JUDGMENT 1. THE petitioner was employed as a peon in the office of the Sub-divisional Controller, Food and Supplies arambag, Hooghly. After a departmental enquiry the District Controller, Food, and Supplies, Hooghly compulsorily retired the petitioner with full entitlement to the pensionary benefits under the rules with effect from 1st June, 1979. The petitioner's appeal was dismissed by the Director, District Distribution, procurement and Supply, Government of West Bengal. Thereafter he has obtained the present Rule challenging his compulsory retirement from service by way of punishment. 2. THE petitioner's first submission is that the Memorandum of Charges dated 31st December. 1975 disclosed that the petitioner's disciplinary authority had already made up his mind and was biased against him. The charge sheet having been issued with a closed mind, the entire disciplinary proceeding against him was void ab initio. The second submission of the petitioner is that the onus of proof was wrongly placed upon the petitioner to establish that he did not possess assets disproportionate to his known sources of his income. Thirdly, it has been submitted that the petitioner's income from the year 1944 ought to have been taken into consideration and the year. 1962 was arbitrarily chosen as the basis for framing articles of charge against the petitioner. Undisputedly, the petitioner was not liable to be removed by way of compulsory retirement except after an enquiry in which he had been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. It is also settled law that a delinquent officer must be told clearly and definitely what the allegations are on which the charges preferred against him are founded. The supreme Court in the case of Surath. Chandra, Chakravarty vs. The State of west Bengal A. I. R. 1971 S. C. 752, had laid down that the whole object of furnishing the statement of allegations is to give all necessary particulars and details which would satisfy the requirement of giving a reasonoble opportunity to put up defence. In the said case, the charges framed against the petitioner was found to be vague and the disciplinary proceeding was quashed on the ground that he had been denied proper and reasonable opportunity of defending himself. In the said case, the charges framed against the petitioner was found to be vague and the disciplinary proceeding was quashed on the ground that he had been denied proper and reasonable opportunity of defending himself. In my judgment in the case of Shyam Sankar Mukherjee vs. State of West Bengal and others 1977 Calcutta high Court Notes 634, I had occasion to consider a similar submission that the charge sheet was bad because the disciplinary authority had already made up its; mind and was biased against the petitioner and, the charges contained findings of guilt. With reference to Rule 10 (1) of the West Bengal Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1971 i had pointed out that the substance of the imputations of mis-conduct and mis-behaviour which require to be drawn up into definite and distinct articles. A statement of imputations of mis-conduct or misbehaviour shall contain (a) a statement of relevant facts and (b) a list of documents and a list of witnesses by whom the articles of charge are proposed to be sustained. The ordinary meaning of the word 'impute' is to attribute or ascribe normally a fault of mis-conduct or misbehaviour. The charge framed is to give notice of the precise and specific accusation which an accused is to meet. Its object is to warn an accused of the case he is to answer. With reference to a criminal charge the Judicial Committee; had oh served that the charge is not an accusation in abstract but it is a concrete accusation of offences allegedly committed. But substance of the imputations set out in a charge sheet do not amount to findings of guilt. At the stage the charge sheet is drawn up there could be no question of recording any finding on the said articles of charge. In Shyam Sankar Mukherjee vs. State of West Bengal and others (supra), I had also recognise ed the imperative necessity of ensuring at the stage of framing of the charges the disciplinary authority does not prejudge the case by arriving at findings about mis-conduct and mis -behavious without conducting the proposed disciplinary enquiry. 3. THE finding of bias in issuing ;a charge sheet cannot be found a priori from the mere language used. The said question is to be decided in the light of the relevant disciplinary rules and the facts and circumstances of each particular case. 3. THE finding of bias in issuing ;a charge sheet cannot be found a priori from the mere language used. The said question is to be decided in the light of the relevant disciplinary rules and the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Merely because in compliance with the disciplinary rules the substance of the imputations have been definitely and distinctly set out, the court cannot straightaway infer that the disciplinary authority was biased. The entire facts and circumstances ought to be considered ho decide whether the delinquent officer could reasonably apprehend that a bias on the part of his disciplinary authority had operated in issuing the charge sheet. I am not prepared to hold that even in the absence of any other evidence regarding the conduct and the state of mind of the disciplinary authority prior to or attendant upon the issue of the charge sheet, the court from the mere language used in the charge sheet could infer that there was any reasonable basis for the apprehension that the disciplinary authority had already made up its mind and it would not be able to act impartially, objectively and without bias (see the test of bias indicated in the Supreme Court decision in Manak Lal vs. Dr. Prem Chand Singhvi and others A. I. R. 1957 S. C. 425 ). 4. MR. Mukherjee, who has appreared on behalf of the respondents has relied upon the decision of P. B. Mukherji C. J. and B. C. Mitra, J. in the case of the Collector of Customs and others vs. Biswanath Mukherjee 75 C. W. N. 797= A. I. R. 1972 Calcutta 401, which interalia, laid down that the proper way of interpreting a charge sheet in disciplinary proceeding is not to be technically or legalistically strict as in the case of charge sheet in criminal proceedings. It should be fairly and reasonably interpreted in a common sense to see that there is a plain statement of thing complained of as wrong so that the party complained against may be put on his defence to meet the allegation. According to the learned judges, a fair interpretation of a charge sheet in a disciplinary proceeding depends on the context of facts in which the charge is led. According to the learned judges, a fair interpretation of a charge sheet in a disciplinary proceeding depends on the context of facts in which the charge is led. The words 'found' and 'giving rise to the presumption' were not, according to the said Division Bench decision, enough by themselves to make the charge in limine bad and void on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice. The learned Judges further pointed out that it would depend on the context of situation whether there was conclusion of the mind when the charge sheet said that the officer has been found to be in possession of, assets disproportionate to his known sources of income. I may also refer to the decision of Sankar Prasad Mitra, C. J. and Salil kumar Datta, J. in the case of Sudhir chandra Chakraborty v. State of West; bengal and others 1976 (1) C. L. J. 483,, which laid down that an enquiry is not; necessarily always vitiated merely because the charge sheet mentioned the proposed punishment. The petitioner in the instant case did not challenge the charge sheet immediately after it was issued in the year 1975 but had availed of the opportunity to contest the departmental proceeding. He had also unsuccessfully appealed against the order for his compulsory retirement. At no earlier stage he had complained of bias against his disciplinary authority. For the first time in his writ application the petitioner has raised the question of such bias in issuing the charge sheet against him. Now that the departmental proceeding has been already concluded, the said question of bias ought to be decided with reference to the entire facts. I am unable to say that the petitioner had been denied reasonable opportunity in the said departmental proceeding or that because of the alleged wordings used in the charge sheet, the entire departmental proceeding including the finding, second show cause notice, punishment order and the appellate order were liable to be qushed and set aside. 5. I am unable to apply to the fasts of the present case the ratio of the decision of Pradyot Kumar Banerjee and b. C. Ray, JJ. in the case of Bimla Kanta Mukherjee vs. State of West Bengali, and others 1980 (2) Calcutta High Court notes 35, because facts of the present case are distinguishable. The division bench in Bimala Kanta Mukherjee's case. in the case of Bimla Kanta Mukherjee vs. State of West Bengali, and others 1980 (2) Calcutta High Court notes 35, because facts of the present case are distinguishable. The division bench in Bimala Kanta Mukherjee's case. (supra), had followed the view taken in the ease of Sunil Kumar Mukherjee vs. State of West Bengal 1977 Calcutta High court Notes 1014 and held that the charge sheet in the said case had been issued with a closed mind and the same rendered the charge sheet void and bad in limini. The learned Judges in the case of Bimala Kanta Mukherjee's case had distinguished on facts the earlier Division Bench decisions in Collector of Customs vs. Biswanath Mukherjee (supra)and Sudhir Chandra Chakraborty vs. State of West Bengal (supra ). In my view, the facts of the aforesaid previous division Bench decisions in Collector of customs vs. Biswanath Mukherjee (supra) and Sudhir Chandra Chakrabory v. State of West Bengal (supra), are nearly similar to the facts of the present case and I respectfully follow the said Division Bench decisions. 6. I, therefore, conclude that the petitioner had full opportunity to contest the departmental proceeding and the same was fairly and impartially held. The petitioner during the departmental proceeding never made any complaint about the charge sheet. Therefore, on the mere ground of the language used in the charge sheet served upon him the petitioner cannot successfully impugne the punishment imposed upon him. I find no substance in the other points raised on behalf of the petitioner. The onus was not placed upon the petitioner. The department produced evidence and the petitioner was also given opportunity to controvert the Same. The enquiring authority recorded reasons for finding the petitioner guilty. After the petitioner had shown cause the proposed punishment, the District controller, Food and Supplies, Hooghly recorded his reasons for compulsorily retiring the petitioner. The appellate authority also passed a reasoned order dismissing the petitioners appeal I fail to see any substance in the contention that the petitioner's income from the year 1941 ought to have been taken into consideration. It was open to the respondents to frame charges in the manner they had done and the petitioner himself never claimed that his income from the year 1941 ought to be taken into reckoning for deciding the total value of his assets and sources of income. 7. It was open to the respondents to frame charges in the manner they had done and the petitioner himself never claimed that his income from the year 1941 ought to be taken into reckoning for deciding the total value of his assets and sources of income. 7. I am unable to hold that the petitioner had suffered any prejudice in defending the charges against him because he was not assisted by a lawyer. Except while showing cause against the memorandum of Charge the petitioner at no stage had prayed to his disciplinary authority for permission to defend himself with the assistance of a lawyer. The petitioner did not also make any grievance while showing cause against the punishment proposed to be imposed upon him. The same was not taken in his appeal. In the departmental proceeding the petitioner was not pitted against a legally trained person and as already observed he did not seriously represent for lawyer's assistance. Therefore, the ratio of the recent Supreme Court decision in the case of The Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Dilipkumar raghavendranath Nadkami and others A. I. R. 1983 S. C. 109 and in the case of Bhagat Ram vs. State of Himachal pradesh and others A. I. R. 1983 S. C. 454, have no manner' of application to the facts of the present case for the foregoing reasons, I discharge this Rule without any order as to costs. Rule discharged.