JUDGMENT - Ginwala J.-These two writ petitions can be disposed of by one judgment since they raise a common question about the validity of the Daman (Abolition of Proprietorship of Villages) Regulation, 1962 (hereinafter referred to as “the Regulation”) and the orders passed by the Collector of Daman under it. 2. In order to appreciate properly the various contentions which have been urged on behalf of the petitioners, it would be convenient at the outset to take note of the legislative and judicial history of the Regulation and its salient features The territories which immediately before 20-12-1961 were comprised in Goa, Daman and Diu and were under the Portuguese rule, were declared as Union Territory by including them in Part 11 of the First Schedule of the Constitution by the Constitution (Twelfth Amendment) Act, 1962. By the said Amending Act this Union Territory was included in clause (1) of Article 240 of the Constitution,' thus enabling the President of India to make regulations for its peace, progress and good government. In exercise of the powers so conferred on him by the said clause, the President promulgated the Regulation to provide for abolition of proprietorship of villages in the Daman District in the said Union Territory. It was to come into force on such date as the Central Government was to appoint and this date being the 13th day of July, 1962 was to be the “appointed date” within the meaning of clause (b) of section 2 of the Regulation. Under clause (g) of section 2 of the Regulation as originally promulgated “land” was defined to mean every class or category of land including benefits to arise out of such land and, things attached to earth. Section 2(h) defines “proprietor” to mean a person, who holds any village or villages granted to him or any of his predecessors-iu-interest by the former Portuguese Government by way of gift, sale or otherwise including his co-sharers. Under section 3 all rights, title and interest of every proprietor in or in respect of all lands in his village or villages are deemed to have been extinguished on and from the appointed date and they stand transferred to and vest in the Central Government free from all encumbrances. Under section 3 all rights, title and interest of every proprietor in or in respect of all lands in his village or villages are deemed to have been extinguished on and from the appointed date and they stand transferred to and vest in the Central Government free from all encumbrances. By virtue of section 4 notwithstanding the provisions contained in section 3 a proprietor is entitled to retain with effect from the appointed date lands under his personal cultivation not being pasture or grass lands, as also homesteads, buildings and structures in his occupation together with the lands appurtenant thereto. Sections authorises the Collector to take charge of all lands and of all rights, title and interest therein of a proprietor vested in the Government under section 3, but does not authorise him to take possession of any land or of any right of proprietor, which may be retained by him under section 4. Section 6 subjects all lands in villages, the rights, title and interest in which have vested in the Government under section 3 to payment of land revenue to the Government in accordance with revenue survey and settlement of land revenue with effect on and from the appointed date. A provision has been made in this section for assessing and recovering the land revenue payable in respect of such lands until revenue survey and settlement of land revenue in respect of such lands are made. Section 7 provides for restoration of possession of their lands to certain cultivating tenants. Under sub-section (1) of section 8 every cultivating tenant holding land of which he was in actual possession on 20 12-1961, became the occupant thereof on payment of land revenue to the Government under section 6 as from the appointed date. Similarly under sub-section (2) of section 8 every proprietor holding the land which he was personally cultivating on 20-12-1961 and the possession of which had not been restored to the cultivating tenant under section 7, is to hold such land as occupant on payment of land revenue as provided hi section 6. Section 9 provides for payment of compensation to proprietors whose rights, title and interest in respect of their lands vest in the Government under section 3. Section 9 provides for payment of compensation to proprietors whose rights, title and interest in respect of their lands vest in the Government under section 3. This compensation is to be computed at the rate of twenty times the annual payment (Contribuicao Predial) which the proprietor was liable to make to the former Portuguese Government in respect of such land immediately before 20-12-1961. Section 10 provides for method of payment of compensation. Any person entitled to compensation under section 9 had to make an application to the Collector in the prescribed form for its payment on or before such date as the Administrator was to specify in this behalf from time to time by notification in the Official Gazette. On receipt of the application the Collector has to determine the amount of compensation after making such inquiry as he thinks fit and he has to apportion the compensation where there are more persons than one entitled to it. Section 11 then provides as to how the payment of compensation has to be made. These are the salient features of the Regulation as it was originally promulgated. 3. In (Gulahbhai v. Union of India)1 the constitutional validity of the Regulation was challenged in a bunch of five writ petitions on the ground that its provisions violated Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. The Central Government sought to bring it under the protective umbrella of Article 31A. Relying on the definition of “estate” in Article 31A (2) (a) as substituted by the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964 retrospectively, it was submitted on its behalf that proprietary interest abolished by the Regulation was (a)” “estate” or (b) “a jagir, inam or maufi or other similar grant” or (c) “land held or let for purposes of agriculture or purposes ancillary thereto”. The Supreme Court held that before “estate” or its equivalent can be found, there must be land which pays land revenue and is held in accordance with law relating to land tenures. It found that the expression “estate” in that sense cannot be said to have had an equivalent in Daman District. It also found that the lands involved in the petitions except one village were not jagir, inam or maufi and that none of them were held under ryotwari tenure. It found that the expression “estate” in that sense cannot be said to have had an equivalent in Daman District. It also found that the lands involved in the petitions except one village were not jagir, inam or maufi and that none of them were held under ryotwari tenure. While considering the question whether the lands affected by the Regulation answered the description of lands given in Article 31A(2)(a)(iii), it found that the definition of land in section 2(g) of the Regulation was wider than the definition of “estate” in Article 31A and that this definition of land as including all categories of lands could not be used in the teeth of restricted definition of “estate”. It then proceeded to consider whether the definition given in section 2 (g) of the Regulation was severable. After reviewing some authorities on this issue it concluded as follows: “The result, .therefore, is that the definition of 'land' in the Regulation being at variance with the definition of 'estate' cannot stand with it. But as it is severable it does not affect the operation of the Regulation which will operate, but the protection of Article 31A will not be available in respect of land not strictly within the definition of Article 31 A. In other words, 'land' would include not every class of category of land but only lands held or left for purposes of agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto, including waste land, forest land, land for pastures or sites of buildings and other structures occupied by cultivators of land, agricultural labourers and village artisans. Land which does not answer this description is not protected from an attack under Articles 14, 19 and 31 and it is from this point of view that the cases of the petitioners before us must be examined where categories of land other than those stated in Article 31(2)(a)(iii) are mentioned.” The Supreme Court then proceeded to examine the facts of each case in the light of the above said decisions and held that the Regulation would operate upon the proprietorship of villages except in the matter of hilly land, salt pans, salt lands, and quarries. Thus according to the Supreme Court, the Regulation in so far as it operated on lands held or let for purposes of agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto, including waste land, forest land, land for pasture or sites of buildings and other structures occupied by cultivators' of land, agricultural labourers and village artisans, but excluding hilly land, quarries, salt lands and salt pans, was immune to the challenge on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. 4. In the wake of this decision of the Supreme Court, the Legislative Assembly of Goa, Daman and Diu which by then had come into existence by virtue of the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963 made under Article 239A of the Constitution, enacted the Daman (Abolition of Proprietorship of Villages) Regulation (Amendment) Act, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as “the Amendment Act, 1968?) to carry out some material amendments in the Regulation. By this amendment clause (g) of section 2 of the Regulation was substituted with retrospective effect in order to bring the definition of 'land' in line with the decision of the Supreme Court in Gulabbhdi's case and Article 31A(2)(a)(iii) of the Constitution. Sections 8-A, 8-B and 8 C were inserted for eviction of occupants of land in certain cases, restrictions on sale etc. of land by occupants, and forfeiture of land transferred in contravention of such restriction. Section 8-B provides that no sale including sales in execution of a decree of a Civil Court or for recovery of arrears of land revenue, gift, exchange or lease or assignment or mortgage of any land in respect of which, any person has become an occupant under section 8 shall be made, except with the previous permission in writing of the Collector, who may grant such permission in such circumstances and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed. In the Regulation as initially promulgated there was no machinery for deciding various questions which may arise in its implementation such as whether a person is a proprietor, an agricultural labourer, a cultivating tenant, or a landless person or to determine the land in respect of which occupancy rights are conferred under section 8 and the person on whom they are conferred etc. In order to till up this lacuna in the Regulation sections 12A to 12F were inserted to require the Mamlatdar to decide such matters and to lay down the procedure which he is to follow. These sections also make a provision for appeal to the Collector and also confer revisionary powers on him. The jurisdiction of Civil Court to settle, decide or deal with any question, which by or under the Regulation is required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Mamlatdar or the Collector is barred and it is provided that no order of the Mamlatdar or the Collector made under the Regulation can be questioned in any Civil or Criminal Court. These are the material additions and changes which have been made in the original Regulation. 5. The Administrator in pursuance of the powers conferred on him by section 15 read with section 8-B of the Regulation made rules called the Daman (Abolition of Proprietorship of Villages) Rules, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as “the Rules”) for prescribing the circumstances in which the conditions subject to which sale etc. of land may be permitted under sec tion 8-B of the Regulation. Sub-rule (1) of rule 2 of these Rules specifies the circumstances in which the Collector can grant permission for transfer of any land in respect of which any person has become an occupant under section 8 of the Regulation. Sub-rule (2) of rule 2 further provides that where permission for sale of any land is given in certain circumstances speci fied in sub-rule (1), it shall be subject to the condition that the occupant who is granted such permission pays to the Government a Nazarana equal to twenty live percent of the price at which the land is being sold or one hundred times the assessment of the land, whichever is higher. 6. The Supreme Court rendered its judgment in Gulabbhai's case on 27-9-1966. The Amending Act of 1968 came into force on 9-8-1968. The Rules came into effect on 16-5 1969. In pursuance of the powers conferred on him by section 10(1) of the Regulation the Administrator under his notification specified 30-6-1967 as the date on or before which applications for payment of compensation in the prescribed form had to be submitted to the Collector. This date was subsequently extended to 30-9-1967. 7. The Rules came into effect on 16-5 1969. In pursuance of the powers conferred on him by section 10(1) of the Regulation the Administrator under his notification specified 30-6-1967 as the date on or before which applications for payment of compensation in the prescribed form had to be submitted to the Collector. This date was subsequently extended to 30-9-1967. 7. In this context now let us turn to the facts of each petition. The petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 73 of 1972 was one of the proprietors of the village Damao de Cima in the district of Daman. In pursuance of the notification issued by the Administrator under section 10(1) of the Regulation he and other co-proprietors made an application to the Collector of Daman in the prescribed form for payment of compensation on 30 9-1967. This application was purported to have been submitted under protest and without prejudice. In the form of the application column 3 is meant for stating the total area of the village and there are six sub-columns for stating areas under (1) Municipality, (2) agricultural use, (3) salt lands and salt pans, (4) quarries, (5) hillocks and (6) tanks. In this application the total area of the village was given as 60 hectares and it was stated that out of this area 54 hectares was under agricultural use including 8 hectares which was under the personal cultivation of the proprietors and areas under Cajuri plantation which as stated in the application under the Portuguese regime were regarded as industrial property and taxed accordingly. No area was shown as under municipality, salt lands and salt pans, quarries or hillocks. Only 4 hectares are shown as the area under tanks. Column No. 4 of the prescribed form of the application is meant for stating the amount of predial, which the proprietor used to pay and this again is classified into (a) contribuicao urban and (b) contribuicao rustic. The amount of Rs. 43.67 is shown against the contribuicao urban and against the contribuicao rustic the following statement is made : “Rs. 2,111.33 nP. This is inclusive of Industrial tax-Rs. The amount of Rs. 43.67 is shown against the contribuicao urban and against the contribuicao rustic the following statement is made : “Rs. 2,111.33 nP. This is inclusive of Industrial tax-Rs. 1,970.00 paid in 1961 on Cajuris which are considered agricultural produce in the Union of India whilst the Portuguese classified it as industrial income.” In column 5 of this application the proprietors claimed compensation in respect of the area which has vested in the Government under section 3 in the following terms: “Rs. 2,111 x 20 = Rs. 42,220 00 less for lands vested in the proprietors (1 /5 area) Rs. 8,440.00.” The Collector set down this application for hearing on 27-5-1969 with due notice to the claimants. On 24-5-1969 one of the claimants namely, Josefa Maria who claimed half share in the compensation wrote to the Collector on 24-5-1969 to adjourn the hearing of the application sine die on the ground that since the filing of the said application it had been found that part of the village Damao de Cima belonged to the heirs of Canji Danji and that the applicability of the Regulation and the amendment thereto, to the proprietors who owned only part of the village had been challenged in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner at Goa. The Collector received this letter for postponement of the hearing on 26-5-1969 and on the same day he informed the said Josefa under his letter that her application had been received and was kept with papers for action. On 27-5-1961 none of the claimants appeared before the Collector. The latter under his order passed on 28-5-1969 considered the application dated 24-5-1969 for adjournment and rejected it on the ground that the said claimant had not stated that she had approached the Court of the Judicial Commissioner and had not produced any stay order from that Court and that the definition of “village” in the Regulation includes part of the village and the definition of the word “proprietor” would therefore include holders of part of the villages. Having rejected this application by the said order the Collector proceeded to determine the compensation. Having rejected this application by the said order the Collector proceeded to determine the compensation. He found that the claimants held 63 20 hectares of land as proprietors of the said village and in the record maintained by the Portuguese Government an area of 7.47 was shown as hilly land though the claimants had stated in their application that there was no hilly land in the village and had also stated that there was no land in the category of salt pans, salt lands, quarries or under municipality. The Collector further observed that according to the survey recently carried out by the Government there is no area in the said village falling within the categories to which, according to the judgment of the Supreme Court, the Regulation does not apply. He found that the topography underwent changes over a period of time and the land shown as hilly lands in the record were subsequently brought under cultivation. He, therefore, held that the entire area held by the claimants as proprietors had therefore vested in the Government under section 3 of the Regulation. He determined the compensation payable to the claimants at Rs. 3700 being twenty times the amount of Rs. 185 which according to him was the contribuicao predial paid by the proprietors. In doing so, the Collector ignored the industrial tax amounting to Rs. 1,970 paid in 1961 out of the amount of Rs. 2,111.33 stated by the claimants as contribuicao rustic. The said amount of Rs. 3700 payable as compensation was apportioned amongst the three claimants according to the shares stated by them. The petitioner received the compensation amounting to Rs. 2775 under prejudice and without prejudice to the rights of the claimants on 19-2-1971. 8. It seems that the Collector had communicated his decision to the claimants by his notice dated 9-6-1969, but since the claimants stated that they had not received the decision, the Collector sent it again under his letter dated 20-8-1970. 9. By their application dated 10-5-1971 the claimants requested, the Collector to review his order dated 28-5-1969 on various grounds. 8. It seems that the Collector had communicated his decision to the claimants by his notice dated 9-6-1969, but since the claimants stated that they had not received the decision, the Collector sent it again under his letter dated 20-8-1970. 9. By their application dated 10-5-1971 the claimants requested, the Collector to review his order dated 28-5-1969 on various grounds. Since the Collector did not attend to this request for a considerable time, the claimants moved the Revenue Secretary, who directed the Collector to expedite the matter and consequently by his order dated 5-5-1972 the Collector rejected the application for review on the ground that there was no provision in the Regulation for review of the order passed by the Collector determining compensation. It is thereafter that the petitioner filed the present writ peti tion in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner at Panaji on 5-8-1972. 10. In this writ petition the petitioner has challenged the validity of the Regulation on the ground that in making the Regulation under Arti cle 240 of the Constitution the President had exceeded his legislative compe tence and that it was violative of Articles 19(1)(f) and 31 and was not protected by Article 31 A of the Constitution. The petitioner also challenges the constitutional validity of sections 3(1)(ii), 4, 8 (2) and clause (g) of sec tion 2 as amended by the Amending Act of 1968 as being violative of the second proviso of Article 31A of the Constitution. Besides these legal chal lenges the petitioner also challenges the orders passed by the Collector on 28-5-1969 and 25-5-1972. While challenging the order dated 28-5-1969 under which the Collector determined the compensation the petitioner con tends that the Collector had erred in not excluding certain areas of land which were hilly, sandy, hillocks, under Cajuri trees, included in the munici pal areas, under roads, ponds and personal cultivation. He seeks a writ of mandamus directing the first respondent, namely, the Collector of Daman to exclude these areas and to pay market value for the agricultural lands and to carry out a proper survey to determine the actual extent of village or in the alternative to exclude 7.4 hectares of hilly land. 11. He seeks a writ of mandamus directing the first respondent, namely, the Collector of Daman to exclude these areas and to pay market value for the agricultural lands and to carry out a proper survey to determine the actual extent of village or in the alternative to exclude 7.4 hectares of hilly land. 11. Pursuant to the deletion of Articles 19 (1) (g) and 31 of the Constitution under the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 with effect from 20-6-1979 the petitioner amended the petition on 27-11-1980 by adding one more ground for challenging the constitutional validity of the Regulation. We shall state this ground when we deal with the submissions made before us. The first respondent has filed an affidavit in reply to the petition. 12. The petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 74 of 1972 is one of the twelve co-sharers of village Dabhel in the District of Daman. In this case also an application for compensation was made to the Collector on 30-9-1967 under protest and without prejudice to their rights. The total area of the village is shown as 610 hectares, out of which an area of 590 hectares is shown as under agricultural use, which according to the claimants includes an area of 102 hectares under personal cultivation of the proprietors and the area under Cajuri plantation which under the Portuguese regime was regarded, as industrial property and taxed accordingly. The areas under quarries, hillocks, tanks and rivulets are shown as 2, 3, 4 and 9 hectares respectively. No land is shown as municipal area, salt land, or salt-pans. The amount of predial which the proprietor used to nay is shown as Rs. 12.50 as contribuicao urban and Rs. 10,254 as contribuicao rustic inclusive of Rs. 9,357 purported to have been paid as industrial tax in 1961 on Cajuri trees which, as stated in the application, are considered as agricultural produce in the Union of India, while the Portuguese classified it as industrial income. The amount of compensation is worked out as under:- “Rs. 10,254x20=Rs. 2,05,080 Less for lands vested in the proprietors (1/5) Rs. 9,357 purported to have been paid as industrial tax in 1961 on Cajuri trees which, as stated in the application, are considered as agricultural produce in the Union of India, while the Portuguese classified it as industrial income. The amount of compensation is worked out as under:- “Rs. 10,254x20=Rs. 2,05,080 Less for lands vested in the proprietors (1/5) Rs. 41,216.” After the filing of this application the petitioner wrote to the Collector on 5-12-1967 stating that it was found that part of the village Dabhel belonged to the Government and hence the Regulation was net applicable to the remaining part of the village as the claimants were not the proprietors of the whole village. She, therefore, contended that any action with regard to the part of the village which belonged to the proprietors was contrary to law. By his letter dated 14-3-1969 the Collector informed the claimants that the application for compensation was fixed for hearing on 18-3-1969 in his office. In reply to this letter, the petitioner by her letter dated 17-3-1969 informed the Collector that the proprietors who owned part of the villages had challenged the applicability of the Regulation to them in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner at Goa and the decision in that case would uphold the interest of the claimants in this case also. She, therefore, requested the Collector to postpone the hearing sine die pending the final decision in the above said cases. It seems that none of the claimants appeared before the Collector on 18-3-1969 and he proceeded to determine compensation under his order dated 22-5-1969. Under this order the Collector rejected the request of the petitioner expressed in the letter dated 17-3-1969 for postponing the hearing of the application on the ground that she had not obtained any stay from the Court of the Judicial Commissioner and the definition of “proprietor” included proprietors of part of villages in view of the definition of “village” which includes part of village. Having rejected this objection, the Collector proceeded to determine the compensation. Having rejected this objection, the Collector proceeded to determine the compensation. As regards the extent of land which vested in the Government, he found that according to the recent survey which had been carried out to ascertain the upto-date position regarding the areas under hills, quarries, salt lands and salt pans, an area of 51.84 hectares in the village of Dabhel consisted of hills and quarries, and hence it did not vest in the Government according to the decision of the Supreme Court in Gulabhhai's case. Thus even though the claimants had shown an area of 5 hectares only as under the quarries and hillocks, the Collector allowed a much larger area on this count. He determined the total compensation at Rs. 14,113.60. In doing so, he held that the contribuicao predial payable for the entire area of 610.31 hectares was, according to the revenue records, Rs. 771 and deducting Rs. 65.32 in respect of the area of 51.84 hectares which did not vest in the Government and for which the claimants were not entitled to any compensation. The contribuicao predial in respect of the land which vested in the Government was Rs. 705.68. The above said amount of total compensation of Rs. 14,113 60 was arrived at hy multiplying the said amount of Rs. 705.68 by 20. In this case also the Collector was moved to review the said order, but the same was rejected an 25-5-1969 on the ground as in the earlier case. The petitioner thereafter filed the present writ petition on 7-8-1972 The grounds of challenge and prayers in this petition are practically identical with those in Special Civil Application No. 73 of 1972. The petitioner claims that the Collector ought to have excluded 435 hectares as hilly land, 377 2635 hectares-as Cajuri land and 19 6645 hectares as the land acquired by the Government for an -Industrial Estate. She further says that the Collector had omitted to pay compensation at twenty times of Rs. 156 which the proprietors had paid as contribuicao predial in 1961 This petition has also been amended on 22-11-1980. The first respondent, namely, the Collector of Daman filed his reply in affidavit. He refutes the various allegations which have been made in the petition, but admits that through error an amount of Rs. 156 which the proprietors had paid as contribuicao predial in 1961 This petition has also been amended on 22-11-1980. The first respondent, namely, the Collector of Daman filed his reply in affidavit. He refutes the various allegations which have been made in the petition, but admits that through error an amount of Rs. 156 paid as contribuicao predial was omitted while determining the amount of compensation and says that the Government is ready and willing to pay this amount to the petitioner. 13. To begin with Mr. Chinoy the learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the deletion of sub-clause (f) of clause (1) of Article 19 and Article 31 of the Constitution and insertion of Article 300A by the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 with effect from 20-6-1979 opens fresh avenues for challenging the constitutional validity not only of the Regulation, but also laws dealing with acquisition of private property. In a nutshell he puts his submission this way. The power of the State to take away or acquire private property without the consent of the owner is an inherent attribute of sovereignty, but there are two limitations on the use of this power and they are firstly that the acquisition must be for a public purpose and secondly that just compensation must be paid to the expropriated owner. These are the two inbuilt restrictions on the power of acquisition of private property by the State which have been recognised both under the doctrine of English Commom Law as well as under the continental doctrine of eminent domain subsequently adopted in America. This doctrine of eminent domain was recognised even prior to the present Constitution as it found place in sub-section (2) of section 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935. One of these limitations, namely, payment of just compensation had been recognised and had been raised to the status of fundamental right by incorporating it in clause (2) of Article 31 of the Constitution as originally enacted. One of these limitations, namely, payment of just compensation had been recognised and had been raised to the status of fundamental right by incorporating it in clause (2) of Article 31 of the Constitution as originally enacted. The other limitation, namely, that the acquisition should be for a public purpose, though not specifically put in clause (2) of Article 31, the Supreme Court in (State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh)2 read it by implication either in the said clause itself or in Entry 33 of the Union List, Entry 36 of the State List or Entry 42 of the Concurrent List, which dealt with the acquisition or requisition of property for the purposes of the Union or otherwise. By the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955 which substituted clause (2) of Article 31 the requirement of public purpose for acquisition of private property had been expressly incorporated in Article 31. By the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956 which came into force from 1-11-1956 the above-said entries in the three Lists were deleted and Entry 42, as it presently stands in the Concurrent List was substituted. Thus according to Mr. Chinoy, the doctrine of eminent domain had not only been judicially recognised in Kameshwar Singh's case,' but had found place in Article 31 of the Constitution. He further submits that consequent to the deletion of Article 19 (l)(f) and Article 31 by the Constitution (Forty-fourih Amendment) Act, 1978 the power of the State to acquire private property without the consent of the owner, which flows from the doctrine of eminent domain, is contained in Entry 42 of the Concurrent List read with Article 246 of the Constitution. In the absence of any express provision limiting this power by the above-said two conditions, which are inseparable concomitants of the power of eminent domain, they would have now to be read in Entry 42 of the Concurrent List. In other words, though that entry merely relates to the power conferred on the Parliament or the Legislature of any State to make laws with respect to acquisition and requisitioning of property, the competence of these Legislatures to legislate in this matter would be subject to the condition that the acquisition or requisitioning is for public purpose and on payment of just and fair compensation to the expropriated owner. Thus according to Mr. Thus according to Mr. Chinoy with effect from 20-6-1979 when the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 came into force the legislative competence of the concerned Legislature to legislate in respect of acquisition and requisitioning of property would be subject to the condition that the legislation provides for acquisition and requisitioning of property only for a public purpose and on payment of just and fair compensation to the expropriated owner. Mr. Chinoy submits that because of these inbuilt limitations on the power of the Legislature, any enactment which contravenes these conditions would be deemed to be void for want of legislative competence and this holds good not only with respect to the laws, which are made after 20-6-1979 but also to the laws which are made prior to that in so far as their enforcement and implementation after that date is concerned. It is for this reason that Mr. Chinoy submits that the Regulation cannot operate on lands which had not already vested in the Government prior to 20-6-1979 as it does not provide for just and adequate compensation for the acquisition of lands or abolition of proprietary rights since the compensation provided for in section 9 thereof computing it at the rate of twenty times the annual payment is illusory. Mr. Chinoy does not dispute that the abolition of the estate under the Regulation would be an agrarian reform and thus in public interest as held by the Supreme Court in Gulabbhai's case. Mr. Chinoy challenges the Regulation only on the ground that fair and adequate compensation has not been provided in the Regulation for acquiring rights of the proprietors in the villages, which would vest in the Government. 14. Mr. Chinoy further submits that it would be open to the peti tioners to challenge the constitutional validity of the Regulation on the above said grounds for the simple reason that such a challenge was not open to the petitioner in Gulabbhai's case because that case was decided on the constitutional provisions obtaining prior to 20-6-1979. He submits that the Regulation was challenged in Gulabbhai's case on the ground of breach of fundamental rights contained in Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution and according to the Supreme Court, this piece of legislation was protected by Article 31 A of the Constitution, in so far as the lands described in Article 31A(2)(a)(iii) are concerned. He submits that the Regulation was challenged in Gulabbhai's case on the ground of breach of fundamental rights contained in Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution and according to the Supreme Court, this piece of legislation was protected by Article 31 A of the Constitution, in so far as the lands described in Article 31A(2)(a)(iii) are concerned. He submits that the present chal lenge to the constitutional validity of the Regulation is altogether on a different plane, namely, the legislative competency which did not arise in Gulabbhai 's case. 15. In our opinion, it would be open to the petitioners to challenge the validity of the Regulation on the above said ground, irrespective of its merits; and the decision of the Supreme Court in Gulabbhai's case alone cannot shut them out. No doubt the argument so elaborately advanced by Mr. Chinoy on the question of survival of the Regulation after the deletion of Articles 19(1)(f) and 31 and addition of Article 300A of the Constitution, leads to an interesting debate, and if accepted would sound the death knell not only of this Regulation but also of all laws relating to agrarian reforms, made prior to the commencement of the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amend ment) Act, 1978. But the question is, are we called upon to enter into this debate in these writ petitions. The question is whether the Regulation which had been validly and competently enacted subject to what has been said by the Supreme Court in Gulabbhai's case with regard to the lands which would come within its sweep can now be struck down for want of legislative competence consequent to the change in the constitutional provisions brought about by the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, assuming but without deciding that such a change affects the legislative competence with regard to laws relating to acquisition and requisitioning of property. In this respect Mr. Chinoy submits that such a challenge would be possible. According to him though there is no express provision in the Constitution dealing with a law which becomes invalid subsequent to its enactment due Jo the Legislature becoming incompetent to make it or to make it on certain conditions, such a provision is not necessary because what is done incom petently is void ab initio. According to him though there is no express provision in the Constitution dealing with a law which becomes invalid subsequent to its enactment due Jo the Legislature becoming incompetent to make it or to make it on certain conditions, such a provision is not necessary because what is done incom petently is void ab initio. Ho submitted that if the Parliament divests itself of its legislative competency, it does so in respect of the laws already made. He further submits that if by virtue of the doctrine of eclipse, laws which are invalidly enacted can subsequently become valid when the obstacle is removed, there is no reason why this doctrine should not apply to laws which were valid when made, but became invalid because of the legislative incompetency. In other words, Mr. Chinoy wants to operate the doctrine of eclipse in the reverse gear. However, Mr. Chinoy is not able to support this proposition by any authority or judicial pronouncement. 16. On the other hand Mr. Dias the learned counsel for the respondents submits that the constitutionality of an Act must be judged on the basis of the Constitution as it was on the date the Act was passed subject to any retrospective amendment of the Constitution. For this proposition he finds support from the decisions of the Supreme Court in( Mahendra Lal v. State of Uttar Predesh)3, the decision of a Full Bench of Jammu and Kashmir High Court in (Raheman v. State of Jammu and Kashmir)4 and of the Allahabad High Court in (U. P. S. R. T. Corporation v. S. T. A. Tribunal)5. We rind that the submissions of Mr. Dias are well founded. In Mahendra Lal's case the Supreme Court was considering. the applicability of the doctrine of eclipse to a post Constitutional legislation. There the question was whether under the Uttar Pradesh Land Tenures (Regulation of Transfers) Act, 1952 which was unconstitutional as it did not comply with Article 31(2) of the Constitution as it stood at the time when the Act was passed, revived on enactment of the Constitution (Fourth Amendment)-Act, by virtue of the doctrine of eclipse. There the question was whether under the Uttar Pradesh Land Tenures (Regulation of Transfers) Act, 1952 which was unconstitutional as it did not comply with Article 31(2) of the Constitution as it stood at the time when the Act was passed, revived on enactment of the Constitution (Fourth Amendment)-Act, by virtue of the doctrine of eclipse. On behalf of the Government it was contended that the constitutionality of the Act must be judged on the basis of the Constitution as it stood on the date of the writ petition and not as it stood on the date of the said Act and reliance was sought to be placed in support of its proposition of the decision of the Supreme Court in (Bombay Dyeing and Manufucturing Co. Ltd. v. State of Bombay)6. The Supreme Court has dealt with this question in para 14 of the report. It held that the judgment in the. Bombay Dyeing's case nowhere considers the question whether the constitutionality of an Act has to be judged on the basis of the Constitution as it stood on the date on which the Act was passed or on the basis of the Constitution as it stood on the date the writ petition was made, and that the observation in that case that the constitutionality of an Act has to be judged on the basis of the Constitution as it stood on the date of the writ petition, cannot be given the meaning, which the counsel for the respondent wanted to put on it, particularly the amendment to Article 31(2) by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act was not retrospective. The Supreme Court went to observe that if the constitutionality is to be judged by the date of the writ petition, the result would be that sometimes the Fourth Amendment of Article 31 would become retrospective and sometimes it would not, depending upon whether the writ petition was filed before the Fourth Amendment Act was passed or after the said amendment. It says that if the writ petition was filed before the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act the same provision of an Act would be unconstitutional, while if it was filed after the Fourth Amendment Act it may be constitutional and such a result is obviously impossible to accept and could not have been meant by the observation in Bombay Dyeing case. It says that if the writ petition was filed before the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act the same provision of an Act would be unconstitutional, while if it was filed after the Fourth Amendment Act it may be constitutional and such a result is obviously impossible to accept and could not have been meant by the observation in Bombay Dyeing case. After making these observations, the Supreme Court in Mahendra Lal's case laid down the law in the following terms: “It is in our opinion absolutely elementary that the constitutionality of an Act must be judged on the basis of the Constitution as it was on the date the Act was passed, subject to any retrospective amendment of the Constitution.” 17. Mr. Chinoy sought to distingnish this dictum by referring us to para 20 of the report in Mahendra La1's case. However, we do not find that anything said by the Supreme Court therein in any way detracts from what it has observed and laid down in para 14 of the report. In our view, what has been said by the Supreme Court in para 14 in Mahendra La1's case applies with equal force to the present writ petitions. In this connection it has to be noted that the deletion of Articles 19(1) (f) and 31 under the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 is not retrospective in the same manner as the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act was not so. We are respectfully bound by the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Mahendra Lal's case. 18. In Raheman v. State of Jammu and Kashmir (cit supra) the ques tion before the Full Bench was whether the Jammu and Kashmir Enemy Agents Ordinance which was. promulgated by the erstwhile Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir lost its validity when the sovereignty of the State passed to the Dominion of India and the erstwhile ruler retired. Relying on the decision the Supreme Conrt in (Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh)7 the Full Bench said that it was well settled law that the Constitu tion is prospective and not retrospective and the general principle is that if a law is made by a competent authority it does not cease to exist because that authority loses its power. In (U. P. S. R. T. Corporation v. S. T. A. Tribu nal) (cited supra) a learned single Judge of the Allahabad High Court has observed that it is well accepted principle that the validity of a statute is to be tested by the constitutional power of a Legislature at the time of its enactment by that Legislature. 19. It would, therefore, appear that there is ample authority for the proposition that the constitutional validity of an Act has to be tested on the basis of the Constitution as it was on the date when the Acs was passed subject to any retrospective amendment of the Constitution. In view of this clear position of law, it would not be possible for the petitioners to chailenge the constitutional validity of the Regulation on the alleged incompetency of the Legislature due to changes brought about by the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, particularly when the amendment, which is relied upon, is not retrospective. 20. Mr. Chinoy had been at pains to show that the petitioners had not been divested of their ownership of the lands inasmuch as the Collector had not taken charge as required by section 5 and no land revenue had been recovered in respect of these lands as required by section 6 of the Regulation. He submitted that since there was dispute with regard to the classification of the lands which would vest in the Government, the whole area did not vest unless and until this dispute was resolved. He seeks to rely on the decision of the Judicial Commissioner in (Gulabbhai v. Collector, Daman)8. Of course this submission is made in order to enable the petitioners to challenge the constitutional validity of the Regulation as above on the ground that the lands affected by the Regulation had not vested in the Government and continued to be vested in the petitioners. Since as we have held above the petitioners cannot challenge the validity of the Regulation on the above said grounds, the question of considering these submissions of Mr. Chinoy does not arise. However, we may observe that the learned Judicial Commissioner has not laid down the proprosition that if there is a dispute in regard to the classification of part of the total lands on which the Regulation operates, the whole would not vest in the Government unless and until” the dispute is resolved. Chinoy does not arise. However, we may observe that the learned Judicial Commissioner has not laid down the proprosition that if there is a dispute in regard to the classification of part of the total lands on which the Regulation operates, the whole would not vest in the Government unless and until” the dispute is resolved. The discussion in para 8 of the report in Gulabbhai's case clearly shows that according to the learned Judicial Commissioner the lands in respect of which there was no dispute as to classification had vested in the Government under the Regulation, but the lands in respect of which there was such a dispute, would vest only after quasi-judicial inquiry in terms of the Regulation as amended by the Amending Act of 1968 is made. We do not pronounce any opinion as regards the correctness even of this proposition since it is not necessary for the decision of the case. 21. The next challenge to the validity of the Regulation is on the ground that it contravenes the second proviso to clause (1) of Article 31A of the Constitution inasmuch as the Regulation seeks to acquire even the lands which are under the personal cultivation of the proprietors without paying compensation according to the market value thereof. Mr. Chinoy submits-that even though under section 4 of the Regulation the proprietor can retain the land under the personal cultivation of the proprietor notwithstanding anything contained in section 3 by virtue of section 8, the proprietor holds the land only as an occupant on payment of land revenue and under rule 2(2) he has to pay Nazarana to the Government in the event of his transferring such land. Mr. Chinoy contends that these restrictions on holding of such lands by the proprietors divest them of their ownership and amounts to acquisition of the lands by the Government as contemplated by the second proviso to Article 31A(1). Mr. Chinoy submits that though in Gulabbhai's case the Supreme Court has upheld the validity of the Regulation as protected under Article 31A, this aspect of the case was not considered there and it is now open to the petitioners, who were not parties to the petition before the Supreme Court. In support of this submission Mr. Chinoy relies on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in (Ramkrishna Ramnath v. State of Maharashtra)9. 22. In support of this submission Mr. Chinoy relies on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in (Ramkrishna Ramnath v. State of Maharashtra)9. 22. It is true that this aspect of the case has not been specifically dis cussed in Gulabbhai's case, but the judgment of the Supreme Court would show that at least in one of the five writ petitions before it, namely Writ Petition No. 148 of 1962 out of 320 acres of cultivable land 180 acres were personally cultivated by the petitioner and even with this fact on record the Supreme Court dismissed this petition wholly. It could be said that this aspect of the case could have been raised before the Supreme Court in view of the facts in one of the writ petitions, but had not been raised or that if raised the Supreme Court had not accepted the contention. In B. M. Lakhani v. Malkapur Municipality10 it has been held that the decision of the Supreme Court is binding on the High Courts and the High Court cannot ignore-it because it thinks that relevant provisions were not brought to the notice of the Supreme Court. There are similar observations in (Mudliar v. State of Tamil Nadu),11. It is, therefore, clear that the decision in a judgment of the Supreme Court cannot be assailed on the ground that certain aspects were not considered or the relevant provisions were not brought to the notice of that Court. As seen above, the Supreme Court has held that the Regulation is protected by Article 31 A of the Constitution. This would mean that it is so in respect of all the provisions including the second proviso contained in that Article. In our opinion, therefore, it is not possible for the petitioners to challenge the validity of the Regulation on this ground also. 23. With regard to the orders passed by the first respondent Collector determining the amount of compensation, it is contended on behalf of the petitioners that he did so without giving them a proper opportunity of being heard and placing material before him to substantiate their contention that certain lands held by them fell outside the purview of the Regulation and did not vest in the Government. The petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 73 of 1972 submits that the first respondent misled the claimants by stating in his letter dated 26-5-1969 (Annexure-I) that the application for postponement of the hearing had been kept with papers for action. It is said that the petitioner and the other claimants were under the impression that the first respondent would first decide their application and intimate them with regard to the date on which the application for compensation would be heard. In reply the first respondent in para 10 of his counter affidavit has said that the application made by the mother of the petitioner dated 24-5-1969 was received by him on 26-5-1969 and that she was informed that the application was kept for hearing on 27-5-1969 along with the case. This statement does not appear to be correct since his letter dated 26-5-1969 only says that the application had been received and was kept with papers for action. It does not indicate that it would be considered on the next day when the case came up for hearing. There is, therefore, much substance in the grievance of the petitioner that the claimants did not attend the hearing on 27-5-!969 under the impression that they would be communicated the date later. 24. Somewhat similar situation obtains in Special Civil Application No. 74 of 1972. There also an application was sent prior to the hearing, but no reply was sent, it is true that the claimants could not have presumed that because they had sent the application for postponement of the hearing, it would be allowed and could not have remained absent, but looking to the ground on which the postponement was sought they could be under the mistaken belief that the inquiry with regard to compensation would be postponed till the Court of the Judicial Commissioner decided the question as to whether the proprietor of a part of village was a proprietor within the meaning of the Regulation. 25. These grievances of the petitioners need not detain us any longer since Mr. Dias the learned counsel for the respondents has very fairly con ceded that the respondents have no objection to give the petitioners a fresh hearing. In our view, this would be fair and equitable on the part of the respondents. Mr. 25. These grievances of the petitioners need not detain us any longer since Mr. Dias the learned counsel for the respondents has very fairly con ceded that the respondents have no objection to give the petitioners a fresh hearing. In our view, this would be fair and equitable on the part of the respondents. Mr. Dias, however, submitted that in the hearing which the petitioners would be given, they would be bound by what they had stated in their application regarding the categories and extent of lands which are exempt from the provisions of the Regulation. Mr. Dias submitted that though the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 73 of 1972 in-his appli cation for compensation had stated that only 4 hectares of land was under tanks, in the petition he has come out with the grievance that large tracts of land were hilly, sandy, hillocks, under Cajuri trees and municipal area. He points out that same is the case in the other petition. He submits that in Special Civil Application No. 74 of 1972 though the claimants had claimed exemption only in respect of 5 hectares of land as quarries and hillocks, the first respondent had been fair enough to allow much larger area on this count, namely, 51 hectares. 26. In our view, it would not be fair and proper to make the claimants stick to what they had stated in their respective applications with regard to the categories and extent of the exempted lands. The order passed by the' first respondent in Special Civil Application No. 74 of 1972 itself indicates that the data which had been furnished by the claimants in their application for compensation was not factually correct since though the claimants therein had claimed exemption for 5 hectares as quarries and hillocks the first respondent Collector had allowed 51.84 hectares on this count. The inquiry which the Collector is supposed to make under sub-section (2) of section 10 of the Regulation read in the context of the amended definition of “land” in section 2 (g) would also be for the purpose of determining the extent of land which answers the description given in this definition and hence vests in the Government. The inquiry which the Collector is supposed to make under sub-section (2) of section 10 of the Regulation read in the context of the amended definition of “land” in section 2 (g) would also be for the purpose of determining the extent of land which answers the description given in this definition and hence vests in the Government. It is needless to say that any land which does not answsr the description given in Article 31 A(2)(a)(iii) of the Constitution or clause (g) of section 2 of the Regulation as substituted by the Amending Act of 1968 cannot fall within the purview of the Regulation and cannot vest in the Government by virtue of the decision of the Supreme Court in Gulabbhai v. Union of India (cited supra). If the Government takes over any land which does not fall within the purview of the abovesaid provi sions of the Constitution or the Regulation, such an expropriation would not have the protection of Article 31 A of the Constitution. Hence in our view, apart from what the petitioners say it is the duty of the Collector to determine the extent of land, which is covered by the definition in clause 2 (g) of the Regulation as on the appointed date. It is for this reason that we say that the claimants should not be held bound by what they had said in their application for compensation with regard to the extent and categories of lands which did not vest in the Government on the appointed date. 27. Mr. Chinoy submitted that we should in order to curtail further litigation specify the classes or categories of lands, which were not governed by the said definition of “land” in the Regulation. In our opinion, it is not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of categories of lands which fall beyond the purview of Article 31A(2)(a)(iii) of the Constitution or sec tion 2(g) of the Regulation. If a dispute arises with regard to the nature or category of a particular piece of land it can be resolved only by taking into consideration several factors relevant for that purpose. No abstract principles can be laid down in this respect. 28. Mr. If a dispute arises with regard to the nature or category of a particular piece of land it can be resolved only by taking into consideration several factors relevant for that purpose. No abstract principles can be laid down in this respect. 28. Mr. Chinoy submitted that all lands situated within the limits of a municipality even though they answer the description given by the defini tion contained in section 2(g) of the Regulation would not be amenable to the provisions of the Regulation. He submitted that the view taken by a Division Bench of this Court (to which one of us, namely, Couto, J. was a party) in this respect in (The Archidiocese of Goa v. The Union of India)12 requires re-consideration as it runs counter to what has been held by the Supreme Court in Gulabbhai v. Union of India (cited supra) and (Malankara Rubber and Produce Co Ltd. v. State of Kerala)13. In the first place we do not find that the Supreme Court has held in Gulabbhai v. Union of India that all lands situated within the municipal area irrespective of the purpose for which they are used are not protected by Article 31 A. While applying the principle which it had laid down, to the facts of each of the writ petitions before it, in para 19 of the report it stated in relation to Writ Petition No. 216 of 1963 that that petition would be dismissed with the declaration that the municipal area does not vest in the Government under the Regulation and Article 31A (2) does not lend its protection to this expropriation. This order is made on the facts of that particular case because an area of 100 acres in respect of which a Municipality was established was covered by 600 houses including markets and a cemetery. No such proposition as is sought to be read by Mr. Chinoy can be deduced from the decision of the Supreme Court in Gulabbhai's case. In the above quoted writ petition the Division Bench of this Court has considered the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Malankara Rubber Company and laid down the proposition in view of what had been said by the Supreme Court. We, therefore, do not think it necessary to reconsider that decision. 29. In the above quoted writ petition the Division Bench of this Court has considered the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Malankara Rubber Company and laid down the proposition in view of what had been said by the Supreme Court. We, therefore, do not think it necessary to reconsider that decision. 29. In view of the above discussion, the petitions fail in respect of prayer clauses (a) to (d) and (f) in Special Civil Application No. 73 of 1972 and prayer clauses (a) to (c) and (e) in respect of Special Civil Application No. 74 of 1972, These petitions are, however, partly allowed in terms of prayer clause (e) in Special Civil Application No. 73 of 1972 and prayer clause (d) in respect of Special Civil Application No. 74 of 1972 and the Collector of Daman (respondent No. 1) is hereby directed to hold an inquiry to determine the extent of land which vested in the Government on the appointed date under section 3 of the Regulation having regard to the definition of “land” in section 2 (g) of the Regulation as amended by the Amending Act of 1968 after giving a reasonable and proper opportunity to the petitioners and the other claimants, if they so desire, of being heard. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. 30. At the time of pronouncement of the judgment the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 73 of 1972 prays for a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of what we have said in the judgment, we do not think that the case involves a substantial question of law of general importance, which needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. The request is, therefore, rejected. The petitioner also submitted that pending admission of the appeal in the Supreme Court the operation of the judgment may be stayed. We direct that the operative part of the present judgment shall be suspended for two months from today. Order accordingly. -----