JUDGMENT Anand Prasad Sinha, J. The petitioners have challenged the order dated 5. 6. 1982 by which cognizance has been taken against the petitioners under section 48 of the Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960 (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Act') and also the subsequent order dated 21.8.1982 by which the petitioners prayer for representation under section 205 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Code') has been allowed, but at the same time the prayer for quashing of the cognizance by the transferee court has been refused. Accordingly, a prayer has been made for quashing of the aforesaid two orders; One by which cognizance has been taken and another by which the trial court has refused to quash the cognizance. 2. The case has been initiated On the basis of a complaint petition which is Annexure-l to this petition. The complainant is the Secretary, Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Bettiah. The accused persons named are the two petitioners, who have been stated to be the General Manager and the Cane Superintendent of Messrs Champaran Sugar Works, Chanpatia, situated in the West Champaran. The period involved is 1981-82. The contravention alleged is of rule 98 (1) of the Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Rules, 1975 (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Rules') which has been framed under the Act and the penal provision is section 48 of the Act. 3. Further, according to the statements made, Jogapatti Anchal is included within the area of Bettiah Market Committee. Under the Act several Market Committees have been created having specific area for their functioning. The two petitioners have been described as the principal Officers responsible for purchasing of sugar cane on behalf of the aforesaid mill. It has been stated that the mill has got different weighment centers at various places for purchase of sugar cane, and the purchase centres are managed by the two petitioners. Messrs Champaran Sugar Works, Chanpatia has got a weighment centre at village Chamainia within the area of Jogapatti Anchal, where sugar cane is purchased by the aforesaid mill. Thus, the purchases are made within the area of Bettiah Market Committee. Messrs Champaran Sugar Works, Chanpatia has got a weighment centre at village Chamainia within the area of Jogapatti Anchal, where sugar cane is purchased by the aforesaid mill. Thus, the purchases are made within the area of Bettiah Market Committee. Sugar Mill has been stated to be a 'trader' and that being so, it was legally bound to take licence for carrying on business in sugar cane which is an agricultural produce and failure to take out a licence is an offence punishable under section 48 of the Act. Bettiah Market Committee had requested the accused persons for taking licence, as required under rule 98 (1) of the Rules several times, but the accused persons have deliberately failed to take the same. 4. Market Committee, Bettiah had adopted a resolution On 7.1.1982 and had authorised for filing of the complaint. 5. The object of the Act appears to be to protect the producers of agricultural produce from being exploited by the middle men and the profiteers so that economically equitable return may be available for their produce. That being so, regulated markets have been established for promoting agricultural development leading to fair protection both to the seller and purchaser of the agricultural produce. The establishment of Market, Market Area, Principal Market Yard and sub-market Yard, which have been indicated in section 2 (definition) of the, Act aims at healthy reciprocal relationship in the transaction of sale and purchase find thereby adopting a method of fair play and reasonable protection from all the evils of modern exploitations generally available in such transactions, mainly based upon un-reasonable excessive and branded motive only. 6. Law and legislation regulating Market and functioning of Markets are of very old origin. Two or three centuries before Christ, there was a body of law known as the Lex Rhodia which grew up in the great Maritime centre in the Island of Rhodes. Romans had also a system of such laws. There was fair and market courts. The Court of pie powder were specially concerned with mobile merchants, who visited from one market to another. India primarily being an agricultural country, necessitated in regulation of conducts between the buyer and the purchaser resulting into such legislation which is concerned in the facts of this case. 7. Rule 98 (1) of the Rules requires to take licence. The Court of pie powder were specially concerned with mobile merchants, who visited from one market to another. India primarily being an agricultural country, necessitated in regulation of conducts between the buyer and the purchaser resulting into such legislation which is concerned in the facts of this case. 7. Rule 98 (1) of the Rules requires to take licence. It reads as follows ;- “98 (i) No person shall carryon business as trader in agriculture-produce in the market area except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of licence in Form XXIII issued in this behalf by the Market Committee.” There are other provisions also for paying fees on the sale and purchase and also for submission of returns, but since they are not the subject matter of prosecution, according to the complaint, it will be advisable to confine only to the adjudication as to whether the petitioners were required under the law to take lience and also as to whether the two accused persons, named above, are liable in the manner that the prosecution involved in this case can be successfully launched against them in accordance with law. 8. The first point raised is that the sugar factory which belonged to M/S. Champaran Sugar Company Limited is situated at Chanpatia in the West Champaran and Chanpatia falls under the area of West Champaran Market Committee and that being so, no license is required for the alleged purchase within the area of Jogapatti which is under the Market Committee of Bettiah. 9. I do not find any force in this contention. The purchase within the area of Jogapatti Anchal has not been denied. It appears to be an admitted fact that there is a Market Committee at West Champaran and also a Market Committee at Bettiah. That being so, if the sugar factory is situated within the area of West Champaran Market Committee, that will not exonerate from the liability either of the application of the Act and Rules or from taking license and submission of returns and payment of fees as required under the Act and the Rules. 10. Constitution of Markets and Market Committees have been indicated in Chapter II of the Act. 10. Constitution of Markets and Market Committees have been indicated in Chapter II of the Act. Sections 3 and 4 of the Act lay down first to issue a notification by the State Government declaring its intention of regulating the purchase, sale storage and processing of such agricultural produce and in such area, as may be specified in the notification and secondly that after the expiry of the period specified in the notification issued and also after considering objections and suggestions, if received, and also after holding such enquiry as it may consider necessary, the State Government may by notification, declare the area specified in the notification under section 3 of the Act or any portion thereof to be a market area. 11. Principal market yard and sub-market yard have been defined in section 2(o) and 2(t) respectively of the Act. 12. Therefore, the liability at once springs, if there be any transaction in any of the area declared to be 'market yard' and in absence of there being any provision under the Act or Rules that any trader. buyer or purchaser, if functioning in a particular market yard after obtaining licence shall not be required to take licence for any transaction what-so-ever having undertaken in different market yard, I am afraid, a trader, whose activities of sale and purchase are extensively existing in the different market yards, the liability of taking licence as contemplated under Rule 98 (i) of the Rules is a requirement of law and any breach will amount to the contravention or the Rules framed under the Act. In the instant case, independent of the fact that the factory itself is situated in a different market yard under a different market committee, which is the West Champaran if purchases have been made in Jogapatti falling under the Bettiah Market Committee, the requirement of taking a licence is a must in law and that being so, the complaint cannot be attacked on this ground. 13. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has also contended that if at all there would be any prosecution, it is the Market Committee of West Champaran competent to file a complaint and not the Bettiah Market Committee. 14. This is also not acceptable. 13. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has also contended that if at all there would be any prosecution, it is the Market Committee of West Champaran competent to file a complaint and not the Bettiah Market Committee. 14. This is also not acceptable. In addition to the discussions made above, if the transaction has taken place within the area falling under Bettiah Market committee, the contravention will be with relation to Bettiah Market committee and that being so, Bettiah Market committee is well justified in filing the complaint. 15. The third contention raised is that, according to the definition of 'trader' laid down in section 2(w) of the Act, the trader is M/s. Champaran Sugar Company Limited. Accordingly, it ought to have been made an accused and consequently in absence of M/s. Champaran Sugar Company Ltd., being an accused, the prosecution is had in law. Further the contention raised is that the two petitioners cannot be said to be the 'traders' and accordingly, they cannot be prosecuted. 16. I am not inclined to accept these contentions even. In absence of any provision either in the Act or in the Rule that it shall not be lawful to take cognizance if the Company is not made an accused, the fact that the Company has not been made an accused shall not reader the prosecution bad in law . 17. If there would have been positive provision barring a criminal prosecution in absence of the Company having been made an accused, definitely any prosecution in that event would have suffered from the infirmity, there being legal impediment in the prosecution. In my opinion, non-mentioning of the Company as an accused will not render either the cognizance or the prosecution had in law because if during trial it becomes necessary, the Company would be included in the prosecution and the court has power to do so as provided under section 319 of the Code. 18. Coming to the submissions regarding complete absence of the liability of the two petitioners and also the plea raised that they cannot be prosecuted, this issue cannot be disposed of on considering the definition of 'trader' as laid down under section 2(w) of the Act and also giving narrow interpretation of the definition of the 'trader' without applying all the legal tests on the subject. 19. 19. A decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi and others will be relevant in this connection. In the reported case, the Food Inspector of Municipal Corporation of Delhi, had visited premises No. 5171, Basant Road. Delhi, where Shri Madan Lal had kept for sale 'Morton Toffees'. The said Inspector after purchasing the sample of the article sent it to the public Analyst who opined that the said sample did not conform to the standards prescribed for toffees. The toffees were manufactured by M/s. Upper Ganges Sugar Mills. Respondent No.1 (Ram Kishan Rohtagi) was the Manager of the company and respondents Nos. 2 to 5 were the Directors of the Company. The company had also been made an accused. A complaint was filed before the Metropolitan Magistrate who summoned all the respondents i.e. Directors and the Manager for being tried for violating the provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. It appears that the criminal proceedings had been quashed by the High Court. There was an appeal by special leave to the Supreme Court. In paragraph 15 and 16 of the judgment it has been held as follows :- “15. So far as the Manager is concerned, we are satisfied that from the very nature of his duties it can be safely inferred that he would undoubtedly be vicariously liable for the offence vicarious liability being an incident of an offence under the Act. So far as the Directors are concerned there is not even a whisper nor a shred of evidence nor anything to show, apart from the presumption drawn by the complainant, that there is any act committed by the Directors from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that they could also be vicariously liable. In these circumstances, therefore, we find ourselves in complete agreement with the argument of the High Court that no case against the Directors (accused Nos. 4 to 7) has been made out ex facie on the allegations made in the complaint and the proceedings against them were rightly quashed. 16. We, however, do not agree that even accused No.3, respondent No. 1, who is manager of the Company and therefore, directly in charge of its affairs, could fall in the same category as the Directors. 4 to 7) has been made out ex facie on the allegations made in the complaint and the proceedings against them were rightly quashed. 16. We, however, do not agree that even accused No.3, respondent No. 1, who is manager of the Company and therefore, directly in charge of its affairs, could fall in the same category as the Directors. Hence, we would set aside that part of the judgment of the High Court which quashes the proceedings against the Manager, respondent No. 1 (Ram Kishan Rohtagi)," 20. Section 48 of the Act, which is a penal clause, provides also imprisonment upto six months or fine. This section is in the sense that in addition to the Company, the law is also for the regulation of the actions of human beings and to protect their interest. It is always possible in law for the existence of "two persons" behind the same name. One may be a human being and the other the Company. The company exists and Continues to exist, though the human beings are replaced, That is the reason that at times law permits to life the veil and break open the sheli. 21. It will appear from the definition of ‘trader' as mentioned in section 2(w) that 'trader' means a person ordinarily engaged in the business of buying and selling agricultural produce as a principal or as a duly authorized agent of one or more principals and includes a commission agent of a person ordinarily engaged in the business of processing of agricultural produce. 22. Therefore, it is indicative of the fact that both the human being and any firm etc. can have the status of a 'trader' and with regard to the human being, if named as an accused, the prosecution can only be challenged if there be a fact that the human being, named as an accused, had not functioned as a 'trader' and what ever had been done, had been done by the firm. 23. Three on reported decision of this Court namely, (Mahabir Prasad Jhunjhunwala and others Vs. State of Bihar and another) (Dr. Manzoor Ahmad and others Vs. The State of Bihar and others) and (Sita Ram Biyani Vs. State of Bihar & another) have been relied upon by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners. 24. I am afraid, these decision are not applicable to the facts of this case. State of Bihar and another) (Dr. Manzoor Ahmad and others Vs. The State of Bihar and others) and (Sita Ram Biyani Vs. State of Bihar & another) have been relied upon by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners. 24. I am afraid, these decision are not applicable to the facts of this case. It will appear that the persons proceeded against in those were the Directors, Managing Directors, Executives and Assistant General Manager. In the instant case, the two petitioners are the General Manager and the cane Superintendent. On the basis of the decision of the Supreme Court quoted above, I have no hesitation in saying that the two petitioners are liable for prosecution in view of the statements made in the complaint. It has been stated in paragraph 4 of the complaint that the two petitioners are responsible for purchasing of sugar cane on behalf of the Mill. In paragraph 5 of the complaint petition, it has been mentioned that the Mill has got its weighment centres at various places for purchase of sugar cane and the aforesaid centres are managed by the accused persons. In paragraph 8 of the complaint petition, it has been mentioned that the market Committee had requested the accused persons to take licence but they have failed to comply deliberately. 25. Therefore, on the face of the allegations made in the complaint petition, it has been prima facie, found that the two accused persons are directly connected with the purchase of sugar cane and thus they have been operating in equation within Mill. Therefore, I find hardly any ground to say that the two accused persons cannot be said to be the traders by virtue of the fact that one is the General Manager and the other is the Cane Superintendent and that being so, they come under the purview of the Act. 26. Learned counsel for the petitioners has also submitted that the real person who had purchased the cane in fact meaning thereby probably the subordinate staff, should have been made an accused and not the two petitioners. 27. I am afraid, this plea raised is totally misconceived. Any liability under the law is upon the person also who is ultimate responsible for commission or omission of any conduct leading to criminal prosecution. 27. I am afraid, this plea raised is totally misconceived. Any liability under the law is upon the person also who is ultimate responsible for commission or omission of any conduct leading to criminal prosecution. The Statements made in the complaint petition speak that the two petitioners were clearly responsible for the purchase of the case, There is no statement in the complaint nor any thing has been put forward on behalf of the petitioners that the two petitioners had not made the purchases at all. It will appear that the prosecution is being resisted on the ground that the two petitioners cannot be said to be the 'traders'. 28. As discussed above, the two petitioners are neither separate nor having any other existence in law from the firm and that being so the legal liability cannot be escaped. 29. The next submission is that the entire market sale is not subjected to tax by any individual market committee. Learned counsel has Cited a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Chandra Kailash & Company and others Vs. The State of U.P. and another in this behalf. 30. I am afraid, the decision cited by the learned counsel is not at all applicable in this case. I fail to understand that for what purpose the decision has been cited. The decision is that there would be no multi point levy of market fee in the same market area. I am afraid, it is not applicable to the facts of the petitioners, case. 31. The another the submission is that the cane had been purchased for crushing and not-sale and that being so the Act shall not be applicable as there being no trading. 32. This contention is also fit to be rejected on the ground that the moment there is a transaction of sale and purchase of agricultural produce, the Act becomes applicable. That being so, it is not material as to for what purpose the cane had been purchased and as a matter of fact what has been done to that commodity. The relevant factor is that there is a transaction of sale and purchase. The definition of 'trade' as laid down in section 2(V) of the Act runs as follows :- “trade” means any kind of transaction of sale and purchase or any kind of remuneration on sale and purchase of any agricultural produce. 33. The relevant factor is that there is a transaction of sale and purchase. The definition of 'trade' as laid down in section 2(V) of the Act runs as follows :- “trade” means any kind of transaction of sale and purchase or any kind of remuneration on sale and purchase of any agricultural produce. 33. The cause of action has arisen on the purchase of the sugar cane and not on any subsequent sate or any transaction of the sugar cane purchased by the two accused persons. That being so, it is quite immaterial that for what purpose the sugar cane had been purchased for the purpose of the Act and this case. 34. Lastly it has been argued that the petitioners have been agitating the liability of the application of the Act and that being so, there being no element of mens rea the prosecution is invalid. 35. I am afraid the plea of mens rea for non-applicability of the law and the penal consequences is not available to the petitioners in the facts and circumstances of this case. On the contrary, it will speak that the petitioners are adamant not to submit to the law involved in this case and rigidly and continuously are violating the provisions of the law. In such cases the exception of criminal liability on the plea of mens rea cannot be said to be available. Accordingly, I do not find any force in this contention. 36. In the result, I do not find any merit in this application which fails and is dismissed. Application dismissed.