JUDGMENT 1. - The only question involved in this miscellaneous appeal is whether the order granting permanent alimony could have been restrained only from the date of the application under section 25(3) of the Hindu Marriage Act or it could be from a retrospective effect. 2. The short facts giving rise to this appeal are that Smt. Amarjeet Kaur obtained a decree of divorce ex parte against her husband Mahendra Singh on November 22, 1977 and an order granting her permanent alimony in the sum of Rs. 100 per month was also made on that day. Thereafter Shri Mahendrasingh made an application on February 27, 1980 for rescinding this order of permanent alimony on the ground that Smt. Amarjeet Kaur had been living an immoral life and had illicit relations with a number of persons and that at the time of the filing of the application she was living with one Banta Singh Nai (barber) as his wife. 3. The application was opposed by Smt. Amarjeet Kaur and three issues were framed by the learned District Judge, Ganganagar. Issue No. 1 related to the question whether Smt. Amarjeet Kaur had illicit relation with Balkarsingh. Issue No. 2 related to the fact whether she was living with Bantasingh as his wife and had contacted Nata with him. Issue No. 3 was regarding relief. Shri Mahendra singh only produced evidence. No evidence was produced by Smt. Amarjeet Kaur. After considering the evidence the learned District Judge found issue No. I against Shri Mahendrasingh but he decided issue No. 2 in favour of Mahander Singh and against Smt. Amarjeet Kaur holding that it was proved that Smt. Amarjeet Kaur living with Banta Singh as his wife after the decree of divorce. He, therefore, rescinded the order of permanent alimony with effect from February 27, 1980, the date when the application under section 25(3) of the Hindu Marriage Act was filed. As a matter of fact, the learned counsel who appeared before the learned District Judge on behalf of Mahendra Singh had conceded before that Court that the order of permanent alimony could be rescinded only with effect from the date of the application under section 25(3) of the Hindu Marriage Act. Now against this order of the learned District Judge, Ganganagar dated August 23, 1982 Mahendra Singh has come in appeal. 4. Now against this order of the learned District Judge, Ganganagar dated August 23, 1982 Mahendra Singh has come in appeal. 4. I have heard Shri Sohan Lal Jain on behalf of the appellant. The respondent has not cared to appear despite notice. 5. Two contentions have been raised before me by the learned counsel for the appellant. His first contention is that Smt. Amarjeet Kaur had been leading an immoral life even before the decree of divorce was passed ex parte and, therefore, the order of permanent alimony should have been rescinded from the date it was passed. In my opinion, this contention is now not open to the appellant. He has not applied for setting aside the ex parte decree and, therefore, the question decided by that decree cannot be reopened in his application under section 25(3) of the Hindu Marriage Act. 6. The only other contention raised by him was that even on the basis of the finding on issue No. 2 the order of permanent alimony should have been rescinded from the date of the order of permanent alimony and not from the date of the application under section 25(3) of the Hindu Marriage Act. I am unable to accept this contention also. Sub-section (3) of Section 25 empowers the Court to rescind, very or modify an order under section 25(1) in certain conditions mentioned in sub-section (3) itself at the instance of the other party i.e. party other than the party to whom alimony has been granted. That being so, the order varying, modifying or rescinding the order of alimony cannot go beyond the date of the application for varying, modifying or rescinding that order because it is only when such a motion is made that the Court gets jurisdiction to vary, modify or rescind that order. The learned counsel had taken time to submit an authority taking a different view but he has very candidly conceded that he has not been able to lay his hands open any such authority. 7. In these circumstances, there is no force in this appeal and it is hereby dismissed. I shall make no order as to costs as the opposite party has not appeared.Appeal dismissed. *******