JUDGMENT - DESHPANDE D.B., J.: - This revision application is filed by the plaintiff against the refusal of temporary injunction in his favour by both the Courts below and it arises out of the following facts:- This is an unfortunate dispute between an educational institution and its employee. Respondent No. 1-Institution is running a college at Gangapur and it is known as “Muktanand Arts and Commerce College at Gangapur”. Petitioner was appointed as a lecturer in Commerce by the respondent No. 1-Institution on 26th June, 1972. The letter of appointment in his favour, dated 22nd June, 1972, was issued by the Secretary of the Institution and a copy of this appointment-letter is produced as Exhibit 'A'. It clearly shows that first of all the petitioner was appointed on probation for a period of one year. But it is not disputed that although he was appointed for one year his appointment continued and till the cause of action arose for filing of this suit he was in service of respondent No. 1-Institution as a lecturer. It is also not disputed that for some time the petitioner-plaintiff was appointed as In-charge of the Principal also of this college. This Institution has a body known as Local Governing Council. On 31st October, 1980, the petitioner gave an application to the President of this Local Governing Council for leave and he went on extending this leave by giving different applications and all these applications were granted by the Local Governing Council. It appears that at one stage this matter of medical leave of the petitioner was taken before the Educational Body which made the appointment of the petitioner-plaintiff and ultimately, the Parent Body, which runs this Institution, sanctioned the medical leave of petitioner. It is on 14th April, 1981 the Resolution No. 8 in the meeting of the Educational Body was passed. It mentions that the medical leave was sanctioned to the petitioner by the Local Governing Council. A copy of this Resolution is produced as Annexure 'J' in this civil revision application. It appears that ultimately the petitioner was reported to be fit for joining the duty on 1-5-81. A copy of the fitness certificate issued in this respect is produced at Page 45 of the paper-book. The college was closed and was to re-open on 20th June, 1981. It appears that ultimately the petitioner was reported to be fit for joining the duty on 1-5-81. A copy of the fitness certificate issued in this respect is produced at Page 45 of the paper-book. The college was closed and was to re-open on 20th June, 1981. According to the petitioner-plaintiff, he went to the law college after previous intimation to join the college as a lecturer but respondent No. 3 the then Principal of this college, refused permission to him to join the duty. It appears that the petitioner-plaintiff tried to get his grievance redressed through the University Act., but he failed in his attempt and that is why he filed a suit in the trial Court against the respondent No. 1-Institution, against the Local Governing Council and against the Principal-respondent No. 3. The reliefs prayed by the plaintiff in the suit were for a declaration that he has joined his duties as a lecturer on 20th June, 1981, and that the act of the defendant No. 3 in denying him permission to join the duties was illegal, void ab initio and ultra vires and was not binding upon him and he prayed also for a mandatory injunction directing the defendants to pay him the salary with allowances. He also prayed for a perpetual injunction restraining the defendants and particularly defendant No. 3 from preventing the plaintiff from joining his duty as a lecturer in the aforesaid college. In this very suit he gave an application for temporary injunction. 2. It was the respondent No. 3 who mainly opposed the application filed by the plaintiff. It may be stated here itself that the learned trial Judge had earlier issued an ad interim ex parte injunction restraining the defendants from preventing the plaintiff from joining the duties. Respondent No. 3 contended that the plaintiff has himself relieved from the service inasmuch as, although several letters and telegrams were sent to him to resume or to appear before the medical Board, he did neither and that is why by virtue of a resolution, dated 8th March, 1981, passed by the Parent Educational Body it must be deemed that the plaintiff has relieved himself from the service. He raised several other contentions also and he challenged the jurisdiction of the Civil Court also to try this suit. He raised several other contentions also and he challenged the jurisdiction of the Civil Court also to try this suit. According to him, the plaintiff should have approached the Tribunal appointed by the State Government for deciding the disputes between the employees and their employers in college. He contended that by following regular procedure a substitute was appointed in place of the petitioner-plaintiff and therefore, temporary injunction should not be granted in favour of the plaintiff. According to him, the petitioner remained absent without getting the leave sanctioned from the parent Body of the Educational Institution. He contended that those persons who have sanctioned the leave to the petitioner had no authority to sanction the leave, and that is why the said order sanctioning the leave to the petitioner is by unauthorised persons and is illegal. 3. After considering the documentary evidence and affidavits filed before him the learned trial Judge came to the conclusion that the ad interim injunction did not deserve to be continue. He held that the plaintiff was not entitled to the temporary injunction. Consequently, he vacated the earlier ad interim injunction granted by him. 4. Feeling aggrieved by this decision, the plaintiff went in appeal to the District Court at Aurangabad and the appeal was heard by the learned Assistant Judge at Aurangabad. The learned Assistant Judge also held that the plaintiff had no prima facie case and he held also that the Civil Court had prima facie no jurisdiction to try this suit in view of the provisions of section 42-B of the Marathwada University Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). The learned Assistant Judge, therefore, dismissed the appeal with no order as to costs. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiff has came to this Court by way of this civil revision application. 5. The same considerations arise before me in this case. The first is about the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and the second is about the existence of prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff. 6. I shall take the first point of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court first. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court is challenged on the basis of section 42-B of the Act. The first is about the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and the second is about the existence of prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff. 6. I shall take the first point of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court first. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court is challenged on the basis of section 42-B of the Act. It run as follows: “42-B(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract for the time being in force, any employee (whether a Teacher or other employee) in any affiliated College of Recognised Institution (other than that managed and maintained by the State Government or the University), who is dismissed or removed or whose Services are otherwise terminated, or who is reduced in rank, by the Management and who is aggrieved, shall have a right of appeal and an appeal against any such order to the Tribunal constituted under section 42-A: Provided that, no such appeal shall lie to the Tribunal in any case where the matter has already been decided by a Court or Tribunal of competent jurisdiction or is pending before such Court or Tribunal on the date of commencement of the Maharashtra Universities (Second Amendment) Act, 1977, or where the order of dismissal, removal, otherwise termination of service or reduction in rank was passed by the Management at any time before 1st day of July, 1974. Hence, it is to be prima facie decided whether the petitioner falls within the category of servants who are dismissed or removed or whose services are otherwise terminated. The other contents of this section are not relevant for our purpose. According to Mr. V.G. Gangapurwala, appearing for the petitioner-plaintiff, the case of the petitioner does not fall in any of three categories, whereas according to Mr. S.K. Shelke, appearing for the respondent No. 3, the present petitioner's case falls in one of the three categories. According to Mr. Shelke, it is a case of otherwise termination of services of the plaintiff and hence, it is submitted that in view of this legal provision the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is ousted to try this suit. 7. Having heard Counsel for both sides, I am satisfied that the present case does not prima facie fall in either of the categories mentioned in the aforesaid section. For this purpose we will have to turn to the letter of the Principal dated 1/6-4-1981. 7. Having heard Counsel for both sides, I am satisfied that the present case does not prima facie fall in either of the categories mentioned in the aforesaid section. For this purpose we will have to turn to the letter of the Principal dated 1/6-4-1981. The Principal i.e. respondent No. 3 sent this letter to the plaintiff petitioner. It is apparent from this letter that it is the contention of contesting respondent No. 3 that he has made out a case that the plaintiff has self-relieved himself from service and that is why there is no question of allowing the plaintiff to join the services. In other words, it is the contention of respondent No. 3 that the plaintiff has abandoned the service and therefore, he is not entitled to resume the duty. Now, such a contention does not fall in any of three categories mentioned in section 42-B of the Act. It is not dismissal or removal and does not even amount to a termination of the service at all. Admittedly, nothing is done on the part of the employer vis-a-vis the employee and hence, this case cannot fall in any of the three categories mentioned in the aforesaid section. This is a clear case of abandonment and the name given by the respondent No. 3 is “self-relieved” and whether it is a case of abandonment or self-relief can prima facie certainly fall within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Mr. Shelke, appearing for the contesting respondent, has placed reliance upon three rulings. One is (Sultan Ali Naghiana Myhammad Ali v. Nur Hussain)1, A.I.R. 1949 Lahore 131. He placed reliance upon Head Note (b). The facts of this ruling are totally different from the facts of the instant case and those observations have no bearing on the facts of this case. There is a discussion about ousting of jurisdiction of the Civil Court on account of some legislation. The second ruling is (M/s. Indian Iron Steel Co. Ltd. and another v. Their Workmen)2, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 130. It appears that learned Counsel wants to place reliance upon Head Note (d) which speaks of absence without leave and that has no bearing on the decision of this case and the last one is (Bata Shoe Co. Ltd. v. Jabalpur Corporation)3, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1955. Ltd. and another v. Their Workmen)2, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 130. It appears that learned Counsel wants to place reliance upon Head Note (d) which speaks of absence without leave and that has no bearing on the decision of this case and the last one is (Bata Shoe Co. Ltd. v. Jabalpur Corporation)3, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1955. In that ruling a suit was filed challenging the valuation, assessment or levy of octroi by the Jabalpur Corporation and hence, it has nothing to do with the present case. It is true that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court can be expressly or impliedly ousted by a legislation. But in the instant case I have presently pointed out that the case of the present petitioner does not fall in any of the three categories mentioned in section 42-B of the Act and that is why prima facie there is no bar to the jurisdiction of Civil Court. 8. Now the next question is whether the plaintiff has a prima facie case. It is true that earlier the leave of the petitioner-plaintiff was sanctioned by the Local Governing Council and it is apparent from the provisions in this respect that the Local Governing Council has no power to grant leave to the employees. The provisions relating to the separate Local Managing Committing are embodied in section 43 sub-section (3) Clause (b) of the Act and it enumerates the powers of the Local Managing Committee. This Local Managing Committee is called as “Local Governing Council” also and it is apparent from the enumerations of these powers that the Local Governing Council or the Local Managing Committee has no power to grant leave to the employees. But the matter does not rest here. The matter ultimately went to the Parent Body which runs this college and the leave which was sanctioned by the Local Governing Council was ultimately sanctioned by the Parent Body by virtue of a resolution No. 8 passed on 14-4-1981. A copy of the same is produced as Exhibit 'J at page 39 of the Paper-book and it clearly supports the contention of the petitioner-plaintiff that his leave is also sanctioned by the Parent Body which runs this college. In respect of this Resolution, it was urged by Mr. A copy of the same is produced as Exhibit 'J at page 39 of the Paper-book and it clearly supports the contention of the petitioner-plaintiff that his leave is also sanctioned by the Parent Body which runs this college. In respect of this Resolution, it was urged by Mr. Shelke that on 10-10-1980 elections were held to the Office Bearers of the Parent Body which runs this educational Institution and the new Managing Committee is elected on that day. This fact itself is in dispute and it is apparent that this change is not accepted by the Charity Department of the State. It appears from the record that an injunction was issued against holding any election on 10-10-1980 and a copy of the panchanama of service of such injunction, dated 10-10-80, is produced at page 62 of the paper-book. 9. It is an undisputed fact that a register is maintained in the Charity Organisation of the State disclosing the full particulars of the Trust and the names of Body which has passed the resolution, dated 14-4-1981, stand in the list of trustees in the said register. Now, so far as the change in the Constitution of the Body of trustees, section 22 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 is relevant. It lays down that where any change occurs in any of the entries recorded in the register kept under section 17, the trustee shall, within 90 days from the date of the occurrence of such change, or where any change is desired in such entries, in the interest of the administration of such public trust, report such change or proposed change to the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner in charge of the Public Trusts Registration office where the register is kept and it further lays down that such report shall be made in the prescribed form. Now, it seems to be an undisputed fact that such a report is made by the contesting respondent No. 3 or by the new Body which is alleged to have been elected on 10-10-80. Then Rule 13 of the Bombay Public Trusts Rules, 1951, speaks about the change in the register of public trusts and it is an undisputed fact that such a change is not sanctioned by the Charity Organisation as yet and the matter is still pending before the competent officer of the Charity Organisation. Then Rule 13 of the Bombay Public Trusts Rules, 1951, speaks about the change in the register of public trusts and it is an undisputed fact that such a change is not sanctioned by the Charity Organisation as yet and the matter is still pending before the competent officer of the Charity Organisation. Thus, it appears to be a dispute between the two rival factions of the Parent Body. One faction contends that there were no elections on 10-10-80 and another faction claims that it got elected on 10-10-80 and hence, it has got all the powers of the Parent Body. Thus, it cannot finally be said as to which of the Body has got powers to pass a resolution. It can only be said that the plaintiff has a prima facie arguable case on this point. It is exactly on the same ground that one cannot place implicity reliance on the resolution, dated 8th March, 1981, passed in the meeting. That is a resolution passed the alleged new body of the parent organisation. At this stage it will be improper to give a final finding in this respect and this matter can be thrashed out only after the entire evidence is led before the trial Court. At the fault of repetition, I may point out that plaintiff has an arguable case in this matter and hence, he has a prima facie case in view of the Resolution No. 8 passed by the so-called old Body on 14-4-81. 10. Now, the last question is about the balance of convenience. To a certain extent Mr. Shelke was right in arguing that if the plaintiff succeeds he can be compensated by payment of all the arrears due to him, etc. That can easily be done but when I questioned Mr. Shelke how the damage caused to the mental condition of the petitioner by remaining idle can be compensated and he has no answer and hence, certainly there is balance of convenience in favour of plaintiff. The mere fact that a new person is appointed in place of petitioner is no ground for holding that balance of convenience is against petitioner. If the rules and terms and conditions permit the Body to terminate the appointment of new appointee it may do so and relieve itself of additional expenditure. This has nothing to do with the merits of this case. If the rules and terms and conditions permit the Body to terminate the appointment of new appointee it may do so and relieve itself of additional expenditure. This has nothing to do with the merits of this case. At the fault of repetition, I may point out that the balance of convenience is in favour of the plaintiff. 11. Hence, I am satisfied that both the courts below have clearly mis-construed the whole position and have clearly come to a wrong conclusion and their conclusions are contrary to the legal provisions in this respect. Hence, this revision application deserves to be allowed and it is accordingly allowed. 12. This revision application is allowed. Defendants are hereby restrained till the decision of the suit from preventing the plaintiff from joining his duty as a lecturer in Commerce at Muktanand College, Gangapur and also signing the muster roll maintained by the College as a lecturer in the said College. It, therefore, follows that the defendants will have to pay plaintiff the necessary salary alongwith all the allowances, etc., from the date of his joining the service. The question of payment of arrears will be decided by the trial Court on merits after the trial is over. Rule made absolute but in the circumstances of this case there will be no order as to costs. Revision allowed. -----