contest the suit to a tenant, a fresh order has to be passed for filing written statement, or the affidavit itself has to be considered to be the written statement. Nothing of this nature was done in this case. Nor does it appear that any court-fee was filed on the written statement or that the procedure for trial of small cause court cases was followed. 8. The result of the above discussion is that the procedure, which is the heart of the matter to attract sub-sec.(8), was not followed, for trial of the case in question between the parties, and, once we reach this conclusion, it is obvious that the bar of sub-sec.(8) of S.14 should not be made applicable. As already indicated above, the application of the summary procedure, indicated in the earlier parts of S.14, is the sine qua non for applying the bar. 9. For the reasons discussed above, I conclude that the learned Subordinate Judge has committed an apparent error of jurisdiction in refusing to admit the appeal of the petitioners for hearing on merits by applying the restrictions contained in sub-sec.(8) of S.14 of the Act. I would accordingly allow this application and set aside the order in question. The appeal of the petitioners would, therefore, be admitted on its merits for disposal in accordance with law. I shall make no order as to costs. The appeal should be disposed of very expeditiously.