M. P. CHANDRAKANTARAJ, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition coming on for preliminary hearing after notice to respondents is disposed of by the following order after hearing counsel for parties. ( 2 ) PETITIONER was the successful lessee who acquired leasehold right over certain buildings situated in hiriyur town in the bus-stand belonging to the Town Municipal Council of Hiriyur which is the 1st respondent herein. At the auction held on 22-4-1982, in terms of the he deposited a sum of Rs. 63,000 being the rent of six months agreeing to pay monthly rental of Rs. 10,500 It was also one of the terms and conditions of the auction of the lease-hold that the the leasee should formally execute lease deed in accordance with law within a specified time. The petitioner has however, contended that he was ready and willing to do that at all times but due to supervening facts and circumstances was never permitted to execute that deed by action of respondents-1 and 2 Town municipal Council and its Chief officer respectively. ( 3 ) HOWEVER, the 2nd respondentchief Officer of the 1st respondent town Municipal Council came to issue an order of attachment of moveables on 25-10-1982 against the petitioner's properties in the premises which he had taken on lease from the 'st respondent Town Municipal Council in which he was running a hotel at the bus-stand. A true copy of that notice is produced as Annexure-D to the petition, pursuant to that notice, the petitioner's belongings found in the premises were taken away forcibly despite his protests and he was prevented from carrying on business in the premises and he was locked out of the premises by the agents of the 1st and 2nd respondents, aggrieved by the same, the petitioner filed a suit in the court of the Munsiff at Chitradurga and while that suit was pending he approached this Court also under article 226 of the constitution for relief inter alia contending that the entire action of the 2nd respondent in ordering attachment on the alleged arrears of rent being due by the petitioner was high-handed and without the authority of law putting the petitioner to a great loss. In the course of hearing, of this writ petition when it was pointed out that the petitioner could not possibly maintain a suit and also this writ petition in this Court, the suit pending in the court of the Munsiff was withdrawn as the petitioner considered that the remedy under Article 226 of the constitution would be more efficacious in the light he had been placed. The responndents have entered appearance and filed their statement of objections. In defence of their action, it is stated that the petitioner did not pay rents for a period five months from the date of lease and that the respondents were apprehensive that the petitioner was leaving the municipal limits in order to avoid payment of monthly dues under the lease and therefore, in exercise of the power conferred on the respondents by section 148 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) cocrsive and emergent action was taken to attach the moveables. In regard to certain other details, there has been denial of the allegations that the respondents and their agents have acted high-handedly it is in the light of the facts and the contentions raised that this Court has to determine the only question that falls for determination and that is : whether there was any justification legal or otherwise for the 2nd respondent to initiate action under Sec. 148 of the Act? chapter-6 of the Act deals with municipal taxation and provides for tax and procedure for levy. Chapter-7 of the Act deals with recovery of municipal dues. Though at one stage sri Balasubramanyam, learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that power of recovery under Section 148 is confined to recovery of dues in respect of taxes and fees levied under the Act and would not relate to the contractual obligations arising out of lease agreements and certainly would not include rent, when attention of the Court was drawn to the provisions made in 161 of the Act, that contention was not pressed. But he nevertheless contended that the action initiated by the 2nd respondent in ordering attachment under S. 148 of the Act was without the authority of law as he had no power under S, 154 of the Act. Therefore, it would be useful to examine the scope of S. 148 and S. 154 of the Act for that limited purpose. But he nevertheless contended that the action initiated by the 2nd respondent in ordering attachment under S. 148 of the Act was without the authority of law as he had no power under S, 154 of the Act. Therefore, it would be useful to examine the scope of S. 148 and S. 154 of the Act for that limited purpose. S. 154 of the Act reads as follows :" 154 : Recovery of rent on land: (1) Where any sum is due on account of rent from a person to the Municipal Council in respect of land vested in, or entrusted to the management of, the Municipal Council, the Municipal Council may apply to the Deputy commissioner to recovery any arrear of rent as if it were an arrear of land revenue. (2) The Deputy Commissioner on being satisfied that the sum is due shall proceed to recover it as an arrear of land revenue. " ( 4 ) FROM the above, tt is clear that any amount which is due to the town Municipal Council can be recovered as an arrear of land revenue on an application made by the Municipal Council to the Deputy commissioner as long as that amount is due on account of rent payable by a person in respect of presumbaly premises belonging to the Municipality. But it is not the case of the respondents that they have followed the procedure prescribed in S. 154. of the Act. On the otherhand, Sri vasudeva Reddy, learned councel for the respondents relies upon the plain language of S. 142 of the Act which does not make a distrinction between either tax or rent. In the light of that argument, it is useful to examine the language of S. 148 of the Act. S. 148 of the Act is as follows:-"148, Summary proceeding may be taken against about to leave the Municipality;- (1) If the Municipal Council has reason to relieve that any person from whom any sum recoverable un- der the provisions of this chapter is due or is about to become due, is about to leave the Municipality, th'e Municipal Council may cause a bill for the sum due or about to be come due to be present ed to such person and demand immediate payment thereof. (2) If, on presentation of such bill, the said person does not forth with pay the sum due or about to become due by him, the amount shall be leviable by distress and sale of the movable property or attachment and sale of immovable property of the defaulter in the manner hereinbefore prescribed, except that it shall not be necessary to serve upon the defaulter any notice of demand and the Municipal Council's warrant for distress or attachment and sale may be issued and executed without any delay. " ( 5 ) THE language used in subsection (1) of S. 148 is any sum recoverable under the provisions of the chapter in which that section occurs. It is therefore, contended that the rents on lands provided under the same chapter as the recovery of taxes and fees, there was no inhibition for the 2nd respondent to Act under S. 148 of the Act in the circumstances of the petitioner's case. While on this section it is useful to notice that sub-section (2) is the only check imposed on the, exercise of power under sub-section (1) But to exercise power under sub-section (1) the Municipal Council must have reason to believe that the person from whom any sum is recoverable under the provisions of that chapter is about to leave the Municipality. Before resorting to coersive methods of recovery, under sub-section (2) it is mandatory that a bill for the amount due should be presented to the person against whom the power is sought to be exercised. In the instant case, a demand is said to have been made on 18-9-1982 under S, 142 and 148 of the Act in the sum of Rs. 57,225 being the rents due from may, 1982 to August, 1982 and it is only thereafter that the action was taken on 25-10-1982 to attach the properties of the petitioner. In the instant case, a demand is said to have been made on 18-9-1982 under S, 142 and 148 of the Act in the sum of Rs. 57,225 being the rents due from may, 1982 to August, 1982 and it is only thereafter that the action was taken on 25-10-1982 to attach the properties of the petitioner. I find it difficult to accept this explanation because undisputedly the petitioner had deposited six months rent at the time he was declared the successful bidder at the auction and thereafter though in terms of the lease that wasrequired to be executed the advance was to be given due deduction only on determination of August, 1982 the petitioner was due to pay rent which was required to be recovered by resorting to coercive steps merely on the complaint of some persons who heard that the petitioner was going to leave the Hiriyur Municipal limits and go away, that complaint was also made on 18-9-1982. On the very same day, the demand for the rent has been made. No explanation has come forward from the respondent as to why the rents were not demanded in accordance with terms of the lease as and when they fell due. In any event as the petitioner had deposited the sum of Rs. 63,000 there was adequate security in the Municipality to cover the rents for the period of five months and for the breach of conditions of lease they could have initiated separate action by terminating the lease of the petitioner for non payment of rent and not complying with the terms of the lease. Not having done that, it is obvious that the respondents were motivated by some other cause to proceed with the attachment of moveables of the petitioner in the manner in which they have done as evidenced by Annexure-D to the petition which is a mahazar of the attachment effected. ( 6 ) I am unable to understand the logic of resorting to the procedure prescribed under S. 148 of the Act when they had ample funds of the petitioner in their own hands which was liable for adjustment on termination of lease which termination they could have brought about in the subsequent month by issuing proper notice. Not. ( 6 ) I am unable to understand the logic of resorting to the procedure prescribed under S. 148 of the Act when they had ample funds of the petitioner in their own hands which was liable for adjustment on termination of lease which termination they could have brought about in the subsequent month by issuing proper notice. Not. having done that in the circumstances of this case, I must conclude that the Chief Officer who appears to have initiated action has erroneously exercised his power in resorting to the procedure prescribed under S. 148 of the Act. Officers holding such responsible position should not be carried away by complaints of the so called citizens of the town who have only heard that the petitioner lease was about to leave the town limits permanently. Even if he had left, there would have been no loss to the Municipality. On the otherhand. the petitioner has resisted the action taken by the respondents and had approached Civil count for relief in anticipation of any steps the Municipality may take for eviction of the petitioner from the premises. But Annexure-D is indicative of the fact that on 25-10-1982 he was locked out by those who carried out the attachment of movables. In otherwords, the respondents effectively prevented the petitioner from re-entering the premises leased to him and also disabled him from carrying on the business by attaching untensils. I am told that even today, the possession continues with the Municipality though Mr. Reddy brought to my notice a letter signed by the petitioner that the petitioner took possession of the premises. That is a matter which need not be decided here. But what is in dispute is the improper and unauthorised action of the 2nd respondent by which the petitioner has been effectively prevented from utilising the premises which he was otherwise entitled to occupy and use, by attaching all his utensils used in a hotel for which purpose the premises was leased. I do not think besides attachment, preventing the petitioner from occupying the premises can be said to be with the authority of law. I must hold, on the admitted facts of this case, that the Municipality deprived the petitioner from using the building from 25-10-1982, illegally. The petitioner has withdrawn the suit filed by him and has brought suitable amendments to the writ petition. I must hold, on the admitted facts of this case, that the Municipality deprived the petitioner from using the building from 25-10-1982, illegally. The petitioner has withdrawn the suit filed by him and has brought suitable amendments to the writ petition. ( 7 ) IN the result, I have reached the conclusion that the Chief Officer was not justified in acting on the complaint. Therefore. I must necessarily hold that the power exercised by him under S. 148 of the Act was impermissible and improper. There fore, the entire attachment is rendered illegal. ( 8 ) IN that circumstance, it is appropriate that rule should issue in this case and that will be to the following effect:- (1) The Municipal Council shall forthwith return all the properties attached under the mahazar to the petitioner within one week from the date of receipt of this order. (2) As informal termination of the lease has been brought to my notice, the petitioner must be declared to be entitled to possession of the leased premises which he had successfully bid at the auction held earlier. (3) The respondents are refrained from preventing the petitioner from occupying the premises. (4) Once the properties attached are returned to the petitioner and the petitioner has commenced the business, he shall formally execute the lease as agreed to in terms of the auction notification within one month from such date. (5) I also must in the extraordinary circumstances of the case, declare that the petitioner is not bound to pay any rent for the period between 25-10-1982 and the date of restoration of possession as directed above pursuant to the lease and therefore will not be liable on that ground to be evicted for non-payment of rent for that period. However, the question of payment of rent for the period from May, 1982 to september, 1982 it left open to be decided by the parties themselves or in a Civil Court having jurisdiction. ( 9 ) I must not fail to point out that S. 154 of the Act provides for a special mode for recovery of rent and occurring as it does after S. 148 in the Act, should be construed as having excluded the mode of recovery in S. 148 of the Act. If held otherwise there would be clear repugnancy between the provisions and that should be avoided. If held otherwise there would be clear repugnancy between the provisions and that should be avoided. ( 10 ) ACCORDINGLY, this Writ Petition is allowed. ( 11 ) THE petitioner is entitled to costs. The Advocate's fee is fixed at --- *** --- .