JUDGMENT P.C. Balakrishna Menon, J. 1. This second appeal by the plaintiffs is against the concurrent decision of the courts below dismissing their suit for partition of one item of property 28 cents in extent. The property belonged to one Chadayankutty who sold the same to his sister Ayisumma and her children Sainaba and Mariyumma. The 1st defendant is the son of Sainaba and the plaintiffs are the children of Chadayankutty. Defendants 2 to 7 are the wife and children of Moideen, brother of Chadayankutty and Ayisumma. The plaintiffs claim that on the death of Ayisumma and Maryiumma their father Chadayankutty inherited 21/72 shares in the suit property and on his death his fractional right devolved on the plaintiffs. They seek partition and separate allotment of 21/72 shares in the suit property. 2. The suit is contested by the 1st defendant. According to him, Ayisumma had orally gifted the property to him and he is in possession of the same in his own right. He has also pleaded that the rights if any of the plaintiffs and other sharers are lost by adverse possession and limitation. 3. Both the courts below have concurrently found against the oral gift pleaded by the 1st defendant. The suit was however dismissed accepting the 1st defendant's plea of adverse possession. it is against this that the plaintiffs have come up in second appeal. 4. The only question for decision in this second appeal is as to whether the plaintiffs' title to the suit property is lost by adverse possession of the 1st defendant. There is no dispute regarding the share claimed by the plaintiffs. It is conceded that if the suit is not barred by adverse possession and limitation, the plaintiffs will be entitled to 21 out of 72 shares, the 1st defendant will be entitled to 30/72 shares and defendants 2 to 7 will be entitled 'to 21/72 shares. The courts below have found that the 1st defendant had been in possession of the property for a long period and for the reason of such long possession, had perfected title by adverse possession against the other coheirs. The property was held by Ayisumma and her children on kanam rights. The 1st defendant had as per Ext. B32 dated 27-5-1946 obtained a renewal of the kanam from the jenmi. Ext. B32 is a registration copy of the marupat executed by the 1st defendant. The property was held by Ayisumma and her children on kanam rights. The 1st defendant had as per Ext. B32 dated 27-5-1946 obtained a renewal of the kanam from the jenmi. Ext. B32 is a registration copy of the marupat executed by the 1st defendant. Even though he admits in his evidence that a document of demise was executed by the jenmi, the same has not been produced in the case. The 1st defendant had later by Ext. B50 dated 20-9-1960 purchased the jenmom rights in the property. He had borrowed certain amounts on the security of the property as per Exts. B35 and B37 hypothecation bonds of the year 1949. Exts. B2 to B27 are the rent receipts issued to Ayisumma, Exts. B28 to B31, B34, B35, B36 and B38 to B41 are the rent receipts in the name of the 1st defendant after 1117 apparently after the death of Ayisumma. Exts. B42 to B49, B51, and B53 to B75 are the demands and receipts in respect of payment of Panchayat tax by the 1st defendant. It is on the strength of these documents that the 1st defendant claims title by adverse possession against the other coheirs. In Para.3 of his written statement, the 1st defendant has pleaded adverse possession against the other coheirs for the reason of their non participation in the rents and profits of the property There is no plea of ouster of the other coheirs nor is there any plea that the possession of the 1st defendant is adverse to the other coheirs to their knowledge. The courts below have also not found ouster or possession of the 1st defendant as hostile to the other coheirs to their knowledge. In page 10 of his deposition, the 1st defendant as D.W. 1 has deposed that the property had never been in the possession of strangers and that Chadayankutty, his brother Moideen and sister Ayisumma are not strangers as far as he is concerned. This part of the deposition of the 1st defendant would clearly indicate that he had no case of ouster of the non possessing coheirs nor was it his case that his possession in hostile to the other coheirs to their knowledge. The Supreme Court in the decision in Lakshmi Reddy v. Lakshmi Reddy ( AIR 1957 SC 314 ) has stated thus at page 317. The Supreme Court in the decision in Lakshmi Reddy v. Lakshmi Reddy ( AIR 1957 SC 314 ) has stated thus at page 317. "4 Now, the ordinary classical requirement of adverse possession is that it should be nee vi nee clarn nec precario (See Secretary of State for India v. Debendra Lal Khan, 61 Ind. App. 78 at p. 82: ( AIR 1934 PC 23 at p. 25). The possession required must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that it is possession adverse to the competitor. (See Radhamoni Debi v. Collector of Khulna, 27 Ind. App. 136 at p. 140 PC (B). But it is well settled that in order to establish adverse possession of one coheir as against another it is not enough to show that one out of them is in sole possession and enjoyment of the profits of the properties. Ouster of the non possessing coheir by the coheir in possession who claim his possession to be adverse, should be made out. The possession of one coheir is considered, in law, as possession of all the oo-heirs When one coheir is found to be in possession of the properties it is presumed to be on the basis of joint title. The coheir in possession cannot render his possession adverse to the other coheir not in possession merely by any secret hostile animus on his own part in derogation of the other coheir's title. (See Cories v. Appuhamy (1912 AC 230 (B). It is a settled rule of law that as between coheirs there must be evidence of open assertion of hostile tile, coupled with exclusive possession and enjoyment by one of them to the knowledge of the other so as to constitute ouster. This does not necessarily mean that there must be an express demand by one and denial by the other. There are cases which have held that adverse possession and ouster can be inferred when one coheir takes and maintains notorious exclusive possession in assertion of hostile title and continues in such possession for a very considerable time and the excluded heir takes no steps to vindicate his title. Whether that line of cases is right or wrong we need not pause to consider. Whether that line of cases is right or wrong we need not pause to consider. It is sufficient to notice that the Privy Council in N. Varada Pillai v. Jeevarathnammal ( AIR 1919 PC 44 at p. 47(D) .quotes apparently with approval, a passage from Culley v. Dood Taylerson, 1840 (3) P and D 539; 52 RR 566(E) which indicates that such , a situation may well lead to an inference of ouster "if other circumstances concur. (See also Govindrao v. Rajabai AIR 1931 PC 48 (F). It may be further mentioned that it A is well settled that the burden of making out ouster is on the person claiming to displace the lawful title of a coheir by his adverse possession." 5. Even though it has been proved that the 1st defendant had been in possession for a considerably long period of time, there is nothing on record to lead to an inference of ouster as there are no other circumstances to concur to draw such an inference. The renewal of kanam as per Ext. B32 cannot be accepted as a circumstance to infer an ouster of the non possessing coheirs. Such renewal under Ext. B32 as was obtained by the 1st defendant can only to be on account of his possession as a coowner and the benefit that he has gained taking advantage of his position as coowner should enure for the benefit of all the coowners, and he should be deemed to be holding under S.90 of the Indian Trust Act. 6. In the decision of the Supreme Court in Karbalai Begum v. Mhd. Sayeed and another ( AIR 1981 SC 77 ) it is stated thus at page 79: "Even if no share was given to the plaintiff by the defendants, as the defendants were cosharers unless a clear ouster was pleaded or proved the possession of the defendants as cosharers would be deemed in law to be the possession of the plaintiff." It is further stated in the same page: "It is well settled that mere non participation in the rent and profits of the land of a cosharer does not, amount to an ouster so as to give title by adverse possession to the other cosharer in possession. Indeed even if this fact be admitted, then the legal position would be that Mohd. Bashir and Mohd. Indeed even if this fact be admitted, then the legal position would be that Mohd. Bashir and Mohd. Rashid, being cosharers of the plaintiff, would become constructive trustees on behalf of the plaintiff and the right of the plaintiff would be deemed to be protected by the trustees. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent was unable to contest this position of law. In the present case it is therefore manifest that the possession of the defendants, apart from being in the nature of constructive trustees, would be in law the possession of the plaintiff." 7. In view of the above pronouncements of the Supreme Court, it is unnecessary for me to refer to the other decisions cited by Counsel on either side at the hearing of the appeal. Since, in the present case, there is neither pleading nor proof of ouster of the non possessing coheirs namely the plaintiffs and defendants 2 to 7 the decision of the courts below finding adverse possession against the plaintiffs and defendants 2 to 7 cannot be sustained in law. 8. Learned Counsel for the contesting respondents submits that the 1st defendant has constructed a building in the property and he is residing there. Partition will be affected in such a way that the building will be in the land to be allotted to the 1st defendant towards his share. The courts below have found the 1st defendant's possession of the property for a considerably long period. He will therefore be entitled to an equitable allotment of the share due to him with the improvements, if any, effected by him, without valuing the improvements to the extent the property is capable of such division without prejudice to the rights of the other sharers to get their shares separately allotted to them. In the result, the second appeal is allowed, the judgments and decrees of the courts below are set aside, and a preliminary decree is passed for partition of the plaint schedule property into 72 shares and for allotment of 21 shares to the plaintiffs with proportionate share of profits from the date of suit. The quantum of profits will be determined in the final decree. There will be no order as to costs in this second appeal.