JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. - This is a decree holder's appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the Civil Judge, Agra, dated April 8, 1974, rejecting its execution application as barred by limitation. 2. The material facts are these. Suit No. 234 of 1950 was filed by the Appellant for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 1,25,872/8/6 on account of price of certain cotton bales and oil supplied. On 31-3-1955, the suit was decreed with pendente lite and future interest. An appeal brought against the said decree to this Court was dismissed on 6-4-1973. After the dismissal of the appeal, the Appellant moved an application for execution for Rs. 1,81,732.18 Paise. 3. The execution application was contested by the judgment debtors Loon Karan Sethia and N.K. Patni. The main objection was that of limitation. It was alleged that in view of Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the execution application had become barred by time. The decree, according to the judgment debtors, was passed on 31-3-1955. As the execution was never stayed, it was an enforceable decree and ought to have been put into execution within twelve years of its being passed. 4. The learned Civil Judge, who was the executing Court, upheld the objection and dismissed the execution application. Being aggrieved, the decree holder has come to this Court. 5. The only question that arises for determination in this case is about limitation. The material part of Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963, runs as follows: * * * * 6. The corresponding Article in the Old Limitation Act was Article 182. Section 48 of the CPC dealt with the period of limitation for executing the decree. 7. While considering the question of amendment of the Limitation Act, the Law Commission gave the following reasons for enacting the present Article 136. Article 182 (old) has been a very fruitful source of litigation and is a weapon in the hands of both the dishonest decree holder and the dishonest judgment debtor. It has given rise to innumerable decisions. The commentary in Rustomji's Limitation Act (5th Edition) on this Article itself covers nearly 200 pages. Article 182 (old) has been a very fruitful source of litigation and is a weapon in the hands of both the dishonest decree holder and the dishonest judgment debtor. It has given rise to innumerable decisions. The commentary in Rustomji's Limitation Act (5th Edition) on this Article itself covers nearly 200 pages. In our opinion the maximum period of limitation for the execution of a decree or order of any Civil Court should be 12 years from the date when the decree or order became enforceable (which is usually the date of the decree) or where the decree or subsequent order directs any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods the date of the default in making the payment or delivery in respect of which the applicant seeks to execute the decree. There is, therefore, no need for a provision compelling the decree-holder to keep the decree alive by making an application every three years. There exists a provision already in Section 48 of the CPC that a decree ceases to be enforceable after a period of 12 years. In England also the time fixed for enforcing a judgment is 12 years. Either the decree holder succeeds in realising his decree within this period or he fails and there should be no provision enabling the execution of a decree after that period. To this provision an exception will have to be made to the effect that the Court may order the execution of a decree upon an application presented after the expiration of the period of 12 years where the judgment debtor has, by fraud or force, prevented the execution of the decree at some time within the twelve years immediately preceding the date of the application. Section 48 of the CPC may be deleted and its provisions may be incorporated in this Act." (Extracted from R. Mitra's Limitation Act, 1963, 1964 edition, at page 794). 8. It would be seen from the above that on the recommendation of the Law Commission, the Parliament enacted the present Article 136 which substantially reproduces repealed Section 48 of the CPC and replaces Article 182 of the old Limitation Act. This was done with a view to overcome the difficulties which used to be faced by the litigants and the courts. This was done with a view to overcome the difficulties which used to be faced by the litigants and the courts. The enactment of Article 136 has simplified the controversy and has provided that for the execution of any decree or order of any civil court, the period of limitation would be twelve years. This period of limitation begins to run "when the decree or order becomes enforceable." 9. In the instant case, the suit was decreed on 31-3-1955 and the decree passed by the trial Court was maintained by the High Court on 6-4-1973, when the appeal preferred against the same had been dismissed. The argument of the judgment debtors, which had been accepted by the Court below, was that since the appeal filed against the trial Court's decree was not pressed and dismissed without consideration on merits, it could not be said that the original decree had been merged in the appellate decree an`d, therefore, the filing of the appeal could not be availed of by the decree holder for the purpose of getting fresh starting point for limitation. In this connection, learned Counsel appearing for the judgment debtors Sri Radha Krishna had also submitted that as there was no order staying the execution of the decree, it became enforceable on the date of its passing, hence the court below rightly held that the execution application was beyond time. 10. It may be pointed out here that on 31-3-1955, when the decree was passed by the trial Court, the Old Limitation Act 1908, was in force. At that time, Article 182 of the Limitation Act provided the limitation of three years from the date of decree of the appeal, if the same had been preferred. This Article 182 was repealed by the Limitation Act, 1963, which came into force on 1-1-1964. By Section 28 of this Act, Section 48 of the CPC had also been repealed. It would thus be found that upto 1-1-1964, the position in law was that the decree had not become barred by time. The decree holder could wait till the decision of the appeal, had the old Limitation Act remained in operation. The argument of the execution being time barred is now based on Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963. It would thus be found that upto 1-1-1964, the position in law was that the decree had not become barred by time. The decree holder could wait till the decision of the appeal, had the old Limitation Act remained in operation. The argument of the execution being time barred is now based on Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963. As pointed out earlier, the judgment debtors' case was that as the decree of the trial Court had become enforceable, it ought to have been executed within twelve years of passing of the decree by the trial Court on 31-3-1955 and as the execution became barred by time in 1967, the application filed in 1974 was liable to be rejected. 11. It is settled law that the decree of the trial Court gets merged with the appellate Court and the latter supersedes the decree of the trial Court. This merger takes place irrespective of the fact that the appellate Court affirms, modifies or reverses the lower Court's decree. (See Abdul Latif v. Mohammad Sufayan Ex. S. A. No. 2295 of 1972 D/- l7-11-1980, Gajadhar Singh v. Kishan Jiwan Lal ILR 39 All 641, Sangram Singh v. Bujharath Singh ILR 14 All 36, Mohammad Sulaiman Khan v. Mohammad Yar Khan ILR 11 All 267, Durga Singh v. Wahid Raza 1964 ALJ 817 , A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar Vs. M. Venkitachalam Potti and Another, AIR 1956 SC 246 . Madan Gopal Rungta Vs. Secretary to The Government of Orissa, AIR 1962 SC 1513 Collector of Customs, Calcutta Vs. East India Commercial Co. Ltd., AIR 1963 SC 1124 , Gojer Bros. (Pvt.) Ltd. Vs. Shri Ratan Lal Singh, AIR 1974 SC 1380 . 12. In Saiyid Jawad Hussain v. Gendan Singh AIR 1926 PC 93 the Privy Council confirmed the view taken by this Court by a Full Bench in Gajadhar Singh v. Kishan Jiwan Lal (supra) and observed: When the Munsif passed the decree, it was open to the Plaintiff or the Defendant to accept that decree or to appeal. If an appeal is preferred, the final decree is the decree of the appellate Court of final jurisdiction. When the decree is passed it is that decree which can be made final in the cause between the parties. If an appeal is preferred, the final decree is the decree of the appellate Court of final jurisdiction. When the decree is passed it is that decree which can be made final in the cause between the parties. It follows from the law down by the Privy Council that if the trial Court's order furnishes a cause of action then similarly the lower Court's decree also furnishes a cause of action. The time from which the limitation begins to run Is the point when the decree or order becomes enforceable. The expression "enforceable" means "to put into execution, to cause to take effect." In case of a decree of the trial Court being affirmed, the appellate decree becomes enforceable and that can be put into execution. The judgment debtors' contention that since there was no stay order, the decree holder could not take advantage of the time spent in prosecution of the appeal, does not appeal to us to be tenable. A judgment debtor does not lose by the decree holder's not putting his decree into execution. The decree holder has the choice to wait for the decision of the appeal. The law does not cast any duty on him to put the decree into execution immediately after its being passed. It had not been denied that In case of a decree being modified or varied, the period of limitation would start from the date of passing of the decree in the appeal. If that is so, there is no reason to take a contrary view in respect of a decree which is confirmed in appeal. There is no logic in holding a decree of the latter category to have become barred by time if the execution of the same is not made immediately after its being passed by the trial Court. If the principle of merger applies, the decree of the trial Court would get merged with that of the appellate Court and it is that decree which would become enforceable. 13. In Abdul Latif v. Mohammad Sufayan (supra) a Division Bench of this Court held that once an appellate Court passes a decree, it is the decree of the appellate Court which alone can be executed. Such a decree is enforceable from the date on which it is passed and not at any time prior to it. 13. In Abdul Latif v. Mohammad Sufayan (supra) a Division Bench of this Court held that once an appellate Court passes a decree, it is the decree of the appellate Court which alone can be executed. Such a decree is enforceable from the date on which it is passed and not at any time prior to it. To the same effect is the view taken by the Calcutta High Court in Shyama Pada Choudhury Vs. Saha Choudhury and Co. and Others, AIR 1976 Cal 122 and Posani Ramachandraiah Vs. Daggupati Seshamma, AIR 1978 AP 342 . In the last case, the Andhra Pradesh High Court held: Consequently under Article 136 of the present Limitation Act, the period of Limitation can be reckoned from the date of appellate decree even though there was no stay in the appeal. If there is an appeal, the decree that can be enforced is that of the appellate Court, and the period of limitation has to be reckoned from the date of that decree. 14. We have already quoted the recommendations of the Law Commission which led to the amendments in hand. The recommendations indicate the real intent and the objects and reasons for the amendment of the aforesaid provisions. The whole purpose and object of the amendment as well as the intention behind it would be defeated in case a contrary view is taken. The running of limitation from the date of the appellate decree would be in consonance with the recommendation and would effectuate a very useful purpose. In Udayan Chinubhai v. R.C. Bali AIR 1977 SC 2319 , the Supreme Court took into account the recommendations of the Law Commission stated in its report in enacting Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act. It observed; We have gone into the history and background of the provision together with the recommendation of the Law Commission, as also the objects and reasons of the Bill in order to arrive at the proper intent of the execution. 15. Lord Denning in Escoigne Properties Limited v. I. R. C (1958) AC 549, observed about the advisability of taking into account the object appearing in the circumstances while considering or construing an enactment. He observed: A status is not passed in a vacuum but in a framework of circumstances so as to give a remedy in the known state of affairs. He observed: A status is not passed in a vacuum but in a framework of circumstances so as to give a remedy in the known state of affairs. To arrive at its true meaning, you should know the circumstances with reference to which the words were used, and what was the object appearing from those circumstances which Parliament had in view. 16. Taking into account the recommendations and the history of the legislation, we are of opinion that the view taken by us would sub serve its purpose. The object would be completely defeated if some other view is taken. Reed Dickerson in his book "The Interpretation and Application of Statutes", 1975 Edition, at page 95, has observed the utility of taking the legislative purpose as an aid to interpretation. It has been said: On the necessity of legislative purpose to legislative interpretation, Llewellyn has said, "If a statute is to make sense, St must be read in the light of some assumed purpose. A statute merely declaring a rule, with no purpose or objective, is nonsense." Hart and Sacks have inquired whether it is not true that "The meaning of a statute is never plain unless it fits with some intelligible purpose. 17. Learned Counsel for the judgment debtors, however, emphasised that since the appeal before the High Court in the instant case had not been pressed, the principle of merger will not apply. According to him, the effect of not pressing the appeal before the High Court was the same as withdrawing it, and, as such, the limitation would start running from the date of the trial Court's decree. We do not find merit in this submission. It is not necessary for us to go into the effect of withdrawal of an appeal in this case. We are concerned with an appeal which had not been pressed by the Counsel appearing for the judgment debtors in the appeal. The withdrawal of an appeal cannot be equated with a case where an appeal is not pressed. Not pressing of an appeal would result in nothing else but into a judicial decision that reaches the subject matter of a case and decides upon it with finality. The withdrawal of an appeal cannot be equated with a case where an appeal is not pressed. Not pressing of an appeal would result in nothing else but into a judicial decision that reaches the subject matter of a case and decides upon it with finality. It may be that in the event of an appeal not being pressed, a Court is not required to write a judgment, but that does not mean that the judgment of the subordinate Court is not affirmed by its dismissal. In such a case, the result of the decision of the appellate Court is to confirm the decision of the trial Court given on merits. 18. In Sheodan Singh Vs. Smt. Daryao Kunwar, AIR 1966 SC 1332 , the Supreme Court was called upon to consider the question of applicability of res-judicata to a matter where an appeal is dismissed on the ground of limitation or on account of not printing of a paper book. The Supreme Court held that: In such a case the result of the decision of the appeal Court is to confirm the decision of the trial Court given on merits, and if that is so, the decision of the appeal Court will be res-judicata. 19. This decision of the Supreme Court lends support to our view that dismissal of the appeal on not being pressed does not take away the character of the appellate judgment being final on merits and it is that judgment which will be binding on the parties. 20. The question of withdrawal of an appeal and its effect was considered by the Madras High Court in Jujisti Mahapatro Vs. Korada Magata Patro and Others, AIR 1933 Mad 442 . The Madras High Court held that: Notwithstanding the fact that the appeal was withdrawn by the Appellant, the date on which the order finally disposing of the appeal superseding the order of the Court appealed against is made would be the date for the purpose of computing limitation. 21. Counsel for the Respondents tried to justify this case on the ground that as no decree for costs was passed in the appeal decided by the High Court in the instant case, the law laid down by the Madras High Court would not be applicable. 21. Counsel for the Respondents tried to justify this case on the ground that as no decree for costs was passed in the appeal decided by the High Court in the instant case, the law laid down by the Madras High Court would not be applicable. To us, it appears that passing of a decree for costs or not doing so is not the material test for making the appellate decree binding. The test is whether the dismissal of the appeal, whether made on the basis of withdrawal, or on the basis of not being pressed, results in confirming the decision of the trial Court on the date on which the appeal is disposed of or not. If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, as in our opinion it should be, the date of the appellate decree would be relevant for computing the limitation for the purpose of execution of the same. Counsel for the Respondents also referred to some of the decisions on the principle of merger and some others on Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. As those cases do not assist us in deciding the controversy involved in this case, we do not consider it necessary to refer to them. 22. In Fazl-ur-Rehman v. Shah Muhammad Khan ILR 1930 All. 385 the controversy of not pressing the appeal and its effect has been considered. In this case, the Bench held: If on judgment debtors' appeal, as sometimes happens, is pending for upwards of three years and if it were held that the Appellant judgment debtor by withdrawing or declining to support his appeal or by omitting to bring on the record the representatives of a deceased Respondent, could, notwithstanding the fact that an appeal had been filed, cause time to run from the date of the original decree, it would, in our opinion, be going directly against the language of the Limitation Act and would open a door to fraud. 23. It was held in this case that an application for execution filed within three years of the dismissal of the appeal, which had not been pressed on merits, would be within time. This case squarely applies to the facts of the present case. 24. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. 23. It was held in this case that an application for execution filed within three years of the dismissal of the appeal, which had not been pressed on merits, would be within time. This case squarely applies to the facts of the present case. 24. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and decree of the Court below rejecting the execution application are set aside and the executing Court is directed to decide the execution application on merits afresh. The parties shall bear their own costs.