JUDGMENT K.N. Shukla, J. This is a defendant's second appeal. Respondent No. 1 (hereinafter addressed as 'plaintiff') brought a suit against the present appellant and 7 others for declaration of title and recovery of possession of Survey Nos. 83, 552, 524, 549/1, 549/2, 550, 551, 890, 1017 and 1029 total area 19 bighas and 8 biswas, situate at village Lahachura, Tahsil Gonad, Distt. Bhind. Appellant (defendant No. 1) was an erstwhile Jagirdar of village Lahachura. Plaintiff's case was that one Nadar Khan was a Pattedar tenant of the suit lands on 14-8-1949. The said Nadar Khan wrote a patta in favour of the plaintiff and delivered possession to him. As a result of this transaction plaintiff entered into possession of the suit lands as a sub-tenant. After coming into force of the Abolition of Jagirs Act (Act No. 28 of 1951), plaintiff acquired pucca tenancy rights under section 21 thereof. Thereafter he became an occupancy tenant and eventually the Bhumiswami under the provisions of the M. P. Land Revenue Code with effect from 1-10-1959. Plaintiff had instituted proceedings under section 92 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act as he had been wrongly dispossessed by defendant No. 1. By an interim order, Court of Tahsildar restored possession to the plaintiff but subsequently, his application was dismissed and by order of the Revenue Court, possession was obtained by defendant No. 1 on 30-7-60. It was further alleged that defendant No. 1 wrongfully gave possession of the suit land to defendants 2 to 8. Plaintiff, therefore, claimed declaration of title, recovery of possession and mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 1,000 per annum. Written statement was filed by defendants Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 jointly. Defendants Nos. 7 and 8 remained absent and suit proceeded ex parte against them. Defendants denied that Nadar Khan was ever a tenant of the defendant No. 1 in respect of the suit lands. It was denied that plaintiff acquired the suit land as a sub-tenant on a patta by Nadar Khan. It was also denied that plaintiff acquired the rights of Pucca tenant after abolition of Jagirdari. His claim as Bhumiswami under the M. P. Land Revenue Code was also denied. It was denied that plaintiff acquired the suit land as a sub-tenant on a patta by Nadar Khan. It was also denied that plaintiff acquired the rights of Pucca tenant after abolition of Jagirdari. His claim as Bhumiswami under the M. P. Land Revenue Code was also denied. It was pleaded that defendant No. 1 as Jagirdar, was in actual possession of the suit land before coming into force of the Abolition of Jagirs Act and became a pucca tenant thereafter. Objection about Civil Court's jurisdiction was also taken, but learned counsel for the appellant conceded that this objection would not be pressed by him. Later, by an amendment, defendants raised a plea that even if it was proved that Nadar Khan had executed a patta in favour of plaintiff, in terms of the patta issued to Nadar Khan, the tenancy in his favour was liable to be cancelled and the lands were liable to be resumed by defendant No. 1. For this reason also, plaintiff could not acquire any title under the said patta by Nadar Khan in his favour. Defendants Nos. 2 to 6 did not claim any title in themselves. Trial Court held that defendant No. 1 (appellant) had given the land to Nadar Khan on a patta and Nadar Khan had sublet the suit lands to the plaintiff on 14-8-49 for a consideration of Rs. 550. Accordingly, plaintiff had acquired pucca tenancy rights and eventually Bhumiswami rights over the suit lands. In the light of this finding claim for possession was decreed. The trial Court further granted mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 1,000 per annum for the three years preceding the date of the suit and gave direction that future mesne profits will be determined and paid under Order 20, Rule 12, Civil Procedure Code. Appellant-defendant No. 1 appealed against the judgment and decree. Other defendants did not appeal and they were added as correspondents. Learned District Judge, Bhind dismissed the appeal holding that Nadar Khan was the Pattedar tenant of the Jagirdar i. e. the appellant. He had written a Patta in favour of the plaintiff creating a sub-lease in his favour. Plaintiff continued as a sub-tenant till the coming into force of the Abolition of Jagirs Act and by virtue of section 21 of the said Act, he became a Pucca tenant. He had written a Patta in favour of the plaintiff creating a sub-lease in his favour. Plaintiff continued as a sub-tenant till the coming into force of the Abolition of Jagirs Act and by virtue of section 21 of the said Act, he became a Pucca tenant. He further held that after coming into force of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, plaintiff became Bhumiswami and was entitled to the relief of declaration of title, recovery of possession and mesne profits. The first appeal was dismissed. The learned counsel for the appellant did not assail the concurrent finding of fact that the suit lands were originally held by Nadar Khan as a tenant of the Jagirdar. He also did not challenge the transfer by Nadar Khan in favour of the plaintiff vide Ex. P. 1. But, he contended that the document (Ex. P-l) apparently did not create a sub-lease in favour of the plaintiff and was a sale. Learned counsel further contended that such a sale was prohibited by law, as it was then in force, and the purchaser in possession was only a trespasser. Such a trespasser could not acquire rights of an occupancy tenant under section 185 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent No. 1, in reply, submitted that no such plea was raised in the written statement and such an argument could not be countenanced for the first time in the second appeal. The learned counsel further urged that in view of the definition of a subtenant in the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, plaintiff who held the land from the tenant, had acquired the rights of sub-tenant and could claim the statutory benefit under the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act and M. P. Land Revenue Code. Learned counsel urged that both the Courts below had held the plaintiff as sub-tenant on the basis of Ex. P. 1 executed by Nadar Khan and also on the basis of the Khasra entries from Samvat years 2006 to 2009. This finding of fact as regards creation of valid sub-tenancy in favour of the plaintiff, could not be disturbed in second appeal. P. 1 executed by Nadar Khan and also on the basis of the Khasra entries from Samvat years 2006 to 2009. This finding of fact as regards creation of valid sub-tenancy in favour of the plaintiff, could not be disturbed in second appeal. About the amendment of the written statement to the effect that by sale or transfer in favour of the plaintiff, Nadar Khan had lost his rights, learned counsel submitted that there was no material to show that after the transfer by Nadar Khan, plaintiff had, in fact, resumed the lands and cancelled the tenancy in his favour. Learned counsel for the appellant invited by attention to the Land Revenue and Tenancy Ordinance of Samvat Year 2005 (Ordinance No. 43 of 1949) dated 5-3-1949 and submitted that under section 15 of the said Ordinance, a Pattedar tenant could not transfer land by sale without the previous sanction of the Suba and such a sale was null and void. According to the learned counsel, Ex. P. 1 was a document of sale by Nadar Khan and, therefore, it was null and void. Plaintiffs possession under the said document was that of a trespasser. This argument has to be rejected. Firstly, because no such plea which raises a mixed question of law and fact, was raised in the written statement and could not be allowed to be raised for the first time in second appeal. Perusal of the relevant paras in the plaint and the written statement with respect to the alleged sub-lease by Nadar Khan will show that there was only a bland denial by the appellant about the alleged sub-lease. In fact, the appellant had even denied that Nadar Khan was his tenant. It is, therefore, not open to him now to take a stand that Nadar Khan was his tenant and the transaction being a sale, was hit by section 15 of the Ordinance. Secondly, no plea was taken to the effect that the conditions which are pre-requisite for the validity of a sale by a tenant, had not been complied with Had such a plea been taken, plaintiff would have pleaded facts and led evidence to show that the requisite conditions had been fulfilled or were not necessary. Thirdly, both the Courts below interpreted Ex. P. 1 in the light of the other evidence on record. Thirdly, both the Courts below interpreted Ex. P. 1 in the light of the other evidence on record. They noted that revenue papers for Samvat Years 2006 to 2009 showed plaintiff as a sub-tenant of Nadar Khan. These entries have a presumptive value and in the light of other evidence and circumstances oh record, the finding of fact about the nature of the right under which plaintiff held the suit lands, cannot be called perverse. 'Subtenant' has been defined under Section 4, cluase (14) of the said Ordinance, as a person who holds land from a pattedar-tenant. Admittedly, plaintiff held the suit land from Nadar Khan who was the pattedar-tenant and, therefore, his possession was permissive as against the pattedar Nadar Khan. He, therefore, fell within the category of a sub-tenant as defined under the Ordinance. For all the reasons stated above, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the transfer by Nadar Khan in favour of the plaintiff was illegal, being a sale in contravention of law then in force, cannot be countenanced. Since I affirm the finding of the Courts below that plaintiff was sub tenant of Nadar Khan, the obvious conclusion is that after Abolition of Jagirs Act, plaintiff acquired pucca tenancy right under Section 21 of the Act. This right was protected under different protection Acts and by virtue of Section 185 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, plaintiff-respondent No. 1 acquired the right of an occupancy tenant and eventually of a Bhumiswami under the M. P. Land Revenue Code. (See Gajraj Singh v. Jagat Singh) 1970 MPLJ 703 . Learned counsel for the appellant relied on Nathu Prasad v. Ranchhod Prasad 1970 MPLJ 210 SC. It was contended by him that a sub-lease in contravention of Section 73 of the M. B. Land Revenue and Tanancy Act (Act No. 66 of 1950), was a trespasser and he could not acquire any right under Section 185 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code. Case of Nathu Prasad (supra) is clearly distinguishable because in that case the sub-lease was granted on May 20, 1955 i.e., after coming into force of the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act. Case of Nathu Prasad (supra) is clearly distinguishable because in that case the sub-lease was granted on May 20, 1955 i.e., after coming into force of the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act. Sections 73 and 78 of the M. B. Land Revenue Tenancy Act were not retrospective and were rot attracted in this case because, the law as it stood on the date of the sub-lease, will govern the rights of the parties. The learned counsel for the appellant then invited my attention to the amendment of the written statement whereby it was pleaded that under the terms of the patta granted by the appellant to Nadar Khan, there was a prohibition of transfer by the pattedar and Jagirdar's right of resumption in case of such a transfer was reserved. This amendment will not help the appellant. It was not his case that as a result of the sub-lease by Nadar Khan, the appellant had enforced his right of resumption under the patta and had taken over possession of the suit land. Therefore, it i.e. really not relevant that the patta in favour of Nadar Khan contained such a condition which apparently was never enforced. Thus, from the aforesaid discussion, it follows that the finding of the Courts below on the issue of sub-tenancy in favour of the plaintiff and acquisition by him in due course, of occupancy and Bhumiswami right, is correct and based on proper legal material. No interference in this second appeal is called for. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs. The appellant shall bear the costs of respondent No. 1. Advocates' fees Rs. 100 if certified. Appeal dismissed