MALIMATH, C. J. ( 1 ) THE appellant has presented this appeal against the direction of the learned Single Judge on I. A. I. in writ petition No. 4184 of 1981, directing that the order of the learned Single Judge be treated as a complaint under S. 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code') and that further proceedings should be initiated against the petitioner in the writ petition, in accordance with law. ( 2 ) SRI T. S. Ramachandra, learned Counsel for the respondent, who has obtained such a direction at the hands of the learned Single judge, raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the appeal. Hence, it is necessary to consider the question as to whether an appeal is competent to the division Bench against the direction of the learned Single Judge made under S. 340 of the Code, to make a complaint against the appellant. ( 3 ) S. 340 (1) of the Code reads thus :" 340. (1) When, upon an application made to it in this behalf or otherwise, any Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence referred to in clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) of s. 195, which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court or, as the case may be, in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court, such Court may, after such preliminary enquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary, - (a) record a finding to that effect ; (b) make a complaint thereof in writing ; (c) send it to a Magistrate if the class having jurisdiction ; (d) take sufficient security for the appearance of the accused before such Magistrate, or if the alleged offence is non-bailable and the Court thinks it necessary so to do, send the accused in custody to such Magistrate ; and (bind over any person to appear and give evidence before such magistrate ". It is unnecessary for us to advert to sub-sees. (2) and (3) of S. 340 of the code, S. 341 (1) provides an appeal. It reads thus :" 341 (1) Any person on whose application any Court other than a high Court has refused to make a complaint under Sub-sec. (1) or sub-sec. It is unnecessary for us to advert to sub-sees. (2) and (3) of S. 340 of the code, S. 341 (1) provides an appeal. It reads thus :" 341 (1) Any person on whose application any Court other than a high Court has refused to make a complaint under Sub-sec. (1) or sub-sec. (2) of S. 340, or against whom such a complaint has been made by such Court may appeal to the Court to which such former court is subordinate within the meaning of sub-sec. (4) of S. 195, and the superior Court may thereupon, after notice to the parties concerned, direct the withdrawal of the complaint, or, as the case may be, making of the complaint which such former Court might have made under S. 340, and if it makes such complaint, the provisions of that section shall apply accordingly ". It is clear from this provision that the Code provides for an appeal only against the order or direction made by a Court under S. 340 except the high Court. The clear effect of sub- sec. (1) of S. 341 is, if the order or direction is made under S. 340, no appeal lies against such order or direction made by the High Court. The procedure for taking action is prescribed by S. 340 of the Code and there is also a specific provisions s. 341, providing for appeals against the orders or directions issued under s, 340. The said provisions expressly make it clear that if the order or direction is made by the High Court under S. 340, no appeal lies against the same. That being the position, when the Code provides for making of certain orders or directions under S. 340 and it also provides for appeals under S. 341, it is not possible to take the view that an appeal can be maintained de hors the provisions concerned in S. 341 of the Code ( 4 ) IT was, however, contended by Sri R. B. Sadashivappa, learned counsel for the appellant, that though an appeal would be competent under S. 341 of the Code, the appellant is entitled to maintain an appeal under S. 4 of the Karnataka high Court Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' ). S. 4 of the act reads thus :" 4. S. 4 of the act reads thus :" 4. Appeals from decisions of a single judge of the High Court.- An appeal from a judgment, decree, order or sentence passed by a single Judge in the exercise of the original jurisdiction of the High Court under this Act or under any law for the time being in force, shall lie to and be heard by a Bench consisting of two other Judges of the High Court". It was contended by Sri Sadashivappa that the direction of the learned single Judge to make a complaint against the petitioner issued under s. 340 of the Code, is an order and that, therefore, it is appealable under s. 4 of the Act, We do not consider it necessary to examine as to whether the direction or the order of the learneu single Judge under S. 340 of the Code can be regarded as having been made by him in exercise of the original jurisdiction of the High court under the Act or under any other law for the time being in force. The limited question which we propose to examine is as to whether the direction issued under S. 340, even if it is assumed to be an order is appealable under S. 4 of the Act. It was contended for the respondent that S. 4 does not contemplate appeal against every type of order. It was submitted that an order in order to become appealable should affect the rights or liabilities of the parties. The question for consideration is as to whether notwithstanding the width of the language of S. 4, an appeal lies only against an order of a learned Single Judge which has the effect of affecting the rights or liabilities of the parties. This question is not res integra as it is fully covered by a decision of this Court which has been rendered following the earlier authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court. It is, therefore, enough for us to advert to the decision of this Court in Govinda v. Mary fernands, 1970 (2) Mys. L. J. 466. This question is not res integra as it is fully covered by a decision of this Court which has been rendered following the earlier authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court. It is, therefore, enough for us to advert to the decision of this Court in Govinda v. Mary fernands, 1970 (2) Mys. L. J. 466. That was a case in which s. 118 (1)of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, as it stood at that time, came up for consideration the said section read as follows :-"save as otherwise provided in this Act, from every decision or order passed by the Tribunal an appeal shall lie to the appellate authority ; and the orders of the appellate Authority on such appeal shall be final. "it is clear from the said provision that in the absence of a provision to the contrary, an appeal would lie to the appellate authority from every decision or order passed by the Tribunal. The said provision is in parimateria with the provisions of S. 4 of the Act. Following the decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1967 SC 799 and AIR 1967 SC 1360 , a Division bench of this Court pointed out that notwithstanding the wide language employed in the said provision, an appeal would lie to the appellate authority only against an order which affects the rights and liabilities of the parties. In other words, this Court pointed out that if the order does not have the effect of affecting the rights or liabilities of the parties, such order would not be appealable under S. 118 of the Karnataka land Reforms Act, 1961, as it then stood. As the said provision is in pari materia with the provision of S. 4 of the Act, it has to be held that an appeal would lie under section 4 of the Act against only such orders of the learned Single Judge which have the effect of affecting the rights and liabilities of the parties. In other words, an appeal would not lie under S. 4 of the Act against each and every order of the learned single judge. It is therefore, necessary to examine as to whether the order under appeal has the effect of affecting the rights and liabilities of the appellant. In other words, an appeal would not lie under S. 4 of the Act against each and every order of the learned single judge. It is therefore, necessary to examine as to whether the order under appeal has the effect of affecting the rights and liabilities of the appellant. ( 5 ) S. 340) of the Code enables the court to take certain action if it is of the opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an enquiry should be made into any offence referred to in Cl. (b) of Sub-sec. (1) of s. 191, which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court or, as the case may be, in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court, in such situation, the Court may hold a preriminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary and record a finding to that effect, make a complaint in that behalf in writing and send it to a magistrate of the class having jurisdiction. It is, therefore, clear that the ultimate order or direction to be issued under S. 340 (1) is either to make a complaint or not to make a complaint. Against such a direction, an appeal, as already stated, lies to the superior Court under S. 341 (1)of the Code if such order or direction is made by a Court other than the high Court. The only effect of the order under S. 340 of the Code, is to direct a complaint being lodged or to take a decision not to lodge a complaint. Such a direction, in our opinion, clearly does not have the effect of affecting the rights or liabilities of the parties. The complaint when lodged, has to be enquired into and it is only if the complaint is duly proved, it may result in conviction and sentence. The rights of the parties will not, therefore, be affected merely by a Court making an order or direction either to lodge a complaint or not to lodge a complaint. It is not possible to agree with the contention of Sri Sadasivappa that everyone has a right to insist that another person or Authority should or should not file a complaint. It is not possible to agree with the contention of Sri Sadasivappa that everyone has a right to insist that another person or Authority should or should not file a complaint. The rights of a party would be affected only if that party is held guilty by the Criminal Court after an appropriate enquiry is held in respect of that complaint in accordance with law. We have, therefore, no hesitation in taking the view that the order made under S. 340 (1) of the Code does not have the effect of affecting the rights or liabilities of the parties. That being the position, assuming for the sake of argument that all other conditions specified under S. 4 of the Act, are satisfied, an appeal would not lie against an order made under S. 340 (1) of the code as the said order does not have the effect of affecting the rights and liabilities of the party. Hence, we have no hesitation in taking the view that the appeal filed by the appellant is not maintainable. As we have come to the conclusion that the appeal is not maintainable, it is unnecessary for us to consider the contention of Sri Sadashivappa as to whether the order made by the learned single Judge is well within the scope and ambit of S. 340 of the code. ( 6 ) FOR the reasons stated above, this appeal is dismissed as not maintainable. No costs. ( 7 ) HOWEVER, we make it clear that all the contentions that may be available to the appellant, could be raised before the appropriate forum at the appropriate stage. --- *** --- .