G. N. SABHAHIT, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal by defendants 1 to 7 is directed against the judgment and decree dt. 3-6-1982 passed by the XV Addl. City civil Judge, Bangalore, in OS 44 of 1980 on his file, decreeing the suit of the plaintiff as prayed for. ( 2 ) THE plaintiff instituted a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell dt. 18-2 1960, marked as Ex.-P 1. The agreement, according to him, was entered into by J. F. D'souza, since deceased. He died on 156 1960. The 1st defendant is the widow of J. F. D'souza and defendants 2 to 7 are his children. As the executant of the agreement J. F. D'souza died on 15-6-1960, the suit was instituted against the heirs who represent the estate of D'souza, for specific performance of an agreement to sell the suit property. According to the plaint averments J. F. D'souza, agreed to sell the suit property absolutely to the plaintiff for a consideration of Rs. 4,000. He advanced Rs. 2,500 towards consideration and agreed to sell the property to the plaintiff on receipt of the balance. The plaintiff was given time of 5 yeas, within which he had to pay the money and get the sale deed executed. The plaintiff, according to him, was ever ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. When notice was issued to the defendants, they did not comply with the request and hence he instituted the suit for specific performance of the agreement to sell. The defendants resisted the suit. They denied that the deceased J. F. D'souza, executed the agreement Ex. P 1. They put the plaintiff to strict proof of the execution of the agreement. They further stated that the suit was barred by time. They denied the consideration received and the alleged agreement set up. According to them J. F. D'souza left a will dated 5-11-1959 in favour of Amelia Corrla and hence she was also a necessary party to the suit. The will was probated in Misc. 60/61 on the file of the Dist. Judge, Bangalore. The plaintiff did not file any objections to the issue of probate. ( 3 ) THE proceeding has a history. The suit was first instituted in the Court of the i Munsiff, Bangalore, at OS No. 288 of 1965. There was a decree in favour of the plaintiff. 60/61 on the file of the Dist. Judge, Bangalore. The plaintiff did not file any objections to the issue of probate. ( 3 ) THE proceeding has a history. The suit was first instituted in the Court of the i Munsiff, Bangalore, at OS No. 288 of 1965. There was a decree in favour of the plaintiff. The defendants appealed against the decree to the Court of the Civil Judge, bangalore City in RA No. 81 of 1973. The appeal was dismissed on 31-3 1973. The unsuccessful defendants took up the matter to this Court in RSA No. 775 of 1973. which was disposed of by this Court on 4 6-1979 allowing the appeal and remanding the suit to the trial Court with a direction to raise an additional issue as specified in the judgment and to dispose of the suit in the light of the observations made therein. That is how the suit came up before the City Civil Judge and it was renumbered as OS No. 44 of 1980. ( 4 ) AFTER remand the Court tried the suit on the following issues : 1. Whether the plaintiff proves that late J. F. D'souza executed the agreement of sale in favour of the plaintiff on 18-2 1960 agreeing to sell the plaint schedule property for Rs. 4,000 within 5 years from 18 2 1960? x x x ( 5 ) AFTER remand the plaintiff and defendant No. 5 were examined further. The city Civil Judge appreciating the evidence on record answered issues 1, 2, 3 and 4 in the affirmative and issues 5, 6, 7 and 8 in the negative. He answered additional issue No. 1 also in the affirmative. In that view the trial Court after remand, decreed the suit of the plaintiff as prayed for by its judgment and decree dated 3-6-1982. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree the defendants, as stated above, have come up with the above first appeal before this Court. ( 6 ) THE learned Advocate Sri U. L. Narayana Rao appearing for the appellants strenuously urged before me that the court below was not justified In holding that Ex. P 1 was proved as duly and legally executed by deceased J. F. D'souza. According to him neither the oral evidence of the witnessess nor the expert evidence of the Hand-writing Experts was properly appreciated by the trial Court. P 1 was proved as duly and legally executed by deceased J. F. D'souza. According to him neither the oral evidence of the witnessess nor the expert evidence of the Hand-writing Experts was properly appreciated by the trial Court. He also submitted that the trial Court even failed to notice the broad probabilities in the case. In that view of the matter he submitted that the trial Court was not justified in arriving at the conclusion that I x. P 1 was duly executed. According to him the appeal was entitled to succeed without more. As against that the learned counsel sri Sharma, argued supporting the judgment and decree of the City Civil Judge. ( 7 ) THEREFORE, the points that arise for my consideration in this appeal are : 1. Whether the trial Court was justified in holding that Ex. P 1 was proved and in relying on the contents of Ex. P 1 ? 2. Whether the judgment and decree of the City Civil Judge require interference ? ( 8 ) THE suit is simple in nature. It is one for specific performance of the agreement to sell. According to the plaintiff the agreement is at Ex. P 1. It is dated 18-2 1960. It is executed by late J. F. D'souza. That agreement is contested by the defendants who are the widow and children of D'souza. According to them j. F. D'souza did not execute the said agreement. It is a forged document. Therefore, the burden of proving that J. F. D'souza executed the agreement Ex. P 1 is heavily on the plaintiff. In order to discharge his burden the plaintiff Narayanaswamy has examined himself as PW 4. He has examined the attesting witnesses as pws 2 and 3 and the scribe as PW 5. He has also examined a hand-writing expert viz. , G. C. Veerappa as PW 1. As against that the defendants have examined the 5th defendant as DW 4 and expert witness viz. , Mr. Lingaiah- Government handwriting expert as DW 3 and they have examined DWs 1 and 2 to speak about the inveracity of the agreement in question. Before I proceed to consider the oral evidence on record I would deal with the expert evidence. In the remanding judgment dt. , Mr. Lingaiah- Government handwriting expert as DW 3 and they have examined DWs 1 and 2 to speak about the inveracity of the agreement in question. Before I proceed to consider the oral evidence on record I would deal with the expert evidence. In the remanding judgment dt. 4th June, 1979 in RSA No. 775/ 1973 this Court has observed regarding the appreciation of evidence of hand-writing experts generally thus :"moreover, it is well settled that an expert's opinion especially in the case of a hand-writing expert must be received with great caution. These gentlemen stand in an impregnable fortress of their own and invariably give emphatic opinions. They talk in terms of pseudo science and try to create an impression by talking glibly of pen pressure, penhold, pen scope, pen-pause, pen-presentation, pen-list, hand movement, irregular movement, angle of pen, retouchings, joinings, change of pivot, understroke, cross-bar, loops of many kinds, embellishments, terminals and numerous other things not easily intelligible to laymen. Almost all of them have a favourite theory of their own which they tend to apply with a firm conviction. They are a type of remunerated witnesses and like others of that class have an unconscious bias in favour of the party engaging them. Moreover, their opinions are previously ascertained and they are brought only when they are favourable to the party calling. The fact that they know before hand why they have been called and what the party calling wishes to be proved, detracts to a great extent from the weight to be given to their opinion. Some handwriting experts do not even hesitate to claim infallibility. These experts generally have in memory a catalogue of cases in which their opinions, confirmed by the other evidence, were found acceptable by Courts and they recite them in commendation of their superior skill, but more by way of advertisement. They do not, of course, give the instances in which their opinions were rejected. It is well established that it is unsafe to base a judgment merely on expert opinion without substantial corroboration. On the facts of this case, it is clear that two experts have contradicted each other and, on going through the judgment, i Gnd that the Courts below have not examined the admitted writings supplied to the experts-whether they were written near about the date of execution of the document. On the facts of this case, it is clear that two experts have contradicted each other and, on going through the judgment, i Gnd that the Courts below have not examined the admitted writings supplied to the experts-whether they were written near about the date of execution of the document. It is well established that the handwriting of a person varies with his mood, with his health, with his age, and several other factors. Hence, it is always advisable, while choosing admitted writings for comparison, to take care that such writings should be of about the same time as the disputed documents. In the case of Shashikumar Banerjee v. Subodhkumar Banerjee (AIR 1964 SC 539), the Supreme Court has cautioned that the expert's evidence as to handwriting is opinion evidence and it can rarely, if ever, take the place of substantive evidence and that before acting on such evidence, it is usual to see if it is corroborated either by clear direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. That being so, it was necessary for the courts below to appreciate the broad probabilities of the case and then examine and scrutinise the expert opinion in the context and perspective". It is in the light of this observation that the trial Court ought to have decided the case. ( 9 ) THERE are two experts examined- one expert contradicting the other as is not unusual in such cases. The trial Court has relied on the evidence of PW 1-Mr. Veerappa - a private expert. The observations made above obviously apply to him. The Court has to be circumspect and scrutinise his evidence. Moreover, the trial Court while preferring the evidence of PW 1 to the evidence of DW 3 has given the following reasons in the course of its judgment :-"the reasons are to be found in the report Ex. P9 as well as in his evidence. While it may not be necessary to furnish the details, I may mention that the following are the glaring similarities. The top of 'j' is oval in all signatures of the first letter 'j' ; the last letter 'a' has similar characteristics. So also the natural variations according to PW 1 and this was also conceded by Lingaiah d W 3. The top of 'j' is oval in all signatures of the first letter 'j' ; the last letter 'a' has similar characteristics. So also the natural variations according to PW 1 and this was also conceded by Lingaiah d W 3. The report of Lingaiah (DW 3) merely reads that the disputed signatures and the signatures in the will are not of the same person in his opinion. He had not said in the report whether the disputed signatures were the result of forgery". Thus, the main reason that persuaded the learned City Civil Judge to accept the opinion of Veerappa in preference to that of Lingaiah is that he has given a catalogue of glaring similarities in the two signatures, viz. , disputed and admitted. ( 10 ) IN this connection it is necessary to read the observation made by this Court in a similar case, in the case of Ravjappa v. Nilkanta Rao (1 ). A Division Bench of this Court consisting of their Lordships justice Hegde and Justice Mir Iqbal Hussain, speaking on this aspect of the case have observed inter alia thus :"the trial Court has accepted his evidence mainly on the ground that several of the letters found in the disputed document are slailar in character and formation with the corresponding letters found in the documents used for comparison. I think it is a wholly wrong approach. In examining a disputed document the true test is not the extent of the similarities observed when compared with genuine documents, as forged documents usually are good imitations of genuine documents, but the nature and extent of dissimilarities noticed. It is these differences which expose the true character of the document in question. Admittedly several of the letters found in the writing and in the signatures in ex. 788 are strikingly dissimilar to the corresponding letters found in the admitted signatures. For instance the letters 'ri', 'are', ':and* and 'rt* found in ex. 788 do not bear satisfactory resemblance to those very letters found in Ex. 613 and Exs. 474 to 477 all of which admittedly contain the genuine signatures of Ravjeppa. I am afraid the Court below had not given sufficient importance to the dissimilarities. The science of calligraphy is not a perfect science and instances are not rare when even the best handwriting expert has not been able to find out the forgery". 613 and Exs. 474 to 477 all of which admittedly contain the genuine signatures of Ravjeppa. I am afraid the Court below had not given sufficient importance to the dissimilarities. The science of calligraphy is not a perfect science and instances are not rare when even the best handwriting expert has not been able to find out the forgery". Thus, it is an established principle in the appreciation of evidence of the handwriting expert, that his opinion based on glaring similarities would not be of much value. The reason is not far to seek, as pointed out by this Court earlier in the above excerpt, in any serious attempt, the forgers achieve some similarities. They may even bring about glaring similarities. An expert must have a view to find out if there are dissimilarities on points which could be considered as normal in the writings of a man. Veerappa has not considered dissimilarities at all and for the reasons advanced by the Division Bench of this Court, quoted above, I am constrained to observe that his opinion cannot be of much value. ( 11 ) IN the disputed signatures at Ex. P 1, there are two signatures. Even a cursory glance at these signatures when considered in the context of the admitted and proved signatures at Exs. P 2, P 3 and P 7, it would strike one that there are more dissimilarities in these signatures-in the utters of the signatures. Take for example, the first letter 'j' in the first disputed signature. The letter 'j" has a circle at the end and a loop at the bottom of the letter, whereas in the second disputed signature the letter 'j' has oval head and oval bottom. Any person who is accustomed to writing would not write that way. In regard to this, we may look into Exs. P 2 to P 7, series. In Ex. P 7, for example, the signature on the vakalat put on 15-9-1959, a few months before the date of the alleged document, the letter 'j' is smoothly written. There is an oval at the top and a loop at the bottom and the line crosses the main line of 'j' and the entire signature is in a running hand. The inclinations are well formed. There is an oval at the top and a loop at the bottom and the line crosses the main line of 'j' and the entire signature is in a running hand. The inclinations are well formed. Whereas in the disputed signatures it strikes one at the yery glance at it that they are forced and laboured writings and not written in a free hand. Normally one accustomed to put a large number of signatures develops a pattern in putting the signatures. He might be in a hurry, he might put his signature leisurely, or he may put his signature in different moods; slight variations are bound to occur, but the broad identification cannot be missed. They are in the formation of letters and inclinations ; flow of hand and of appearance. When we compare the admitted signatures in Exs. P 2, P 3 and P 7 with the two disputed signatures they are not of the same person, but they are laboured and attempted. ( 12 ) WHEN the experts differ, ultimately the Court has to form its own opinion on the basis of the entire evidence brought on record. The Court also would be competent to compare the signatures and the writings under S. 73 of the Evidence Act. The Supreme Court of India, speaking on this aspect in Fakhruddin v. State of MP (2), has observed in paras 10 and 11 of the judgment thus :"the writing may be proved to be in the handwriting of a particular individual by the evidence of a person familiar with the handwriting of that individual or by the testimony of an Expert competent to the comparison of handwritings on a scientific basis. A third method is comparison by the Court with the writing made in the presence of the court or admitted or proved so by the writing of the person. Both under Ss. 45 and 47 the evidence is an opinion, in the former by a scientific comparison and in the latter on the basis of familiarity resulting from frequent observations and experience. In either case, the Court must satisfy itself by such means as are open that the opinion may be acted upon. Both under Ss. 45 and 47 the evidence is an opinion, in the former by a scientific comparison and in the latter on the basis of familiarity resulting from frequent observations and experience. In either case, the Court must satisfy itself by such means as are open that the opinion may be acted upon. Where an expert's opinion is given, the Court must see for itself and with the assistance of the expert come to its own conclusion whether it can safely be held that the two writings are by the same person. This is not to aay that the Court must play the role of an expert, but to say that the court may accept the fact proved only when it has satisfied itself on its observations that it is safe to accept the opinion whether of the expert or other witnesses. The Supreme Court in an appeal also is entitled to call for the writings for making a comparison thereof. ( AIR 1957 SC 381 ; and AIR 1963 sc 1728 and AIR 1964 SC 529 ; and air 1967 SC 778 , relied on)". Comparing the admitted signatures with the disputed signatures I am satisfied that the disputed signatures cannot be of the same person whose signatures are admitted in Exs. P 2 to P 7. ( 13 ) THE trial Court explaining one of the points raised before it that in the disputed signatures the letter 'u' in the word d'souza was not to be found has observed in para 37 of its judgment thus :"in regard to signatures at Exs. P 19 (d), P 19 (e) and P 20 (a) DW 4 admitted, sri Karanth stated that the latter 'u' present in all these signatures of J. F. D'souza is singularly absent in the disputed signature at Ex. P 1 (g ). In the signature at Ex. P 19 (e) the letter 'u' is not to be found. Further, we find the letter 'u' in the signature at Ex. P 1 (f ). If the person who signed Ex. P 1 (f) was J. F. D'souza then reasonably it can be inferred that the same person has also made the signature at Ex. P 1 (g ). Therefore, the absence of letter 'u' is not of any signification. Possibly it was a style of writing". P 1 (f ). If the person who signed Ex. P 1 (f) was J. F. D'souza then reasonably it can be inferred that the same person has also made the signature at Ex. P 1 (g ). Therefore, the absence of letter 'u' is not of any signification. Possibly it was a style of writing". What I wish to stress is that the learned city Civil Judge has misread the facts in ex. P 19 (e ). He has stated that there Is no V. It is totally wrong. 'u' can be deciphered in the signature even with the naked eye. That only shows how careless the learned City Civil Judge was when he compared those signatures. It is not necessary for me to compare every letter and point out the dissimilarities for it can be easily seen with naked eyes that the disputed signatures are entirely laboured and they are not put by a person who is accustomed to put his signatures frequently. The admitted signatures of D'souza, as stated above, run freely. They are steady ; the style is impressive and the similarities in the signatures strike one. When the disputed signatures are looked at after looking at the admitted signatures, any prudent man can easily find out that they are not of the same person. It can further be stated that the disputed signatures are attempted, laboured and probably forged. They are not the genuine signatures at all. Hence, I am unable to bring myself to agree with the findings of the trial Court that the disputed signatures are by the same person whose signatures are to be found in Exs. P 2 to P 7, viz. , the signatures of late J. F. D'souza. ( 14 ) NEXT it was submitted that the learned counsel for the respondent that apart from the opinion of the expert there is oral evidence on record to prove Ex. P 1. It is no doubt true that the plaintiff has examined two witnesses viz. , PWs 2 and 3 in addition to examining himself as PW 4. He submitted that the evidence of the plaintiff finds corroboration in the evidence of PWs 2 and 3 and together they prove the execution of Ex. P 1 the agreement to sell. The Court below has no doubt agreed with such a submission. , PWs 2 and 3 in addition to examining himself as PW 4. He submitted that the evidence of the plaintiff finds corroboration in the evidence of PWs 2 and 3 and together they prove the execution of Ex. P 1 the agreement to sell. The Court below has no doubt agreed with such a submission. I was taken through the evidence of these witnesses and their evidence was commented upon by the learned counsel for the appellant. Hence it is necessary to re--assess their evidence in the light of the arguments addressed before me. According to the plaintiff, examined as PW 4, there were panchayats thrice and it was agreed that j. F. D'souza should sell the suit property to the plaintiff for the amount mentioned therein and accordingly, the agreement was executed. Speaking about this aspect he has stated thus :"there was Nyaya and panchayathi in 1960, Feb. It was decided I should pay Rs. 4,000 to D'souza. I agreed for it. I paid him Rs. 2,500 and took an agreement from him. Ex. P 1 is that agreement. D'souza signed it as per ex. Q 1 and Q 2". It is his case that the agreement was written in the suit property. In the cross-examination of this witnesses, it is elicited thus:"the talks prior to Ex. P 1 were on 23 occasions. That was once in the month of Dasara prior to Ex. P 1, once after X-mas festival. The third time was in February. x x x x all the three panchayatis were held in the suit house. I had taken two panchayatdars. Tippur Khan, Ramaswamy naidu and Byatappa are Panchayat-dars". We have to see whether this version of the plaintiff is corroborated by the two witnesses. Before the testimony of a witness could be called credit -worthy, it is necessary that the evidence of the witness must be consistent with the evidence of other witnesses and together they must be in consonance with the broad probabilities. ( 15 ) PW 2 in his evidence has stated thus :"it was decided in the panchayathi held two months earlier plaintiff should pay Rs. 4,000 to D'souza and the latter should give up plaintiff's property. This panehayathi and the decision was in the shoe shop of D'souza in Old madras road cross cash Bazar". ( 15 ) PW 2 in his evidence has stated thus :"it was decided in the panchayathi held two months earlier plaintiff should pay Rs. 4,000 to D'souza and the latter should give up plaintiff's property. This panehayathi and the decision was in the shoe shop of D'souza in Old madras road cross cash Bazar". Thus, it is the case of this witness that the panchayatis took place in the shoe shop of D'souza and not in the suit property, whereas it is the definite case of the plaintiff that the panchayatis took place in the suit property. This witness is emphatic in saying that the proposals were decided in the panchayat held two months earlier to the date of agreement. PW 3 on the other hand asserts that everything took place in the last panchayati in February when the agreement was executed. This is what he has stated in the course of his evidence. "nothing was decided in the two panchayatis. The matter was settled only on the day the agreement was written. Plaintiff and D'souza and Chinnanna were responsible for the panchayathi on the 3rd occasion". Thus, this witness gives a go-by to the version of the other witnesses. Each witness gives his own version. In a simple matter like this, if it were true each of them would not have told his own version. The Court below failed to see this glaring discrepancy. Minor discrepancies may naturally creep in when evidence is recorded after some years. But when the evidence bristles with discrepancies on material particulars It would be hard for the court to swallow such evidence as true. But, that is what has been done by the court below. I am unable to agree with the trial Court. ( 16 ) PW 2 in his evidence admits that there were criminal and civil cases against him filed by D'souza. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that his evidence is free and unbiassed. It Sows from a tainted source and it cannot be relied upon. The scribe examined as PW 5 gives another version. According to him the draft was got prepared and it was handed over to him and he copied it and that is not the version of any of the witnesses. Hence, his evidence also cannot be relied upon. It Sows from a tainted source and it cannot be relied upon. The scribe examined as PW 5 gives another version. According to him the draft was got prepared and it was handed over to him and he copied it and that is not the version of any of the witnesses. Hence, his evidence also cannot be relied upon. In the result I am of the considered view that the trial Court was in error in holding that execution of Ex. P. 1 was proved. ( 17 ) IN the result, I am constrained to hold, differing from the finding of the trial court, that the plaintiff has miserably failed to prove the execution of Ex. P. 1 for the reasons discussed above. That being so the appeal is entitled to succeed. Therefore, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the trial Court it set aside and the suit for specific performance on the basis of Ex. P. 1 is hereby dismissed, with costs throughout. --- *** --- .