G. N. SABHAHIT, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal by defendant-2 is directed. against the judgment and decree dated 13-9-1974 passed by the District judge, South Kanara, Mangalore in r. A. No. 2 of 1971, on his file, dismissing the appeal on confirming the judgment and decree dated 26-10-1970, passed by the Civil Judge, Mangalore, in O. S. No. 142 of 1969, on his file. ( 2 ) THE plaintiff filed a suit before the learned Civil Judge for recovery of rs. 17,600 against the defendants. He averred in the plaint that the first defendant is a partnership firm of which defendants 2 and 3 are partners. The defendants were taking advances from the plaintiff for supply of cocoanut oil and oil cakes at the agreed prices and thus the business was thus carried on from 23-10-1968 to 15-10-1969. As on 15-10-1969, a sum of Rs. 22,650 was due from the defendants. Between 15-10-1969 and 21-10-1969 the defendants supplied 86 tins of cocoanut oil worth Rs. 5,050 in respect of which bills and invoices have not been sent to the plaintiff. However, the plaintiff has given deduction to the extent of the value subject to the variation if any after receipt of bills. Therefore, the plaintiff claimed Rs. 17,600 as the balance due from the defendants. ( 3 ) DEFENDANT-1 the firm and defendant-3 remained ex-parte. The contest was only by defendant-2. While admitting he was a partner of defendant-1 firm, he put forward his case that the firm was dissolved on 31-8-1969. As per the terms of the deed of dissolution, the entire liabilities of the dissolved firm had to be borne by defendant-3 and from that date onwards, he became the sole proprietor of the business. The dissolution was effected to the knowledge of the plaintiff. The dealings thereafter between the plaintiff and third defendant were not binding on the second , defendant. It was the third defendant that had to pay all the liabilities of the side solved firm and according to the second defendant that had been discharged by the third defendant. ( 4 ) THE learned Civil Judge raised the following issues as arising from the pleadings : - (1 ). Whether the firm of Sri Venkatesh Mills has been validly dissolved as on 31-8-1969 ? (2) Whether the plaintiff has knowledge of the said dissolution ? ( 4 ) THE learned Civil Judge raised the following issues as arising from the pleadings : - (1 ). Whether the firm of Sri Venkatesh Mills has been validly dissolved as on 31-8-1969 ? (2) Whether the plaintiff has knowledge of the said dissolution ? If so, whether the plaint dealings after 31-8-1969 are not Binding upon the 2nd defendant ? (3) Whether liabilities of the firm of Venkatesh Mills due to the plaintiff have been discharged as alleged by the 2nd defendant ? (4) Whether 2nd defendant is not liable for plaint-claimed amount ? (5) What is the amount due to the plaintiff? (6) To what relief? ( 5 ) THE learned Civil Judge appreciating the evidence on record, answered issue No. I in the negative. Under Issue no. 2 he held that the plaintiff had no knowledge of the alleged dissolution of the firm and as such dealings after 31-8-1969 were also binding on the second defendant. On Issue No. 3 his finding was in the negative. Under Issue No. 4, he found that the second defendant was liable for the plaint amount. Under issue No 5 his finding was that the plaintiff was entitled to recovery of the amount claimed in the plaint. Accordingly, he decreed the suit as prayed for. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the second defendant went up in appeal before the District Judge in R. A. No. 2 of 1971 on his file and the learned district Judge raided the following points as arising for his consideration in the appeal. (1) whethre defendant-2 is liable to answer the suit claim ? (2) Whether as alleged by defendant-2, the amount claimed in the plaint has been paid off by defendant-3 ? ( 6 ) THE learned District Judge, reassessing the evidence on record, in the light of the arguments addressed before him, found under Point No. 1 that defendant-2 was liable to answer the suit claim. Under Point No. 2 he held that second defendant failed to prove that the third defendant paid off the amount claimed in the plaint and in that view he dismissed the appeal, confirming the judgment and decree of the trial court. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the second defendant has instituted the above second appeal before this Court. Under Point No. 2 he held that second defendant failed to prove that the third defendant paid off the amount claimed in the plaint and in that view he dismissed the appeal, confirming the judgment and decree of the trial court. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the second defendant has instituted the above second appeal before this Court. ( 7 ) THE learned Advocate Sri V. Krishnamurthy appearing for the appellant strenuously urged before me that the courts below were not correct in coming to the conclusion that the plaintiff bad no notice of dissolution of the firm and as such defendant-2 was bound to account even for the future transaction after the dissolution of the firm. He, however fairly and rightly conceded before me that the 2nd defendant was liable for the transactions before the dissolution of the firm on 31-8-1969. ( 8 ) AS against that, the learned advocate appearing for the respondents argued supporting the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge. ( 9 ) THE sole point, therefore, that arises for my consideration in this appeal is : Whether the appellant is liable for transactions after the dissolution of the firm on 31-8-1969 ? ( 10 ) THE learned Counsel appearing for the appellant invited my attention to sections 22,32 and 45 of the Indian partnership Act. S 22 of the said Act slates :"in order to bind a firm, an act or instrument done or executed by a partner or other person on behalf of the firm shall be done or executed in the firm name, or in any other manner expressing or implying an intention to bind the firm. "s. 32 (3) of the said Act states inter alia : "notwithstanding the retirement of a partner from a firm, he and the partners continue to be liable as partners to third parties for any act done by any of them which would have been an act of the firm if done before the retirement, until public notice is given of the retirement. S, 45 (1) of the said Act states :"notwithstanding the dissolution of a firm, the partners continue to be liable as such to third parties for any act done by any of them which would have been an act of of the firm if done before the dissolution until public notice is given of the dissolution". S, 45 (1) of the said Act states :"notwithstanding the dissolution of a firm, the partners continue to be liable as such to third parties for any act done by any of them which would have been an act of of the firm if done before the dissolution until public notice is given of the dissolution". Thus, by reading S. 22 of the Act it becomes clear that a partnership firm is bound if anything or any person on behalf the firm does anything or executes anything in the firm name, or in any other manner expressing or implying an intention to bind the firm. Anything done otherwise by a partner will not bind the firm. Ss. 32 and 45 would generally speak of the liability of partners alter retirement or dissolution till notice is given of the retirement from or dissolution of the firm to the old customers and to the public in general. The learned Counsel invited my attention in this behalf to the observations in Halsbury's laws of England, 3rd Edn. Vol. 28 at Paras 1118, 1119 and 1120 which speak of notice of dissolution. They read :- para 1118 : Advertisement of dissolution :-Any partner is entitled to give public notice of a dissolution or of the retirement oi a partner, and to require the concurrence of his partners for that purpose in any necessary or proper acts which cannot be done without their concurrence. Para 1119 : Old customers :-Old customers of a firm, who deal with it after a change in its constitution, are entitled to treat all former apparent members as still being members until they have actual notice of the change. As regards them, notice of the dissolution published in the gazette is not per se sufficient; but evidence has been admitted of facts showing that it was probable that an old customer had seen the gazette. Para 1120 : New customers:-SUFFICIENT notice is given to those who have not dealt with the firm before the date of the change or dissolution by the insertion of an advertisement in the London, Edinburgh, or Belfast Ga/ette, according as the firm has its principal place of business in England, Scotland or northern Ireland. . . . . . . . "thus, a distinction is made between future dealers with the firm after dissolution and the old customers. . . . . . . . "thus, a distinction is made between future dealers with the firm after dissolution and the old customers. In the case of old cus on ers it is not enugh if a public notice is given, They should be given indivdual noties and any notice given to them of the actual factum of dissolution is suitfecent central United Bank Ltd. v. B. A. Venkatarama Naidu (1), It is ruled therein thus :"s. 32 (3) of the Partnership act specifies the mode by which the retring partner may be relieved of the responsibility by issuing notice to the various classes of persons who might enter into transactions with the surviving partners. Public notice is intended only to serve a purpose, namely, to bring home to the persons concerned the fact of retirement. That purpose will undoubtedly be served in a better way by personal or actual notice. "explanation in that section contemplates public notice and pointing out that it is not to be literally construed, their lordships have observed :"s. 32 (3) of the Partnership act puts an end to the partnership between partners qua the retiring partner with the consequence that the rule as to the agency of each partner to the rest of the partners would cease to apply in the case of the retiring partner. A strict application of this rale would cause hardship to third parties who were having and continue to have dealings with the firm without knowing that a particular partner had retired. Its object therefore is not to impose a statutory liability on the retiring partner but to protect third parties by embodying a rule of estoppel so far as retiring partner is concerned for repudiating the agency of others". That is also the opinion of the learned oomentator Sri S. T. Desai in Law of partnership In India, V Edn. , at page 179. This is what the learned author had observed inter alia :"question may arise whether the Act lays down in S. 32 (3) and S. 45 (1) an absolute rule which makes it necessary that public notice must be given of the retirement or dissolution, or only declares that a public notice shall be sufficient. , at page 179. This is what the learned author had observed inter alia :"question may arise whether the Act lays down in S. 32 (3) and S. 45 (1) an absolute rule which makes it necessary that public notice must be given of the retirement or dissolution, or only declares that a public notice shall be sufficient. Thus, for instance, can a third person, who deals with the continuing partners in a firm after being ia fact aware of the retirement of a partner or the dissolution of the firm, seek to hold the out going partner liable for such dealings on the ground that no public notice was given ? It may be contended that the rule of literal construction should be applied and the rule laid down in these sections snould be interpreted to mean that public notice is necessary and incumbent in the cases referred to in the section. Such a construction would certainly lead to most surprising results and it is submitted that no such construction can be put on the words of these sections. 'a' person who deals with the continuing partner with knowledge of the retirement of a partner or dissolution of the old firm deals with a totally different body of persons, and the question of notice does not arise at all. Besides the rule of literal construction is subject to a number of limitations, one of them being that the words of an Act need not be read in a literal sense when good reason for not doing so is to be foun within the four corners of the Act itself. The provisos to both the clauses under consideration afford good reasons for interpreting the rules as only laying down what is sufficient Notice'. It would appear therefore, that any proper notice of the retirement of a partner or dissolution of the firm to a third person would be a sufficient answer to any such claim made by him against the outgoing partner. "the learned author has relied upon for his opinion on the following decisions : ratanji v. Prem Shankar (2), Central United Bank Ltd. v. Venkatarama (3) and Rama rao v. Venkateswara (4) thus it is well established that public notice is not the only mode of notifying dissolution, though public notice is one of them. "the learned author has relied upon for his opinion on the following decisions : ratanji v. Prem Shankar (2), Central United Bank Ltd. v. Venkatarama (3) and Rama rao v. Venkateswara (4) thus it is well established that public notice is not the only mode of notifying dissolution, though public notice is one of them. In the case of old customers individual intimation of the factum of dissolution would be necessary. The learned District Judge, however, laboured under the wrong notion that the only mode of intimation was by public notice and he further held that any other mode would not be of any avail or of legal consequence. In the course of the judgment the learned District Judge has inter alia, observed thus : "as we have seen, the dissolution of the partnership has not at all been brought home to the plaintiff and the only way that the dissolution can be brought to the notice of the 3rd parties will be by issue of a public notice as provided in s. 45 in the form prescribed under s. 72 of the Indian Partnership Act". Thus, it is obvious that the learned District Judge has misdirected himself in thinking that the only mode of notice even to old customers is by public notice as Contemplated under S. 45. I am unable to agree with the first appellate court for, reasons discussed above. ( 11 ) THAT leads me to the next point as to whether notice was at all given to the plaintiff about the factum of dissolution of the partaership. The learned Counsel for the appellant pressed into service two factors to show that the notice was given to the plaintiff. Firstly, he invited my attention to the definite suggestion pade to PW-1 that the plaintiff was intimated by phone about the dissolution of the partnership. Secondly, he pressed into service the circumstance that after the dissolution, the third defendant endorsed the in voices as proprietor and not as partner as he used to do before. I will presently advert to those ctrcumstances on the basis of the evidence on record. When PW-1 was in the box a definite suggestion is put to him, which of course he has denied, thus :"it is not true to say on 31-8-69 on phone the fact of dissolution was intimated to Dayananda Nayak on phone". I will presently advert to those ctrcumstances on the basis of the evidence on record. When PW-1 was in the box a definite suggestion is put to him, which of course he has denied, thus :"it is not true to say on 31-8-69 on phone the fact of dissolution was intimated to Dayananda Nayak on phone". When DW-1 was in the box he has specifically stated that intimation on phone was given to Dayananda Nayak, about the dissolution of the firm. Dayananda nayak has not chosen to to step into the box and deny this on oath. That being so, the courts below ought to have held that such intimation was given to Dayananda Nayak. It is further probabilised by the evidence on record that the- wife of the plaintiff and defendant No. 2's wife were cousin sisters and therefore they were on cordinal terms. That being so, I am persuaded to believe that he was intimated about dissolution of the partnership firm on phone, especially so because of their cordial relationship. ( 12 ) AS pointed out above S. 22 of the Partnership Act makes it very clear that in order to bind a firm an act or instrument done or executed by a partner or other person on behalf of the firm shall be done or executed in the firm name or in any other manner expressing or implying an intention to bind the firm The Supreme Court of India in devji v. Manganlal (5) has ruled that a partner taking sub-lease not in the name of the firm but in his own name would not bind and was not intended to bind the firm. It is of significance to note that earlier to the dissolution of the firm all the invoices were signed by the 3rd defendant as partner, which meant that it was for and on behalf of the partnership. Subsequent to it he had signed the invoices as proprietor striking out the word 'partner'. That should have normally put the plaintiff on guard that the partnership firm was no longer in existence and the act by the third defendant was not for and on behalf of the firm. It is no doubt true that when the plaintiff was in the box he said that he had not noticed it. That should have normally put the plaintiff on guard that the partnership firm was no longer in existence and the act by the third defendant was not for and on behalf of the firm. It is no doubt true that when the plaintiff was in the box he said that he had not noticed it. But that is a very lame excuse and that would not change the nature of the transaction. In the circumstances, I find that the plaintiff had notice of the dissolution of the firm and as such defendant No. 2 is not bound by any transaction carried on with defendant No. 3, after the dissolution of the firm. To that extent the judgment and decrees of the courts below are to be modifed ( 13 ) IN the result, therefore, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the Court confirmed by the 1st Appellate Court are hereby set aside and the matter is remitted back to the trial Court, with a direction that the trial Court shall now proceed to determine the amount due to the plaintiff on account of the transactions that took place earlier to the dissolution of the partnership on 31-8-1969 and then proceed to fix the liability, if at all, on the 2nd defendant and other defendants and pass a decree in accordance with law. No costs of this appeal. Parties shall appear before the trial court on 21 -3-1983 to take further instructions. Send back the concerned records to the trial court forthwith. Refund admissible Court fees in this court as well as in the 1st appellate court. The amount drawn at the time of issue of stay order of this Court by the plaintiff may not be ordered to be restituted before the disposal of the suit by the trial Court. I. A III is dismissed as not pressed. --- *** --- .