JUDGMENT Gopi Nath, J. - This is a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution praying that the order of the II Additional Civil Judge, Kanpur dated 17-9-1981 refusing to consolidate Suit No. 1593 of 1980, Smt. Kalawati Reja (Plaintiff) v. Manoj Kumar and Ors. (Defendants), with Rent Case No. 90 of 1979, Manoj Kumar and Ors. (Petitioners) v. M/s. Heera Lal and Sons and Ors. (opposite parties), be quashed and the two cases be directed to be consolidated. 2. The Petitioner is a tenant of two portions of house No. 51/41, Nayaganj, Kanpur, which consists of a shop on the front side and three godowns behind it. Respondent Nos. 2 to 6 are the landlord of the premises. Respodent Nos. 2 to 6 requested the Petitioner to vacate the premises so that it could be reconstructed. The Petitioner agreed to release a portion of the accommodation. It was agreed between the parties that the landlord shall reconstruct the premises in phases, and the same shall be leased out to the Petitioner in phases, i.e. the Petitioner shall release a portion which would be reconstructed and let out to her and then she will release another portion which shall be reconstructed and leased out to her thereafter. This agreement was reduced into writing. It appears that thereafter the Respondents found some difficulty in reconstructing the premises in phases, and they applied for the release of the accommodation in the occupation of the Petitioner by means of an application u/s 21 of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. The Petitioner filed an objection on the ground that under the agreement entered into between the parties, she was required to release the premises in her occupation in phases, and was not liable to vacate the entire premises without the reconstructed portions in phases being leased out to her. According to the Respondents, the building could not be reconstructed in phases, and had to be demolished as a whole before any reconstruction could take place. The release application u/s 21 was accordingly made on the ground that the building was in a dilapidated condition and had to be demolished first before any reconstruction could take place. The Respondents, however, in paragraph No. 25 of the petition gave an assurance that after the new constructions were brought into existence, the Petitioner would be given the first preference to occupy them. The Respondents, however, in paragraph No. 25 of the petition gave an assurance that after the new constructions were brought into existence, the Petitioner would be given the first preference to occupy them. The objection, on the other band, was that the release of the entire building was not called for, and the Petitioner was not liable to be evicted there from in view of the agreement entered into between the parties. The release application accordingly deserved to be rejected. It appears that during the pendency of the release application, the Petitioner filed a suit (No. 1593 of 1980) referred to above in the Court of Munsif City, Kanpur for specific performance of the agreement entered into between the parties in respect of the reconstruction of the premises and for letting out of the same In accordance with its terms. An application was moved to the District Judge to transfer the suit to the Court of II Additional Civil Judge, Kanpur where the release application u/s 21 of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 was pending. The District Judge, by an order dated 25-7-1981, transferred the suit to the Court of II Additional Civil Judge, Kanpur. It appears that the release application, by some order, was transferred to the Court of Munsif-Magistrate, Kanpur, and it was again re-transferred to the Court of II Additional Civil Judge, Kanpur by an order dated 7-8-1981 passed on the application moved by the Respondents themselves. These two proceedings are thus pending before the II Additional Civil Judge, Kanpur. The Petitioner, by an application dated 4-8-1981, prayed that the two proceedings be consolidated. Although in the prayer part this specific prayer was not made, but in the body of the application it was stated that these two proceedings be consolidated. This application was filed in the Rent Case, i.e. in the release application pending before the II Additional Civil Judge. Although in the prayer part this specific prayer was not made, but in the body of the application it was stated that these two proceedings be consolidated. This application was filed in the Rent Case, i.e. in the release application pending before the II Additional Civil Judge. The Civil Judge by an order dated 7-8-1981 rejected the application on three main grounds-firstly that the powers of the Prescribed Authority and the procedure to be followed by him in a proceeding u/s 21 of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 were different from those which have to be exercised and followed by a Civil Court trying a suit; secondly that there was no specific provision for consolidation of a release application with a civil suit; and thirdly that the release application had to be disposed of within a short time as prescribed by the Act while there was no time limit for the disposal of a civil suit. Hence if it was consolidated with the suit, the release proceeding will get inordinately delayed. 3. Aggrieved by the order refusing consolidation of the two proceedings, the Petitioner has filed this petition praying for quashing of the order of the II Additional Civil Judge, Kanpur dated 17-9-1981. The reliefs sought in the petition are as follows: (i) that a suitable writ, order or direction be issued directing the Respondent No. 1 to consolidate the suit No. 1593 of 1980 and case No. 90 of 1979 pending in the Court of II Additional Civil Judge, Kanpur for deciding it together; (ii) that a suitable writ, order or direction be issued quashing the order passed by II Additional Civil Judge, Kanpur, enclosed as Annexure 8'. (iii) that a suitable writ, order or direction be issued directing the Respondent No. 1 to decide both the Suit No. 1593 of 1980 and rent case No. 90 of 1979 together after consolidating the same; (iv) that any other suitable writ, order or direction as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case be also issued; (v) that costs of this petition be also awarded to the Petitioner against the Respondents. The Petitioner thus prays for consolidation of Rent Case No. 90 of 1979 with suit No. 1593 of 1980, the former pending before the II Additional Civil Judge, Kanpur as a Prescribed Authority, and the latter pending before him as a Civil Judge, and for their joint trial. The application for consolidation, as mentioned earlier, was filed before the Prescribed Authority who happened to be the II Additional Civil Judge, in the Rent Case No. 90 of 1979 and it was rejected by him by the impugned order on the ground inter alia that he had no power to do so. The petition does not pray for the stay of the proceedings in Rent Case No. 90 of 1979. The prayer, in its various forms, is only that the Rent Case be consolidated with the suit and be tried together. The question thus for consideration is whether the Prescribed Authority by the impugned order, erred in not directing the consolidation of the Rent Case with the suit and whether the consolidation of the two proceedings is warranted in law. 4. It seems to me that consolidation of two actions, apart from other considerations, is warranted if they are within the same jurisdiction, i.e. the authority which is trying one action is trying the other also in the same capacity, and the action is of a like nature. Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 1, Section 110, at page 1349, states: To authorise a consolidation the Court to which the application is made must have jurisdiction of the different actions sought to be consolidated Action assigned for trial without a jury could not properly be consolidated with a case assigned to the jury trial calender. 5. It will accordingly have to be seen whether the Rent Case and the suit fall under one jurisdiction. The Rent Case is before the Prescribed Authority who in the instant case happens to be the II Additional Civil Judge but he, as a Prescribed Authority, is not competent to try the suit. The application for consolidation was filed before the Prescribed Authority in the Rent Case, and what is required to be seen is whether the Prescribed Authority can be held to be a Court in regard to the Rent Case in order to clothe him with a jurisdiction in respect of the other action, namely, the Suit. The application for consolidation was filed before the Prescribed Authority in the Rent Case, and what is required to be seen is whether the Prescribed Authority can be held to be a Court in regard to the Rent Case in order to clothe him with a jurisdiction in respect of the other action, namely, the Suit. A Court is a body in the government to which the public administration of justice is delegated... for the administration of justice, through which the state enforces its sovereign rights and powers ...(see Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 21, Section 1, page 15). 6. The State exercises its judicial functions through Court. It is distinct from a tribunal or an authority which is invested only with a part of the judicial powers and functions of the State for a particular purpose. A body is constituted a Court by the attributes it possesses by its constitution and not by the prescriptions made as to its performances for a particular purpose. It seems to me that a body invested with judicial powers of a State gets the constitution of a Court by its being vested with the judicial power of a sovereign character. The Court exercises the normal judicial sovereign powers of the State which is unlimited and if limits are to be fixed, the Court itself decides the same while a tribunal or a body which is not a Court exercises judicial powers in a limited area and for a particular purpose, and does not decide its own limits. While a Court represents the entire sovereign judicial power of a state in its own field a tribunal exercises only some of them for a particular purpose. This is not to confuse between the various kinds of Courts, namely, civil, criminal or revenue, which refer to the jurisdiction within which the judicial power of the state is to be exercised, without any limits, and in one has to be fixed, they would do it themselves. It is in this background that I shall now examine the authorities dealing with Courts and tribunals. In the Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi v. The Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi, and the Bharat Bank Employee's Union, Delhi AIR 1950 SC 188 at p. 195 Mahajan, J. observed; ... It is in this background that I shall now examine the authorities dealing with Courts and tribunals. In the Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi v. The Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi, and the Bharat Bank Employee's Union, Delhi AIR 1950 SC 188 at p. 195 Mahajan, J. observed; ... It appears to me that before a person or persons can be said to constitute a Court, it must be held that they derive their powers from the State and are exercising the judicial powers of the State.... there are tribunals with many of the trappings of a Court which, nevertheless, are not Courts in the strict sense of exercising judicial power ... 7. In Shell Co. of Australia v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1931) AC 275 it was pointed out that a tribunal is not necessarily a Court in this strict sense because it gives a final decision, nor because it hears witnesses on oath, nor because two or more contending parties appear before it between whom it has to decide, nor because it gives decisions which affect the rights of subjects, nor because there is an appeal to a Court, nor because it is a body to which a matter is referred by another body. The judicial power of the State is the power which every sovereign authority must of necessity have to decide controversies between the subjects, or between itself and its subjects. See also Huddart Parker and Co. v. Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330 , It is in this sense that a Court is invested with the entire inherent judicial power of a State while a tribunal is invested with only a part of it-this was clarified in the case of Associated Cement Companies Ltd. Vs. P.N. Sharma and Another, AIR 1965 SC 1595 where it was observed: Judicial functions and judicial powers are one of the essential attributes of a sovereign State, and on considerations of policy the State transfers its judicial functions and powers mainly to the Courts established by the Constitution; but that does not affect the competence of the state, by appropriate measures to transfer a part of its judicial powers and functions to tribunals by entrusting to them the task of adjudicating upon special matters and disputes between parties. Gajendragadkar, C.J. While considering the scope of Article 126 of the Constitution, at page 1599 observed: It would be noticed that Article 136(1) refers to a tribunal as distinguished from a Court. The expression "Court" in the context denotes a tribunal constituted by the State as a part of the ordinary hierarchy of Courts which are invested with the State's inherent judicial powers. A sovereign State discharges legislative, executive and judicial functions and can legitimately claim corresponding powers which are described as legislative, executive and judicial powers. Under our Constitution, the judicial functions and powers of the State are "primarily conferred on the ordinary Courts which have been constituted under its relevant provisions Judicial functions and judicial powers are one of the essential attributes of a sovereign State, and on considerations of policy, the State transfers its judicial functions and powers mainly to the Courts established by the Constitution, but that does not affect the competence of the State, by appropriate measures to transfer a part of its judicial powers and functions to tribunals by entrusting to the task of adjudicating upon special matters and disputes between parties. 8. It would thus be seen that while a Court is invested with the entire judicial powers of a State, a tribunal is vested with only a part of them. A tribunal thus does not possess all the attributes of a Court (see also Shri Virindar Kumar Satyawadi Vs. The State of Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 153 . 9. The fact that a tribunal is invested with trappings of a Court is not to constitute it as a Court which possesses the sovereign judicial function of pronouncing definitive judgment with all the acillary" powers attached to it. A tribunal is not a Court in the sense that the entire inherent judicial powers and functions of a State are not vested in it (See The Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi Vs. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi and The Bharat Bank Employees' Union, Delhi, AIR 1950 SC 188 ; Brajnandan Sinha Vs. Jyoti Narain, AIR 1956 SC 66 ; Shri Virindar Kumar Satyawadi Vs. The State of Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 153 ; Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. Vs. Shyam Sundar Jhunjhunwala and Others, AIR 1961 SC 1669 ; Jagannath Prasad Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1963 SC 416 ; Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay City I, Bombay Vs. Jyoti Narain, AIR 1956 SC 66 ; Shri Virindar Kumar Satyawadi Vs. The State of Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 153 ; Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. Vs. Shyam Sundar Jhunjhunwala and Others, AIR 1961 SC 1669 ; Jagannath Prasad Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1963 SC 416 ; Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay City I, Bombay Vs. Bai Shirinbai K. Kooka, AIR 1963 SC 477 , The Engineering Mazdoor Sabha Representing Workmen Employed Under the Hind Cycles Ltd. and Another Vs. The Hind Cycles Ltd., Bombay, AIR 1963 SC 874 ; Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. P.N. Sharma AIR 1956 SC 1995, Bijai Narain Singh v. State of U.P. 1969 AWR 482 All Party Hill Leaders' Conference, Shillong Vs. Captain W.A. Sangma and Others, AIR 1977 SC 2155 . It may further be observed that a Court for the purposes of a particular Act such as a Court of Inquiry or a Court of References has to be distinguished from an ordinary Court of civil, criminal or revenue jurisdiction. 10. Authorities which are constituted under special legislations to decide disputes of a particular nature are also not Courts within the meaning of that term, as explained above. The authorities appointed under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, namely Assistant Consolidation Officer, Consolidation Officer, Settlement Officer (Consolidation), Deputy Director of Consolidation, etc. have been held not to be Courts (see Bijai Narain Singh v. State of U.P. 1969 AWR 482 ; Sita v. State of U.P. 1967 AWR 731 and Ram Bharosey Lal v. Dy. Dir. of Consolidaion, U.P. Fatehpur 1964 AWR 424 . Ram Bharosey Lal's case (supra) referred to the observations of Hidayatullah, J. made in Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. Vs. Shyam Sundar Jhunjhunwala and Others, AIR 1961 SC 1669 , which needs to be reproduced. They are: By 'Courts' is meant Courts of Civil Judicature and by "tribunals" those bodies of men who are appointed to decide controversies arising under certain special laws. Among the powers of the State is included the power to decide. Such controversies this is undoubtedly one of the attributes of the State, and is aptly called the judicial power of the State. In the exercise of this power, a clear division is thus noticeable. Broadly speaking, certain special matters go before tribunals, and the residue goes before the ordinary Courts "of Civil Judicature.... Such controversies this is undoubtedly one of the attributes of the State, and is aptly called the judicial power of the State. In the exercise of this power, a clear division is thus noticeable. Broadly speaking, certain special matters go before tribunals, and the residue goes before the ordinary Courts "of Civil Judicature.... Reliance was placed on the following observations of Lopes L.J. in Royal Aquarium and Summer and Winter Garden Society v. Parkinson (1892) 1 Q.B. 431 (452); The word 'judicial' has two meanings. It may refer to the discharge of duties exercisable by a judge or by justices in Court, or to administrative duties which need not be performed In Court, but in respect of which it Is necessary to bring to bear a judicial mind-that is a mind to determine what is fair and just in respect of the matters under consideration. His Lordship then observed: That an officer is required to decide matters before him "judicially" in the second sense does not make him a Court or even a tribunal, because that only establishes that he is following a standard of conduct, and is free from bias or interest. 11. The decision in Bijai Narain Singh v. State of U.P. 1969 AWR 482 , which approved the view taken in Ram Bharosey Lal's case (supra) and held that the Consolidation authorities were not Courts, distinguished the decision in Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha v. The Sitamarhi Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. AIR 1969 SC 1494 on which strong reliance was placed by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner. That case held that an Assistant Registrar Co-operative discharging the functions of the Registrar u/s 48 read with Section 6(2) of Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act, was a Court. Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha's case (supra) is inapplicable in the instant case as well. The question for consideration in that case was whether the Assistant Registrar while exercising powers under Bihar and Orissa Cooperative Societies Act was a Court subordinate to High Court for purpose of Section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952, while the instant case is concerned with the question whether a Prescribed Authority under U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 is an ordinary Court of Civil jurisdiction competent to try a civil suit. The Supreme Court in Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha's case (supra) itself held that in view of the particular provisions of Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act, the Assistant Registrar could be treated as a Court for the purposes of Contempt of Courts Act but it did not mean that all the Registrars of the co-operative societies In different States were Courts. The tests laid down by the earlier authorities of the Supreme Court from time to time to distinguish a Court from a tribunal were not departed from. One of such tests is that tribunals derive whatever powers they exercise under the terms of the Act which created them. If they are conferred powers which a civil or a criminal Court possesses, for particular purposes or for purposes of particular provisions of particular Act or Acts, they could not be treated as Courts for all purposes and in the ordinary sense of that term. 12. My attention was invited to the decision in Smt. Jamila Khatoon v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, U.P. Lucknow at Moradabad 1971 ALJ 843 wherein it was held that a Consolidation authority was a Court for the purposes of t he Evidence Act. The Evidence Act defines the word "Court" as including all Judges and Magistrates and all persons, except Arbitrators, legally authorised to take evidence. This definition is for the purposes of the Evidence Act, and is not to be extended where such extension is not warranted. To fall within the definition of the word 'Court' as given in a particular enactment for the purposes of that enactment is not to construe a body as a Court in the strict sense of that term. Smt. Jamila Khatoon's case (supra) is thus distinguishable and is only an authority for the proposition that the Evidence Act applies to the proceedings before Consolidation Authorities. 13. I now come to the definition of Prescribed Authority in the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. Smt. Jamila Khatoon's case (supra) is thus distinguishable and is only an authority for the proposition that the Evidence Act applies to the proceedings before Consolidation Authorities. 13. I now come to the definition of Prescribed Authority in the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. Section 3(e) defines it as meaning "a Civil Judicial Officer or Judicial Magistrate authorised by the District Judge to exercise, perform and discharge all or any of the powers, functions and duties of the prescribed authority under this Act, and different such officers may be so authorised in respect of different areas or cases or classes of cases, and the District Judge may recall any case from any such officer and may transfer it for disposal to any other such officer." A Prescribed Authority is thus an authority who may be a Civil Judicial Officer or a Judicial Magistrate or a different Officer nominated by the District Judge. He is an Officer, and not a Court, which is constituted as a Prescribed Authority. The authority flows from the nomination made by the District Judge. The whole of the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings before him (see Section 34 and Rule 22 of the Act). In Hira Lal v. Ranjit Singh 1976 AWG 397, after an elaborate discussion, a Division Bench of this Court held that the Prescribed Authority was not a Court, and the proceedings before him were not a suit. To the same effect are the decisions in Gur Narain Jagat Narain and Co. v. M/s. Motor and General Sales Pvt. Ltd. 1977 U.P. RCC 58 and Smt. Shakuntala Devi v. IV Addl. District Judge, Meerut 1981 (7) ALR 396. In Smt. Shakuntla Devi's case (supra) it was held that the Prescribed Authority was only a persona designate. In Nathulal v. Collector Sawai Jaipur AIR 1952 Raj 36 it was held that the rent control authorities under the Jaipur Rent Control Order were not Courts of civil jurisdiction in the strict sense of that 46-Rep, term although they were quasi judicial authorities with some trappings of a Court. In Ebrahim Aboobaker and Another Vs. Tek Chand Dolwani and Others, AIR 1953 SC 298 , it was laid down that the custodian under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, was not a Court though the proceedings held before him were of quasi-judicial nature. In Ebrahim Aboobaker and Another Vs. Tek Chand Dolwani and Others, AIR 1953 SC 298 , it was laid down that the custodian under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, was not a Court though the proceedings held before him were of quasi-judicial nature. Only a part of the CPC was applicable to such proceedings. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner invited my attention to the Sahkari Ganna Vikas Samiti Ltd. Vs. Mahabir Sugar Mills (P) Ltd., AIR 1982 SC 119 where a Divisional Commissioner acting under the U.P. Act. No. 24 of 1953 as an appellate authority was held to be a revenue Court, and not a persona designate. The Divisional Commissioner as a revenue Court was constituted an appellate authority under the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act to hear an appeal under the U.P. Act No. 24 of 1953. The Supreme Court observed that since the Divisional Commissioner, and not the Cane Commissioner was constituted an appellate authority, he acted as a revenue Court, and not as a persona designate. The case does not help the Petitioner. 14. My attention was then invited to the provisions of Section 34 of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 to contend that since by Sub-section (2) the Prescribed Authority shall be deemed to be a Civil Court within the meaning of Sections 345 and 346 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, he should be deemed to be a Civil Court for the purposes of consolidation of the two proceedings. Sub-section (2) of Section 34 itself makes it clear that the Prescribed Authority is not a Civil Court, and is deemed to be such Court only for the purposes of Sections 345 and 346 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. When a person is 'deemed to be something' the only meaning possible is that whereas he is not in reality that something, the legislature requires him to be treated as if he were so (see The Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay v. The Bombay Trust Corporation Ltd. 1930 ALJR 73 , and the Commissioner of Income Tax,Madras Vs. Express Newspapers Ltd., Madras, AIR 1965 SC 33 , at page 39. By deeming it to be a Civil Court for certain purposes the legislature did not intend to give full status of a Court to the Prescribed Authority. Express Newspapers Ltd., Madras, AIR 1965 SC 33 , at page 39. By deeming it to be a Civil Court for certain purposes the legislature did not intend to give full status of a Court to the Prescribed Authority. It does not even possess the powers to grant interim reliefs. 15. Learned Counsel submitted that under Rule 22 of the Act, the Prescribed Authority has been conferred the power as contained in Sections 151 and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure, hence he should be held to be a Court. The power conferred is only for certain purposes, and is limited in its scope. It is not the power which inheres in a Court by its own constitution. Section 151 of the CPC which saves the inherent powers of Court is differently worded and is as follows: 15. Saving of inherent powers of Court-nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. 16. The Prescribed Authority is not a Court, much less an ordinary Court of civil jurisdiction which the II Additional Civil Judge is in respect of the Civil Suit. The two actions thus fall under two different jurisdictions. The II Additional Civil Judge trying the rent case as a Prescribed Authority being not a Civil Court while he being a civil Court in respect the suit he could not consolidate the Rent Case with the Civil Suit. The two proceedings, besides falling under two different jurisdictions, further do not appear to be of a like nature. They may be civil proceedings but their nature is different. 17. Learned Counsel then submitted that there would be no prejudice to any party if these proceedings are consolidated. The question of prejudice will arise only if it is permissible in law to consolidate them. There Is a clear distinction between power and jurisdiction. The question of prejudice pertains to the domain of power, and that can be looked into when there is jurisdiction to consolidate the proceedings, which in the instant case the Prescribed Authority lacks. The question of prejudice will arise only if it is permissible in law to consolidate them. There Is a clear distinction between power and jurisdiction. The question of prejudice pertains to the domain of power, and that can be looked into when there is jurisdiction to consolidate the proceedings, which in the instant case the Prescribed Authority lacks. The consolidation of actions is not, in the absence of statute, a matter of right, but rests in the sound discretion of the Court; and its discretion will not be interfered with unless abused. (See American Jurisprudence) (Vol. I, Section 92, p. 477) Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol.1, Section 109, at page 1345, states: In the absence of statute providing otherwise, a consolidation of actions, where permissible, cannot be demanded as matter of strict right. It is addressed to the discretion of the Court which may either consolidate or refuse to do so if the conditions essential to authorise a consolidation do not exist, the Court has no discretion to exercise. 18. The discretion exercised by the authority below in refusing to consolidate the two proceedings did not suffer from any error, and hence needs no interference in exercise of this Courts' power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution (see The Union of India, Represented by The General Manager, North-eastern Railway, Gorakhpur Vs. The Indian Sugar Mills Association, Calcutta and Another, AIR 1968 SC 22 and Dr. Jai Narayian Mishra v. The State of Bihar AIR 1971 SO 1318. 19. Learned Counsel then submitted that this Court may, in exercise of its own powers, consolidate the two proceedings. Reliance was placed on P.V. Shetty Vs. B.S. Giridhar, AIR 1982 SC 83 wherein the Supreme Court in a petition under Article 133 of the Constitution stayed a suit for eviction of a tenant filed subsequent to the filing of an application before the Rent Controller for fixation of rent. The Petitioner has not prayed for stay of any proceeding in this petition. She has required the two proceedings to be consolidated and tried jointly. The conditions essential to authorise a consolidation being lacking, the two proceedings cannot be directed to be consolidated. 20. The petition accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs.