Judgment :- 1. This second appeal at the instance of the plaintiffs is against the concurrent decision of the courts below dismissing their suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property, 31 cents in extent, with a building thereon. The property belonged to Sekharan Nanu as per Ext.B2 assignment obtained by him in the year 1955. Shortly after Ext. B2 Nanu left for Malaysia and did not come back afterwards. His mother Kochali and sister Parvathy were in possession of the land and the building. The defendant was allowed to occupy a room in the building and later when the toother and the sister of Nanu vacated the building, the defendant occupied the entire building and is in possession of the same. Nanu assigned the property to the plaintiffs as per Ext. A2 sale deed in their favour on 15-4-1974. The document Ext. A2 was executed by Parvathy (Pw.2) on the strength of Ext. A5 Power of Attorney granted by Nanu to her. The plaintiffs seek recovery of possession of the property on the strength of Ext. A2 assignment in their favour. The defendant contended that she is the legally wedded wife of Nanu who left the country shortly after her marriage. Ext B2 sale deed in the name of Nanu was benami for her, and she is the real owner of the property. Ext. A2 sale in favour of the plaintiffs was attacked on the ground that Nanu had no title to the property and also on the ground that pw. 2 who excuted the sale deed had no valid authority or power from Nanu to execute the same. Ext. A5 Power of Attorney purported to have been granted by Nanu, according to the defendant, is not a properly executed Power of Attorney and on the strength of the same pw. 2 does not derive any authority to execute Ext. A2 sale deed. The plaintiffs denied that the defendant was the legally wedded wife of Nanu. The defendant has a further contention that in the event of a decree for recovery of possession, she is entitled to value of improvements: 2. Both the courts below have found that the defendant is the wife of Nanu, Ext. B2 acquisition by Nanu of the suit property was not benami for the defendant and Nanu was the true owner of the property under that document. Both the courts below have found that the defendant is the wife of Nanu, Ext. B2 acquisition by Nanu of the suit property was not benami for the defendant and Nanu was the true owner of the property under that document. Both the courts below have however found that Ext. A5 is not a valid Power of Attorney empowering pw. 2 to execute the sale deed Ext. A2. Ext. A2 was therefore invalid and cannot convey title to the plaintiffs. On these findings the suit was dismissed by the trial court and the decision of the trial court was confirmed in appeal. Both the courts below have found the defendant's possession of the property from 1955 onwards. Since her possession was in her capacity as the wife of Nanu, the courts below have found that she has not acquired a title by adverse possession. It is against this that the plaintiffs have come up in second appeal. 3. Ext. A5 Power of Attorney, on the authority of which Ext. A2 sale deed was executed by pw. 2, is purported to have been executed by Nanu in the presence of the Commissioner for Oaths of the Federation of Malaysia at Kuala Lumpur. The Commissioner for Oaths has attested that Nanu had affixed his signature in his presence and that the signature contained in the document is the true signature of Nanu. The signature of the Commissioner for Oaths who attested Ext. A5 Power of Attorney is attested by the Assistant Secretary, Consular Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There is also a seal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia. Under S.85 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 the Court shall presume that every document purporting to be a Power of Attorney, and to have been executed before, and authenticated by, a Notary Public, or any Court, Judge, Magistrate, (Indian) Consul or Vice Consul, or representative of the Central Government, was so executed and authenticated. Ext. A5 is not authenticated by any of the authorities mentioned in S.85. S.32 of the Registration Act, 1908 empowers an agent of the executant of the document or his representative or assign, duly authorised by power-of¬attorney executed and authenticated in the manner referred to in S.33 to present documents for registration. The relevant portion of S.33(1) of the Indian Registration Act is extracted below: "33. S.32 of the Registration Act, 1908 empowers an agent of the executant of the document or his representative or assign, duly authorised by power-of¬attorney executed and authenticated in the manner referred to in S.33 to present documents for registration. The relevant portion of S.33(1) of the Indian Registration Act is extracted below: "33. (1) For the purposes of S.32, the following powers-of-attorney shall alone be recognized, namely: (a) …… (b) …… (c) if the principal at the time aforesaid does not reside in India, a power-of-attorney executed before and authenticated by a Notary Public, or any Court, Judge, Magistrate (Indian) Consul or Vice-Consul, or representative of the Central Government: Since the power-of-attorney Ext. A5 is not executed before or authenticated 'by any of the authorities mentioned in clause (c) of S.33, pw. 2 was not competent to present Ext. A2 document for registration. There is also no presumption under S.85 of the Indian Evidence Act of due execution and authentication of Ext. A5 power-of-attorney. Apart from the document, there is no other evidence of the execution and authentication of Ext. A5 power-of-attorney. On these materials the courts below are perfectly right in holding that Ext. A2 executed on the authority of Ext. A5 does not convey title to the plaintiffs. 4. The appellants have filed CMP. No. 17590/1978 in this second appeal to admit a power-of-attorney dated 17-1-1977 purported to have been executed by Nanu at Kuala Lumpur as additional evidence in the second appeal. This power-of-attorney is signed in the presence of the Consular Attache, High Commission of India, Kuala Lumpur and is authenticated by him. The document shows that the executant Nanu was identified with reference to his identity card No. 3564137. The document contains the seal of the High Commission of India, Kuala Lumpur and of Shri S. Rajagopalan, Consular Attache, High Commission of India, Kuala Lumpur. This is a document that has come into existence after the; trial court passed the decree dismissing the suit. This document was not available at the time of trial of the suit. The respondent has filed; a counter opposing the admission of this document as additional evidence in the second appeal. In the counter affidavit it is stated that Nanu has not signed the power-of-attorney sought to be admitted as additional evidence in the second appeal. This document was not available at the time of trial of the suit. The respondent has filed; a counter opposing the admission of this document as additional evidence in the second appeal. In the counter affidavit it is stated that Nanu has not signed the power-of-attorney sought to be admitted as additional evidence in the second appeal. In view of its attestation and authentication by the Consular Attache of the High Commission of India, Kuala Lumpur, this power-of-attorney can be presumed as properly executed and authenticated under S.85 of the Indian Evidence Act. The person who has authenticated this document is competent to authenticate the same as one of those persons mentioned in S.85 of the Indian Evidence Act and S.33(1) (c) of the Indian Registration Act. I do not see any valid objection for the admission of this document as additional evidence in the second appeal. I have therefore allowed CMP.17590/1978 and have admitted the power-of-attorney as additional evidence in the second appeal. The power-of-attorney by Nanu admitted as additional evidence expressly states that it is also for the purpose of ratifying all actions done by virtue of his power-of-attorney dated 1-3-1974 "which is said to be defective". The reference is to Ext. A5 power-of-attorney. What is the effect of the power-of-attorney subsequently executed ratifying all transactions effected on the strength of a defective power-of-attorney was considered by the Supreme Court in the decision in Jugraj Singh v. Jaswant Singh reported in AIR. 1971 SC. 761. It is stated thus at page 764: "8. The only question is whether the second power of attorney was effective to render valid the transaction of sale and the registration of the document both earlier than the power of attorney. In our judgment, it would be so. Mr. Hardev Singh does not read into this matter the fact of ratification by Vernon Seth Chotia of his earlier power of attorney. The second power of attorney states, in express terms that the first power of attorney was defective and was being ratified. Vernon Seth Chotia also stated in the second power of attorney that the act of Mr.Chawla would be his act which included not only the making of the document but also the presentation of that document. The second power of attorney states, in express terms that the first power of attorney was defective and was being ratified. Vernon Seth Chotia also stated in the second power of attorney that the act of Mr.Chawla would be his act which included not only the making of the document but also the presentation of that document. Now the law is quite clear that ratification relates back to the original act provided there is a disclosed principal and this has been stated nowhere better than by Lord Macnaghten in Keighley Maxsted and Co. v. Durant, 1901 AC. 241 at pp. 246,247 quoting Tindal, C. J. in Wilson v. Tumman, (1843) 6 M & G 236 at p. 242 "That an act done, for another, by a person though without any precedent authority whatever, becomes the act of the principal, if subsequently ratified by him, is the known and well established rule of law. In that case the principal is bound by the act, whether it be for bis detriment or his advantage, and whether it be founded on a tort or on a contract, to the same effect as be, and with all the consequences which follow from, the same act done by his previous authority. And so by a wholesome and convenient fiction, a person ratifying the act of another, who, without authority has made a contract openly and avowedly on his behalf, is deemed to be, though in fact he was not, a party to the contract". Relation back of an act of ratification was expressly accepted in this case. Other cases have been summarised in the manual of the Law and Practice of Power of Attorney issued by the Council of Chartered Institute of Secretaries. This follows from the maxim of law "Omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur et mandato priori acquiparatur" that is to say, ratification is thrown back to the date of the act done, and the agent is put in the same position as if he had authority to do the act at the. time the act was done by him. The learned authors quote the case of the House of Lords which we have above cited and add to it certain other cases with which we do not consider necessary to encumber this judgment. 9. It therefore follows that the second power of attorney was a valid document and it authorised Mr. time the act was done by him. The learned authors quote the case of the House of Lords which we have above cited and add to it certain other cases with which we do not consider necessary to encumber this judgment. 9. It therefore follows that the second power of attorney was a valid document and it authorised Mr. Chawla to execute the document as well as to present it for registration. This being document ratifying a former inconclusive act related back to the time when the first document was made and cured the illegality in the presentation for registration which had taken place." In view of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court there cannot be any doubt that Ext A2 sale will be perfectly valid for the reason of the second power of attorney dated 17-1-1977 executed by Nanu ratifying all actions done under Ext. A5 power of attorney. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent Shri Krishnan Nair submits that the presumption under S.85 of the Indian Evidence Act is a rebuttable presumption and the respondent should be given an opportunity to prove that in spite of such presumption under S.85, the power of attorney is not executed by Nanu He relies on the decision in Wali Mohammad v. Jamal Uddin reported in AIR. 1950 Allahabad 524 wherein it is stated: "It is for this reason that a power of attorney bearing the authentication of a notary public or an authority mentioned in S.85 is taken as sufficient evidence of the execution of the instrument by the person who appears to be the executant on the face of it. The presumption, no doubt, is rebuttable. But unless rebutted the presumption stands and the document can be admitted in evidence as a document executed by the person alleged to have executed it without any further proof: vide Haggit v. Ineff, (1855)24 Q. Ch. 120: (3 W.R.141) and Performing Right Society Ltd. v; Indian Morning Post Restaurant, AIR.(26) 1939 Bom. 347: (ILR. (1939) Bom. 295) " Since the presumption under S.85 of the Indian Evidence Act is a rebuttable presumption, I am of the view that an opportunity should be given to the defendant to adduce evidence and prove that the power of attorney dated 17-1-1977 was not executed by Nanu. 6. In the view that the courts below took that Ext. (1939) Bom. 295) " Since the presumption under S.85 of the Indian Evidence Act is a rebuttable presumption, I am of the view that an opportunity should be given to the defendant to adduce evidence and prove that the power of attorney dated 17-1-1977 was not executed by Nanu. 6. In the view that the courts below took that Ext. A2 sale deed does not convey title to the plaintiffs for the reason of the invalidity of Ext. A5 power of attorney, the suit was dismissed without considering the question relating to the value of improvements claimed by the defendant and covered by issue No. 4 in the suit. The question as to whether the defendant is entitled to any value of improvements, in the event of a decree for recovery of possession will also be considered by the trial court. The result is, I set aside the judgments and decrees of the courts below and remand the case to the trial court for fresh disposal in accordance with law and in the light of the observations contained in this judgment. The parties will appear before the trial court on 24-10-1983. The court-fee paid on the memorandum of second appeal will be refunded to the counsel for the appellants. The second appeal is allowed as indicated above. There will be no order as to costs. Allowed.