JUDGMENT R.S. Singh, J. - This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arises out of Consolidation of holdings proceedings. 2. The land in dispute was recorded in the name of Tej Singh during the consolidation of holdings proceedings. On the death of Tej Singh proceeding under Section 12 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act was started on the application of Mahabir Singh, respondent no. 2. According to him Tej Singh had four sons, namely, Mahabir Singh, Raj Kumar, Budh Prakash and Jai Prakash. According to his application his three brothers were missing for the last fifteen years and have not been heard of by persons who in the normal circumstances would have known their whereabouts. Therefore, Mahabir Singh, respondent No. 2, alone is entitled for mutation of his name in place of Tej Singh deceased. This application was allowed ex-parte by the consolidation officer. An appeal was filed by Raj Kumar, one of the sons of Tej Singh, along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. On the basis of the compromise the names of all the four sons of Tej Singh were ordered to be recorded. Respondent No. 2 had filed, a revision against the order of the settlement Officer (Consolidation), recording the names of all the four sons of Tej Singh. The said Revision No. 48 (1333) of 1977 is still pending decision before the Deputy Director of Consolidation. It appears that during the pendency of the revision Budh Prakash executed, a sale-deed, after obtaining permission from the settlement Officer (Consolidation) in favour of Sheo Nath Singh, father of the petitioners, in respect of his one fourth share. Sheo Nath Singh thereupon filed an application under Section 12 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act for mutation of his name in place of Budh Prakash which is also pending. According to the case of the petitioners Budh Prakash died on 12-11-1980. The petitioner's father Sheo Nath Singh thereafter filed an application for his impleadment as a party in the aforesaid revision in place of Budh Prakash. In the meantime, Mahabir Singh, respondent no. 2, moved an application for recalling the order granting permission for sale which was allowed ex-parte. Sheo Nath Singh filed a restoration application which was allowed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). In the meantime, Mahabir Singh, respondent no. 2, moved an application for recalling the order granting permission for sale which was allowed ex-parte. Sheo Nath Singh filed a restoration application which was allowed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). Respondent No. 2 challenged the aforesaid order in revision before the Deputy Director of Consolidation which is registered as revision No, 1197 (296) of 1980, Sheo Nath Singh also died and thereafter the petitioners filed applications in both the aforesaid revisions for their impleadment as parties in place of Sheo Nath. The applications were rejected by the Deputy Director of Consolidation by his order dated 24-11-1981. The petitioners have challenged the orders of the Deputy Director of Consolidation before this Court in this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 3. The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that before the Deputy Director of Consolidation the question for consideration was whether Sheo Nath Singh and thereafter the petitioners may be made parties in the aforesaid revisions as vendees of Budh Prakash. But the Deputy Director of Consolidation decided the claim of the petitioners on merits without affording them an opportunity to prove their case. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners the findings recorded by the Deputy Director of Consolidation that Budh Prakash had died before the execution of the sale-deed and the aforesaid compromise was forged one were unjustified and uncalled for in view of the fact that the petitioners had no opportunity to prove their case which was in fact the very subject matter of the decision in the revision itself. 4. The learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 in reply contended that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has rightly rejected the applications of the petitioners on the findings that Budh Prakash died before the compromise which was forged one and the petitioners were not entitled to be impleaded in the revisions. 5. I have considered the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties. There is no doubt about the fact that the Deputy Director of Consolidation was not hearing the revisions itself. 5. I have considered the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties. There is no doubt about the fact that the Deputy Director of Consolidation was not hearing the revisions itself. He was only deciding the applications moved by Sheo Nath Singh and thereafter by the petitioners for their impleadment in the aforesaid revisions and their ground for impleadment was that they are the vendees of Budh Prakash and therefore, they are interested in the hearing of the revisions. The Deputy Director of Consolidation was required to consider applications on the prima facie evidence at that stage that they were entitled to be impleaded and heard in the revisions. That was not the stage of deciding the merits of the case which was to be decided in revisions itself. According to the findings recorded by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in the impugned orders and the questions involved in the revisions have been disposed of and nothing remains to be decided in the revisions itself. Therefore, in this case such findings were unwarranted at that stage and the Deputy Director of Consolidation should consider whether on the prima facie evidence the petitioners are entitled to be impleaded or not. According to the case of the parties there is a registered sale-deed executed by Budh Prakash in favour of Sheo Nath Singh father of the petitioners and therefore it was just and proper in the interest of justice that they should have been allowed an opportunity to participate in the revisions which were pending before the Deputy Director of Consolidation as their interest based on a registered sale deed was vitally involved. 6. In view of the aforesaid discussions, the orders of the Deputy Director of Consolidation cannot be sustained in law and deserve to be quashed. 7. In the result, the petition succeeds and it is accordingly allowed. The orders of the Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 24-11-1981 are quashed and he is directed to decide the case afresh according to law and in the light of the observations made above. However, in the peculiar circumstances of the case, there shall be no orders as to costs.