Eknath Kira Akhadkar v. Administrative Tribunal — 1983 DIGILAW 21 (BOM)

ORDER:- All these eight writ petitions arise out of the judgments passed by the Administrative Tribunal, dismissing appeals filed by the petitioners against orders of eviction made by the Rent Controller under Ss.22 (2) (a) or S.32 (4) of the Goa, Daman and Diu Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1968 (hereinafter called the Act for sake of brevity). Though the facts that led to the said orders of eviction and judgments are not the same and, therefore, some of the grounds of attack differ in accordance with the peculiarities of each case, the main challenge is nevertheless common, it becomes, thus, appropriate and convenient to jointly dispose of ail these petitions and accordingly they will be dealt with by this single judgment. 2. In the petition No. 165/B/75, the petitioner's case is that, on or about 29th June 1970, respondents 3. 4 and 5 instituted in the Court of the Rent Controller, North Goa, proceedings for eviction of the petitioners from a house existing at Ribandar and occupied, by them. The said petition was resisted by the petitioners on the ground that the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to entertain and try the application as nowhere it has been averred in the application that the petitioners were occupying the house as tenants, and also on different grounds. The application was dismissed by the Rent Controller after holding that the subject-matter would not fall within the purview of the Act. Respondents 3, 4 and 5 filed an appeal against the order of the Rent Controller to the Administrative Tribunal and in the course of the hearing of the said appeal, it was suggested that respondents 3, 4 and 5 should file a fresh application before the Controller. Accordingly, on 22-9-71, the aforesaid respondents 3, 4 and 5 presented in the Court of the Rent Controller, North Goa Division a fresh application for eviction of the petitioners on the ground that they had not complied with the notice dated 21-8-1969. Accordingly, on 22-9-71, the aforesaid respondents 3, 4 and 5 presented in the Court of the Rent Controller, North Goa Division a fresh application for eviction of the petitioners on the ground that they had not complied with the notice dated 21-8-1969. The Rent Controller by his order dated 14-1-74 held that the relationship between the respondents 3, 4 and 5 and the petitioners was of landlord and tenant and that respondent 3 had made efforts to have the lease contract executed and directed the petitioners to put the said respondents 3, 4 and 5 in possession of the suit premises within three months from the date of the order as they were in default of the payment of rent. Aggrieved by this Order of the Rent Controller, petitioners filed an appeal against the said order in the Administrative Tribunal which was dismissed by the judgment dated 31-12-1975. 3. In Writ Petition No. 2/B/77 the petitioner's case is that respondent 1 filed an application before the Rent Controller, North Goa Division for the eviction of the petitioner under S.22 (2) (a) of the Act on the ground that the petitioner had failed to pay rent for a period of three months. Notice of the said application was served and the petitioner on 21st June, 1974. In his reply dated 25th July, 1974, the petitioner showed cause against the said application by filing a written statement and admitting therein that he was in arrears of rent for the months of March to May, 1974 amounting to Rs. 114/-. He further moved an application before the learned Rent Controller praying that he be permitted to deposit the rent due and the Rent Controller was pleased to permit the petitioner to deposit the rent, which accordingly was deposited on 9-7-74. However, by his judgment and order dated 23rd December, 1975 the Rent Controller was pleased to allow the application of respondent 1 and to order that the petitioner should vacate the suit premises within three months from the date of the issue of the order. The petitioner, being aggrieved by the said order, preferred appeal to the Administrative Tribunal of Goa, Daman and Diu and the said appeal was dismissed by the Tribunal by its order dated 8-7-76 wherein it was held that the petitioner has failed to prove reasonable cause to testify his default in the payment of rent. 4. The petitioner, being aggrieved by the said order, preferred appeal to the Administrative Tribunal of Goa, Daman and Diu and the said appeal was dismissed by the Tribunal by its order dated 8-7-76 wherein it was held that the petitioner has failed to prove reasonable cause to testify his default in the payment of rent. 4. In the Writ Petition No. 28/B/77, petitioner's case is that respondent 1 filed an application before the Rent Controller, Goa. North Division on 7-1-75 under S.22 (2) (a) of the Act and on 14-3-75, the petitioner paid to the said respondent a sum of Rs. 3000/- towards the arrears of rent due in respect of the said premises, as also advance rent up to the month of May, 1965. Upon receiving the said sum of Rs. 3000/-, the first respondent issued a writing to the petitioner to the effect that he would withdraw the eviction case which had been filed by him and that the petitioner was authorised to open a new door to the said premises and carry out other repairs to the said premises suitable to the petitioner, at the latter's expense and cost. On 10-6-75, the petitioner filed a written statement opposing the application. Later on, on 13-10-75 respondent 1 made an application to the Rent Controller that the petitioner had paid rents from June, 74 to June, 1975 and thereafter, he had again fallen in arrears of rent from July, 1975 to September, 1975 and, therefore, all the proceedings ought to be stopped and order be passed under S.32 of the Act directing the petitioner to put the first respondent in possession of the premises. The petitioners opposed that application but the Rent Controller by his Order dated 30th October, 1975 ordered the eviction of the petitioner. Aggrieved by this Order of the Rent Controller, the petitioner preferred appeal against it to the Administrative Tribunal and the said appeal was dismissed by Order dated 11-10-76. 5. In Writ Petition No. 113/B/77, the petitioner's case is that he has been residing in a house situated at Alto dos Pilotos ward, at Panaji, for the last over 50 years. The said house has been taken on lease by the petitioner from the late Dr. Arminio Santana and on the death of he said Dr. 5. In Writ Petition No. 113/B/77, the petitioner's case is that he has been residing in a house situated at Alto dos Pilotos ward, at Panaji, for the last over 50 years. The said house has been taken on lease by the petitioner from the late Dr. Arminio Santana and on the death of he said Dr. Arminio Santana, the property came to the share of his daughter who is residing in Pakistan since the time of the lease. Respondent 1 had been accepting the rents from the petitioner as the power of attorney holder of the aforesaid daughter of Dr. Arminio. In his written statement, petitioner denied that respondent 1 was landlord of the premises. By an application dated 20-8-74 filed by respondent 1 under S.22 (2) (a) of the Act the eviction of the petitioner was sought on the ground that he was in default in the payment of the rent for a total period of three months. Petitioner showed cause against the application and claimed that no rent was due as substantial amount of money amounting to Rs. 2958/- had been spent by him as expenses for repairing the suit premises. However, by judgment and order dated 30-8-76, the Rent Controller allowed the application. Aggrieved, the petitioner preferred an appeal against the said Order of the Rent Controller which was dismissed by judgment dated 2nd July, 1977. 6. In Writ Petition No. 64/B/77, the petitioner's case is that he is a tenant of premises belonging to respondent 1 and situated at the Menezes Braganza Road where the petitioner has installed his garage for repairs of motor cars. He has been tenant of the said premises since 1-1-73 and prior to that, petitioner and respondent 1 were jointly running in partnership the business of the garage. The premises had been let to the petitioner on the monthly rent of Rs. 150/- by way of an oral agreement of lease. Respondent 1 filed an application, on 1-6-74, for eviction of the petitioner on the ground that he had failed to pay the rents for the months of January to April, 1974 amounting to Rs. 600/- and that respondent 1 required the said premises for his personal occupation. By his reply dated 3-8-74, petitioner contended that there was no cause of action as on 6-4-74 and he further denied that he was in arrears in the payment of the rents. 600/- and that respondent 1 required the said premises for his personal occupation. By his reply dated 3-8-74, petitioner contended that there was no cause of action as on 6-4-74 and he further denied that he was in arrears in the payment of the rents. He also alleged that he had tendered the rents every month from January onwards and that respondent 1 had refused to accept the rents, twice, in February and March, 1974 and further that he had sent a Money Order for Rs. 300/- to the respondent on 30-3-74, remitting the amounts of rent for the months of January and February, 1974. By judgment and order dated 30-3-76, the Rent Controller, however, ordered the eviction of the petitioner from the premises, though the rents had been paid within one month from the notice being served on the petitioner. Aggrieved by the said Order of eviction, the petitioner preferred appeal to the Administrative Tribunal and the said appeal was dismissed by judgment dated 13-6-77. 7. In the Writ Petition No. 136/B/78, petitioner's case is that respondent 1 sought his eviction from the premises situated at Panaji under the provisions of S.22 (2) (a) of the Act alleging that petitioner was in arrears in payment of the rent for the months of July, 1972 till April, 1973. Petitioner opposed the application by contending that the reason for the rent falling in arrears was attributable to the unreasonable conduct of respondent 1 himself, for, against the established practice, he had refused to collect the rent from the shop of one Damodar Kashinath Naik at Panaji, during the months of August, September and October and that in November, 1972 petitioner had tendered the rent for the months of July, August, September and October amounting to Rs. 900/- by Money Order, but the said Money Order had been refused by the respondent. By Order dated 30-10-75, the Rent Controller held that the reason for the rent falling in arrears was due to the fault of the petitioner himself and, therefore, directed that the petitioner should hand over the possession of the premises to respondent 1. Aggrieved, the petitioner preferred appeal to the Administrative Tribunal which was dismissed by order dated 20-3-76. 8. In the petition No. 19/B/79, the petitioner's case is that he is the tenant of a house known as 'Durga Niwas' situated at Ribandar and belonging to respondent 1. Aggrieved, the petitioner preferred appeal to the Administrative Tribunal which was dismissed by order dated 20-3-76. 8. In the petition No. 19/B/79, the petitioner's case is that he is the tenant of a house known as 'Durga Niwas' situated at Ribandar and belonging to respondent 1. On or about 16-5-74, the said respondent filed an application before the Rent Controller for eviction of the petitioner under S.22 (2) (a) of the Act and the said application has been resisted on several grounds by the petitioner. Subsequently, the Rent Controller conducted an inquiry and passed an Order dated 30-3-77 directing the petitioner to vacate the suit premises and to hand over the vacant possession of the same to respondent 1 within three months from the date of the said Order. Aggrieved, the petitioner preferred an appeal to the Administrative Tribunal which was dismissed by Order dated 28th July, 1978. 9. In Writ Petition No. 178/B/82, the petitioner's case is that respondent 1 moved an application before the Rent Controller, North Goa Division on 13th June, 1972 on the ground that the petitioner had not deposited the monthly rents at the rate of Rs. 20/- from January, 1971 till June, 1972 i.e. the date of the filing of the application. The petitioner resisted the application stating that it was not true that the rent due was of Rs. 20/- per month, for actually he agreed rent was of Rs. 15/- per months; that he had paid the rents up to December, 1971 and that respondent 1 has refused to accept the rent of January, 1972 when it was tendered in February, 1972. Summons of the proceedings were served on the petitioner on 27th June, 1972 and by his Order dated 18th April, 1973 the Rent Controller dismissed the application filed by respondent 1. Respondent 1, being aggrieved, filed an appeal to the Administrative Tribunal and the said appeal was also dismissed by judgment dated 2-2-1975. Thereafter, respondent 1 filed a writ petition in the Judicial Commissioner's Court and the Hon'ble Judicial Commissioner set aside the order of the Rent Controller and the judgment of the Administrative Tribunal and remanded the case to the Rent Controller with a direction to hear the case afresh and to decide the matter after considering two issues which are mentioned in his judgment. After the decision of the Administrative Tribunal and the decision of the Judicial Commissioner, no rents were paid or deposited, since it was the case of respondent 1 that the rent was of Rs. 20/- per month and this was being challenged by the petitioner on the ground that the rent due was of Rs. 15/- per month. After the case was remanded, respondent 1 moved an application dated 1st February, 1980 under S.32 (4) of the Act stating that no rents were paid or deposited after the case has been decided by the Administrative Tribunal. In his reply, the petitioner prayed that the rent be fixed by the Administrative Tribunal and that an opportunity be given to the petitioner on fixation of the said rent to pay the arrears, if any. However, by his Order dated 26-6-1980 the Rent Controller allowed the application under S.32 (4) of the Act and directed the petitioner to hand over possession of the premises to respondent 1. An appeal was preferred against the said order to the Administrative Tribunal and the said appeal was dismissed by judgment dated 17-8-1982. 10. The main contention of the petitioners in all the above cases is that the Act, as it stood at the time of initiating the eviction proceedings before the Rent Controller, under its S.22 (2) (a); was amended by the Goa, Daman and Diu Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control (Amendment) Act, 1976, the Amendment having come into force on 27th May, 1976 by virtue of S.1 (2) of the Amending Act and its publication in the Official Gazette dated 27th June, 1976, and, therefore, during the pendency of the said proceedings, either before the Controller or, the Administrative Tribunal. The original S.22 was ended inasmuch as cl.(a) in sub-s. (2) was substituted, the proviso was omitted and sub-ss. (3) and (4) were added. The original S.22 was ended inasmuch as cl.(a) in sub-s. (2) was substituted, the proviso was omitted and sub-ss. (3) and (4) were added. The wording of the amended cl.(a) in sub-s. (2) makes it clear that the Rent Controller shall make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building, in a proceeding for eviction on the ground of arrears in payment of the rents due, only in the event the tenant is in arrears of the payment of rents for a total period of three months and in addition, he has failed to pay or tender such arrears of rent within 30 days of the receipt or the refusal of a registered notice served on him by the landlord for such arrears. The requirement of giving such notice was not existing in the original cl.(a) and the amendment was introduced to eliminate the mischief that such omission was giving cause to. At the present, therefore, the landlord has cause of action for instituting eviction proceedings on the ground of arrears in the payment of rent only in case such arrears are for a total period of three months and in addition, he has given the aforesaid notice. The Act is a beneficial piece of legislation enacted for the protection of the tenant and hence, has to be applied retrospectively, for otherwise there will be discrimination. However, this was not done either by the Rent Controller or by the Administrative Tribunal with the result that the eviction orders are ab initio null and void since the landlords in each case, having failed to give the statutory notice had no cause of action. Reliance was placed in support of the above contentions in the cases of Mst. Refiquennessa v. Lal Bahadur Chetri, AIR 1964 SC 1511 , Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills v. Subhash Chandra Yograj Sinha, AIR 1961 SC 1596 , Mohanlal Chunilal Kothari v. Tribhovan Haribhai Thamboli, AIR 1963 SC 358 , Smt. Safali Roy Chowdhary v. A. K. Dutta, AIR 1976 SC 1810 , Ganesh Flour Mills Company Ltd. v. Ramesh Chand, (1979) 2 Ren CJ 418 (Delhi) and A. Krishnaswami v. S.Rasheeda, (1981) 1 Ren CJ 320 (Mad). 11. 11. This view was, however, strongly opposed by the respondents, their case being that they admittedly had a cause of action under S.22 (2) (a) of the Act, as it stood at the time of the institution of the eviction proceedings, to obtain an order under the said section. The amended cl.(a) did not confer any particular right on the tenants, nor did it take away right of a landlord to seek eviction of his tenant on the ground of non-payment of rents. It has only imposed a condition regulating the exercise of the right of the landlord to apply for the eviction of his tenant on that ground. Therefore, the amendment is not to be, and cannot be, applied retrospectively the rulings in the cases of Mst. Rafiquennessa and S.B. K. Oil Mills (above) being presently against the petitioners' case and the rulings in the cases of Mohanlal Kothari and Smt. Safali R. Chowdhary (supra) being not helpful for them. It was further argued that, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Katikara Chintamani Dora v. Guatreddi Annamanaidu, AIR 1974 SC 1069 , it is well settled that ordinarily, when the substantive law is altered during the pendency of an action, the rights of the parties are decided according to law, as it existed when the action was begun, unless the new statute shows a clear intention to vary such rights, i.e. in the absence of anything in the Act to say that it is to have retrospective operation, it cannot be so construed as to have the effect of altering the law applicable to a claim in litigation at the time when the Act is passed. Therefore, as the respondents had already a right and the substantive law was altered during the pendency of the proceedings, it is the old law that governs the said proceedings. Reliance was also placed in this connection in the cases of Mahendra Nath Gupta v. Moti Ram Rattan Chand, AIR 1975 Delhi 155 and A. F. Ferguson and Co. v. Lalit Mohan Ghosh AIR 1954 Patna 596. Reliance was also placed in this connection in the cases of Mahendra Nath Gupta v. Moti Ram Rattan Chand, AIR 1975 Delhi 155 and A. F. Ferguson and Co. v. Lalit Mohan Ghosh AIR 1954 Patna 596. Besides, the Act is a remedial piece of legislation and not a declaratory Act and thus, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Central Bank of India v. Their Workmen, AIR 1960 SC 12 and by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Kopparthi Satyanarayana v. Smt. Kopparti Seetharammamma, AIR 1963 Andh Pra 270 (FB), it could have had retrospective effect only by express terms or necessary intendment, a condition that does not exist in the amendment. In any case, even where two interpretations are possible, one giving retrospective effect to a law and the other merely prospective, the latter interpretation has to prevail. In addition, it was further contended by the respondents that the proceedings were complete at the time the amending Act came into force and since, as observed in the case of Nani Gopal Mitra v. State of Bihar, AIR 1970 SC 1636 , a statute should not be construed as to create new disabilities or obligations or impose new duties in respect of transactions which were complete at the time the amending Act came into force, the amended S.22 cannot be construed as having retrospective effect. Also, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Moti Ram v. Suraj Bhan, AIR 1960 SC 655 , it is well settled that where an amendment affects vested rights, the amendment would operate prospectively unless its retrospective operation follows as a matter of necessary implication or it is expressly retrospective. Reliance was also placed in the case of Mohd. Rashid Ahmad v. The State of U. P., AIR 1979 SC 592 . Prithiviraj Chunilal Sand v. Hari G. Parkhe, (1954) 56 Bom LR 1076 in support of the same view. 12. It is an admitted position that in all the petitions, the landlord/respondents had instituted proceedings against the petitioners for their eviction from the premises occupied by them on lease, inter alia, on the ground of non-payment of rents for three or more months. It is also common ground that, at the relevant time, the original unamended S.22 (2) (a) of the Act was in force. It is also common ground that, at the relevant time, the original unamended S.22 (2) (a) of the Act was in force. It becomes, therefore, necessary to analyse the said provision of law as it stood at to the material time of the institution of the eviction proceedings. 13. Section 22 (1) of the Act provides that a landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf. Sub-section (2) lays down that if the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the application, is satisfied that any of the grounds specified in its cls.(a) to (g) exists, shall make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building or, if not so satisfied, reject the application. The unamended clause (a) as runs under: "That the tenant is in arrears in payment of rent due by him in respect of the building for a total period of three months". It does not require much effort to arrive at a finding that bare arrears in payment of rent due by the tenant of a building for a total period of three months constituted a ground for his eviction from the premises occupied by him on lease and that the landlord had a right to seek eviction of his tenant on the aforesaid ground alone. Thus, in the event the tenant fell in default of payment of rent for a total period of three months, a cause of action would, under the said S.22 (2) (a) of the Act, accrue to the landlord to seek the eviction of such tenant and a right would be vested in him to evict the defaulter. It is not denied by the petitioners that they had not actually paid the rents for a total period of three months, though they gave some reasons therefor. Thus, it is clearly established that the respondents had a vrested right to get an order of eviction of the petitioners and a cause of action had accrued to them to seek such an order of eviction. 14. Thus, it is clearly established that the respondents had a vrested right to get an order of eviction of the petitioners and a cause of action had accrued to them to seek such an order of eviction. 14. Clause (a) of S.22 (2) was admittedly amended, the amendment having come into force on 27th May, 1976, the date on which the same was published in the Official Gazette, by virtue of S.1 (2) of the Amending Act which provided that the amendment shall come into force at once. The amended cl. (a) reads as follows:- "(a) that the tenant is in arrears in payment of rent due by him in respect of the building for a total period of three months and has failed to pay or tender such arrears of rent as are legally recoverable from him within 30 days from the receipt of or of the refusal of a registered notice served on him by the landlord for such arrears." A careful reading of the aforesaid cl. (a), as it stands at the present, shows that the Amendment consisted in adding to the requirement of arrears in the payment of rent for a total period of three months, the failure of the tenant to pay or tender the arrears within thirty days from the receipt of or of refusal of a registered notice served on him for such arrears. In other words, the original ground of arrears in the payment of the rents for a total period of three months for seeking eviction was qualified by the need of serving a notice on the tenant demanding the payment and the failure of the latter in paying or tendering such arrears of rent to the landlord. Therefore, though the ground for the eviction continues basically the same (the nonpayment of rent for a total period of three months), the fact remains that, by virtue of the amendment, there exists a modification and a cause of action accrues to the landlord and a right to get an order of eviction vests in him only after the tenant fails to pay or tender the arrears within thirty days from the service of or refusal of the notice demanding such arrears. It was contended by the petitioners that the Act is a beneficial piece of legislation, enacted to protect the interests of the tenant and, therefore, it is, in the light of its scope, that the amendment is to be looked into for the purpose of arriving at a finding as to whether or not it has got retrospective effect. Thus, the statement of objects and reasons for the amendment becomes relevant. Such statement of objects and reasons makes it clear that the amendment was intended to eliminate the mischief arising out of the original S.22 since no notice was required to be given to the tenant, though such notice was required by the Transfer of Property Act. Hence, it was submitted, the amendment is necessarily to be applied retrospectively, I am, however, unable to persuade myself to accept this view. In fact, the statement of objects and reasons for moving a bill for the amendment of the Act serves only the purpose of showing what is the mischief intended to be eliminated through the amendment. It is solely meant to justify the need for the amendment and has nothing to do with the prospective or retrospective effect of the amendment, such effect being to be gathered from the amending Act itself. Besides, it is a fundamental rule of law that a statute shall not be construed as having retrospective effect, unless such retrospective effect is expressly provided in the Act or is to be necessarily implied from its language. There is nothing in the Goa, Daman and Diu Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control (Amendment) Act, 1976, either express or of necessary implication, to warrant the contention of the petitioners that the amendment is to be applied with retrospective effect. Therefore, in the absence of any such thing, it would be erroneous to hold that the amendment has retrospective effect. 15. Irrespective of this aspect of the case, it is pertinent to note that the Act is not a declaratory legislation, but remedial and, therefore, unless so declared expressly, or that much is necessarily to be implied, it has to be prospective. 15. Irrespective of this aspect of the case, it is pertinent to note that the Act is not a declaratory legislation, but remedial and, therefore, unless so declared expressly, or that much is necessarily to be implied, it has to be prospective. Indeed, as observed in the case of the Central Bank of India v. Their Workmen (AIR, 1960 SC 12) (supra), a remedial Act, unlike a declaratory one is not necessarily retrospective, for it may be enlarging or restraining and it takes effect prospectively, unless it has retrospective effect by express terms or necessary intendment. Similar was also the view taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Kopparthi Satyanarayana v. Smt, Kopparti Seetharamamma (above) (AIR 1963 Andh Pra 270 (FB)). In addition, it becomes also necessary to consider that under the original unamended S.22 (2) (a) a right had vested in the respondents to obtain an order of eviction on the failure of the tenant to pay the rent for a total period of three months and they actually had instituted eviction proceedings on the ground of arrears of rent for a total period of three months. Now, as already observed, the amendment modified this right, subjecting it to the serving of a demand notice on the tenant and the latter's failure to pay or tender the arrears within thirty days from the service of the notice or of its refusal. It is an admitted position that proceedings were already pending against the petitioners at the time the amendment came into force. This being so, the rights of the parties had to be decided in accordance with the law, as it existed at the initiation of the eviction proceedings. I am fortified in this view by the rulings of the Delhi and Patna High Courts in the cases of Mahendra Nath v. Moti Ram Rattan Chand (AIR 1975 Delhi 155) and A. F. Ferguson and Co. I am fortified in this view by the rulings of the Delhi and Patna High Courts in the cases of Mahendra Nath v. Moti Ram Rattan Chand (AIR 1975 Delhi 155) and A. F. Ferguson and Co. v. V. Lalit Mohan (above) ( AIR 1954 Pat 596 ), as well as of the Supreme Court in the case of K. C. Dora v. G. Annamanaidu ( AIR 1974 SC 1069 ), wherein, after quoting from Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, it was observed that in the absence of anything in the Act to say that it is to have retrospective operation, the same cannot be construed as to have the effect of altering the law applicable to a claim is litigation at the time the Act is passed. It is also very pertinent to recall that when the Amendment came into operation, respondents had already exercised their right under the unamended S.22 (2) (a) and, in that sense, they had completed their action. In N. G. Mitra v. State of Bihar (AIR, 1970 SC 1636) (supra) it was observed that a statute should not be construed as to create new disabilities or obligations or impose new duties in, respect of transactions which were complete at the time of the amending Act came into force. Obviously, the amended cl.(a) imposes a new duty on the landlord and, therefore, once the respondents had already exercised their right, the new duty of serving of notice as a precondition to initiate eviction proceedings cannot operate retrospectively. In any case, it is well settled that where an amendment affects vested rights, the Amendment would operate prospectively unless its retrospective, operation falls as a matter of necessary implication or it is expressly made retrospective. I am fortified in this view by the rulings in the case of Prithviraj Chunilal v. Hari Ganesh (1954-56 Bom LR 1076) (supra) and of the Supreme Court in Moti Ram v. Suraj Bhan ( AIR 1960 SC 655 ) and of Mohd. Rashid Ahmed v. State of U. P. ( AIR 1979 SC 592 ) (both referred to above). 16. Rashid Ahmed v. State of U. P. ( AIR 1979 SC 592 ) (both referred to above). 16. Petitioners placed reliance in the cases of Rafiquennessa v. Lal Bahadur Chetri ( AIR 1964 SC 1511 ), S.B.Oil Mills v. Subhash Chandra ( AIR 1961 SC 1596 ), Mohanlal v. Tribhovan ( AIR 1963 SC 358 ), Safali Roy v. A. K. Dutta ( AIR 1976 SC 1810 ), Ganesh Flour Mills Company Ltd. v. Ramesh Chand (1979-2 Ren CJ 418) (Delhi) and A. Krishnaswami v. Rasheeda (1981-1 Ren CJ 320) (Mad) in support of their contentions that since the Act is beneficial legislation, it operates retrospectively. Though, at the outset, I may say that none of these authorities help the case of the petitioners, it will be expedient to analyse them. 17. In the case of Rafiquennessa v. Lal Bahadur Chetri ( AIR 1964 SC 1511 ), it was held that where vested rights are affected by any statutory provisions, the said provisions should normally be construed to be prospective in operation and not retrospective, unless the provision in question relates merely to a procedural matter. The legislature is competent to take away vested rights by means of retrospective legislation. Similarly, the legislature is undoubtedly competent to make laws which override and materially affect the terms of contracts between the parties; but unless a clear and unambiguous intention is indicated by the legislature by adopting suitable express words in that behalf, no provision of a statute should be given retrospective operation if by such operation vested rights are likely to be affected. It was further observed that retrospective operation of a statutory provision can be inferred even in cases where such retrospective operation appears to be clearly implicit in the provision construed in the context where it occurs. As already observed, respondents had accrued a right to get an order of eviction. They had, therefore, a vested right which would be affected by the retrospective operation of the amendment which otherwise does not express in clear manner the intention to make the operation of the amendment retrospective. Hence, this ruling of the Supreme Court actually runs counter against the petitioner's cases. 18. In S.B. K. Oil Mills v. Subhash Chandra Sinha, ( AIR 1961 SC 1596 ), it was held that a section may be prospective in some parts and retrospective in other parts. Hence, this ruling of the Supreme Court actually runs counter against the petitioner's cases. 18. In S.B. K. Oil Mills v. Subhash Chandra Sinha, ( AIR 1961 SC 1596 ), it was held that a section may be prospective in some parts and retrospective in other parts. It further held that while it is the ordinary rule that substantive rights should not be held to be taken away except by express provision or clear implication, many Acts, though prospective in form, have been given retrospective operation, if the intention of the Legislature is apparent. These observations were made while construing the provisions of S.12, Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, namely its sub-sec. (1). But while holding that the said sub-sec. (1) was retrospective in its operation, the Supreme Court approved its earlier decision and that of this Court to the effect that sub-secs. (2) and (3) of S.12 of the aforesaid Act had only prospective effect. Curiously enough, the said sub-secs. (2) (3) are akin to the amended cl. (a) of the Act. This being so, this authority also, in fact, helps the respondents and not the petitioners. 19. In Mohanlal Chunilal Kothari v. Tribhovan Haribhai Tamboli ( AIR 1963 SC 358 ), it was held that the Court is bound to apply the law as it finds on the date of its judgment. In the said case, the appellants were landlords and the respondents tenants in possession of certain lands situated in the erstwhile State of Baroda before it became part of Bombay. The Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act was extended to Baroda on 1-8-1949. The suits had been instituted on the basis that the respondents had become trespassers on the service of notice in March 1950 with effect from the beginning of the new agricultural season in May, 1951. Respondents did not comply with the terms of the notice and continued in possession of the lands, to which they had been inducted and therefore the landlords instituted the suits for possession. These suits were decreed and second appeal was dismissed. During the pendency of the suit at the appellate stage, a second notification had been issued under S.88 (1), Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 cancelling the first Notification. It was in such background that the Supreme Court gave the above ruling. These suits were decreed and second appeal was dismissed. During the pendency of the suit at the appellate stage, a second notification had been issued under S.88 (1), Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 cancelling the first Notification. It was in such background that the Supreme Court gave the above ruling. The right that the appellants had in that case to get possession of the lands by virtue of the first Notification had been taken away by the second Notification and, therefore, such Notification had necessarily retrospective effect, particularly when it was meant to protect the rights that some people had before the first Notification which rights had been taken away by the same Notification. The factual position before me is completely different, being pertinent to note that it is not the case of either party that the right of the landlord to seek eviction of the tenant for nonpayment of rents had been taken away. In fact, the case of the petitioners is only that such rights were qualified by the amendment. In the circumstances, the above ruling of the Supreme Court is not, in my opinion, attracted to the facts of the case before me. 20. In Smt. Safali Roy Chowdhary v. A.K. Dutta, ( AIR 1976 SC 1810 ) it was held that when the legislature in exercise of its sovereign powers regulates the relations of landlord and tenant, altering or abridging their rights, what it does is not transfer of property attracting the doctrine of lis pendens. However, this ruling is not attracted at all to the facts of the cases before me, because, in the case dealt by the Supreme Court, the new Act has conferred a new status to the said tenant and, therefore, the said ruling has been given on entirely different footing. 21. In the Ganesh Flour Mills Company Ltd. v. Ramesh Chard (1979 (2) Ren CJ 418), the Delhi High Court, relying upon the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohanlal Chunilal Kohari (above), ( AIR 1963 SC 358 ), held that the Court is bound to apply the law as it finds on the date of the judgment. I need not repeat the observations made by me to hold that the aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court is not applicable to the cases before me. I need not repeat the observations made by me to hold that the aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court is not applicable to the cases before me. Suffices to say that for the same reasons, the above ruling of the Delhi High Court is of no help to the case of the petitioners. 22. In A. Krishnaswami v. S.Rasheeda (1981-1 Ren CJ 320) (Mad), it was held in the facts of that case that the doctrine of election could not be a defence and that the plea of estoppel by conduct or promise is not maintainable against a statute. This ruling does not appear to have any relevance for the cases of the petitioners. 23. The contention of the petitioners that the eviction orders made against them are ab initio null and void is, as such, unsustainable and devoid of substance. In fact, in the absence of express provision giving retrospective operation to the amendment, nor the language of the amendment clearly and unambiguously implying such retrospective intendment by the legislature, I am bound to hold that the said amendment of S.22 of the Act is merely prospective in its operation, specially when a right had been vested in the landlords and they had actually exercised such right. 24. The next contention of the petitioners had been that in any case, even if the notice was not required, no order could have been made by virtue of sub-sec. (3) to S.22 introduced by the Amendment. Sub-sec. (3) provides that no order of eviction of a tenant shall be made on the ground specified in cl. (a) of sub-sec. (2) if the tenant within thirty days of the service of the summons of the proceedings on him, pays or tenders to the landlord or deposits with the Controller the arrears of the rent due by him up to the date of such payment, tender or deposit together with the cost of the application. A plain reading of the aforesaid provision is sufficient to show that the same is necessarily to be construed as prospective, for its retrospective operation is patently impracticable. It indeed requires the tenant to pay or tender to the landlord or deposit with the Controller the arrears of rent up to the date of the payment together with the costs of the applicationwithin thirty days of the service of the summons of the proceedings. It indeed requires the tenant to pay or tender to the landlord or deposit with the Controller the arrears of rent up to the date of the payment together with the costs of the applicationwithin thirty days of the service of the summons of the proceedings. Naturally, if such thirty days period of time had already lapsed, as otherwise happens in the cases of all the petitioners, it does not stand to reason that the operation of the said sub-section operates retrospectively. Therefore, here also the contention of the petitioners is unsustainable. 25. Petitioners submitted also that notwithstanding the merits of their earlier contentions in respect of the retrospective operation of the amendment of Section 22 of the Act and its consequences, the eviction orders are vitiated, even in the light of the aforesaid provision of law as it stood before the Amendment. In fact, it was argued that where proceedings were instituted under S.22 (2) (a), the provisions of S.32 (4) of the Act were not applicable by virture of the proviso to the unamended S.22 (2) of the Act. The said proviso laid down that notwithstanding anything contained in S.32, the Rent Controller, it satisfied that the tenant's default to pay or tender rent was not without reasonable cause, may give the tenant a reasonable time, not exceeding 30 days to pay or tender the rent due. Therefore, it was argued, if the Controller may give the tenant reasonable time to pay or tender rent due, notwithstanding anything contained in S.32, it becomes clear that the proviso was excluding the operation of S.32 in cases filed under S.22 (2) of the Act. It was, however, contended by the respondents that both the provisions have to be construed harmoniously and, therefore, considering their wording, it clear that the proviso to S.22 (2) operates only in the event the tenant's default is established, either by his admission or otherwise, whereas S.32 comes into picture only in cases where the ten an intends to contest and does not admit the default. Secondly, the proviso applies only to the default prior to the institution of the eviction proceedings, whereas S.32 (4) comes into operation only in the event the default occurs pending the proceedings. I find myself to some extent in agreement with the respondents in this point. Secondly, the proviso applies only to the default prior to the institution of the eviction proceedings, whereas S.32 (4) comes into operation only in the event the default occurs pending the proceedings. I find myself to some extent in agreement with the respondents in this point. Indeed, the proviso to S.22 (2) laid down that if the Controller was satisfied that the tenant's default to pay or tender rent was not without reasonable cause, he might, notwithstanding anything contained in S.32, give the tenant reasonable time not exceeding 30 days to pay or tender the rent due. Analysing the aforesaid provision of law, it becomes clear that there are two requisite conditions for the Controller to act under the said proviso, namely (1) that the tenant is in default and (2) that such default is not without reasonable cause. Now, considering that S.22 (2) (a), as it stood before the amendment, was providing that the Controller should make the order of eviction of the tenant if, after giving the later a reasonable opportunity of showing cause is satisfied that the same tenant is in arrears in payment of rent due for a total period of three months, it becomes apparent that the satisfaction of the Controller that the tenant is in default, spoken about in the proviso, could have been arrived at only by admission of the default by the tenant himself. The second requisite, viz. that the default is not without reasonable cause has, therefore, to be looked into only in case the first condition is satisfied. Hence, it follows that only when the default of payment of rent for a total period of three months was admitted and it was further summarily established that such default was not without reasonable cause, the Controller could give opportunity to the tenant to pay or tender the rent due and this notwithstanding anything contained in S.32. It is, as such, necessary to analyse the said S.32 which provides for payment or deposit of rent during pendency of the proceedings for eviction. It is, as such, necessary to analyse the said S.32 which provides for payment or deposit of rent during pendency of the proceedings for eviction. Section 32 lays down that no tenant against whom proceedings for eviction has been instituted by a landlord under the Act shall be entitled to contest the proceedings unless he has paid to the landlord or deposited all the arrears of rent, due in respect of the building up to the date of the payment and continues to pay and to deposit any rent that may subsequently become due till the termination of the proceedings. In other words, S.32 bars the tenant from contesting a proceedings for his eviction unless he pays or deposits the rents due and continues to pay or deposit any further rents that become due in the course of the proceedings. Thus, it is manifest that the provision of S.32 comes into operation only in the event the tenant wishes to contest the proceedings, because either he does not admit, in a case instituted on the ground of nonpayment of rent, to be defaulter, or he was unable to summarily satisfy the Controller that the default was not without reasonable cause. Indeed, there may be cases where a defaulting tenant can easily and summarily that the default was not without reasonable cause, as there may be other cases where this can be shown and established only after elaborate evidence. Thus, the proviso was attracted only in cases where the tenant has admitted the default and has further satisfied summarily the Controller that such default was not without reasonable cause, whereas S.32 applies only to cases where the tenant wishes to contest the proceedings, either on the footing that he is not in default or because, though he admits to be in default, he has been unable to summarily satisfy the Controller that the default was not without reasonable cause and needs to adduce evidence therefor. Hence, the expression notwithstanding anything contained in S.32appearing in the proviso is to be construed as meaning that the tenant, who admitted his default but was unable to summarily satisfy the Controller, is entitled to prove in the proceedings that his default was not without reasonable cause provided that before contesting the proceedings he pays or deposits the rent due and continues, to pay or deposit such rents which became due during the proceedings. It follows, therefore, that the contention of the petitioners is devoid of substance and the operation of the proviso to S.22 (2) in no manner constitutes a bar to act under S.32 (4) of the Act. 26. Having discussed and dealt with the submissions which are common to all the petitions, it becomes now necessary to deal with the contentions peculiar to each case. In Petition No. 2/B/77 the petitioner's case is that the Rent Controller did not give reasons for passing the eviction order, namely whether the petitioner's default was without reasonable cause. It is further the case of the petitioner that the Administrative Tribunal has attempted to fill in the gap and in any event, no eviction order could have been made, for the petitioner, having been served with summons in the proceedings of 21st June, 1974, deposited the rents due on 9-7-1974. These submissions of the petitioners, however, hold no water. Indeed, on going through the eviction order, it is clear that the Rent Controller did consider that, in the circumstances of the case, the defence set out by the petitioner was not to be believed and in any event, if the respondent was refusing to receive the rents. It was the duty of the petitioner to remit them by Money Order, as otherwise it appears that he has done twice in the past. He found also that the petitioner has not made any attempt to pay the arrears of rent till the institution of the proceedings and, in addition, had been irregular in the payment of the rents in the past. Therefore, he held that the petitioner has failed to make a case to give him the benefit of the proviso to S.22 of the Act. In these circumstances, it is wrong to say that the learned Rent Controller did not give reasons and that the Administrative Tribunal filled in a gap that was not actually existing. Both the Controller and the Administrative Tribunal arrived at a concurrent finding that the petitioner had not been regular in the payment of the rents and was actually in default of payment of rents for a total period of three months at the initiation of the proceedings. It was further held that the story of the petitioner that the respondent had refused to receive the rent was not proved. It was further held that the story of the petitioner that the respondent had refused to receive the rent was not proved. Reasonable cause, as correctly observed by the Administrative Tribunal, is a cause that a prudent man accepts as reasonable. The test to assess the reasonableness of the cause for default is, therefore, to find whether in the judgment of a common prudent man the cause is such that any normal man would, in the same or similar circumstances, be also a defaulter. The application of this test does not help the petitioner and as such, both the Rent Controller and the Administrative Tribunal correctly held that the petitioner had no reasonable cause for being in default in the payment of the rents and to benefit of the proviso to S.22 of the Act. This being the case, the fact that the petitioner deposited the rent within 30 days from the serving of the summons of the institution of the proceedings, does not help him, for the benefit embodied in the aforesaid proviso is to be given only when the default in the payment of rent was not without reasonable cause, 27. In Petition No. 165/B/75, it was contended that the Rent Controller did not apply his mind to S.21 of the Act and, therefore, has failed to appreciate that the petition before him could not have been construed as an application under S.22 (2) (a) of the Act. In fact, the petitioner's case has been that he was occupying the premises as a prospective purchaser and the monthly amount he was paying was to be adjusted in the consideration agreed for the sale of the building. In addition, in the application filed before the Rent Controller, respondent/applicant did practically give up the ground of non-payment of rent to advance the ground of authorised alterations made in the premises. Such ground, however, is not available under S.22 of the Act. In addition, in the application filed before the Rent Controller, respondent/applicant did practically give up the ground of non-payment of rent to advance the ground of authorised alterations made in the premises. Such ground, however, is not available under S.22 of the Act. The learned counsel for the respondent however contended that the question of whether or not a relationship of landlord and tenant existed was to be decided by the Controller under the proviso to S.21 and, in the present case, the Controller, being satisfied that such relationship was existing, had correctly acted under S.22 of the Act, the ground of alteration having been averred only for the purpose of showing that, besides the ground of arrears of rent, the aforesaid additional ground would alone warrant the eviction of the petitioner. Both the Rent Controller and the Administrative Tribunal dealt with the issue and after elaborate discussion arrived at the concurrent finding that the relationship of landlord and tenant existed. This concurrent finding is be accepted by this Court, if not for other reasons, because, in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, the Court is not sitting in appeal or revision. Hence, the contention of the petitioner that the Rent Controller failed to appreciate that the application was falling under S.21 and was outside the purview of S.22 is entirely erroneous and unacceptable. Insofar as the ground of unauthorised alterations, a plain reading of the application before the Controller suffices to show its fallacy. In fact, what is averred is that, irrespective of nonpayment of the arrears of rent, the unauthorised alteration of the premises would alone be a ground for eviction. This does not take the application for eviction out of the sphere of S.22, for the eviction had been sought also on the ground of default in payment of rents. Naturally, the ground of untauthorised alterations was not, as actually was not to be, considered. 28. In Petition No. 19/B/79, it was submitted that the landlord was residing in Bombay and was coming to Goa from time to time. As a result, there was no uniform manner to pay the rents and the default in payment of the same rents was not without reasonable cause. It was further argued that a liberal construction is to be given to the expression "reasonable cause" so as to protect a bona fide tenant. As a result, there was no uniform manner to pay the rents and the default in payment of the same rents was not without reasonable cause. It was further argued that a liberal construction is to be given to the expression "reasonable cause" so as to protect a bona fide tenant. Correctly, it was further argued, the Administrative Tribunal held that "reasonable cause" should be construed as a "not wilful" cause and the petitioner, definitely, has not committed such a default. It was, however, contended by the respondent that the petitioner had been in default in the payment of the rents for long periods, being a fact that the payment of rent was to be made in the terms of the contract of lease. In any case, the petitioner had been given notice before the filing of the application for eviction on 30-3-74, the petition having been filed only on 16-5-74. In spite of such notice, petitioner has not paid the rents and hence, no reasonable cause existed for his default. It is an admitted position that the petitioner had been often in arrears in the payment of rent and that, at the time of the filing of the application, he was in default for a period of more than three months. Petitioner's case is that since the respondent was residing in Bombay there was no uniform manner to pay the rent. This is denied by the respondent and both the Rent Controller and the Administrative Tribunal did not accept the version of the petitioner as being true. As already observed, it is not proper for this Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction to go into the merits of findings of fact. Therefore, even taking the most liberal construction of the expression "reasonable cause" found on the proviso to S.22 (2), such construction will never help the petitioner, for he has not shown any cause at all. And in any event, a cause to be reasonable should be not only not wilful but should also be such that a prudent man, in his judgment, would find it to be reasonable. Petitioner has not shown any such cause, specially when a notice was given to him on 30-3-74 and he has failed to pay the arrears of rent, at least, till the filing of the application on 16-5-74 i.e. about 1½ months after the service of the notice. 29. Petitioner has not shown any such cause, specially when a notice was given to him on 30-3-74 and he has failed to pay the arrears of rent, at least, till the filing of the application on 16-5-74 i.e. about 1½ months after the service of the notice. 29. In Petition No. 28/B/77, the petitioners' case is that after the institution of the eviction proceedings they had paid not only the rents due but also rents in advance and had been assured by the landlord that proceedings would be withdrawn. In these premises and since the rents had been in the past paid in lump sums and in respect of several months at a time, petitioners in good faith and not wilfully did not pay the rents for three months during the pendency of the proceedings. Therefore, there was reasonable cause for default and the Rent Controller was wrong in making the eviction order under S.32 (4) as also wrong was the Administrative Tribunal in confirming it. Section 32 (4) provides for a notice to the tenant who defaults in the payment of the rent during the pendency of eviction proceedings. If the tenant shows sufficient cause for the default, then no order under the said sub-s. (4), stopping the proceedings can be made. The Rent Controller and the Administrative Tribunal held with cogent reasons that, in the facts of the case, no such sufficient cause has been shown by the petitioners, I fully concur in such finding, for it is hard to understand why the petitioners failed to pay or deposit the rents in the pendency of the proceedings although the same proceedings had been instituted on the very same ground and though the respondent had not withdrawn it, as allegedly he had promised. The facts imply that the whole story of the petitioners is false. Hence, I find that this is not a fit case for the interference of this Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, specially when the petitioner entirely failed to show a satisfactory and sufficient cause for his failure to pay the rents due in the pendency of the eviction proceedings, 30. Hence, I find that this is not a fit case for the interference of this Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, specially when the petitioner entirely failed to show a satisfactory and sufficient cause for his failure to pay the rents due in the pendency of the eviction proceedings, 30. In Petition No. 136/B/78, petitioner submits that, though under the lease contract the rents were to be paid at the residence of the landlord at Verem, the fact remains that the same landlord used to receive them at the shop of one Damodar Naik at Panaji. Therefore, in conformity to the practice that was going on, petitioner deposited the rent with the said Damodar Naik but respondent refused to accept it. Therefore, there was sufficient cause for the non-payment of the rent pending the eviction proceedings. Irrespective of the alleged practice, it does not appear to me that the cause shown by the petitioner was sufficient to avoid an eviction order. In fact, admittedly, in spite of the said alleged practice, respondent has initiated the eviction proceedings under S.22 of the Act and, therefore, if at all respondent has refused to receive the rents, it was incumbent upon the petitioner to remit the rents by Money Order as provided by S.17 (3) of the Act. Having failed to do so, the cause shown is not satisfactory and, therefore, rightly was not considered as sufficient cause by the Rent Controller and the Administrative Tribunal. 31. In Petition No. 113/B/77, it was contended that, first of all, petitioner has deposited the rent due within 30 days of the notice of the proceedings having been served on him. Therefore, he was benefiting of the proviso to S.22 (2) (a) of the Act and no eviction order could have been made against him. Secondly, admittedly, the lease has been created by the late Dr. Arminio R. Santana, father of respondent 1. On the death of Dr. Arminio, the said building was devolved on one of his daughters, who is a resident of Pakistan. Respondent 1 is not, therefore, a landlord, the extended definition given by the Act being of no help. In any event, by virtue of sub-s. (3) to S.22, no order of eviction could have been made since the petitioner has deposited the rents due within 30 days of the date of the summons of the proceedings served on him. Respondent 1 is not, therefore, a landlord, the extended definition given by the Act being of no help. In any event, by virtue of sub-s. (3) to S.22, no order of eviction could have been made since the petitioner has deposited the rents due within 30 days of the date of the summons of the proceedings served on him. None of these submissions is, however, sustainable. In fact, and in so far as the payment of deposit of rents due within 30 days of the serving of the summons, it is pertinent to note that sub-s. (3) was introduced by the 1976 Amendment and it is prospective in operation as its very wording makes exceedingly clear. It indeed provides that no order for eviction of a tenant shall be made on the ground specified in cl.(a) of sub-s. (2), if the tenant pays or deposits the rent along with the cost of the application within 30 days of the serving of the summons. The requirement of the payment or deposit within 30 days of serving of the summons unmistakenly makes the provision prospective in nature, for if the said period of 30 days had lapsed at the time of the coming into force of the said sub-s. (3), obviously the provisions could not be applied to the past with retrospective effect. Therefore, the payment made by the petitioner has to be appreciated in the light of the proviso to S.22 (2) of the Act and it is necessary to see whether reasonable cause was shown for the default. Both the Rent Controller and the Administrative Tribunal held that the alleged repairs done by the petitioner were not proved and, therefore, the reason given for the default was not reasonable. On this concurrent finding of fact, I find no fault in the conclusion that no reasonable cause was shown by the petitioner. 32. Petitioners, placing reliance the case of Nanalal Girdharlal v. Gulamnabi Jamalbhai Motorwala, AIR 1973 Guj 131 (FB), contended that respondent 1 was not a landlord within the meaning thereof in S.22 of the Act, for, admittedly, he is merely attorney for his sister who is the owner of the house. And the extended definition of landlord is of no avail for proceedings under the aforesaid provisions of the Act. And the extended definition of landlord is of no avail for proceedings under the aforesaid provisions of the Act. The learned counsel for respondent 1, however, strongly opposed this view and argued that it is not disputed that petitioner had been paying rents to respondent 1 and that information about the collapsing of a wall of the leased building had been given to the same respondent. Hence, it was submitted, respondent 1 is for the purpose of the Act landlord, as defined in S.2 (j). This definition is to be read into S.22, for it is general for the purpose of the Act and unlike what happens in respect of S.23, such meaning was not excluded in the aforesaid S.22. I am one with the learned counsel for respondent 1 on this point. In fact, S.2 (j) of the Act defines landlord as a person who, for the time being, is receiving, or is entitled to receive, the rent of any building, whether on his own account or on account of, or on behalf of, or for the benefit of, any other person or as a trustee, guardian or receiver for any other person or who so receives the rent or be entitled to receive the rent, if the premises were let to a tenant. It is not disputed that respondent 1 is power-of-attorney holder for the owner of the building and that the rents were received by him in that capacity from the petitioner. Therefore, respondent comes squarely within the definition of landlord given in S.2 (j), the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Nanalal Girdharlal v. Gulamnabi Motorwala (supra) to the effect that the extended definition of the word 'landlord' given in S.5 (3), Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act cannot be projected in Ss.12 and 13 (1) thereof having no bearing on the cases before me. However, most relevant is the observation made therein, at page 141 of the AIR Report, that the artificial meaning given in the definition clause would apply if there is nothing repugnant in the subject or context, for not only there is nothing repugnant to, the extended definition of landlord in S.22 of the Act, but on the contrary, the same definition is under the scheme of the Act and in the context of the said provision, entirely consistent with it. Pertinent to note is that the Act specifically excludes such extended meaning whenever a different one is to be given, as it happens in S.23 where an explanation was added, giving a special meaning to the word 'landlord' in the aforesaid section. The contention of the petitioner that respondent 1 is not landlord for the purposes of S.22 of the Act, is, as such, not correct and is unsustainable. 33. Petitioner further contended that the owner of the building is admittedly residing for many years in Pakistan and that under the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1968 no foreigner can hold property without the permission of the Reserve Bank of India. The power-of-attorney in favour of respondent 1 is, therefore, contrary to the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1968 and, as such, the same power-of-attorney is null and void by virtue of S.23 of the Act and as a result, the same respondent would have no jurisdiction to manage and administer the properties. Hence, the eviction order made by the Rent Controller is vitiated and liable to be set aside. This submission, however, does not stand and is unacceptable since there is no evidence at all to establish that the aforesaid sister of respondent 1, owner of the building, though residing in Pakistan, is a foreigner and not an Indian citizen. This being so, manifestly the provisions of the aforesaid Act are not attracted. 34. Coming now to the Writ Petition No. 178/B/82, it was submitted that the original application filed by the respondent under S.22 of the Act was dismissed by the Rent Controller on 18-4-1973 and the appeal preferred against the said Order was also dismissed by the Administrative Tribunal. These orders were, however, set aside by the Judicial Commissioner in a writ petition filed by respondent 1 herein and the matter was remanded to the Rent Controller with a direction to decide it after considering two issues mentioned by the Judicial Commissioner in his judgment. Therefore, it was argued, the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller was restricted to deal with the points on which the case has been remanded and as such, it was not open to the said Rent Controller to deal with the application filed under S.32 (4) of the Act as he did. Therefore, it was argued, the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller was restricted to deal with the points on which the case has been remanded and as such, it was not open to the said Rent Controller to deal with the application filed under S.32 (4) of the Act as he did. The argument does not however hold scrutiny, since the Orders of the Rent Controller and the Administrative Tribunal were actually set aside by the Judicial Commissioner though on the ground that two relevant issues had not been considered and the matter was remanded to be decided afresh by the Rent Controller, bearing in mind the issues mentioned in the judgment. This being so, it is wrong to say that the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller way is restricted to decide only those two issues mentioned in the judgment of the Hon'ble Judicial Commissioner. And since thereafter the proceedings were pending, there was no bar for the Rent Controller acting under S.32 (4) of the Act, which provides that if a tenant fails to pay or deposit the rent as required in the section, the Controller or the appellate or revisional authority, shall stop further proceedings and make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building, unless the tenant shows sufficient cause to the contrary. It was further contended that in any event, the Controller ought to have considered that a sufficient cause existed for the petitioner to be in default in the payment of the rent, because an application had been filed by him asking the Controller to fix what was the monthly rent. The Controller did not make any such fixation of rent and, on the contrary, straightway made the eviction order. Here again, petitioner's contention has no substance, for, as correctly observed by the Rent Controller, the point of the fixation of the quantum of the monthly rent had been already settled before and, therefore, there was no reason for fixing it again. Thus, since the cause shown to explain the default in payment or to deposit the rent during the pendency of the proceedings was not sufficient, the Rent Controller was quite justified, in the circumstances, to make the eviction order. 35. Thus, since the cause shown to explain the default in payment or to deposit the rent during the pendency of the proceedings was not sufficient, the Rent Controller was quite justified, in the circumstances, to make the eviction order. 35. In the Writ, Petition No. 64/B/77, petitioner contended that the rent was paid within 30 days of the serving of the summons of the proceeding on him and a reasonable cause was shown for the delay. However, the Rent Controller and the Administrative Tribunal arrived at a different finding which is entirely against the evidence on record. The aforesaid eviction is based on some findings of fact of both the Rent Controller and the Administrative Tribunal. Therefore, there are concurrent findings on facts and such findings cannot be challenged in a writ petition. However, the question that arises is whether, on those facts, the petitioner had shown a reasonable cause as to benefit of the proviso to S.22 (2) (a) of the Act. Admittedly, the petitioner was in default of payment of the rents for the months of January and February, 1974 and that after being served with the notice on 30-3-74 he deposited the same rents. The case of the petitioner is that there was a dispute about the date on which the rents were to be paid, for according to the respondent such rents were to be paid up to the 10th of the subsequent month, whereas according to the petitioner no date has been fixed. The Rent Controller after discussing the evidence before him, arrived at the finding that according to the contract, as admitted by the petitioner himself, the rent was to be paid up to the 10th of the subsequent month. It is an admitted fact that the petitioner has not paid the rents of the aforesaid two months within the time stipulated in the lease agreement, but he remitted them afterwards. The respondent refused to accept the said Money Order, on the ground, that the rents had been sent to him beyond the said 10th day of the month. Besides, in any case, and within 30 days of the serving of the notice of the proceeding, admittedly, the petitioner deposited the rents due. The respondent refused to accept the said Money Order, on the ground, that the rents had been sent to him beyond the said 10th day of the month. Besides, in any case, and within 30 days of the serving of the notice of the proceeding, admittedly, the petitioner deposited the rents due. Therefore, in the circumstances of the case, where there was admittedly a dispute about the date of payment of rents and when the petitioner remitted the rents due by Money Order and where he deposited the rent within 30 days, petitioner has shown a reasonable cause for his default and as such, it appears to me that it was only fair and proper to give him the benefit of the proviso to S.22 (2) (a) of the Act. The learned Rent Controller, therefore, was not justified to make the eviction order and the Administrative Tribunal had been consequently wrong in confirming the aforesaid eviction order which is as a result, liable to be set aside. 36. In this view of the matter and for the reasons given above, the petition,except writ petition No. 64/B/77, fail and are consequently dismissed with costs. The rule issued of those petitions is discharged. However, the Rule issued in Petition No. 64/B/77 is made absolute in terms of prayer (a). Costs in this petition by respondent 1. 37. The learned advocates appearing for the petitioners in Writ Petitions Nos. 165/B/75, 28/B/77, 136/B/78, 19/B/79, 113/B/77, 178/B/82 and 2/B/77 submit that the petitioners intend to prefer Letters Patent appeal and as such, pray that the execution of the eviction Orders be stayed for four weeks. The execution of the above Order is accordingly stayed, but for a period of fifteen days form today only. Order accordingly.