JUDGMENT 1. IN this proceeding, the writ petitioner has challenged the order dated 17.2.1979 passed by Sri M. C. Sen Gupta, Deputy Magistrate and Deputy collector and Appellate Authority under the West Bengal Restoration of Alienated land Act, 1973 at Uluberia in the district of Howrah in LR. Appeal Case No. 57 or' 1977-78 dismissing the appeal preferred by the petitioner against an order dated 26.11.1977 passed by the Block Development Officer (Special Officer) Udayanarayanpore, Howrah in case no. 102 of 1976. 2. THE respondent no. 3 sold dag no 1464 appertaining to khatian no. 376 of Mouza kurichi being a plot of agricultural land measuring about. 17 acre to the petitioner on 24. 3. 1970 by a registered deed of sale for a consideration of Rs. 1000/ -. In the said document reason for sale was mentioned as the necessity for money on account of the business of the vendor. Thereafter the respondent no. 3 applied before the Special Officer for restoration of the said land under section 4 (1) (a) of the West Bengal Restoration of Alienated Land Act, 1973 (hereinafter called the Act) and in the said application he mentioned that the reason for sale was the need of money for maintenance of family and repayment of debt. He also stated in his application that there was an oral agreement between the parties for reconveyance of the disputed land on payment of the consideration money within Chaitra 1383 B. S. The Special Officer after taking evidence from the parties allowed the application of the respondent no. 3 on the ground that he sold the Land being in distress. The Special Officer further found that there was reliable evidence of oral agreement between the parties for reconveyance of the disputed land and that even assuming that there was no such agreement for reconveyance, the petitioner satisfied the condition that being in distress he was forced to sell the disputed land to the present petitioner. On such findings, the Special Officer allowed the application of the respondent no. 3. Against the said order of the Special Officer, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority in his impugned order has found that as the respondent no. On such findings, the Special Officer allowed the application of the respondent no. 3. Against the said order of the Special Officer, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority in his impugned order has found that as the respondent no. 3's family was to be maintained by very small earning from his trade in rice on a very small scale and that was the main source of income of his family, he disposed of the disputed land to keep the business running and such disposal was a distress sale for maintenance of the family. In that view, the appellate Authority has dismissed the appeal by the impugned order dated 17.2.1979 3. IT has been submitted by Mr. Mukherjee appearing for the petitioner before this Court that the decision of the Appellate Authority is contrary to the evidence of respondent no. 3 himself who has stated on oath that he did not take money (by sale of the disputed land)for running his business and is, therefore, perverse. He has further submitted that as the Appellate Authority is the respondent no. 2, the Special Officer being respondent no. 1 and both of them after service of the Rule have not filed any return it should be held that the allegations made and the grounds taken against them that they misred and misinterpreted the materials on record are correct and the Rule against them should be made absolute. On the other hand, it has been submitted on behalf of the respondent no. 3 by Mr. Roy Choudhury that the Special Officer has allowed the application of the respondent no. 3 on two grounds, viz, economic distress and oral agreement for reconveyance and that as the petitioner's lawyer did not challenge the second ground of oral agreement for reconveyance before the Appellate Authority, whatever be the infirmity in the finding of the Appellate Authority regarding the first ground, the decision of the Appellate authority should be upheld in view of the other ground found by the Special Officer, any argument against which was given up or abandoned on behalf of the present petitioner, before the Appellate Authority. In this connection, he has referred to the decision in the case of Gouri Sankar vs. Hindusthan Trust (Private) Limited, 1973 (2) SCC 127 and the decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in Paresh Nath vs. Kamal Krishna. In this connection, he has referred to the decision in the case of Gouri Sankar vs. Hindusthan Trust (Private) Limited, 1973 (2) SCC 127 and the decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in Paresh Nath vs. Kamal Krishna. 61 CWN 779 He has also relied on the decision of a single Bench of Lahore High Court in the case of Karim baksh v. Quarter Baksh, AIR 1950 Lahore 126. He has called in aid the aforesaid decisions in support of his proposition that in 1he absence of an affidavit from the learned counsel who argued the case before the appellate forum that he raised a point which was not discussed by the appellate Judge or Authority in the judgment, it is to be taken that the said point was; not raised on behalf of the appellant and was given up or abandoned. But as it has been rightly pointed out by the learned Advocate for the petitioner, the precondition for taking that view is that there must be express statement in the judgment of the Appellate Court or Authority that no other point was argued on behalf of the appellant. In this connection, reference may be made to the observations of the supreme Court in paragraph 11 of the judgment in the decision reported in 1973 (2) SCC 127 that if the court expressly says than only certain points have been argued and no other point has been argued, the statement in the judgment has, prima facie, to he accepted as correct. In the present case, there is no such statement in the judgment of the Appellate Authority to indicate that no other point was taken or the point assailing the finding of the Special officer regarding the existence of oral agreement for reconveyance was not taken before the Appellate Authority. It has been pointed out that in paragraph 1 of the memo of appeal filed before the Appellate authority, the petitioner specifically denied the existence of such oral agreement for reconveyance of the disputed land. 4. AFTER considering the submissions made by (the learned Advocates of the parties and the impugned decision of the Appellate authority, I find that the Appellate Authority did not direct itself properly to the relevant issue in the appeal arising out of the, decision of the Special Officer and than his finding that the respondent no. 4. AFTER considering the submissions made by (the learned Advocates of the parties and the impugned decision of the Appellate authority, I find that the Appellate Authority did not direct itself properly to the relevant issue in the appeal arising out of the, decision of the Special Officer and than his finding that the respondent no. 3 sold the disputed land to keep his small scale rice business running or for the purpose of the said business is contrary to the evidence of the respondent no. 3 himself before the Special Officer that he did not take the money (by selling the disputed land) for the purpose of his business. The decision of the Appellate Authority is such as no reasonable person properly instructed in law would take on the material on record. The appellate officer has by making a finding of fact contrary to evidence misdirected himself in law and has committed an error of law reviewable under the writ jurisdiction of this Court. (See De Smith's Constitutional and Administrative law, 3rd Edn. P 560). A finding of the lower court does not become final when the appellate court does not adjudicate upon the question (See Ebratunnensa bibi v. Debendra Nath Sen 37 CWN 892 db). On the same principle the finding of the Special Officer in this case on oral agreement for reconveyance is not final and the appellate authority has failed to exercise its jurisdiction by not deciding that question without stating expressly that it was not raised on behalf of the appellant. The decision of the appellate Authority should, therefore, be set aside and it should be directed to hear the appeal afresh in accordance with law. It is therefore ordered that the impugned decision of the Appellate Authority be quashed by a Writ of Certiorari and the Appellate Authority be directed by a Writ of Mandamus to hear the appeal and dispose of the same in accordance with law. Let the status quo as to possession be maintained till the disposal of the appeal. The Rule is made absolute. There will be no order as to costs. Rule made absolute.