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Allahabad High Court · body

1983 DIGILAW 218 (ALL)

Sudama v. Krisha Devi

1983-03-11

N.N.MITHAL

body1983
JUDGMENT N.N. Mithal, J. - In this first appeal, the opposite parties have challenged the order of the court below granting letters of administration to the respondent in respect of the estate of one Jagannath with a copy of the will dated 10-1-1975 attached thereto. 2. The main plank of attack in the appeal is that the legatee was neither related nor closely associated with the deceased. In preference to the appellants, who were nephews of the deceased, there existed no possibility that the will propounded by the respondent might have been executed at all in her favour. In fact, the whole effort is to discredit the evidence of the propounder of the will by focusing attention on several circumstances which, according to the appellant, are so suspicious as to show that its execution was not the conscious act of the deceased. It was also urged that the will had not been proved in accordance with law. 3. The respondent, Smt. Krishna Devi, had applied for the grant of letters of administration to her with the will dated 10-1-1975 annexed on the ground that the same had been duly executed by the deceased in her favour consciously and while possessed of free disposing mind. She claimed that the testator was looked after by her during his illness and since his nephews. the appellants before me. never cared for him the will was executed in her favour. Admittedly she is not related to the deceased. The testator belonged to Lohar community while she is a Brahmin. The petitioner's husband is a milk-vendor but as the deceased was a bachelor and had no one to look after him the petitioner used to prepare food for him and also looked after him during his illness. Admittedly the deceased was employed in the Elgin Mills, Kanpur and was residing in Karachi Khana. It is alleged that the deceased had been ill for about 2 years and about two months before his death, he had to be hospitalised. Soon after his discharge from the hospital, the will in question was executed on 10-1-1975. He took ill again and was admitted in the hospital where he ultimately died on 20-1-1975. 4. To prove the will the petitioner has examined the Notary Public before whom the will was executed and attestation and authentication of the will took place. Soon after his discharge from the hospital, the will in question was executed on 10-1-1975. He took ill again and was admitted in the hospital where he ultimately died on 20-1-1975. 4. To prove the will the petitioner has examined the Notary Public before whom the will was executed and attestation and authentication of the will took place. The scribe Kalka and one attesting witness Gauri Shankar have also been examined. They have all stated that at the relevant time, the deceased was mentally conscious and full of understanding. The draft of the will was prepared by Kalka earlier and typed out which was finally executed on 10-1-1975 after its approval by the deceased in the presence of witnesses. 5. According to the appellants, the evidence shows that the deceased knew how to sign his name but the will bears only thumb impressions which, it is urged, showed that he was so critically ill as to be not able to write his name even. However, the statement of Shri Ram Kishan Singh, Notary Public, Kanpur shows that at the time of the execution of the will, he had noticed that there wer. rashes and ulcers on the right hand fingers which prevented him from writing his name. This fact has been noted by him on the original will also. In these circumstances, the testator was obliged to put his thumb impressions on the will instead of signing the name. There is no cross-examination on this point by the appellants and it cannot be said that the explanation why the testator had put his thumb impression instead of his signatures was improbable or improper. 6. It is further submitted that admittedly the testator had been ill for quite some time and this by itself showed that he did not possess a proper disposing mind at the relevant time. However mere illness cannot always mean that the person did not have a free disposing state of mind or that his mental faculties were not functioning well. At best it is only a weak circumstance which is completely washed off by the direct evidence led in the case that the testator in fact was in a proper state of mind and had proper understanding. The mere fact that earlier he was in the hospital or that he had been ill cannot be a ground for rejecting the will. 7. The mere fact that earlier he was in the hospital or that he had been ill cannot be a ground for rejecting the will. 7. Next it was urged that neither the legatee was related to the testator nor it had been proved that-his relations with his own nephews were strained and this would show that there could be no occasion to execute the will particularly when he had earlier nominated one of the nephews for receiving the provident fund. Though it is true that the legatee is not related but then relationship is not the only element or consideration for a person to feel attached or obliged to another. Instances are not wanting when an utter stranger who may have helped a person during days of distress or miseries to become much more close to him than any of his own kith and kin. Such a relationship is churned out of higher values of life like affection and mutual regard and not merely on account of blood relationship. The appellants who are nephews of the testator had been enjoying the use of his share in the land and other house property in the village. They have led no evidence to show that they had at any time taken proper care of the testator. All that has come in the evidence is that the testator used to send money orders to them from time to time in order to maintain them. No documentary proof has come forth to establish this. Even assuming that he was doing so out of some sense of duty towards his nephews, it does not necessarily follow that he had more affection for them than the lady who had been looking after him. The evidence shows that he was ill for the last about 2 years and was even hospitalised for some time prior to his death. Surprisingly none of these nephews even cared to show their faces to the ailing old man. They have shown their utter ignorance about the nature of the illness, while in the witness box. In such circumstances, to expect the testator to give any share in his assets to them would be only wishing for too much. Surprisingly none of these nephews even cared to show their faces to the ailing old man. They have shown their utter ignorance about the nature of the illness, while in the witness box. In such circumstances, to expect the testator to give any share in his assets to them would be only wishing for too much. The person who was constantly close at hand and who was looking to the comforts while lying ill and also took so much care about his meals was either the petitioner or her husband but not the nephews. This circumstance, therefore, cannot be taken as a suspicious one although much of the benefit under will have gone to the petitioner and she had also taken active interest in the execution of the will. Reference made to AIR 1958 SC (sic) in this connection is not material as the facts of that case were quite different. 8. It is also pointed that at least in two material particulars, the statements in the will were incorrect one about his permanent address and the second about his village property. From these circumstances, it is sought to be made out that these contents in the will could not have been made had the testator knowledge or approval of the same. In the will the address given is 25/16 Kursada Shahr, Kanpur, present address 25/ 16 Karachikhana Kanpur. The address of the petitioner is 25/38 Karachi Khana Kanpur and the evidence has come that for some time the testator was living with the respondent. The question arises why such a mistake crept in the earlier part of the will? To me it appears that the mistake is accidental and genuine and appears to have been caused by the fact that the scribe was given two addresses, the house where the testator originally resided and the second where he was residing at the time of execution of the will. He originally lived in house No. 25 (1) 16 Khursada, Kanpur from where he appears to have shifted to house No. 25/38 Karachi Khana, Kanpur, i. e. the house of the respondent. It appears that while mentioning the present address, instead of 25/38, the scribe mistakenly mentioned it as 25/26, the same house number of Mohalla Kursada was thus repeated. 9. It appears that while mentioning the present address, instead of 25/38, the scribe mistakenly mentioned it as 25/26, the same house number of Mohalla Kursada was thus repeated. 9. As regards the second point, it is true that in the earlier part of the will he has not made any specific mention of his immovable property, yet later on in para I of the document, there is a mention that during his lifetime he would continue to remain owner of his movable and immovable properties. In the later part of the will in paras 5 and 8 again he refers toy the immovable property. Merely because no details of the immovable property have been given in the will cannot be taken to mean that he was not the author of the will or that he was unaware of its contents. This argument also, therefore, fails. 10. A feeble effort has been made by the appellants' witnesses to prove that the testator did not live with the respondent. But evidence is shaky and it is obvious that appellants' witnesses had no idea about true facts. One of them claimed to have lived with the deceased for about six months in 1965. The other witness only claimed to have visited the testator three or four years before his death. Their visits if at all, must have been rather casual and without any other supporting evidence, it would be unsafe to place reliance on their evidence particularly in the face of more reliable evidence to the contrary led by the respondent. I would, therefore, prefer to rely on the conclusions of the trial court in this respect. 11. The only substantial point urged before me was that the respondent had failed to prove the will in accordance with law. It is urged that no clear statement has cone on record to prove that the testator and the witnesses had signed the impugned will in the presence of each other. I have been taken through the statements of these witnesses and I do find that these exact words have not been used in the testimony of any of the witnesses be he Gauri Shankar, Kalka Prasad or R. K. Singh. The special mode of proof of a will as provided under S. 63(c). I have been taken through the statements of these witnesses and I do find that these exact words have not been used in the testimony of any of the witnesses be he Gauri Shankar, Kalka Prasad or R. K. Singh. The special mode of proof of a will as provided under S. 63(c). Succession Act, requires as under : The will shall be attested by two or more witnesses, each of whom has seen the testator sign or affix his mark to the will or has seen some other person sign the will, in the presence and by the direction of the testator or has received from the testator a personal acknowledgement of his signature or mark or the signature of such other person and each of the witnesses shall sign the will in the presence of the testator but it shall not be necessary that more than one witness is present at the same time and no particular form of attestation shall be necessary". 12. According to his provision, requirement for the purposes of the present case is that it must be proved to the satisfaction of the court that the will had been signed by the testator and by at least two attesting witnesses who had seen the testator put his signatures on the will and that the signatures of such witnesses also were appended in the presence of the testator. The whole emphasis appears to be that execution of a will being a solemn transaction, its proof should be above all suspicion and law has made an effort to see that there remains no suspicion regarding proof of the wills. It is with this object that attestation by at least two witnesses is to be insisted upon and each of them ought to have seen the testator append his signatures on the document propounded as his will and each of the witnesses is also required to sign the same in the presence of the testator. The court, therefore, has to scrutinise the evidence in proof of the will in this light but it does not mean, as suggested by the appellants' learned counsel, that any precise language need be used by the witnesses. All that is necessary is that the court must feel satisfied about the due execution of the will looking to all circumstances as laid in evidence. 13. All that is necessary is that the court must feel satisfied about the due execution of the will looking to all circumstances as laid in evidence. 13. Examining the evidence led in the present case, in the light of the above, we find that the Notary Public has appeared in the witness box and has made an elaborate statement that he had read over the contents of the will to the testator who appeared to be in mentally sound condition. He further stated that will was executed in his presence and thereafter he has made a long endorsements on the back of the will. According to him, three other attesting witnesses had also signed the will in his presence i.e. Maiku Lal, Noor Mohammad and Gauri Shankar. Kalka Prasad has identified the testator and had signed on the will for this purpose. He was cross-examined at length and in reply to the many searching questions, he stated that when he reached the house of the testator he was in ground-floor room and was in a position to sit up and appeared to him as 53 years old. No questions were put to him in cross-examination about the manner in which execution of the will took place. Gauri Shankar (A. W. 1) also stated that the testator had executed the will in January, 1975 and it was attested by him. The testator had thumb-marked it and Maiku Lal and Noor Mohammad has also signed as witnesses on the will. Further, according to him, Kalka Prasad scribe and the Notary Public were also present then and Kalka Prasad has identified the testator and then the Notary had made certain note on the back of the will. continuing he stated that the testator who had proper disposing mind at the time and the witnesses had signed before the testator and he himself had signed before the witnesses. He, however, did not specifically say that he had also signed in presence of the testator. This omission is being made as the main plank of attack regarding proof of the will. On cross-examination he stated that on reaching there he had asked the scribe to read over the contents of the will which was done and after that the will was signed by him and the testator had put down his thumb impressions on it. This omission is being made as the main plank of attack regarding proof of the will. On cross-examination he stated that on reaching there he had asked the scribe to read over the contents of the will which was done and after that the will was signed by him and the testator had put down his thumb impressions on it. Here again no further effort was made to cross-examine the witness about the mode of execution of the will. Same is the position about third witness Kalka Prasad. What is contended by Shri Sahai, the learned counsel for the appellants, is that the proof of execution of a will is a serious matter and relying upon certain observations of the Supreme Court in AIR 1959 SC 443 , it was urged that the will must be proved to have been executed in the manner laid down and free from all suspicious circumstances. 14. It appears from the evidence that the appellants never seriously contested that the will bears testator's thumb-marks. Although respondent's evidence is consistent that the testator had put his thumb-mark on the impugned will, yet no effort has been made by the appellants to disprove this fact. It cannot, therefore, be doubted that the testator had put his thumb impression on the will. The witnesses had also signed the same. One cannot be too rigid in the assessment of evidence regarding the proof of the will and courts have to be pragmatic and liberal in this respect. It is true that if there be suspicious circumstances, every effort should be made to scrutinise the evidence more closely and minutely to achieve required degree of satisfaction but that does not mean that a party could be allowed to take any advantage of some technical defect in the evidence. The entire sequence of facts as narrated by the witnesses ought to be considered in a reasonable manner so as to form an opinion about the truth of their testimonies. If a firm opinion can be formed that the testator had executed the will in the presence of attesting witnesses and minor defects in the evidence can be explained in a reasonable manner, it should suffice and such evidence can be taken as sufficient proof of the will. If a firm opinion can be formed that the testator had executed the will in the presence of attesting witnesses and minor defects in the evidence can be explained in a reasonable manner, it should suffice and such evidence can be taken as sufficient proof of the will. In the present case, every witness is unanimous that the transaction regarding the will took place at one sitting when all were present in the same room and a certain sequence of events followed i.e. the scribe identified the testator, the Notary read out the contents of the will after which some endorsements were made by him on its back. The will was thereafter thumb marked by the testator followed by signatures of the attesting witnesses. There is no suggestion anywhere that any witness had an opportunity of going away when the will was being executed. In my opinion, such a strict construction of the evidence would not be justified. 15. A similar situation arose in Ladhi Bai v. Thakur Shriji, AIR 1968 Raj 41 where a learned single Judge of that court observed thus (at p. 43) : "If a witness owing to inadvertence omits to say that he had attested the document in the presence of the testator and narrates the sequence which leads to no other inference but the one that he had put his signatures in the presence of the testator, then this omission on the part of the witness would not invalidate the will and it shall not preclude the court to infer this fact from other evidence on the record that the testator had signed the document in the presence of the testator. The law does not emphasise that the witness must use the language of the Section to prove the requisite merits thereof. If it is clear from the sequence of events described by a witness, that the witness had attested the document, in the presence of the testator, then this technicality that he did not say so in the language used in S. 63, would not be of any avail to the opposite party.". 16. I am in entire agreement with these observations. The court ought not to take too narrow or technical view of the oral evidence nor should it be examined in a pedantic way with a view only to find faults therein. 16. I am in entire agreement with these observations. The court ought not to take too narrow or technical view of the oral evidence nor should it be examined in a pedantic way with a view only to find faults therein. If on an assessment of the evidence, it can reasonably be inferred that the will had been signed and executed by the deceased testator and that it had been attested by the witnesses, it should be taken that the will had been duly executed particularly when no suspicious circumstances are present or those alleged have been explained to the satisfaction of the court. 17. It is striking to note that none of the so-called suspicious circumstances were ever pointed out during the trial and no opportunity to explain was also given to the witnesses. Even as regards due attestation of the will, this fact was never disputed in cross-examination of the witnesses. 18. On an overall consideration of the evidence, therefore, I find that the omission to prove due attestation was merely accidental and the evidence clearly points out that the attesting witnesses and the testator had signed on the will at the same sitting and as part of a single transaction. I am fully satisfied that plaintiff-respondent has successfully proved due execution and attestation of the will and the court below was right in granting the letters of administration, as prayed. 19. In the result, the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs.