ORDER K.N. Shukla, J. 1. This revision has been filed by the plaintiff, challenging the order dated 17-10-1981, passed by Civil Judge Class II, Morena, dismissing her application, purporting to be under Sections 151, 152 and 153 of the Code of Civil Procedure and, alternatively, under Order 47, Rule 1, CPC. 2. The facts are interesting and admittedly, learned counsel were unable to show any precedent on such a question. The non-applicant Ramswaroop, was a tenant of a non-residential accommodation, belonging to the plaintiff-petitioner. The petitioner had filed a suit for ejectment on the grounds available under Section 12(1)(a) and (f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter called 'the Act'). The suit was registered as C.O.S. No. 28-A of 1977. On 19-4-1977, parties filed a compromise petition before the trial Court. In this petition, the defendant-non-applicant had admitted that the suit shop was genuinely required by the plaintiff for the business of her son. It was also admitted that the defendant was in arrears of rent, which had not been deposited in the Court within the prescribed time. The compromise deed contained a recital that the suit shop had been vacated by the defendant and possession was delivered to the plaintiff voluntarily. 3. When the plaintiff sought a decree in terms of the compromise, the defendant resiled and denied the compromise. The Court rejected the compromise application on 10-4-1978. 4. Plaintiff preferred a revision in the High Court. The High Court set aside the order rejecting the application for a decree in terms of the compromise and directed an enquiry into the factum of such a compromise and passing of appropriate orders thereon. In compliance, the trial Court conducted an enquiry under Order 23, Rule 3 CPC and by order dated 11-4-1980, held that the compromise had been arrived at between the parties, It further directed that the said compromise be taken on record and a decree be drawn up accordingly. The decree was, therefore, drawn in terms of the compromise. 5. As narrated above, the compromise petition recited that possession-had already been delivered to the plaintiff and the decree also was passed to that effect in these very words. In fact, however, actual possession had not been delivered. The decree was, therefore, drawn in terms of the compromise. 5. As narrated above, the compromise petition recited that possession-had already been delivered to the plaintiff and the decree also was passed to that effect in these very words. In fact, however, actual possession had not been delivered. Neither during the enquiry before the trial court nor at any stage during the proceedings under Sections 151 etc.; the defendant anywhere stated that he had actually delivered the possession in terms of the compromise. It may also be noted that, at no stage, defendant countered the allegation of the plaintiff that though the defendant had removed his goods from the shop, he had locked the door and had refused to deliver the possession to the plaintiff. 6. When the plaintiff found that the compromise decree was innocuous and she could not execute the same in order to obtain possession, she invoked the inherent powers of the Court for assistance so that the decree may become effective and meaningful. She came forward with the petition that the decree should direct delivery of possession in terms of the compromise. 7. This petition was opposed by the defendant-non-applicant. In reply, he reiterated that there had never been any compromise between the parties. A technical plea was raised that the compromise was taken on record and the decree in terms thereof had been passed. It is not open to the court, now, to go behind the decree or in any way alter the terms of the compromise so as to direct delivery of possession. There was no error in the judgment and decree, which could be corrected either under Section 152 or Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. The trial court upheld this technical objection of the defendant-non-applicant and dismissed the petitioner's applications under Section 151, 152 CPC. etc. 8. The question, therefore, which arises is, whether the Court in exercise of its inherent powers can grant suitable relief to the plaintiff petitioner on the facts and circumstances of the case ? As already observed, counsel were unable to show any precedent for such a situation. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner cited Ramjanam v. Bindeshwari Bai AIR 1951 Pat, 299 wherein it was observed that the court had complete jurisdiction to make on sequential order (under Section 151 CPC) in order to give effect to the terms of compromise and to record the same. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner cited Ramjanam v. Bindeshwari Bai AIR 1951 Pat, 299 wherein it was observed that the court had complete jurisdiction to make on sequential order (under Section 151 CPC) in order to give effect to the terms of compromise and to record the same. In the cited case, facts of which are complicated, one of the parties was refusing to accept the amount, which was payable by a certain specified date in terms of compromise. The court observed that it had powers ex dabito justitiae to accept the deposit of the amount for giving effect to the terms of the compromise even after the passing of the decree. 10. In Samarendra v. Krishna Kumar AIR 1967 SC 1440 ., preliminary decree for sale of the mortgaged property was passed but during the final decree proceedings, the purchaser of the equity of redemption wanted to be imp leaded and he claimed that in terms of the mortgage-bond, final decree for foreclosure ought to have been passed and the said purchaser was entitled to redeem the said martgage. Dealing with the inherent powers of the court, in such a situation, their Lordships said that though the preliminary decree was passed for sale, the final decree for fore closure could be passed under the inherent powers of the court, in view of the real intention of the parties as expressed in the document. 11. In Pema v. Dhanya 1973 JLJ 186: A1R 1972 MP 211, this Court held that if a mistake in describing the property correctly was carried in the judgment and decree and later it was found that the decree as such was in executable, the court in its powers could rectify the mistake and pass appropriate decree. 12. In Pariyakkal v. Dakshyani (1983)2 SCC 127 . their Lordships of the Supreme Court, while giving effect to an order under compromise, held that the court had freedom to act to further the ends of justice and exercising its inherent powers the court extended the time for making deposit of money in order to relieve the aggrieved party against the forfeiture clause in the compromise. 13. Inherent powers of the court cannot be defined in clear limits. Cases decided by the High Courts and the Supreme Court are only illustrative not exhaustive of the extent of such power. 13. Inherent powers of the court cannot be defined in clear limits. Cases decided by the High Courts and the Supreme Court are only illustrative not exhaustive of the extent of such power. The whole matter has to be seen from the angle of justice and the court has to frame a question to itself, whether the ends of justice require that it should intervene and straighten out the folds created by the ingenuity of the parties. If this yard-stick is applied to the facts of the present case, it is clear that justice requires court's intervention in order to give effect to the intention of the parties which merged in order of the court, If the compromise petition is read from this angle, it is clear that the parties intended that a decree for delivery of possession ought to be passed in favour of the plaintiff-petitioner. The defendant cannot be allowed to wriggle out of his commitment and it is the duty of the court to intervene and exercise its inherent power to do justice between the parties. 14. Learned counsel for the non-applicant raised an altogether new point before me. He contended that the compromise petition did not indicate explicitly that the plaintiff bonafide required the suit accommodation and has no other accommodation of her own suitable for the purpose. According to the learned counsel since this ground under section 12 (1)(f) of the Act was not fully made out, the decree had become a nullity even though it was passed in terms of a compromise. I do not find any substance in this argument. There is clear admission by the defendant non-applicant in the compromise petition about the plaintiff's bonafide non-residential requirement and therefore the decree passed on one of the grounds mentioned in section 12 of the Act, has to be held as legal and valid which can be enforced in execution. 15. Under these circumstances, it is necessary to exercise the inherent powers of the court so that the decree becomes effective and meaningful. It is, therefore ordered that the decree be suitably amended and it should be added therein that defendant-non-applicant shall deliver peaceful possession to the plaintiff. 16. The revision is allowed. Costs of this revision shall be borne by the non-applicant defendant. Counsel's fee Rs.100/-, if certified. Appeal allowed