JUDGMENT - Couto G.F. J.-This revision application is directed against the judgment dated 21st January, 1983 whereby the learned Sessions Judge, Panaji dismissed the appeal of the present petitioner and two others against their conviction under section 8(1) read with section 30(a)(l) of the Goa, Daman and Diu Excise Duty Act, 1964 and the sentence passed against them. 2. A criminal case had been filed against the petitioner herein and two others for offences punishable under section 8(1) read with section 30 of the Goa, Daman and Diu Excise Duty Act, 1964 on the grounds that, on 22nd March, 1980, the petitioner and two others had been found in possession of and transporting 16 kgs. of charas which is a dangerous drug and is subject to excise duty. The said narcotic found in possession of the petitioner was worth Rs. 64,000. The three accused pleaded not guilty and after trial was held, they had been convicted under the aforesaid section 8(1) read with section 30(a)(l) of the Goa, Daman and Diu Excise Duty Act, 1964 and each of them sentenced to undergo three months of Simple Imprisonment and in addition to pay a fine of Rs. 200 or in default, to undergo a further period of two months of Simple Imprisonment. The three accused, being aggrieved, preferred an appeal to the Sessions Court which was dismissed by the impugned judgment. 3. The case of the petitioner before me is that his conviction is not justified, since it is supported by the evidence of only one witness which is not corroborated by any other person and, on the contrary, is contradicted to some extent by another witness. Secondly, the case of the petitioner is also that the trial Judge ought to have given him the benefit of the provi sions of section 360, Criminal Procedure Code since the offence allegedly committed by him is punishable with imprisonment upto three years and that he is a first offender; Elaborating these grounds Mr. F. Rebello, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, invited my attention to the judgment of the learned trial Judge and submitted that the conviction rests solely on the statement of P. W. 6 Xec Gafur Razak, Asst. Sub-inspector of Police. F. Rebello, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, invited my attention to the judgment of the learned trial Judge and submitted that the conviction rests solely on the statement of P. W. 6 Xec Gafur Razak, Asst. Sub-inspector of Police. In fact, according to the said Razak, he had been deputed by P. I. Aires de Souza to go near Eldorado cinema and to bring three people, who were trying to sell drugs, near the Shalimar restaurant. The said Xec Gafur Razak further stated that he went near the Eldorado cinema and that he saw the three accused. At that time, accused No. 1/petitioner herein was holding a bag in his hands and the said bag was opened and he saw inside slabs of charas. Mr. Rebello then invited my attention to the statement of P. W. 3 Jose Fernandes. The said witness stated that he had accompanied Xec Gafur Razak, but he did not mention that he saw the . petitioner opening the bag at any time near the Eldorado cinema. What he stated is that the bag was only opened near the Dempo house and, at that time, accused No. 2 was holding the same bag. Thus, according to the learned counsel, the evidence of the said Razak is not supported in the material portion, namely, that the bag allegedly containing charas had been at any time in possession of the petitioner. The result, therefore, is, accord ing to Mr. Rebello, that the prosecution has failed to prove that the charas was in possession of the petitioner at the relevant time and, therefore, no conviction could have followed. 4. It is in the evidence that P. 1. Aires de Souza got information that three people were near the Eldorado cinema trying to sell some drugs. It seems that, therefore, the said P. I. deputed A. S. I. Xec Gafur Razak to trap the said people so that they could be arrested red-handed while selling the drugs. A. S. I. Gafur Razak was examined in Court and stated that, in the month of March, 1930, he was deputed by P. I. Aires de Souza to go near the Eldorado cinema to trap by pretending to be a customer and then, to bring three people, who were attempting to sell drugs near the said cinema, to book. A. S. I. Gafur Razak was examined in Court and stated that, in the month of March, 1930, he was deputed by P. I. Aires de Souza to go near the Eldorado cinema to trap by pretending to be a customer and then, to bring three people, who were attempting to sell drugs near the said cinema, to book. Accordingly, he proceeded to the place in company of the informant, as well as of P. W. 3 Jose Fernandes, at about 10 a.m. Once there, according to A. S. I. Razaq, he saw the three accused at the place. They had come on two motor cycles and were pointed out to him by the Informant. The accused had with them one white coloured trunk. The witness approached them and told them he was interested in purchasing narcotics and further that he had some agents to re-sell drugs. He also stated that, at that time, accused No. 1 /petitioner herein opened the bag or trunk and showed him some slabs. Thereafter following the instructions of P. I. Aires de Souza, the witness managed to take the three accused along with him towards the Marietta restaurant which is situated near the Shalimar restaurant. At that time, it Appeared that the witness saw the raiding party headed by P. I. de Souza, and, as such, he made a signal to him and the accused were thereafter caught with the trunk. In his turn, witness Jose Fernandes stated that he had accompanied the A. S. I. Razak to the Eldorado cinema and that, once there, the said A. S. I. had “gone to talk to three people who were nearby and who had come there on two motor cycles. He further stated that A. S. I.-Razak talked to the said persons for about 10 minutes and thereafter, he started walking along with them towards the Dempo house i.e. towards the Shalimar restaurant. The witness followed him and, at one stage, he saw the police party coming to the place and the accused being caught. It is no doubt true that, practically, this is the only relevant evidence connecting the petitioner with the offence. As such, it has to be scrutinised carefully. Mr. The witness followed him and, at one stage, he saw the police party coming to the place and the accused being caught. It is no doubt true that, practically, this is the only relevant evidence connecting the petitioner with the offence. As such, it has to be scrutinised carefully. Mr. Rebello, as already said, has contended that, the offences being in respect of possession of an excisable article, the prosecution ought to have proved beyond any reasonable doubt that the petitioner had been found in possession of the charas being a fact that such onus had not been discharged. He invited my attention to the fact that, except for the state-ment given by Razak to the effect that the petitioner was holding the bag near the Eldorado cinema house and that on such occasion had opened the said bag and showed the charas, there is nothing on record in support of this statement, being specially relevant to note that Jose Fernandes, who was admittedly near the Eldorado cinema and had accompanied A. S. I. Razak, does not refer to the petitioner opening the bag near the Eldorado cinema house, having however stated that the bag was only opened near the Shalimar restaurant. Thus, according to Mr. Rebello, there is material omission in the statement of Jose Fernandes which amounts to a contradiction and as such, the statement of A. S. I. Razak cannot be relied upon to warrant the conviction of the petitioner. At the outset, it may be pointed out that there are concurrent findings of the Courts below in this respect and that, this being a revision application, it is not open to this Court to interfere with such concurrent findings of fact unless it is shown that the said findings are not supported at all by the evidence and are perverse. Thus, the question to be considered is whether the aforesaid concurrent findings of the Courts below are or are not perverse. As already said, Xec Gafur Razak has stated that he had gone under the instructions of P. I. Aires de Souza to a place near Eldorado cinema house in the company of Jose Fernandes and of the informant. Thus, the question to be considered is whether the aforesaid concurrent findings of the Courts below are or are not perverse. As already said, Xec Gafur Razak has stated that he had gone under the instructions of P. I. Aires de Souza to a place near Eldorado cinema house in the company of Jose Fernandes and of the informant. He further stated that he saw three people with a white bag or trunk in hand, that he approached them and told them that he was interested in purchasing narcotics and that he had agents to resell the drugs. In Examination-in-Chief, the said Razak stated that the accused opened the trunk and showed him some slabs. He did not, at that stage, identify who was the accused who opened the trunk at the relevant time, for it was in cross-examination that the same witness identified the petitioner as being the one who was carrying the trunk and who had opened it and showed the slabs. This impliedly shows that the statement identifying the petitioner as the one holding the trunk and opening it near the Eldorado cinema was a result of some questions put to that effect to him by the petitioner himself. It seems that witness Jose Fernandes, who admittedly accompanied Razak and who was present at the time Razak had the talk with the three accused near the Eldorado cinema house, does not refer to the opening of the trunk and to its holding by the petitioner near the aforesaid cinema house. “ The records of the proceedings of the lower Court are not before me. However, I was given the benefit of being taken through the statement of the said witness Jose Fernandes since Mr, Rebello had a copy thereof and minutely read the said statement to me. It is clear and manifest from his statement in the trial Court that the said witness had corroborated practically, even in all other small details, the evidence given by Razak. In fact, Jose Fernandes stated that he was called to the Police Station and he heard P. I. Aires de Souza to depute Razak to trap three people who were attempting to sell drugs near the Eldorado cinema house; he further deposed that Razak took the witness along with him to the Eldorado cinema house and, then, he saw the three accused coining on two motor cycles to the place. He also narrated the whole incident by saying that Razak went to talk with the said three persons and after a talk of about 10 minutes, started walking with them towards the Dempo house, near the Shalimar restaurant, when a police party caught the three accused. He further stated, that, at that time, the bag or trunk was being carried by Accused No. 2. He also said that only then the bag was opened. It is undoubtedly true that the witness Jose Fernandes has not mentioned the opening of the bag or trunk near the Eldorado cinema but, considering that the said witness has practically corroborated in all other details the evidence of Razak, it Appeared to me that the omission in making reference to the opening of the bag near the Eldorado cinema house is not of such a significance as to vitiate the evidence of Razak. In fact, it may be pointed out that it has not been brought in the evidence what were the relative positions near the Eldorado cinema of Razak, petitioner and the witnesses and, therefore, it is quite possible that the witness Jose Fernandes was unable from the place he was to see the opening of the trunk. -Therefore, in my view, the omission of the said witness Jose Fernandes to mention the opening of the bag or trunk near the Eldorado cinema house amounts to a minor discrepancy which does not vitiate the evidence of Razak. It is also pertinent to note that the witness Jose Fernandes stated that all three accused were together, and together, they accompanied Razak upto near the Shalimar restaurant where they were arrested by the police party. This conduct of the petitioner and two other accused is significant and its meaning is such that justifies the inference that they were connected in some manner with the business of narcotics and that they had interest in the charas found in the trunk, This being the position, in my view, the findings of the Courts below cannot be said to be perverse and there is no justification for this Court to interfere with them and with the consequent conviction of the petitioner. 5. The next contention of Mr. Rebello has been that the petitioner was, at the relevant time of the offence, 22 years old and that he was a first offender. 5. The next contention of Mr. Rebello has been that the petitioner was, at the relevant time of the offence, 22 years old and that he was a first offender. Thus, he argued, since the offence allegedly committed by him is punishable with imprisonment upto three years, the provision of section 360, Criminal Procedure Code was coming into operation and as such, it was the duty of the learned trial Judge to collect the necessary material in respect of the character and the antecedents of the petitioner so as to enable the Court to decide whether or not the benefit of the said provision of law was to be given to him. This was compulsory, in view of section 361, Criminal Procedure Code which casts on the sentencing Magistrate the duty to give special reasons for his not acting under sec tion 360. Mr. Rebello placed reliance in support of this submission on the rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases of (Ved Prakash v. State of Harayana)1, (Bishnu Deo Shaw v. State of West Bengal)2 and (Dilbag Singh v. State of Punjab)3 as well as in the ruling of the Delhi High Court in the case of (Jai Parkash v. State)4. 6. Section 360, Criminal Procedure Code provides that when any person not under twenty-one years of age is convicted of an offence punish able with fine only or with imprisonment for a term of seven years or less, or when any person under twenty-one years of age or any woman is convicted of an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life, and no previous conviction is proved against the offender, if it Appeared to the Court before which he is convicted, regard being had to the age, character or antecedents of the offender and to the circumstances in which the offence was committed, that it is expedient that the offender should be released on probation of good conduct, the Court may, instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment, direct that he be released on his entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period not exceeding three years as the Court may direct and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour. It would, therefore, appear that section 360 confers an unfettered discretionary power to the Court to, instead of sentencing the offender at once release him on his entering into a bond, when, in its opinion, this is advisable having regard to the age, character or antecedents of the offender as well as to the circumstances in which the offence was committed and when, in case of a person above 21 years of age, the offence is punishable with fine only or with imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years and, in case of a person under twenty-one years, the offence is not punishable with death or imprisonment for life and further when in both cases, the offender has no previous conviction. Section 360, Criminal Procedure Code has, however, to be read together with the provision of section 361 which provides that where the Court could have dealt with an accused person under section 360 or under the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, but has not done so, the Court shall record in its judgment the special reasons for not having done so. It becomes thus clear that, though section 360 gives a discretion to the Court to release the offender on his entering into a bond in the circumstances mentioned therein, the fact remains that, in view of section 361 which is mandatory as its. clear language shows, the discretion of the Court is to some extent reduced, since it Appeared undoubtful that, as a rule, the benefit of section 360 is to be given to an offender fulfilling the conditions laid down therein and that only for special reasons such an offender can be deprived of it. This is so, because section 361, Criminal Procedure Code requires the Court to record the special reasons for not proceeding under section 360 when the conditions mentioned therein are occurring. 7. Considering this position of the law, Mr. Rebello submitted that it is the duty of the convicting Magistrate to gather the necessary material beforehand so as to enable him to act under section 360 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 7. Considering this position of the law, Mr. Rebello submitted that it is the duty of the convicting Magistrate to gather the necessary material beforehand so as to enable him to act under section 360 of the Criminal Procedure Code. He furtheer contended that, since the Supreme Court has held in the aforesaid case of Bishnu Deo Shaw v. State of West Bengal that special circumstances are reasons which have special reference to the offender and that such special reasons are those which lead inevit ably to the conclusion that the offender is beyond redemption, having due regard to his personality and proclivity, to the legislative policy of reformation of the offender and to the advances made in the methods of treatment, it was the duty of the Court to look at the offender himself, and not the offence, at the time of considering whether or not the benefit of section 360, Criminal Procedure Code was to be given to him and, in the event of being of the opinion that such benefit was not justified, it was his duty to give the special reasons as to why it had not acted under section 360, Criminal Procedure Code. 8. In the case of Bishnu Deo Shaw v. State of West Bengal, the Supreme Court, while dealing with the question of the passing of death penalty has observed that the provisions of section 354(3), Criminal Procedure Code require the Court to give special reasons for passing a death penalty. It further observed that the said provision of law is akin to the provision of section 360, Criminal Procedure Code and that in the context of section 360, the special reasons contemplated by section 361 must be such as to compel the Court to hold that it is impossible to reform or rehabilitate the offender after examining the matter with due regard to the age, character and antecedents of the offender and the circumstances in which the offence was committed. The Supreme Court further observed that criminal justice is not a computer machine and it deals with complex human problems and diverse human beings and, therefore, differently shaped and differently circumstanced individuals react differently in given situations. As such the Court further observed :¯ “A Judge has to balance the personality of the offender with the circumstances, the situations and the reactions and choose the appropriate sentence to be imposed. As such the Court further observed :¯ “A Judge has to balance the personality of the offender with the circumstances, the situations and the reactions and choose the appropriate sentence to be imposed. A Judge must try to answer a myriad questions such as was the offence committed without premeditation or was it after due deliberation? What was the motive for the crime? Was it for gain? Was it the outcome of a village feud?” etc. Then, the Court observed that the special reasons are in regard to the offender with reference to constitutional and legislative directives and with reference to the time, i. e., with reference to contemporary ideas in the fields of Criminology and connected sciences, and hence, special reasons, are those which lead inevitably to the conclusion that the offender is beyond redemption, having due regard to his personality and proclivity, to the legislative policy of reformation of the offender and to the advances made in the methods of treatment etc. It would appear, therefore, that the law-laid down by the Supreme Court in the said case of Bishnu Deo Shaw v. State of West Bengal is that, in the context of section 360, the special reasons contemplated in section 361 must be of such a nature as to compel the Court to hold that it is impossible to reform and rehabilitate the offender and that such finding has to be arrived at after examining the matter with due regard to the age, character and antecedents of the offender and the circumstances in which the offence was committed. It also laid down the law inasmuch as the meaning of special reasons is concerned, by clarifying that these special reasons are with reference to the offender, to his personality and proclivity. 9. Thus, the question that falls for determination is whether, in the light of the above observations made by the Supreme Court, the reasons given by the learned trial Judge constitute “special reasons” for not giving to the petitioner the benefit of section 360, Criminal Procedure Code. Oh going through the judgment of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, one finds that undoubtedly the learned Magistrate has not made any reference to section 361, Criminal Procedure Code and, therefore, it may appear that he did not consider at all the said provision of law, as he ought to have done since it is mandatory. Oh going through the judgment of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, one finds that undoubtedly the learned Magistrate has not made any reference to section 361, Criminal Procedure Code and, therefore, it may appear that he did not consider at all the said provision of law, as he ought to have done since it is mandatory. However, in para 3 of his continued Judgment, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has observed as under :¯ “I quite agree with the prosecution. The sale of dangerous drugs-like Hashish, Charas is very much in increase in this territory. The accused were trying to dispose of 16 kgs. of charas which drug would be sold in Goa and mainly to the youth which is falling prey to the vice with the natural consequences of mental disease and even death. The law which was providing for a maximum punishment of 3 years imprisonment of an offence under section 8(1) of the Excise Duty Act, 1964 has enhanced this punishment to 7 years exactly because the Legislature found that deterrent punishment was required in such cases in view of (he eminent danger which sale of dangerous drugs is posing in Goa. Therefore this Court feels that deterrent punishment must be given to the accused, Mr. Sangodkar alleges that life of the accused will be ruined if they are sentenced to imprisonment. It may be so.. However, it is not to be forgotten that the acts committed by the accused, if they had not been caught in time, would have ruined many more lives.” Mr. Rebello, as already said, has contended before me that the learned trial Judge had no material at all before him to assess whether or not the petitioner was amenable to any regeneration or reform and, therefore, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Ved Prakash v. State of Haryana (supra), it was his duty to gather the necessary material before sentencing the petitioner. By failing to gather such material and by considering only the nature of the offence, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has also-failed, according to the learned counsel, to give the special reasons for not acting under section 360, Criminal Procedure Code. By failing to gather such material and by considering only the nature of the offence, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has also-failed, according to the learned counsel, to give the special reasons for not acting under section 360, Criminal Procedure Code. it is no doubt true that the reasons given by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate are connected mostly with the seriousness of the offence committed by the petitioner and no reference at all is made to his character and to his antecedents. It may, therefore, appear that, in fact, the reasons given by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate are not coming within the meaning and the scope of special reasons in section 361 Criminal Procedure Code. The learned Sessions Judge also, in his impugned judgment, did not deal in detail with this aspect of the case though it Appeared that the petitioner herein did not raise the point before him. However, it may be pointed out that though the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate did not make a direct reference to the personality of the petitioner, the fact remains that the reason why he felt that a deterrent punishment was required is that the drugs (16 kgs. of Charas) were meant to be sold mainly to the youth who are falling prey to the vice with the natural consequences of mental disease and even death. He also considered that the life of many other people would have been ruined as a result of the selling of the drugs by the petitioner and the two other co-accused. These reasons reflect strongly on the personality and character of the petitioner and thus, though no direct reference has been made to it, nevertheless such personality was, in the circumstances, impliedly considered. Hence, it would not be correct to hold that the learned Magistrate did not consider at all the personality and character of the petitioner. Besides, section 360 Criminal Procedure Code requires the Court to consider whether, having regard to the age, character or antecedents of the offender and to the circumstances in which the offence was committed, the offender should be released on his entering into a Bond and hence, as observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Bishnu Deo Shaw v. State of West Bengal, the circumstances are also to be considered. The offence committed by the petitioner is in respect of traffic of narcotics and a huge quantity of charas had been found in his possession and of the two co-accused. It is obvious and stands to reason that such a quantity of narcotics (16 kgs. of charas) was not meant for the personal use of the accused and, therefore, the inference drawn by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate that the said drugs were meant to be sold in Goa, mainly to the youth, Appeared to be a logical and necessary inference and is, as such, to be accepted. This inference, otherwise, is corroborated to some extent by the evidence of witness Razak inasmuch as he stated that he trapped the accused by saying that he used to purchase narcotics and had agents for its resale. Thus, it is safe to conclude that petitioner was dealing with narcotics as a business. It is well known that unfortunately the use of drugs and narcotics is a vice that is spreading among the youth, poisoning and perverting their minds and destroying their lives. Petitioner, according to the learned counsel appearing for him, is a student of Polytechnic and as such, he is not an uneducated and illiterate person. He was and is, therefore, bound to know that narcotics are treacherous, very dangerous and deleterious to the physical and mental sanity of its consumers, who become slaves of the vice and many a time, with their minds affected, become practically vegetables. Thus, narcotics destroy the lives of its consumer, with consequent suffering and unhappiness to their families and ultimately pose an insidious danger to the Society. In spite of this, the facts of the case show that the petitioner is indulging not only in mixing himself with drugs, but also in making a business of them for his own gain and profit. This kind of activity of the petitioner undoubtedly reflects on his personality and gives a clear and firm indication of his character and moral and social upbringing. The facts show that the petitioner is a drug peddler and that he is doing business in narcotics on a large scale, as the quantity of charas apprehended by the police clearly indicates. This kind of activity of the petitioner undoubtedly reflects on his personality and gives a clear and firm indication of his character and moral and social upbringing. The facts show that the petitioner is a drug peddler and that he is doing business in narcotics on a large scale, as the quantity of charas apprehended by the police clearly indicates. This unmistakenly indicates a wicked and danger-”ous personality, a character that, for gain, does not show any concern about the spreading of the narcotics cancer and misery among people with all-deleterious consequences thereof, A person with such personality and character needs to be deterred and to be dealt with sternly, for definitely, in my considered opinion, it would be wrong to think that such a person is amenable to regeneration and reform. Thus, though the learned trial Magistrate has not specifically stated in his judgment what were the special reasons for his not giving the benefit of the provisions of section 360, Criminal Procedure Code to the petitioner, the fact remains that his reasoning for passing the sentence constitute sufficient and special reasons to take the petitioner out of the purview and of the benefit of the said section. It is true that Mr. Rebello argued on basis of the observations made in the case of Fed Prakash v. State of Haryana that it was incumbent upon the Chief Judicial Magistrate to gather the necessary material before deciding whether or not the said benefit was to be given. In the said case, Krishna Iyer J. observed that the materials before the Court were imperfect because the trial Court has been perfunctory in discharging its sentencing function. He further observed that it is to be emphasised that sentencing of an accused is a sensitive exercise of discretion and not a routine or mechanical prescription acting on hunch. It was in this context that the learned Judge observed that the trial Court ought to have collected materials necessary to help award a just punishment in the circumstances. This authority of the Supreme Court, to my mind, in no manner helps the petitioner and supports the contention of Mr. Rebello. No doubt, before giving the benefit of the provision of section 360, Criminal Procedure Code, it is the duty of the sentencing Magistrate to satisfy himself about the age, character and antecedents of the offender and also about the circumstances of the case. Rebello. No doubt, before giving the benefit of the provision of section 360, Criminal Procedure Code, it is the duty of the sentencing Magistrate to satisfy himself about the age, character and antecedents of the offender and also about the circumstances of the case. Nowhere it has been laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case that this has to be done at the threshold. To my mind, considering the language of section 360, Criminal Procedure Code, it Appeared that the Magistrate, having regard to all circumstances and the evidence on record, has first to arrive at a prima facie finding as to whether there are no special reasons for not acting under section 360 and that the circumstances are such that it is expedient to call for a-report of the Probation Officer so as to gather material about the character and antecedents of the offender. However, if, at the threshold and in the light of the circumstances of the case, the sentencing Magistrate is of the opinion that the benefit of probation is not at all to be given, then there is no question of calling for such report and further material. Thus, in my view, the aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Ved Prakash v. State of Haryana is not an authority for the proposition advanced by Mr. Rebello. In the light of the discussion above, I need not address myself to the submissions made by Mr. Rebello on basis of the rulings of the Supreme Court in the case of Dilbag Singh v. State of Punjab and of Delhi High Court in the case of Jai Parkash v. State. In fact, the said rulings are an authority only for the proposition that the provision of section 361, Criminal Procedure Code is mandatory and, therefore, it is incumbent upon the sentencing Magistrate to record the special reasons why he had not proceeded under the provisions of section 360, Criminal Procedure Code, 10. In this view of the matter and though no specific reference is made by the Courts below to the provisions of section 361, Criminal Procedure Code, it is my considered opinion that in the particular circum stances of the case, special reasons exist for the Court not proceeding under section 360, Criminal Procedure Code. 11. In the result, this revision application fails and is accordingly dismissed. 11. In the result, this revision application fails and is accordingly dismissed. The petitioner, in the event he is not in custody, to surrender to the trial Court within ten days from today. Revision application dismissed -----