R. A. MISRA, J. ,, J. ( 1 ) BY this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the petitioner raghvendra Singh alias Chhote Raja challenges the validity of his detention order of District Magistrate, Moradabad passed on 3rd October 1982 under section 3 (2) of the National Security Act 1980 (for short the Act) on his being satisfied that the detention of the petitioner was necessary with a view to preventing him from acting In any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. ( 2 ) THE order of detention is based on three grounds, the first of which relates to an incident of 15th August 1981 at 5. 30 P. M. where in the petitioner is alleged to have made an attempt to commit the murder of Chhote Singh resident of Makrandpur and fired as many as 250 rebunds by his gun alongwith his associates, causing tension and creating terror amongst the persons of the locality. A case under sections 147, 148, 149 and 307 I. P. C. was registered at the Police Station on 16th f August, 1981. The case was investigated, charge-sheet submitted and trial was alleged to be pending before Additional Sessions Judge VIII Kanpur. In support of this ground copies of two first information report, General Diary were supplied to the detenu, the second ground relates to an incident of 23rd of September 1981 at 10 A. M. wherein the detenu alongwith his 9 to 20 associates armed with guns, rifles, stain guns committed dacoity at the residence of Prem Chandra in village Tilsara causing tension and creating terror amongst the residents of the area. First information report was lodged by Prem Chandta on 24. 9. 81. The case was registered. One accused Vishram Singh who was arrested on 3rd October 1981 disclosed petitioners involvement in the Commission of the dacoity. This fact was mentioned in General Diary No. 9 dated 3. 10. 81. Ghanshyam Singh accused who was subsequently arrested corroborated the aforesaid facts in his statement. That fact was recorded in G. D. No. 1 dated 6. 10. 81. The detenu was put up for identification on 30th March, 1982 but on account of fear the witnesses did not identify him and final report under section 169 Cr. P. C. was submitted. Ghanshyam Singh accused who was subsequently arrested corroborated the aforesaid facts in his statement. That fact was recorded in G. D. No. 1 dated 6. 10. 81. The detenu was put up for identification on 30th March, 1982 but on account of fear the witnesses did not identify him and final report under section 169 Cr. P. C. was submitted. In support of this ground copies of aforesaid first information reports and General Diaries were supplied to the petitioner. The third and the last ground relates-to an incident which is alleged to have occurred on the night between 27th and 28th of March 1982 at Village Bhitipur wherein the petitioner alongwith 15 or 20 others is alleged to have committed dacoity with murder. First Information Report was lodged at 7. 30 A M. On 28th March, 1982 and case was registered at the police station. The petitioner was arrested on 30th March, 1982 at 9. 30 A. M. and a 12 bore country made pistol alongwith ten live cartridges were recovered from his custody. He made a confession of having committed the aforesaid dacoity. He was put up for identification and was identified by Ram Chandra and Shaufi Lal witnesses on 26th April, 1982. Copies of first information report, General Diary and his confessional statement were supplied to him in support of this ground. ( 3 ) THE respondents filed counter affidavit in compliance to the notices served upon the regarding this petition. The petitioner subsequently filed rejoinder affidavit and in para 15 thereof he took the plea that his detention was vitiated inasmuch as the detaining authority did not furnish to him the copies of the police report mentioning various offences said to have been committed by him and the recommendation made by the Police Officer to detain the petitioner which has resulted in denial of opportunity to make an affective representation. In para 20 of the rejoinder affidavit he took the plea that none of the documents supplied to the detenu furnished any material to show that any terror or panic prevailed in the locality as mentioned in the grounds of detention. In para 20 of the rejoinder affidavit he took the plea that none of the documents supplied to the detenu furnished any material to show that any terror or panic prevailed in the locality as mentioned in the grounds of detention. According to the petitioner the said facts had been mentioned in the grounds without there being any material in support of the same and in case if there was any such material the same was not furnished to the petitioner to enable him to make an effective representation. The learned Government Advocate raised objection saying that either the petitioner should not be permitted to raise these new points at this stage or the respondents should be afforded an opportunity to meet these allegations. The record of the case was available in the court and we perused the same. Prima facie it appeared to us that the satisfaction of the District Magistrate that the petitioner was likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order as recited to the order dated 3. 10. 81 based on the report submitted by Inspector of Police Station Ghatampur. It also appeared to us that a copy of this report was not supplied to the detenu. Having regard to all these facts we thought it proper to permit the petitioner to argue these two points and to question the validity of detention also on the ground that material relied upon by the District Magistrate was not supplied to the detenu and as such his detention would be rendered invalid. However, before expressing our considered opinion on this aspect of the case we thought it proper that the respondents should be given an opportunity to explain to this court and if necessary with reference to the record of the case as to what was the material that was relied upon by the District Magistrate for believing the various facts stated in the three grounds permitting petitioners detention and also to satisfy the court that in fact all the material that had been relied upon by the District Magistrate for coming to the conclusion that the petitioner was likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order was supplied to him along with grounds of detention. The Government Advocate was, therefore, allowed sufficient opportunity to tile supplementary affidavit. The Government Advocate was, therefore, allowed sufficient opportunity to tile supplementary affidavit. The opportunity has been availed and Sri Anurag Goel, District Magistrate who had passed the detention order has filed supplementary affidavit wherein he has tried to explain the fact that he had supplied copies of the material documents relied upon by him to the detenu alongwith the grounds of detention. We would like to quote below para 2 of the supplementary affidavit of Sri Goel which reads as below: that it may be stated that while examining the case of the petitioner with a view to decide whether any action under the provision of National Security Act were necessary against him or not, the deponent had summoned the Station House Officer of Police Station, Ghatampur at the time of examining the said proposal. The deponent has perused the entire material furnished by the Superintendent of Police Kanpur Dehat which included a dopier of Station House Officer, Ghatampur as also the first information reports and G. D. extracts mentioned in the said report of the Police Station concerned. The deponent has based his satisfaction after perusing the first information reports as also the G. D. entry mentioned in the grounds of detention. The deponent had also perused the brief description of the Criminal Activity mentioned in the said report of police station concerned. However, whereas the deponent did find the fact of tension prevailing in the locality mentioned in the first information report relating to ground No. 1 this assertion was not found in the F. I. R. or G. O. entries relating to grounds Nos. 2 and 3. The deponent was consequently not prepared to accept the submissions made in the police report of police station concerned but the Station House Officer of Ghatampur Police Station Sri Rajendra Kumar Singh told the deponent that he had personally verified this assertion and had found the fact to be correct that after the incident the terror had prevailed in the nearby locality as is mentioned both in the grounds Nos. 2 and 3 also. Similarly Sri Rajendra Kumar Singh had told the deponent that he had further verified the fact that the petitioner was instrumental in getting the witnesses terrorized with the result that in his test identification parade in respect of crime No. 479 the witnesses had not identified him. 2 and 3 also. Similarly Sri Rajendra Kumar Singh had told the deponent that he had further verified the fact that the petitioner was instrumental in getting the witnesses terrorized with the result that in his test identification parade in respect of crime No. 479 the witnesses had not identified him. The deponent had consequently relied upon the facts orally communicated to him by Sri Rajendra Kumar Singh, with the result that these facts were incorporated in the ground of detention. The deponent further asserts that he had in fact refused to accept the said assertions contained in the police report but he relied upon the statements made by the Station House Officer of the Police Station concerned in the manner as has been mentioned above. Since this fact was consequently part of own know ledge of the deponent which had been reduced into writing in the ground of detention itself, there was no question of any material in support of the said fact being supplied to the petitioner. Moreover it may be stated that these are the facts which constitute the background making it necessary to pass the order of detention against the petitioner and do not constitute his main activities. The main activities of the petitioner as would be clear from the perusal of the grounds that he had been recklessly attacking people in committing dacoities with the result that he was likely to affect the maintenance of public order future also. Since all the basic facts and material in support of the real ground of detention had been furnished to the detenu and since even other antecedent facts such as the resultant terror and non- identification by the witnesses resulting in submission of the final report against the accused had been veritably reproduced in the ground of detention itself, It cannot be said that the petitioners right to make an effective representation against the grounds of detention had in any manner been affected by not supplying to him separately the same facts which had come to the notice of the deponent in the manner as mentioned above. ( 4 ) IT is by now well settled law of the land that if there arc any documents, statement or other material relied upon in the grounds of detention, they must also be communicated to the detenu, because being incorporated in the grounds of detention they form part of the grounds and grounds furnished to the detenu cannot be said to be complete without them. It is recognized right of the detenu which is implicit in Article 22 (5) of the Constitution that he should be furnished with all the basic facts and materials with reasonable expedition which have been relied upon in the ground of detention. Sri Anurag Goels affidavit shows that he relied upon the material furnished by the Superintendent of Police Dehat including the dozier of the Station House Officer Ghatampur and brid description of the criminal activity mentioned in the said report of police station concerned. Admittedly the copies of the brief description of the criminal activity submitted by the police station and relied upon by the detaining authority has not been supplied to the petitioner and as such the detenu has been deprived of his constitutional right to get the copy of the aforesaid material which was relied upon by the detaining authority and non-supply thereof undoubtedly vitiates the order of detention. ( 5 ) THE detaining authority has further admitted that he was not satisfied on perusal of the documents i. e. the First Information Report and the G. D. entries produced before him that by the incidents referred in ground Nos. 1, 2 and 3 tension and terror was created in the nearby localities. He was, however, satisfied about the existence of the terror and tension as a result of the incidents referred in the ground Nos. 1, 2 and 3 on the basis of the oral submissions made before him by the Station House Officer Ghatampur Sri Rajendra Kumar Singh. He further admits to have placed reliance on the oral submission of Rajendra Kumar Singh that the witnesses did not identify the detenu because they were terrorized by him. The detaining authority thus admittedly placed reliance on the oral submission and oral information given to him by the Station House Officer Ghatampur and his subjective satisfaction is undoubtedly based on those submission and informations. The detaining authority thus admittedly placed reliance on the oral submission and oral information given to him by the Station House Officer Ghatampur and his subjective satisfaction is undoubtedly based on those submission and informations. These basic facts have not been communicated to the detenu and that also making the order of detention illegal. We may hasten to observe that the detaining authority was not bound to disclose the source of information and if the public interest so required he could withhold the source of information but he shall have communicated to the detenu that he relied upon the information received otherwise than from the documents placed before him that as a result or the incident mentioned in the grounds Nos. 1, 2 and 3 tension and terror was created and that he had also received information that the witnesses did not identify the detenu on account of fear. These basic facts which have been relied upon in arriving at the subjective satisfaction by the detaining authority have not been communicated to the detenu and that also makes the order of detention illegal. In the result we hold that the order of detention passed against the detenu is illegal and he cannot be kept under detention on the basis of the aforesaid order of detention. ( 6 ) IT so appears that the petitioner is detained in the District Jail of Kanpur. The Superintendent District Jail of Kanpur has not been made a party. Sri Gajraj Singh the Assistant Jailer of District Kanpur has filed an affidavit to say that the petitioner is under valid custody otherwise than on the basis of the order of detention under section 3 (2) of the National Security Act. His contention is that the petitioner is in jail custody in perusal of the warrants of remand in crime No. 105 of 1982 under section 396 I. P. C. , police station Ghatampur (2) crime No. 108 of 1982 under section 25 Arms Act; police station Ghatampur (3) crime No. 168 of 1982 under sections 324, 323 I. P. C. police station Kotwali, Kanpur. The learned counsel for the petitioner has seriously challenged the validity of these warrants of remand and has urged that all these warrants of remand as unlawful and the petitioner cannot be kept under detention on the basis of these warrants of remand. Sri. The learned counsel for the petitioner has seriously challenged the validity of these warrants of remand and has urged that all these warrants of remand as unlawful and the petitioner cannot be kept under detention on the basis of these warrants of remand. Sri. Gajraj Singh the Assistant Jailer has in para 4 of his affidavit. It deposed that he has been advised to state that the, present detention of the petitioner being in pursuance of the valid order of remand in crime No. 105 of 1982 under section 309-I. P. C. the present habeas corpus petition is misconceived and deserves to be dismissed. The learned counsel for the State has produced before us the warrant of remand under section 396 I. P. C. and has filed copy thereof before us. This warrant of remand simply says that Raghvendra Singh is an accused of an offence punishable, under section 396 I. P. C. and has been committed for trial. The Superintendent District Jail, Kanpur is required to keep him in custody and to produce him before the trial court as and when required by the trial court. The warrant remaining the accused to jail does not specify the period for which the accused is to be kept under detention and as to for which period to jail officials have been authorized to detain the accused. It simply says that the accused has been committed for trial for having committed an offence punishable under section 396 I. P. C. so the jail officials are authorized to keep him in their custody and produce him before the trial court as and when required. This warrant of remand thus is a warrant of remand passed under section 209 Cr. P. C. which provides that where the accused appears or is brought before a Magistrate and the Magistrate feels that the offence is exclusively triable by the court of Sessions, he has to, unless the accused had been directed to he released on bail, remand him to custody during the, until conclusion of the trial. He has no option in, the matter. In such circumstance, where a Magistrate commits an accused to court of Session and direct his being, remanded to custody during and until conclusion of the trial, the warrant is not required to specifying the period for which the accused is to be kept in custody by the jail authority. He has no option in, the matter. In such circumstance, where a Magistrate commits an accused to court of Session and direct his being, remanded to custody during and until conclusion of the trial, the warrant is not required to specifying the period for which the accused is to be kept in custody by the jail authority. What the Magistrate required to mention is simply that the accused has been committed for the trial and the Jail authorities have been authorised to keep him in their custody during and until Conclusion of the session trial. In such circumstances the order of detention would not stand vitiated merely because no Period is mentioned in the warrant for which he is to be detained. The purpose of warrant of remand under section 209 Cr. P. C. is to ensure the custody of the accused during and until conclusion of the session trial and the Magistrate is empowered to direct the jail authorities to keep the accused in custody during and until the conclusion of the, trial. Section 209 Cr. P. C. is a special provision which enables a Magistrate to while committing the accused to session court, authorise his detention during and until conclusion of trial. In the instant case the warrant of remand produced before us had not been passed by the Magistrate. It has seen passed by Sessions Judge who was not at all competent to issue an order of remand under section 209 Cr. P. C. for keeping the accused in custody during and until conclusion of trial; and under section 309 the Sessions Judge could not remand the accused to jail custody during and until conclusion of the trial before him. Section 309 is general revision contained in the Code enabling all court taking cognizance of an offence or commencing the trial that if they find it necessary or advisable to postpone the commencement or adjourn any inquiry or trial, remand an accused who is already in custody. The Sessions Judge cannot exercise the power or a Magistrate under section 209 Cr. The Sessions Judge cannot exercise the power or a Magistrate under section 209 Cr. P. C. If the court taking cognizance of an offence white trying the accused finds it necessary or advisable to adjourn or postpone the inquiry or trial then he is authorized to remand the accused who is already in custody till the date on which the case is to be taken up next and the detention of the accused beyond the period mentioned in the custody warrant has to be re-authorized after the expiry of that date. The custody warrant produced before us does not show that the accused was remanded to custody for any specified period upto any particular date, although some dates are noted on the back of the aforesaid custody warrant but it does not say that the Superintendent of the Jail has been authorized to keep the accused in custody during the periods mentioned on the reverse of the custody warrant. As we have observed above under section 309 the trial court has been empowered to remand the accused who is already in custody only till the date on which the case is to be taken up next and the detention of the accused beyond the period mentioned in the custody warrant has to be re-authorized after the expiry of that date. The detention of the accused on the basis of the aforesaid custody warrant stands vitiated because the Sessions Judge was not empowered to remand the accused in jail custody for unlimited period without specifying the period for which the accused was to be kept in custody. We would like to make it clear that section 209 enables a Magistrate to pass order in respect of the proceedings that are to take place before a court other than himself and also for the period during and until conclusion of the trial irrespective of the date on which the accused was to be produced before the court trying him. Inasmuch as section 209 is a special provision dealing with special type of cases it will continue to govern the cases coming under it not withstanding that such cases may in terms be dealt with under section 309, as well. Inasmuch as section 209 is a special provision dealing with special type of cases it will continue to govern the cases coming under it not withstanding that such cases may in terms be dealt with under section 309, as well. In cases falling under section 209 it is the Magistrate committing the accused to sessions who has been empowered to validly authorize the Superintendent of the District Jail to keep him in his custody during and until conclusion of the trial even though it is the Sessions Court, which may be seized of the case. In such cases the authority to detain the accused flows not [roman order made by the Sessions Judge before whom the proceedings are to take place but from the order made by the Magistrate under section 209. Once the detention of an accused during and until conclusion of the trial has been duly authorized, it would not be necessary for the trial court to, while every time adjourning postponing the trial, confer the authority for the detention of the accused. In the instant case the opposite parties have not placed before us any order of remand passed by the Magistrate under section 209 Cr. P. C. for the detention of the detenu during and until conclusion of the trial and as we have observed above the custody warrant produced before us is not a valid custody warrant under section 309 Cr. P. C. ( 7 ) THERE is yet another point which makes. the continued detention of the accused illegal on the basis of the aforesaid custody warrant. Following dates are mentioned on the reverse of the custody warrant: 5-6-1982 19-6-1982 19-6-1982 3-7-1982 raghvendra Singh Urf Chhote Raja putra Badan Singh aadesh di ek mahtak jel men raha aur bhaja jarat hai 7. 12. 82 3. 8. 82 se 13. 8. 82 17. 1. 82 se 19. 1. 82 13. 8. 82 se 21. 8. 82 17. 1. 83 se 18. 1. 83 21. 8. 82 se 20. 9. 82 18. 1. 83 se 19. 1. 83 18. 9. 82 se 20. 9. 82 Raghvendra Singh putra Badan Singh 20. 9. 82 se 12. 10. 82 12. 10. 82 se 4. 11. 82 19. 1. 83 se 2. 2. 83 2. 2. 83 se 8. 3. 1. 83 se 18. 1. 83 21. 8. 82 se 20. 9. 82 18. 1. 83 se 19. 1. 83 18. 9. 82 se 20. 9. 82 Raghvendra Singh putra Badan Singh 20. 9. 82 se 12. 10. 82 12. 10. 82 se 4. 11. 82 19. 1. 83 se 2. 2. 83 2. 2. 83 se 8. 3. 83 as we have observed above there is nothing in the custody warrant to show that the Superintendent District Jail Kanpur was authorized to keep the accused under detention during the dates mentioned on the reverse but even if we presume that it is so, then there is no authority for his detention during the period of 3rd July 82 to 3rd August 82 and 4th of November 82 to 7th jf December 82 though subsequent dates on the reverse do mention the period beginning from 3rd f August 82 to 13th August 82 and similarly for the period beginning from 7th December 82 to 17th, and 19th of January 82. But as he was not in valid custody on 3rd of August, 82 and 7th of December 82 the Sessions Judge could not pass the. As we have observed above there is nothing in the custody warrant to show that the Superintendent District Jail Kanpur was authorized to keep the accused under detention during the dates mentioned on the reverse but even if we presume that it is so, then there is no authority for his detention during the period of 3rd July 82 to 3rd August 82 and 4th of November 82 to 7th of December 82 though subsequent dates on the reverse do mention the period beginning from 3rd of August 82 to 13th August 82 and similarly for the period beginning from 7th December 82 to 17th and 19th of January 82. But as he was not in valid custody on 3rd of August, 82 and 7th of December 82 the Sessions Judge could not pass the orders of remand on these dates. In Han Prasad Dube v. District Magistrate Farrukhabad he has been held that the custody contemplated by section 309 (2) Cr. P. C. means legal custody. In Kamlesh Kumar Dixit v. State it has again been held that power to remand an accused to custody under section 309 (2) can be exercised only where the accused is in a valid custody. P. C. means legal custody. In Kamlesh Kumar Dixit v. State it has again been held that power to remand an accused to custody under section 309 (2) can be exercised only where the accused is in a valid custody. The accused was not in valid custody on 3rd August 82 and 7th December 82 for want of valid warrants of remand upto 3rd of August 82 and 7th of December 82 and so the Sessions Judge was not competent to pass order of remand on 3rd August 82 and 7th December 82 and that vitiates the aforesaid warrants of remand and makes the continued detention of the petitioner illegal. ( 8 ) IT has been argued by the learned Government Advocate that the trial court while adjourning case under section 309 (2) Cr. P. C. is competent to remand the accused to jail custody even where the accused is not in valid custody in that case but happens to be in valid custody in come other case. We do not agree with this contention because one cannot be legally detained in a case simply because he happens to be in custody in some other case. The accused cannot be directed to be detained in the case in which bail has already been granted to him by the trial court or the appellate court and orders of his release have been issued. Once the court has issued orders for release of the accused in a case it cannot pass order for his detention in that very case while adjourning that case under section 309 (2) Cr. P. C. without canceling the bail. The court is not empowered to remand an accused to jail custody under section 309 (2) Cr. P. C. Simply because he happens to be in custody in some other case because as observed above his re-detention would amount to cancellation of his bail which the court is not competent to do in exercise of its power under section 309 (2) of the Code. For example take the case of an accused who is being tried in two cases one under section 302 I. P. C and the other under section 25 Arms Act. He applies for bail in the case under section 302 IPC without moving an application for bail in case under section 25 Arms Act. For example take the case of an accused who is being tried in two cases one under section 302 I. P. C and the other under section 25 Arms Act. He applies for bail in the case under section 302 IPC without moving an application for bail in case under section 25 Arms Act. The bail is granted to him in the case under section 302 I. P. C. and the order of release is issued after he furnishes securities and bonds but the jail authorities rightly do not release him as he is still required to be kept under detention in the case under section 25 of Arms Act. Subsequently he moves an application for bail in the case under section 25 of Arm. Act and obtains an order of bail in that case also but before the issue of release order he is produced before the trial court (in custody) in the case under section 302 I. P. C. and the trial is adjourned for two months. Now if the accused is remanded to jail custody for two months in the case under section 302 I. P. C. simply because he happens to be in valid custody in the other case under section 25 Arms Act, then he would not be released even after the issue of release order in the case under section 25 Arms Act and both the release orders would become ineffective. Thus nullifying the orders of bail and subsequent release orders. The law cannot permit such a situation and no one can be allowed to play with the most precious right of liberty of a citizen guaranteed by the Constitution of India. We, therefore, hold that the trial Court is competent to remand the accused to jail custody under section 309 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure only when the accused is in valid custody in the case of which the court has taken cognizance and which is being adjourned. In this view of the matter the continued detention of the accused on the basis of the warrant of remand in the offence punishable under section 390 I. P. C. produced before us is illegal on this ground also. ( 9 ) NOW coming to the remaining three remand warrants produced before us one in Crime No. 108 of 1982 is under section 25 of the Arms Act. ( 9 ) NOW coming to the remaining three remand warrants produced before us one in Crime No. 108 of 1982 is under section 25 of the Arms Act. It has not been addressed to any jail authority though it says that the accused is required to be kept in custody and produced as and when required. Same is position of the remaining two warrants. They purport to have been issued by some Magistrate. They are not addressed to any jail authority and the accused has been remanded to custody for unlimited period of time. There is nothing to say that the accused is required to be kept in custody during the periods mentioned in the dates given on the reverse. So the dates given on the reverse are of no help. The Magistrate could not remand the accused in jail custody for a period of more than 15 days. So these warrants of remand are illegal on two grounds, firstly because they are not addressed to any jail authority and secondly because the Magistrate has remarked them to custody beyond a period of 15 days. We, therefore, hold that the remaining three warrants of remand produced before us are also bad in law and the accused cannot be kept under detention on the basis of these warrants of remand. ( 10 ) THE petition, therefore, succeeds and is allowed. The order of detention passed against the petitioner dated 3rd October 1982 is hereby quashed. Respondents and the Superintendent of District Jail Kanpur are directed to set the petitioner Raghwndra Singh at liberty forthwith. Petition allowed .