Judgement B. D. AGRAWAL, J.: - This is a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution. The petitioner Atul Kumar Singh was a candidate in the Combined Pre-Medical Test, 1982, conducted by the Kanpur University. He is son of Dr. S.R. Singh, Principal, Motilal Nehru Medical College, Allahabad. Dr. Singh is also an officer in the Territorial Army holding the rank of Lt. Colonel. In the application made in the prescribed form the petitioner claimed benefit of reservation under category of "Children of present or ex-Army personnel (Male)". There was reservation of one seat in this category in the Medical College, Allahabad and two seats in K.G. Medical College, Lucknow. The preference indicated by the petitioner was for M.B.B.S.; B.D.S. and B.H.M.S. (Homeopathy) in that Order and in respect of institutions his first choice was for Medical College, Allahabad. In the application the petitioner gave his address as under : "S/- Dr. S.R. Singh, R/o 1, Professors Residence, M.L.N. Medical College, Allahabad." 2. The application submitted by the petitioner also contained a certificate in Form IV-A from the Registrar General Hospital, Territorial Army, Allahabad (countersigned by the District Magistrate, Allahabad to the effect that he is son of Dr. S.R. Singh r/o Hardoi (Dr. Singh is permanent resident of Hardoi. 3. Admission card was issued to the petitioner from the office of the Kanpur University treating him as a candidate in the said reserved category. He secured 941 marks out of 1200. Admission has not been given to him, however, in the M.B.B.S. course. There are two seats of this reserved category vacant one each in the K.G. Medical College, Lucknow and the Medical College, Allahabad. The only other candidate in this reserved category who secured higher percentage of marks than the petitioner is Kamal Netra Singh whose first preference is for the K.G. Medical College, Lucknow. To the petitioner the admission offered on 11th Sept., 1982 is instead in the course of B.H.M.S. (Homeopathy) in the Government Ghazipur (Homeopathic) Medical College, Ghazipur. 4. Aggrieved the petitioner has moved this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the State Government to admit him to M.B.B.S. Course in the current session and preferably in the Medical College, Allahabad. 5. Sri S.P. Gupta learned Counsel for the petitioner raised a twofold contention in support of the petition. 4. Aggrieved the petitioner has moved this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the State Government to admit him to M.B.B.S. Course in the current session and preferably in the Medical College, Allahabad. 5. Sri S.P. Gupta learned Counsel for the petitioner raised a twofold contention in support of the petition. It was urged that the expression "Army personnel" used to describe the reserved category includes personnel of the Territorial Army. The Army comprises, it is submitted, not merely the regular Army but also the Army Reserve and the Territorial Army, Territorial Army personnel is subjected to rigors of discipline etc. as that of the regular Army and the argument further is that with suitable alterations the provisions of the Army Act, 1950 extend also to personnel of the Territorial Army constituted under the Territorial Army Act, 1948. The petitioners father being an officer holding the rank of a Lt. Colonel in the Territorial Army, the argument proceeds, the petitioner is entitled to benefit of the reserved category. The other contention of the learned Counsel is that since admit card had been issued to the petitioner treating him as covered under this category, there can be no going back. 6. Taking up the second contention of the petitioners learned Counsel first, there is no dispute that on receipt of the petitioners application in the prescribed form admit card was issued to the petitioner from the office of the Kanpur University thereby permitting him to appear as a candidate of reserved category. For the respondent it has been submitted that this was due to inadvertent error on the part of the clerical staff of the University. The application in the prescribed pro forma gave the address, as mentioned above, namely : - "S/o Dr. S.R. Singh, r/o 1, Professors Residence, M.L.N. Medical College, Allahabad." 7. The petitioner admits, as appearing from para 5 of his rejoinder affidavit, that he did not state in the application form that his father was the Principal of the Medical College at Allahabad and by way of explanation it is stated that the application did not require the petitioner to disclose the occupation of his father. In the certificate appended in Form IV-A comprised in this same application form the mention made was that the petitioner is son of Lt. Colonel Dr. In the certificate appended in Form IV-A comprised in this same application form the mention made was that the petitioner is son of Lt. Colonel Dr. S.R. Singh, territorial Army r/o Hardoi, Para 5 of the rejoinder affidavit states also that Dr. Singh is a permanent resident of Hardoi. We do not find called upon to decide whether the conduct of the petitioner was fraudulent as averred in the counter-affidavit. All that we would like to say is that a person concentrating upon the certificate appended in Form IV-A was apt to be misled by the description given. The petitioner sought benefit of a reserved category on ground of being the child of a member of the "Army personnel (Male)". It is implicit in our view that there should have been a full and complete description made of the petitioners fathers avocation instead of stating merely that he is a Lt. Colonel in Territorial Army and a permanent resident of Hardoi. In this same context the disclosure of normal avocation of the petitioners father should have been regarded as material. We are not quite sure that the decision would have been the same if the picture presented were complete. The decision is not unlikely to be mistaken where it was reached as in the present case in ignorance of a relevant fact. 8. Learned Counsel relied upon the decision in the case of Krishan v. Kurukshetra University, ( AIR 1976 SC 376 ) in support of his contention. In that case the appellant was allowed to appear at LL.B. Part II Examination. Later the University informed the appellant that since his percentage was short in Part I his candidature stood cancelled. The appellant contended that once he was allowed to appear at the LL.B. Part II Examination, his candidature could not be withdrawn for any reason whatsoever, in view of the mandatory provision of cl.2 (b) of Ordinance X of the Kurukshetra University. The relevant clause of the Ordinance reads as under : "2. The appellant contended that once he was allowed to appear at the LL.B. Part II Examination, his candidature could not be withdrawn for any reason whatsoever, in view of the mandatory provision of cl.2 (b) of Ordinance X of the Kurukshetra University. The relevant clause of the Ordinance reads as under : "2. The following certificates signed by the Principal of the College/Head of the Department concerned, shall be required from each applicant : - (a) that the candidate has satisfied him by the production of the certificate of a competent authority that he has passed the examinations which qualified him for admission to the examination; and (b) that he has attended a regular course of study for the prescribed number of academic years. Certificate (b) will be provisional and can be withdrawn at any time before the examination if the applicant fails to attend the prescribed course of lectures before the end of his term." 9. In view of this statutory provision the Supreme Court held (at pp. 380-81) - "The last part of this statute clearly shows that the University could withdraw the certificate if the applicant had failed to attend the prescribed course of lectures. But this could be done only before the examination. It is, therefore, manifest that once the appellant was allowed to take the examination rightly or wrongly then the statute which empowers the University to withdraw the candidature of the applicant has worked itself out and the applicant cannot be refused admission subsequently for any infirmity which should have been looked into before giving the applicant permission to appear." 10. The Supreme Court further observed that it was the duty of the Head of the Department of Law before submitting the form to the University to see that the form complied with all the requirements of law. The University authorities had time and opportunity to scrutinise the form in order to find out whether it was in order. It was neither a case of suggestion falsi, or suppressio veri. The other argument for the respondent that the appellant had not obtained prior permission of the employer was negatived on the ground that there was no statutory provision which required that candidates attending the evening law class who are in service should first get the prior permission of their superior officers. The other argument for the respondent that the appellant had not obtained prior permission of the employer was negatived on the ground that there was no statutory provision which required that candidates attending the evening law class who are in service should first get the prior permission of their superior officers. A decision of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh viz., Premji Bhai Kshatriya v. V.C. Ravishanker University Rampur (AIR 1967 Madh Pra 194) was cited with approval. That related to scrutiny as to requisite attendance of the candidates and it was held that the discretion having been clearly exercised in permitting the petitioner to appear, it could not later be withdrawn. 11. The instant case stands on a distinct footing. There is nothing in the executive instructions under which the Combined Pre-Medical Test was held or any statute that prevents the authorities from rectifying the position in relation to the scope or coverage of the reserved category despite the fact that admit card was issued and the petitioner appeared in the test. Sri Gupta the learned counsel candidly did not urge that there is bar of estoppel arising. As to whether children of an officer of the Territorial Army are or are not included in the particular reserved category under consideration is it itself a mixed question of facts and law. The averments contained in the petitioners application form could not possibly be checked with the help of any record of the University conducting the test and it may be difficult to say, as explained above, that the petitioner did not indulge in suppressio veri in not making a full and complete disclosure of his fathers avocation. The determination is not left to the discretion of the concerned authorities. The Supreme Courts decision in Krishans case ( AIR 1976 SC 376 ) (supra) therefore, does not assist the petitioner. 12. The determination is not left to the discretion of the concerned authorities. The Supreme Courts decision in Krishans case ( AIR 1976 SC 376 ) (supra) therefore, does not assist the petitioner. 12. Coming now to the chief contention of the petitioners learned counsel namely that the expression "Army personnel" used to describe that reserved category is inclusive of personnel of the Territorial Army, it may be pointed that as appearing from the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Territorial Army Act, 1948, the role of the Territorial Army is - (a) to provide a second line to, and a source of reinforcement for, the regular army; (b) to assist in internal defence duties in a national emergency; (c) to be responsible for anti aircraft and coastal defence; and (d) to give the youth of India an opportunity of training themselves to defend their country. 13. The personnel of the Territorial Army comprises two classes - (a) Officers and (b) enrolled persons (S.4). Officers are of two classes: (a) Officers holding commissions in the Territorial Army granted by the President with designations of rank corresponding to those of commissioned officers of the Regular Army and (b) junior commissioned officers (S.5). According to S.6 any person who is a citizen of India may offer himself for enrolment and may, if he satisfies the prescribed conditions, be enrolled for such period and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed. S.7 provides for liability for military service: It reads - "(1) No officer or enrolled person shall be required to perform military service beyond the limits of India save under a general or special order of the Central Government. (2) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (1), every officer or enrolled person shall, subject to such conditions as may be prescribed be bound to serve in any unit of the Territorial Army to which he is for the time being attached, and shall be subject to all the rules made under this Act in relation to such unit. (3) Every officer or enrolled person shall be liable to perform military service, - (a) when called out in the prescribed manner to act in support of the civil power or to provide essential guards. (3) Every officer or enrolled person shall be liable to perform military service, - (a) when called out in the prescribed manner to act in support of the civil power or to provide essential guards. (b) When embodied in the prescribed manner for training or for supporting or supplementing the regular forces; and, (c) When attached, to any regular forces either at his own request or under the prescribed conditions." 14. According to S.9 every officer, when doing duty as such officer and every enrolled person when called out or embodied or attached to the Regular Army, shall subject to suitable adaptation be subject to the provisions of the Army Act, 1950 and the rules or regulations made thereunder. S.14 (2) (b) empowers the Central Government to make rules prescribing the manner in which, and the period for which and the conditions subject to which any person may be enrolled under this Act or may be required to perform compulsory service in the Territorial Army. R.33 of the Territorial Army Rules, 1948 accordingly provides that "Every officer and every enrolled person of the Territorial Army shall by order of the Central Government or by order of such other authority as may be empowered by the Central Government in this behalf, be liable, to be called out to act in support of the civil power or to provide essential guards or to be embodied for the purpose of supporting or supplementing the regular army." 15. Rule 34 specifies that every officer and every enrolled person when called upon or embodied (shall act?) as essential guard or support or supplement the regular army. Provision for military training is made under Part IV of these Rules. R.23 (a) provides that every person subject to the Act shall be entitled to such pay and allowances as are specified in Schedule III. According to para 30 of the Regulations for the Territorial Army, 1948 officers of the Medical Services will be posted to Medical units constituted for the Zone in which they are for the time being resident. When not so posted, they will be attached for training to a military hospital or regular medical unit, and, it further states that such attachment will be made, as far as circumstances permit at such time and place as may be convenient to the officer concerned. When not so posted, they will be attached for training to a military hospital or regular medical unit, and, it further states that such attachment will be made, as far as circumstances permit at such time and place as may be convenient to the officer concerned. Para 67 of these Regulations also clarifies that officers of the Territorial Army become subject to the Army Act, 1950 when doing duty as such vide S.9. 16. The distinctive features of an officer of the Territorial Army thus are that he is not under liability to render military service continuously for a term. In an emergent situation he may be called out to act in support of the civil power or to provide essential guard, He is not required ordinarily to perform military service beyond the territorial limits of the country. During the period of active service he is, of course, under the discipline of the Army Act, 1950. If he is a Medical Officer, due regard is to be had to his convenience in the matter of time and place of his attachment. 17. In contrast, an officer of the Regular Army is liable to render continuously for a term military service to the Union in any part of the world, (S.3 (xxi) of the Army Act, 1950). Active service for purposes of the Army Act means the time during which such person - "(a) is attached to, or forms part of a force which is engaged in operations against an enemy, or (b) is engaged in military operations in, or is on the line of march to, a country or place wholly or partly occupied by an enemy, or (c) is attached to or forms part of a force which is in military occupation of a foreign country; (Section 3 (i)). 18. Section 2 (1) (e) points that officers of the Territorial Army shall be subject to the Army Act, 1950 when doing duty as such officers. S.21 provides for restrictions of certain fundamental rights by Rules of the Central Government. In so far as officers of the Territorial Army are concerned, these restrictions are operative only when they are doing duty as such officers. The corresponding provisions of the Air Force Act, 1950 and the Navy Act, 1957 are also similarly suggestive of distinction in material respect vis-a-vis personnel of the Territorial Army. 19. In so far as officers of the Territorial Army are concerned, these restrictions are operative only when they are doing duty as such officers. The corresponding provisions of the Air Force Act, 1950 and the Navy Act, 1957 are also similarly suggestive of distinction in material respect vis-a-vis personnel of the Territorial Army. 19. The expression Army personnel or ex Army personnel is not defined for purposes of the reserved category under consideration. Learned counsel urged that personnel of the Territorial Army be held included within Army personnel since in certain situations the provisions of the Army Act, 1950 apply to them and also because according to para 1 (b) of the Defence Regulations the Army comprises of the Regular Army, the Army Reserve and the Territorial Army. We have referred above in brief to the distinction observed in the duties and responsibilities of personnel of Territorial Army, on the one hand and the Regular Army on the other. Assuming that for purposes of statures relating to the Armed Forces personnel of the Territorial Army is included in Army personnel, the context in which the expression requires interpretation in the instant case cannot be undermined. 20. The law is settled that however wide in the abstract, general words and phrases are more or less elastic, and admit of restriction or extension to suit the legislation in question. "The object or policy of the legislation often affords the answer to problems arising from ambiguities which it contains. For it is a canon of interpretation trial all words, if they be general and not precise, are to be restricted to the fitness of the matter, that is, to be construed as particular if the intention be particular" (Maxwell: Interpretation of Statutes 12th Ed.P.86). The principle may well be adopted where, as in the present, we are concerned with interpretation of executive instructions, and not statutory provisions. Indeed the precision and exactitude of statutory provisions is not unoften found lacking in administrative instructions. It is here that the context plays a supporting, subordinate role. Referring to this Reed Dickerson in the Interpretation and Application of Statutes (1975) at page 111 observes : "Although subordinate, the role of context is highly significant. An utterance taken out of the specific context that it presupposes is at best inadequately oriented and overgeneral. It is here that the context plays a supporting, subordinate role. Referring to this Reed Dickerson in the Interpretation and Application of Statutes (1975) at page 111 observes : "Although subordinate, the role of context is highly significant. An utterance taken out of the specific context that it presupposes is at best inadequately oriented and overgeneral. Not only does the context limit the normal sweep of primary (semantical) meaning, but it often also selects among the alternative potentialities of primary meaning. The elements of context that performs the latter function are usually factual assumptions or ethical norms that are either expressly recited in the document or, more usually, judicially noticed. They affect meaning by turning the potentialities of multiple, or alternative, primary meaning into the actualities of a single relevant primary meaning." 21. The most useful function of context is to narrow the range of reference of otherwise overgeneral words. "Farewell to the context and fanatical adherence to the text.", said Krishna Iyer J., an the Life Insurance Corporation of India v. D.J. Bahadur ( AIR 1980 SC 2181 at p 2185), "may lead to the tyranny of literality - a hazardous road which misses the meaning or reaches a sense which the author never meant". The statutes should after all be interpreted with imagination of purpose behind them The purpose or the reason and spirit pervading through the statute furnish material guidance in ascertaining the intention of the author of the provision, (see S.K. Chatterji v. Hira Lal (1976 (2) All LR 140) : ( AIR 1976 All 512 ). In Arun Narayan v. State of Karnataka (AIR 1976 Kant 174) a Division Bench held interpreting the Rules for admission of students to Medical Colleges in that State that "if a statutory provision or Rule is capable of two constructions, that which accords with the probable intention of the Legislature or the Rule making authority, should be preferred." It would be relevant to bear in mind, therefore, the purpose that the state Government seeks to achieve by providing for reservation to children of Armed or Ex-Armed personnel in the State owned Medical Colleges. 22. The matter can be viewed from another angle also. The Courts strongly lean against a construction which reduces the statute to a futility. A statute or any enacting provision therein must be construed so as to make it effective and operative. 22. The matter can be viewed from another angle also. The Courts strongly lean against a construction which reduces the statute to a futility. A statute or any enacting provision therein must be construed so as to make it effective and operative. It may be safely presumed that statutory limitations were not intended to be transgressed. In re Hindu Womens Rights to Property Act, 1937 case (AIR 1941 FC 72) the question arose with regard to the competence of the Central Legislature to enact the law with respect to agricultural land. The expression used in the Act is property. It was held that if the word property necessarily and inevitably comprises all forms of property, including agricultural land, then clearly the Act went beyond the powers of the Legislature but when a Legislature with limited and restricted power makes use of a word of such wide and general import, the presumption must surely be that it is using it with reference to that kind of property with respect to which it is competent to legislate and to no other. Their Lordships cited Lord Esher M.R. in (1890) 25 Q.B.D. 129 at page 134, which points that "the proper construction to be put on general words used in an English Act of Parliament is, that Parliament was dealing only with such persons or things as are within the general words and also within its proper jurisdiction, and that we ought to assume that Parliament (unless it expressly declares otherwise), when it uses general words, is only dealing with persons or things over which it has properly jurisdiction". 23. In Tilkayat Shri Govindlal Ji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan ( AIR 1963 SC 1638 ) at page 1655 it was held: "If the impugned provisions are reasonably not capable of the construction which would save its validity, that of course is another matter, but if two constructions are reasonably possible, then it is necessary that the Courts should adopt that construction which upholds the validity of the Act rather than the one which affects its validity." In the Corporation of Calcutta v. Liberty Cinema ( AIR 1965 SC 1107 ) at page 1113 it was stated that a statute has to be read so as to make it valid and, if possible, an interpretation leading to a contrary position should be avoided. In Collmann v. Mills (1897) 1 QB 396) at page 400, there is an observation made that it being in the power of the local authority to make bye-laws for regulating the conduct of the business, the bye-laws so made must receive a natural construction, i.e., they must be held to cover the acts of servants as well as those of the proprietor of the business. In Re, Hindu Womens Rights To property Act case (AIR 1941 FC 72) (supra) it was also held that the principle is the same for all law making bodies with limited powers and that the subordinate legislation should also receive such an interpretation as will make the same operative and not inoperative. It is a settled rule in the interpretation of statutes, it was pointed out, that general words will be taken to have been used in the wider or mare restricted sense according to the general scope and object of the enactment. The interpretation that is placed in reference to the reserved category, we are concerned with in this case, must, therefore, be such that, in the event of the validity of the provisions being challenged by some one interested in so doing, the vires is upheld, This may in our opinion, be adopted as a valid test. 24. The crux of the controversy thus is as to what may legitimately have been the executive intent in formulating this reserved category. Could this be designed to attract as well children of an officer in the Territorial Army who has not been called out to active service at any point of time and is otherwise in a position to educate and maintain the children ? Art.15 (4) of the Constitution enables reservation for admission to State owned Medical colleges being made by way of special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizen or for the Scheduled Castes and the scheduled Tribes. The traits of social and educational backwardness were explained by the Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Pradip Tandon ( (1975)1 SCC 267 ): ( AIR 1975 SC 563 ). The petitioner does not claim benefit under any of those categories. The traits of social and educational backwardness were explained by the Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Pradip Tandon ( (1975)1 SCC 267 ): ( AIR 1975 SC 563 ). The petitioner does not claim benefit under any of those categories. "The principle underlying Article 15 (4) is that a preferential treatment can validly be given because the socially and educationally backward classes need it, so that in course of time they stand in equal position with the more advanced sections of the society." This principle has been extended to certain other classes not falling within Article 15 (4). The condition is that the sources be properly classified whether on territorial, geographical or other reasonable basis. In Km. Chitra Ghosh v. Union of India ( AIR 1970 SC 35 ) the principle was thus stated (at p. 39) : "It is the Central Government which bears the financial burden of running the medical college. It is for it to lay-down the criteria for eligibility. From the very nature of things it is not possible to throw admission open to students from all over the country. The Government cannot be denied the right to decide from what sources the admission will be made. That essentially is a question of policy and depends, inter alia, on an overall assessment and survey of the requirements of residents of particular territories and other categories of persons for whom it is essential to provide facilities for medical education. If the sources are properly classified whether on territorial, geographical or other reasonable basis it is not for the Courts to interfere with the manner and method of making the classification." 25. In D.N. Chanchala v. State of Mysore ( AIR 1971 SC 1762 ) the question raised was regarding the validity of setting apart a certain number of seats in State Medical Colleges for children of political sufferers. Defence personnel and ex defence personnel. The Supreme Court observed that it was not a case. f reservation but of laying down sources for selection necessitated by certain overriding considerations, such as obligations towards those who served the interest of the countrys security and the like. Proceeding to consider whether the classification of children of Political sufferers. Defence personnel and ex defence personnel. The Supreme Court observed that it was not a case. f reservation but of laying down sources for selection necessitated by certain overriding considerations, such as obligations towards those who served the interest of the countrys security and the like. Proceeding to consider whether the classification of children of Political sufferers. Defence and ex defence personnel as a source for selection had a reasonable relation to the object for which the rules for admission were made, it was observed (at Pp. 1575-76). "The object of the Rules for admission can obviously be to secure a fair and equitable distribution of seats amongst those seeking admission and who are eligible under the University Regulations. Such distribution can be on the principle that admission should be available to the best and the most meritorious. But an equally fair and equitable principle would also be that which secures admission in a just proportion to those who are handicapped and who, but for the preferential treatment given to them, would not stand a chance against those who are not so handicapped and are, therefore, in a superior position. The principle underlying Article 15 (4) is that a preferential treatment can validly be given because the socially and educationally backward classes need it, so that in course of time they stand in equal position with the more advanced sections of the society. It would not in any way be improper if that principle were also to be applied to those who are handicapped but do not fall under Article 15 (4). It is on such a principle that reservation for children of Defence personnel and Ex-Defence personnel appears to have been upheld. The criterion for such reservation is that those serving in the Defence forces or those who had so served are and were at a disadvantage in giving education to their children since they had to live, while discharging their duties, in difficult places where normal facilities available elsewhere are and were not available. The criterion for such reservation is that those serving in the Defence forces or those who had so served are and were at a disadvantage in giving education to their children since they had to live, while discharging their duties, in difficult places where normal facilities available elsewhere are and were not available. In our view it is not unreasonable to extend that principle to the children of political sufferers who in consequence of their participation in the emancipation struggle became unsettled in life; in some cases economically ruined, and were therefore, not in a position to make available to their children that class of education which would place them in fair competition with the children of those who did not suffer from that disadvantage. If that be so it must follow that the definition of political sufferer not only makes the children of sufferers distinguishable from the rest but such a classification has a reasonable nexus with the object of the rules which can be nothing else than a fair and just distribution of seats." 26. In the Full Bench case of Jagdish v. State of Haryana (AIR 1977 Punj and Har 56) Chinnappa Reddy, J., (as he then was) relying upon D.N. Chanchala ( AIR 1971 SC 1762 ) (supra) held that revision extended to ex-Defence personnel on the same analogy (at p. 61): - "On the same analogy it must be said that while the best and the most meritorious of those seeking appointment under the State should be selected, it is also equally fair and equitable that a just proportion of the posts should be given to those who, because of a peculiar handicap, may not stand a chance against those not so handicapped. It would be an extension of the principle of Article 16 (4) to those that do not fall under Article 16 (4). Defence Personnel who on account of their service with the Army, the Navy and the Air Force over the years have lost opportunities for entering Government service and have also lost contact with ordinary civilian life, may find it extremely difficult, on demobilisation, to compete with civilians for civilian jobs, despite the qualities of discipline, sacrifice, sense of public duty, initiative, loyalty and leadership which they would have undoubtedly acquired as members of the Defence Forces". 27. 27. His Lordship cited with approval the minority view of Das C.J., in Sukhanandan Thakur v. State of Bihar ( AIR 1957 Pat 617 ) which pointed that displaced persons who suffered from undeserved want by reason of circumstances which followed in the wake of partition of the country and political sufferers furnish another instance of undeserved want. Classification in the matter of employment in relation to them is not unreasonable. In Subhashini K. v. State of Mysore (AIR 1966 Mys 40), Hegde, J., (as he then was) speaking for the Division Bench upheld reservations made in medical colleges in favour of children or wards of the men in armed services, and ex-servicemen including those who were in the armed services during the second world war on the basis that this was in national interest. In an unreported case of Km. Asha Rani Bhadoria v. State of U. P. (Civil Misc. Writ No. 7017 of 1974, decided on 26th March 1976) the question raised before a Division Bench of this Court was with respect to the validity of executive instructions making reservation by orders of the State Government for the dependants of political sufferers in the U. P. Civil (Judicial) Service. The argument advanced for the petitioner, inter alia, was that the impugned G. O. D/-27-9-1972 created a fiction in favour of the relations mentioned therein saying that all those persons would be deemed to be dependents of political sufferers irrespective of the fact whether they were actually dependents or not and since this included even those who were not dependents of political sufferers, it went beyond the permissible limits and had on that account to be struck down. The Bench declined to accept the interpretation that would have rendered the rule invalid on the ground that the rule of construction requires a Court to give that meaning to a provision of law which does not render it invalid. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Joginder Nath v. Union of India ( AIR 1975 SC 511 ). The interpretation preferred thus was : "It appears to us that this clause only says that only the relations mentioned in it can be considered for the purpose of conferring the benefit of this Government Order. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Joginder Nath v. Union of India ( AIR 1975 SC 511 ). The interpretation preferred thus was : "It appears to us that this clause only says that only the relations mentioned in it can be considered for the purpose of conferring the benefit of this Government Order. This does not say that the these relations would be entitled to get the benefit irrespective of the fact whether they are not dependents of the political sufferers or not. The intention behind this Government Order can only be to confer the benefit of reservation to genuine dependents who have, in fact, suffered. The Government cannot be attributed to have the intention of making reservation even for those who did not actually suffer." 28. In para 5 of the writ petition it is averred: "That the petitioner claimed to be considered in the aforesaid category on the basis of the facts that the father of the petitioner is an officer of the Territorial Army raised by the Central Government under the Territorial Army Act, 1948. The rank of the father of the petitioner is Lieutenant Colonel. The father of the petitioner also gets emoluments for being an officer of the Territorial Army according to the provisions of the aforesaid Act and the rules made thereunder." 29. The petitioner nowhere states that his father has ever been called out to serve in any unit of the Territorial Army as contemplated in Section 7 of the Territorial Army Act. In the course of arguments it was indicated for the petitioner that Dr. Singh has been in the Territorial Army for the last about four years only. The petitioner does not aver and there is no material placed before us to infer that his father has at any stage been handicapped on this account in providing education to his children or in their upbringing. It does not appear consequently a case of neglect or undeserved want. There is no suggestion of any element of suffering or sacrifice. The principle underlying Article 15 (4) of the Constitution may not, therefore, be said to be attracted and the petitioner cannot claim that he qualifies for special consideration on this footing. The burden to establish that he falls within a reasonable classification lay undoubtedly upon the petitioner which he failed to discharge. The principle underlying Article 15 (4) of the Constitution may not, therefore, be said to be attracted and the petitioner cannot claim that he qualifies for special consideration on this footing. The burden to establish that he falls within a reasonable classification lay undoubtedly upon the petitioner which he failed to discharge. We would like to make clear in this connection that we confine ourselves to that class of Territorial Army which has not been called out to duty. No final opinion needs be expressed herein with respect to such class of Territorial Army as has been called to active service. 30. Sri Gupta also referred to photostat copy of a pamphlet purporting to be issued by the Ministry of Defence in March 1975 saying in general terms that educational concessions granted to dependants of Defence personal have been extended to Territorial Army personnel (Annexure-I to the Writ Petition). It was also submitted that on 5-1-1983 in reply to a letter from a Member of the Parliament, Dy. Defence Minister wrote that as per the provisions of the Defence Services Regulations, the Army comprises the Regular Army, the Army Reserve and the Territorial Army (Annexure-IV to rejoinder-affidavit). These need not detain us long. We have ourselves referred to the Defence Regulations and other relevant provisions above. The decision would rest upon reasonable interpretation that the concerned provision bears under the law in the light of accepted norms. 31. In view of the discussion made above, we find that the petitioner is not eligible to the benefit of being placed in the reserved category of Children of Army Personnel for purposes of admission to the State Medical Colleges. 32. The petition, accordingly, fails and is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.