JUDGMENT K.N. SHUKLA, J. This is a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. This is petitioner's second round before this Court. Petitioner was appointed as a male social worker by Civil Surgeon, Vidisha in the grade of Rs. 110-190 vide order date 30-6-1967 (Annexure-1). He was later designated as Family Planning Field Worker and worked under the District Family Planning-cum-Health Officer, Vidisha. By order dated 16-3-1971, the petitioner was sent for a month's training from 5-4-1971 to 10-5-1971. In terms of the order for training he executed a bond (Annexure-3) for re-imbursing the expenses to the Government, if there was breach of condition to the effect that he would serve the State Government for a period of one year on completion of the training course. When the petitioner was already undergoing training, order dated 1-5-1971 was passed terminating his services along with services of three as 'no longer required'. The order further stated that the petitioner ceased from Government service with effect from 7-5-1971. This order was modified on 11-6-1971 and the date of termination of service was altered from 7-5-1971 to 5-6-1971. The petitioner made a representation against the termination of his services. The Government of Madhya Pradesh in the General Administration Department passed an order dated 21-3-1972 (Annexure-6) of the petition to the effect that since petitioner's services alongwith services of three other persons were terminated under the orders of the Minister concerned in May 1971, no interference could be made on his representation. This letter was signed by the then Chief Secretary of the State Government. Petitioner challenged the order of his termination in writ petition (Misc. Petition No. 157/73). The petition was partly allowed by the Division Bench of this Court vide its order dated 28-9-1979 wherein it was observed that the reason for termination of his services was not known and the reason given in the order that his services were 'no longer required' was not the true reason. The Court, therefore, directed the appropriate authority in Government. On 15-4-1980, order of the State Government in the Public Health and Family Planning Department was communicated to the petitioner, rejecting his representation. The Court, therefore, directed the appropriate authority in Government. On 15-4-1980, order of the State Government in the Public Health and Family Planning Department was communicated to the petitioner, rejecting his representation. The order of termination has been challenged by the petitioner on various grounds, but the grounds canvassed before me by the learned counsel for the petitioner are as follows- It was urged firstly, that termination of petitioner's services was by way of punishment at the instance of the Minister. Secondly, a month's notice was not given to him while terminating his services. Thirdly, his juniors had been retained and, therefore, termination of his services was discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Lastly, the department of Public Health and Family Planning in the State Government is 'Industry' within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') and the petitioner was a "workman". Termination of his services amounted to retrenchment and without payment of retrenchment compensation as required under Section 25F of the Act, it was invalid and liable to be quashed. In the return filed by the respondents, it was pleaded that services of the petitioner were terminated because his work was found unstisfactory and not by way of punishment. No stigma was cast in the order of his termination. On the second ground it was pleaded that order of termination was properly modified and a month's notice as required by the rules, had been duly given. On the third point it was submitted that there was no violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, because only such junior officers were retained who were found fit and competent. Lastly, it was stated that the petitioner was posted in a Primary Health Centre not attached to any hospital or dispensary and, therefore, he was not a 'workman' within the ambit of the Act and the provisions of the said Act were not applicable. First question for consideration is whether termination of the petitioner's services was punitive as alleged. Order dated 1-5-1971 (Annexure-4) terminating his services reads as follows: The services of the following Family Planning Field Workers are no longer required. They are ceased from Government service w. e. f. 7-5-1971.............. On the face of it this order is for termination of service simpliciter and does not cast any stigma on the conduct or character of the petitioner. Order dated 1-5-1971 (Annexure-4) terminating his services reads as follows: The services of the following Family Planning Field Workers are no longer required. They are ceased from Government service w. e. f. 7-5-1971.............. On the face of it this order is for termination of service simpliciter and does not cast any stigma on the conduct or character of the petitioner. But this very order had come up for consideration before this Court in Misc. Petition No. 157 of 1973 decided on 20-8-1979. Paragraph 4 of the order shows that this Court was of the view that the services were terminated on the orders of the Minister. This observation was based on the letter of the Chief Secretary dated 21-3-1972 (Annexure-6). The following observations made in the order passed in the earlier petition, are significant: The real reason not being known, the reason that his services were no longer required, shown in the order terminating the services does not appear to be the true reason...... As a result of this finding, the earlier petition was partly allowed and a direction was given to the State Government through its Chief Secretary to reconsider the representation of the petitioner and pass appropriate orders on merits. Thus, this Court had earlier held that the termination order was not as innocuous as the respondents profess it to be. The material on record shows that if the veil is lifted, it will be seen, as this Court saw it earlier, that the termination of service of the petitioner was punitive because the Minister concerned had orally given such orders. This inference is inescapable. Thus, though the petitioner was temporary servant, his termination being punitive in nature, could not be validly ordered without a proper inquiry about his alleged misconduct which prompted the Minister concerned to direct the authorities to terminate his services. It is now well established that even a temporary Government servant is entitled to protection under Article 311 of the Constitution of India, if he is sought to be dismissed or removed. Second question relates to validity of the notice. Rule 12 of the M. P. Government Servants (Temporary and Quasi-Permanent Service) Rules, 1960 provides that subject to any provision contained in an order, service of a temporary Government servant shall be liable to termination by notice in writing, the period of such notice being one month. Second question relates to validity of the notice. Rule 12 of the M. P. Government Servants (Temporary and Quasi-Permanent Service) Rules, 1960 provides that subject to any provision contained in an order, service of a temporary Government servant shall be liable to termination by notice in writing, the period of such notice being one month. The order of appointment of the petitioner dated 30-6-67 (Annexure-1) shows that the appointment was purely temporary and liable to be terminated without giving any notice. Rule 12 of the Rules mentioned above, will not be applicable. However, I may mention that had the Rules been applicable, the above order dated 1-5-1971 and the second order dated 11-6-1971 modifying the earlier order, would have been invalid because the first order did not give a month's notice as required under the Rules and the second order could not be made to operate retrospectively. However, in view of the condition of the service in the letter of appointment, this ground will not be available to the petitioner. The third ground about discrimination in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, is also of no avail, because it appears from the order of termination that the petitioner war not singled out by the Department but three other persons were also visited with the same fate. If the termination was on the ground of unsuitaiblity, as stated in the return, retention of persons junior to the petitioner, will not impinge Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The last and the most important point made by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the petitioner was a "workman" within the meaning of the Act and, therefore, his termination amounted to retrenchment. This being in contravention of the provisions of Section 25F of the Act, was invalid and liable to be quashed. This argument raised three questions: First is, whether the department in which the petitioner was serving and the nature of his duties constitiuted it to be an "industry". Secondly, whether the petitioner was a "workman" and thirdly, whether the termination of his-services was "retrenchment" within the meaning of the Act. It will be appropriate to reproduce the definitions of "Industry", "Workman" and "Retrenchment" under the Act. Secondly, whether the petitioner was a "workman" and thirdly, whether the termination of his-services was "retrenchment" within the meaning of the Act. It will be appropriate to reproduce the definitions of "Industry", "Workman" and "Retrenchment" under the Act. Section 2(j) of the Act defines "Industry" as follows: "Industry" means any business, trade undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers and includes any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen." Section 2(s) of the Act defines "Workman" as follows : "Workman" means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be expressed or implied, and for the purposes or any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to the dispute, but does not include any such person- (i) Who is subject to the Army Act 1950 ............ (ii) Who is employed in the police service___ ...... (iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial..................; or (iv ) who, being employed in supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding five hundred rupees per mensen or exercises...........functions mainly of a managerial nature. Section 2(00)of the Act defines "Retrenchment" as follows : - "Retrenchment" means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include- (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or (b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf; or (c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health; The crucial question is whether the District Family Planning-cum-Health Officer working under the Public Health and Family Planning Department of the State Government, is as "industry" within the meaning of the Act. Though the definition of "industry" reproduced above prima facie indicates an undertaking business, trade, manufacture etc. yet it has acquired new dimensions by judicial pronouncements from time to time. Formerly, meaning to the word "industry" was confined to business, trade or manufacturing activities of an organisation having employers and employees. Though the definition of "industry" reproduced above prima facie indicates an undertaking business, trade, manufacture etc. yet it has acquired new dimensions by judicial pronouncements from time to time. Formerly, meaning to the word "industry" was confined to business, trade or manufacturing activities of an organisation having employers and employees. But the word acquired a broader meaning later. Here also, there has been thinking and rethinking by the Supreme Court but the latest view takes the concept of "industry" in its widest amplitude and even covers such areas which were originally thought to be beyond its pale. Mass of case law has developed in the process, but I will only refer to those cases which are landmarks in defining the concept of "industry." In D.N. Banerji v. P.R. Mukherjee AIR 1953 SC 58 , for the first time, it was observed by the Supreme Court that "industry" includes within its scope what might not strictly be called "trade" or "business". In the said case a dispute arising between Municipality and their employees in certain branches of work, was held to be an "industrial dispute." In State of Bombay and others v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha and others AIR 1960 SC 610 , the question which arose before the Supreme Court was whether a hospital run by the Government is an "undertaking" within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Act. Following observations are significant: Nevertheless it cannot harp back the old-age notions about the relations between employer and employee or to the doctrine of laissez faire which then governed the regulation of the said relations. That is why in construing the wide words used in section 2(j) it would be erroneous to attach undue importance to attributes associated with business or trade in the popular mind in days gone by. Negatively stated the activities of the Government which can be properly described as regal or sovereign activities are outside the scope of Section 2(j). These are functions which a constitutional Government can and must undertake for governance and which no private citizen can undertake. But it is only these activities that are outside the scope of Section 2(j). Activities undertaken by the Government in the interests of socio-economic progress of the country as beneficial measures are not exempted from the operation of the Act which in substance is a very important beneficial measure itself. But it is only these activities that are outside the scope of Section 2(j). Activities undertaken by the Government in the interests of socio-economic progress of the country as beneficial measures are not exempted from the operation of the Act which in substance is a very important beneficial measure itself. In paragraphs 16 and 17 of the Hospital Mazdoor Sabha's case (supra), the Court put a question, "Whether a hospital run by the Government will be excluded from the definition of an 'undertaking' within Section 2(j) of the Act, whereas a similar institution by a private person cannot be excluded therefrom ?" To answer this question His Lordship Gajendragadkar J. observed as follows: We have yet to decide which are the attributes the presence of which makes an activity an undertaking within Section 2(j), on the ground that it is analogous to trade or business. It is difficult to state these possible attributes definitely or exhaustively; as a working principle it may be stated that an activity systematically or habitually undertaken for the production or distribution of goods or for the rendering of material services to the community at large or a part of such community with the help of employees is an undertaking. Such an activity generally involves the co-operation of the employer and the employees; and its object is the satisfaction of material human needs. It must be organised or arranged in a manner in which trade or business is generally organised or arranged. It must not be causal nor must it be for oneself nor for pleasure. Thus the manner in which the activity in question is organised or arranged, the condition of the cooperation between employer and the employee necessary for its success and its object to render material service to the community can be regarded as some of the features which are distinctive of activities to which Section 2(j) applies, Judged by this test there would be no difficulty in holding that the State is carrying on an undertaking when it runs the group of Hospitals in question. (Emphasis supplied), There was a slight reversal to this line of radical thinking in the case of The Management of Safdar Jung Hospital New Delhi v. Kuldip Singh Sethi AIR 1970 SC 1407 . (Emphasis supplied), There was a slight reversal to this line of radical thinking in the case of The Management of Safdar Jung Hospital New Delhi v. Kuldip Singh Sethi AIR 1970 SC 1407 . His Lordship Hidayatullah C.J. over-ruled the Hospital Mazdoor Sabha's case (supra) and observed that - Hospitals run by Government and even by private associations, not on commercial lines but ON charitable lines or as part of the functions of Government Department of Health, cannot be included in the definition of industry. The matter again came before a Bench of 7 Judges in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa AIR 1978 SC 548 , the Supreme Court overruled The Management of Safdar Jung Hospital, New Delhi v. Kuldip Singh (Supra) and approved the earlier ruling in Hospital Mazdoor Sabha's case (supra). Further, in Bangalore Water Supply's case (supra), reference was made with approval to another decision of the Supreme Court in The Corporation of the City of Nagpur v. Its Employees and another AIR 1960 SC 675 . A reference to The Corporation of the City of Nagpur case, therefore, will be useful because it distinguishes the regal function of the Government as against the service oriented functions. In paragraph 20 (ix) at page 687, the Supreme Court in that case considered the activities of the Health Department of the Corporation and found that this Department satisfied the tests laid down by the Court and is an 'industry' within the meaning of the definition of 'industry' under the Act. Now, applying the yard-stick formulated by the Supreme Court in the decisions cited above to the Department in which the petitioner was working, it will be noted that the functions of a Family Planning-cum- Field Worker have been enumerated in a booklet which has been filed by the learned counsel of the petitioner. There are as many as 25 items which the Family Planning Field Worker is supposed to carry out. It includes Propo-gation of family planning techniques, providing guidance to subordinate-officials like midwife and Basic Health Workers and several other functions-for promoting family planning and health consciousness in the villages. There are as many as 25 items which the Family Planning Field Worker is supposed to carry out. It includes Propo-gation of family planning techniques, providing guidance to subordinate-officials like midwife and Basic Health Workers and several other functions-for promoting family planning and health consciousness in the villages. These functions partake of the character of such activities which are undertaken by the Government in the interest of socio-economic progress of the country as beneficial measures and are not exempted from the operation of the Act which in substance is a very important beneficial measure itself. See observations in State of Bombay v Hospital Mazdoor Sabha (supra). The Primary Health Centres set up by the State Government in the Department of Public Health and Family Planning cater to this very object of creating consciousness about health and family planning in the masses. The District Family Planning-cum-Health Officer who is in charge of the Primary-Health Centres, has control over the staff engaged, medical instructions and health programmes in the district (See Annexure R-2). Thus, the activities-of Primary Health Centres under the Public Health and Family Planning Department of the Government are such which are carried on by an organisation having employers and employees, with its objective of providing material services to the community. These are akin to services rendered by Government hospitals. The Public Health Department of the State Government and Primary Health Centres working under it will constitute an 'industry' within the meaning of section 2(j) of the Act in the light of the amplified meaning given to this definition by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the cases cited above. The principal issue having been decided, there is no difficulty in holding that the petitioner was a 'workman' as defined under section 2(s) of the Act. About this, there could not be any dispute. Now the question which remains for consideration is whether termination of the services of the petitioner, who has been held to be a 'workman', amounted to his retrenchment within the meaning of section 2(oo) of the Act. If it is 'retrenchment' then section 25F of the Act will be attracted and if there is non-compliance with the conditions laid down therein, the termination will become invalid. Meaning of 'retrenchment' was considered by the Supreme Court in Santosh Gupta v. State Bank of Patiala AIR 1980 SC 1219 . If it is 'retrenchment' then section 25F of the Act will be attracted and if there is non-compliance with the conditions laid down therein, the termination will become invalid. Meaning of 'retrenchment' was considered by the Supreme Court in Santosh Gupta v. State Bank of Patiala AIR 1980 SC 1219 . It was held therein; The expression 'termination of service for any reason whatsoever' in section 2(oo) includes every kind of termination of service except those not expressly included in section 25F or not expressly provided for by other provisions of the Act such as 25-FF and 25-FFF. Since the termination of petitioner's services did not fall under the categories (a), (b) or (c) under section 2(oo) of the Act, it amounted to retrenchment within the meaning of this section. Section 25F of the Act lays down certain conditions for retrenchment and unless those conditions are fulfilled, a workman who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer, cannot be retrenched. The conditions are : (a) The workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice wages for the period of notice. (b) The workman has been paid at the time of retrenchment compensation which would be equivalent to 15 days average pay for every completed of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months, and (c) Notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or suc% authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette. None of the above conditions have been fulfilled by the respondents and, therefore, the termination of petitioner's services which amoanted to retrenchment' under the Act, was illegal and invalid. In the result, the petition is allowed and the order of termination of services of the petitioner, dated 1-5-1971 (Annexure-4) and the subsequent order dated 11-6-1971 (Annexure-5) are quashed. Similarly, the final order dated 15-4-1980 (Annexure-8) to the petition passed by the State Government in the Public Health and Family Planning Department, is also quashed. Respondents shall bear the costs of the petitioner. Advocates' fees Rs. 250 if certified. The outstanding security amount Rs. 100 be refunded to the petitioner. Petition allowed