PONNAMMA v. REGIONAL DIRECTOR — 1983 DIGILAW 218 (KER)

Judgment :- 1. The petitioner was appointed as a Lower Division Clerk in the first respondent-Corporation with effect from 4-4-1979. She was regularised in that post with effect from 29-10-1979. She was overaged at the time of her appointment, but that disqualification was overlooked on the basis of her statement that she belonged to a Scheduled Caste. Subsequently by Ext. P3 her service was terminated. No reason is stated in Ext. P3 apart from a reference to the temporary nature of her appointment. The petitioner contends that her service was terminated because the respondents wrongly came to the conclusion that she had misled them by stating that she was a member of the. Scheduled Caste. The allegation has not been denied. In fact it has been accepted by the respondents in the counter affidavit. The case of the respondents, as disclosed in the counter affidavit, is that the petitioner could not have been a member of the Scheduled Caste as she was born of non-Hindu parents. This is what the respondents say: " ...The position that emerges is that, neither common sense nor the laws enacted support a view that a person born of non-Hindu parents by conversion to Hinduism, could become a member of the Scheduled Caste. It would thus be seen that the contention of the petitioner that she was a member of the Scheduled Caste or that she did not give an incorrect declaration, cannot be sustained" The sole reason for the termination of the petitioner's service is thus admitted to be that she supplied incorrect information about her caste because at the time of her birth her parents were not Hindus, for they had been converted to Christianity before she was born, and as such she could not by conversion to Hinduism claim to be a member of the Scheduled Caste. This was the fundamental assumption on the basis of which the respondents came to the conclusion that the petitioner misled them about her caste. This was an inference of law which was drawn by the respondents and which led to the termination of the petitioner's service. This inference, as seen from the decision of the Supreme Court in Guntur Medical College v. Mohan Rao ((1976) 1 S.C.W.R. 448), was founded on wrong understanding of the law. Referring to its decision in C.M. Arummugam v. S. Rajgopal (AIR. 1976 SC. 939), the Supreme Court stated: 7. This inference, as seen from the decision of the Supreme Court in Guntur Medical College v. Mohan Rao ((1976) 1 S.C.W.R. 448), was founded on wrong understanding of the law. Referring to its decision in C.M. Arummugam v. S. Rajgopal (AIR. 1976 SC. 939), the Supreme Court stated: 7. The reasoning on which this decision proceeded is equally applicable in a case where the parents of a person are converted from Hinduism to Christianity and be is born after their conversion and on his subsequently embracing Hinduism, the members of the caste to which the parents belonged prior to their conversion accept him as a member within the fold. It is for the members of the caste to decide whether or not to admit a person within the caste. Since the caste is a social combination of persons governed by its rules and regulations, it may, if its rules and regulations so provide, admit a new member just as it may expel an existing member. The only requirement for admission of a person as a member of the caste is the acceptance of the person by the other members of the caste, for, as pointed out by Krishnaswami Ayyangar, J., in Durgaprasad Rao v. Sudarsanaswami, AIR. 1940 Mad. 513, "in matters affecting the well being or composition of a caste, the caste itself is the Supreme Judge", (emphasis supplied). It will, therefore„ be seen that on conversion to Hinduism, a person born of Christian converts would not become a member of the caste to which his parents belonged prior to their conversion to Christianity, automatically or as a matter of course, but he would become such member, if the other members of the caste accept him as a member and admit him within the fold." In the light of this decision, it was not open to the respondent-Corporation to say that, by reason only of the fact that the petitioner's parents were Christians at the time of her birth, she was not entitled to claim upon conversion to Hinduism a membership of the caste to which her parents and forefathers once belonged. Whether or not the petitioner had become a member of the Scheduled Caste has to be determined on the basis of evidence. Whether or not the petitioner had become a member of the Scheduled Caste has to be determined on the basis of evidence. Stating that there was no invariable or absolute rule to the effect that whenever a member of a caste was converted from Hinduism to Christunity he lost his membership of that caste, the Supreme Court in Guntur Medical College v. Mohan Rao ((1976) 1 S.C.W.R. 448) stated that there were castes, particularly in South India, where a person did not lose his membership of the caste by conversion since such castes comprised both Hindus and Christians. However, for the purpose of that case, the court assumed that the person who was converted lost the membership of his caste. The court then proceeded to consider the question whether such a person could regain his caste. Relying on the principle in C. M. Arummugam v. S. Rajgopal (AIR. 1976 SC. 939) the Supreme Court observed: "on reconversion to Hinduism a person can once again become a member of the caste in which he was born and to which he belonged before conversion to another religion, if the members of the caste accept him as a member" For the same reason, the court concluded that that principle was equally applicable: "where the parents of a person are converted from Hinduism to Christianity and he is born after their conversion and on his subsequently embracing Hinduism, the members of the caste to which the parents belonged prior to their conversion accept him as a member within the fold" Therefore the question is whether or not the petitioner on conversion to Hinduism was accepted by the members of the caste to which her parents and forefathers once belonged. 2. Ext. P1 is a certificate dated 13-2-1975 issued by the Tahsildar stating: "Certified that Smt. Aley P. R. daughter of Sri. Paulose Markose, Eleyedathu house, Nditassery Kara, Vnayapuram Village who originally belongs to Christian community and subsequently converted to Hindu cheramar community which is recognised as scheduled caste (Vide publication in Kerala Government Gazette dated 11-12-73 page No. 486) and re-named as Smt. P. M. Ponnamma." This shows that the petitioner whose father is a Christian has been converted to Hinduism as a member of the cheramar community. Ext P5 is a certificate dated 24-7-1980 issued by the Branch Secretary of the Kerala Hindu Cheramar Association (Reg. Ext P5 is a certificate dated 24-7-1980 issued by the Branch Secretary of the Kerala Hindu Cheramar Association (Reg. No. 25/75) reading: "This is to certify that Smt. P. M. Pennamma, Elayidathu House. Nattassary Kara belongs to Hindu Cheramar Community which is recognised as a Scheduled Caste and has membership in this Association from 1975." This certificate is relied on by the petitioner to show that the petitioner has not only been converted as a member of the Hindu cheramar community but has been accepted as such by the other members of that community, Ext.P6 is a certificate dated 10-8-1983 issued by the Village Officer reading. This certificate shows that the parents of the petitioner are cheramar Christians. The petitioner's counsel points out that the fact that the certificate was issued by a competent authority stating that the parents of the petitioner were cheramar Christians indicates that the parents belonged to the Hindu cheramar community before their conversion to Christianity. 3. ft is not stated in the counter affidavit that the parents of the petitioner or her forefathers were not Hindus until the conversion of her parents to Christianity. It is also not stated in the counter affidavit that the parents of the petitioner were not members of the cheramar community before their conversion to Christianity It would appear from the pleadings that the parties accepted as a common ground that the petitioner's parents and their forefathers were members of the cheramar community, at any rate, until their conversion to Christianity. The respondents' counsel contends that Christianity having no castes within its fold, the petitioner's parents, upon their conversion to that religion, could not retain their identity as members of the cheramar community and claim the benefits thereof for themselves, and their progeny. 4. As I stated earlier, the fact that the parents of the petitioner at the time of her birth, and subsequently, have been converted Christians would not by itself disqualify the petitioner to claim her rightful place in the caste to which her forefathers once belonged provided the members of that caste are willing to accept her as a member thereof. There is no doubt as regards this principle. The question is whether on the facts of this case can it be said that the petitioner, on becoming a Hindu, reverted to the caste of her forefathers? 5. Ext. P5 is a significant document. There is no doubt as regards this principle. The question is whether on the facts of this case can it be said that the petitioner, on becoming a Hindu, reverted to the caste of her forefathers? 5. Ext. P5 is a significant document. It was issued by a responsible officer of the Kerala Hindu Cheramar Association which seeks to represent the generality of the members of that caste. The certificate was issued on 24-7-1980, but it refers to the fact that the petitioner has been a member of the Association ever since 1975, which was a long time before she applied for a post in the first respondent-Croporation Unlike in Das v. State of Kerala (1981 KLT. 863) or in Guntur Medical College v Mohan Rao ((1976) 1 SCWR. 448), the conversion of the petitioner to Hinduism was a long time before she thought of seeking a position in the first respondent-Corporation. It is therefore not a case of a person changing faith for securing material benefits. The conversion at the time at which it took place is not indicative of any lack of bona fides. It has therefore to be presumed to have been effected in good faith. The petitioner having converted herself to Hinduism was entitled to claim the benefits of the membership of the caste of her forefathers by associating herself with its members and by their reciprocal response to her The best evidence which she could produce in support of that fact is Ext. P5. I have no doubt in my mind that in the absence of any. challenge against the genuineness of Ext. P5, it is a clear indication of the reciprocal sentiments extended to her by the members of her caste. That is the best evidence the petitioner has in her armoury. T see no reason to doubt the veracity or the effectiveness of that evidence. The respondents have not been in a position to controvert or nullify the effect of Ext.-P5 6. The respondents' counsel submits that Ext. P6 says that the parents of the petitioner are cheramar Christians. But he points out that there are no cheramars among Christians for it is a casteless community. The respondents have not been in a position to controvert or nullify the effect of Ext.-P5 6. The respondents' counsel submits that Ext. P6 says that the parents of the petitioner are cheramar Christians. But he points out that there are no cheramars among Christians for it is a casteless community. Indeed it is a casteless community, but it is common knowledge that certain classes of Christians who were converted from particular castes of Hinduism continue to describe themselves for the purpose of identification as members of their castes. The parents of the petitioner are described as cheramar Christians to indicate the source from which they came. Ext. P6 is thus a description of the original source of the parents of the petitioner. That is clear evidence of the identity of the original caste to which a person in the position of the petitioner is entitled upon conversion to revert, provided that person is acceptable to the fellow members. This is exactly what has happened in this case. The petitioner has by her conversion to Hinduism reverted to the original caste of her parents and forefathers because she has been with open arms accepted as such by the members of that caste. In the circumstances it would be unfair to deny the petitioner her legitimate rights and privileges as a member of that caste. Accordingly, I declare that the reasons stated by the respondents in the counter affidavit for the termination of the petitioner's temporary appointment are unsustainable and invalid. I therefore quash Ext. P3. It is declared that the petitioner is deemed to continue in service as if Ext. P3 was never made. I direct the respondent-Corporation to pass appropriate order in regard to the petitioner's rightful claim for financial and other benefits according to law. Issue carbon copies of this judgment to the parties on the usual terms. Allowed.