JUDGMENT 1. FOR violation of an order under section 144 Cr. P. C. a complaint was filed under section 188 I. P. C. against the three accused opposite parties by the Executive Magistrate, Sealdah, who had passed the order. The learned Additional chief Judicial Magistrate, Sealdah took cognizance upon the said complaint and issued process against the accused. After the accused entered appearance the case was transferred to the learned Judicial Magistrate, 5th Court, Sealdah for disposal. Against the initiation of the prosecution, one of the accused namely, Ramendra Nath Das, moved this court by filing a revisional application and obtained a Rule which was registered as Criminal Revision No. 1592 of 1981. The said Rule came up for hearing before a learned Judge of this Court on January 18, 1982 when nobody was present 'on behalf of the petitioner in that rule. While disposing of the Rule, the learned Judge observed, inter alia, as under : "i have perused the application and the petition of complaint and see no prima facie ground for interfering with the impugned order in exercise of revisional jurisdiction of this Court. The application is, therefore, rejected and the Rule is discharged. " 2. AFTER the matter went back, an application was filed on behalf of the accused persons on March 29, 1982 praying for an order of acquittal on the ground that the complaint was not maintainable in law. The learned Magistrate heard the parties on the application and by an order dated August 11, 1982 dropped the proceeding and released the accused from their bailbonds. Aggrieved by the said order, this Revisional application was filed by Sandip Kumar Ghosh, who was the petitioner in the proceeding under section 144 Cr. P. C. and on that application the present Rule Nisi was issued. At the time of hearing a question was raised as to the maintainability of the application at the instance of the petitioner as he was not, nor could he be, a party in a case under section 188 i. P. C. It is true that in a proceeding under section 188 I. P. C. the complainant is the public servant whose order is violated and consequently a party at whose instance initially the proceeding under section 144 Cr. P. C. was initiated cannot file this revisional application. P. C. was initiated cannot file this revisional application. But then, when a Rule has been issued on such an application and when the records are before it, this Court, in exercise of its inherent powers, may make any order to secure the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. Judged in that context, I find that this is a fit case where this Court should exercise its inherent powers under section 482 Cr. P. C. I, therefore, proceed to consider the merits of the case. 3. THE proceeding has been dropped on two grounds namely first, that the petition of complaint does not disclose an offence and secondly, that in view of a Civil Court's order, it could not be said that the accused persons violated the order of the learned Magistrate. In dropping the proceeding on the first ground, the learned Magistrate drew inspiration from certain judgments of this Court which have held that in the complaint the second ingredient of the offence under section 188 I. P. C. namely, the consequence of the disobedience must be present and in absence of any allegation to that effect, the proceeding is liable be quashed. Though those decisions are binding upon me, I cannot lose sight of the fact that a learned Judge of this Court has held that there is a prima facie case to go to trial and I cannot sit in appeal over that order. Mr. Basu, appearing for the opposite party, however, argued that the order was passed on a revisional application filed by one of the accused, namely Ramendra Nath das, and not by the other two accused, who had filed the application before the learned Magistrate and obtained the impugned order. Mr. Basu accordingly, submitted that the earlier order of this Court cannot be binding upon other accused persons who were not parties to that proceeding. On going through the records, I find no substance in this contention. The application dated 29/3/82, which was disposed of by the impugned order was filed on behalf of the accused persons and in describing who were the accused persons it has been stated therein : "R. K. Dutta (Executive Magistrate) vs. Brojabala Das and Ors." 4. MR. On going through the records, I find no substance in this contention. The application dated 29/3/82, which was disposed of by the impugned order was filed on behalf of the accused persons and in describing who were the accused persons it has been stated therein : "R. K. Dutta (Executive Magistrate) vs. Brojabala Das and Ors." 4. MR. Basu, however, submitted that the application was filed on behalf of the other two accused and not on behalf of Ramendra Nath Das and he pointed out that a fresh vokalatnana was filed on their behalf. While it is true that a fresh vokalatnama was filed on behalf of the other two accused on that very day, the fact that in the application it has been stated "brojabala Das and ors", means that it cannot be an application on behalf of two only. It also appears that one attendance slip was filed on behalf of all the accused persons by the self-same lawyer on that day. In fact, I find that all the three accused persons were recording their presence in Court jointly through the same lawyer before and after the day the application was filed. There cannot be any manner of doubt, therefore, that the application, praying for an order of acquittal was made for all the accused persons. It is unfortunate therefore that the order of this Court earlier passed was not disclosed in that application and I presume was not brought to the notice of the learned Magistrate. This presumption is being drawn from the fact that had the learned Magistrate looked into the order of this Court as quoted above, he could not have possibly considered the application of the accused persons and over-ridden that order without any evidence brought On record, since the order was passed. Mr. Basu however, contended that setting aside of the impugned order and remanding the case back for proceeding with the trial would be an exercise in. futility now that there was a Division bench Judgment of this Court which laid down that the, second ingredient of the offence as indicated earlier was required to be incorporated in the petition of complaint and as in the instant case that ingredient was singularly lacking the present complaint was liable to be quashed in the ultimate analysis. I am unable to accept the above contention of Mr. Basu. 5. I am unable to accept the above contention of Mr. Basu. 5. THE complaint in the instant case includes and incorporates a report submitted by the police on November 18, 1980 which was called for by the learned Executive Magistrate when his attention was drawn on behalf of the petitioner that his earlier order under section 144 Cr. P. C. was violated by the accused persons. The relevant portion of the police report as disclosed in the complaint, reads as follows : "(b) On 6.11.80 at the schedule time, the petitioner, his licensed electrical contractor and Sri S. K. Das Gupta, Mains Engineer, Calcutta North. The Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation (I)Ltd., and the police came in front of the room wherein the meter is installed, (c) The O. Ps. straightway declared that under no circumstances, they would allow the installation as ordered by the court and placed Debasis Das, son of nemai Ch. Das (O. P. No. 2) and other family members for physical obstruction to the access of Sri S. K. Das Gupta, Mains Engineer and the licensed electrical contractor and also the police to the meter for execution of your Honour's order. " 6. THE above allegation prima facie, satisfies the second requirement of the offence under section 188 I. P. C as it speaks not only of the violation but obstruction to the police as also other persons mentioned therein, who must be said to have been lawfully employed. Whether the allegations are true or not is not for me to decide at this stage, but the fact remains that prima facie those statements make out an offence under section 188 I. P. C. The learned Magistrate could not have relied upon certain orders of the civil Court for dropping the proceeding at a stage when evidence was yet to be taken. That apart, I am unable to agree with the learned Magistrate that the obstruction to the Police and the Officers of the Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation was not an offence in view of the order of the Civil Court as referred to by the learned Magistrate. 7. FOR the foregoing discussions I set aside the impugned order and direct the learned Magistrate to proceed with the trial in accordance with law. The Rule is made absolute. Rule made absolute.