Judgment B.P. Griyaghey, J. This is an application under section 481 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by two of the accused of complaint Case No. 28 of 1982 of the court of the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Koderma at Hazaribagh, who were accused Nos. 5 and 6 of that case to quash the order dated 31.7.1982 by which the learned Magistrate has taken cognizance of the case so far as these petitioners are concerned. 2. The complainant-opposite Party No.2 of this application had filed a complaint before the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate Koderma at Hazaribagh alleging inter alia that he had placed orders for supply of 34 Pump Sets with M/s Barega Engineering Industries Private Limited. It was further alleged that the complainant was assured that the consignments would be transported through the Road Transport Corporation and the Transport Corporation of India. It was further alleged that subsequently the complainant detected that out of the five bills, three consignments notes were in the name of the Economic Transport Organisation. 1t is stated that this was against the terms of contract that the consignments bad to be transported through agencies known as Transport Corporation of India and Road Transport Corporation. It was further alleged that the complainant could receive only six pumps out of 14 pumps for which the contract was made though, the transport receipts were issued for the remaining 8 pumps but these were not delivered at all to the complainant. It was therefore complained that the complainant was induced to make payment on misrepresentation of facts and had been cheated of a total sum of Rs.24,761,90/- The complainant, therefore, filed a complaint against the accused Nos. 4 who are the Managing Director and other Directors of M/s Bareja Engineering Industries Private Limited which had entered into contract with the complainant to supply. These petitioners were made as accused Nos. 5 and 6 described as Directors of the Economic Transport Organisation. It was stated that accused company of which the accused persons are Directors, Managers and Officers in conspiracy with the agents and officials of Economic Transport Organisation have committed an offence of cheating and also bleach of trust with respect of the said amount. "The complaint was, therefore under Section 406/420 of the Indian Penal Code (in short 'the Code'). 3. "The complaint was, therefore under Section 406/420 of the Indian Penal Code (in short 'the Code'). 3. The learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate Koderma has taken cognizance under section 420 of the Penal Code against the petitioners and others and has transferred the Case to the file of Shri R. Sinha, Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Koderma for disposal who issued processes under section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against all the accused persons, including these petitioners. 4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners has raised three points as grounds for quashing the order taking cognizance of the case so far as the petitioners are concerned. His first point is that though in the petition of complaint, there is no allegation against the petitioners having themselves committed the offence of cheating, but from some averments made in the complaint petition, it appears that there is an allegation against these petitioners of having entered into conspiracy with the principal offenders namely accused Nos. 1 to 4 who are the Director etc., of the Supplier Company, M/s Bareja Engineering Industries Private Limited. The first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that even against the principal accused persons, namely, accused Nos. 1 to 4, the officials of the Supplier-Company on the allegations made in the petition of compliant, at best a case of breach of contract which is of a civil nature, is made out. On this score, it is contended that if no offence is said to have been committed by the principal accused persons, the petitioners who are alleged by the complainant to have entered into the conspiracy with the principal offenders, cannot be said to have committed any offence. But this point does not find favour with me in view of the fact that the allegation that the complainant had made against the principal offenders is not only of a simple breach of contract, but of having cheated the complainant by having entered into the contract and not complied with the terms with the end of Cheating the compliant. 5. The second point contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that at any rate on the perusal of the petition of complaint, no allegation is made out against those petitioners of either having entered into any contract with the complainant or to have committed any Act, of cheating. 5. The second point contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that at any rate on the perusal of the petition of complaint, no allegation is made out against those petitioners of either having entered into any contract with the complainant or to have committed any Act, of cheating. It is further contended that the petition of complaint does not also allege any Act, of conspiracy said to have been committed by these petitioners along with principal offenders by which the petitioners can be charged for an offence on the strength of section 120B of the Penal Code read with section 420 of the Penal Code. It is a well settled principle of law that in the question of quashing the prosecution at this stage the only matter to be considered is the allegation that is made in the petition of complaint to see as to whether if on these allegations even taken for granted any offence is made out against the petitioners who seek to quash the Prosecution. On perusal of the different paragraphs of the complaint-petition, particularly to paragraphs 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 to which the learned counsel for opposite party No.2, the complainant, has adverted to during his argument. I do not find that there is any allegation made of facts constituting an Offence of conspiracy, said to have been committed by these petitioners along with principal offenders namely the Supplier-Company. What has been alleged in paragraph 11 is simply the fact that though the contract was between the complainant and the Supplier Company (the principal accused persons) to send the consignment through Road Transport Corporation and the Transport Corporation of India but it was detected by the complainant that some bills were sent in the name of Economic Transport Organisation (of which these petitioners are said to have the Directors). But this allegation in paragraph 11 is only against the principal offenders, namely the Supplier-Company who had acted in the manner against the terms of the contract and the misrepresentation that it had made to the complainant at the time of contract. There is no allegation in paragraph 11 of the complaint petition so far as the Economic Transport Organisation is concerned. In paragraph 12 of the complaint-petition, the allegation is only against the Supplier Company. There is no allegation in paragraph 11 of the complaint petition so far as the Economic Transport Organisation is concerned. In paragraph 12 of the complaint-petition, the allegation is only against the Supplier Company. Learned counsel for opposite party No.2 has particularly placed reliance on the averments made in paragraph 13 of the complaint petition in which the different transport receipts are referred to and on the basis of which by referring to certain documents, namely the receipts, the learned counsel wants to connect the name of this Economic Transport Organisation. But it may be noted that even in this paragraph there is allegation in that para 13 that it was Economic Transport Organisation which had committed any such act. It may be noted at this place that for deciding the matter, the evidence cannot be looked into. The matter has to be considered only on the allegation made in the complaint-petition to see if any offence is made out against the petitioners. 6. So far as paragraph 14 of the complaint-petition is concerned also there is no allegation against these petitioners or the Economic Transport Organisation. So also as the position so far as of paragraph 15 of the Complaint petition is concerned. 7. It is only in paragraph 16 of the compliant-petition that it is stated that the Supplier Company in conspiracy with the agents and officials of the Economic Transport Organisation have committed this offence of cheating and breach of trust. But it may be noted that even in this paragraph there is no allegation, made of facts constituting the offence against the Economic Transport Organisation or its Officials having entered into any conspiracy with the principal offenders. It is a well settled principle of law that the complaint petition should allege the facts constituting the offence. It is not enough that simply the offence is named as an offence like that of conspiracy or of cheating as to have been committed by a particular person. The fact constituting the offence has to be alleged, and in its absence no offence can be said to have been committed simply by stating that such offence has been committed. 8. Thus, on perusal of the complaint-petition. The fact constituting the offence has to be alleged, and in its absence no offence can be said to have been committed simply by stating that such offence has been committed. 8. Thus, on perusal of the complaint-petition. I do not find that there is any allegation of facts made against the Economic Transport Organisation or its officials by which they can be said to have committed an offence either of conspiracy Or of Cheating. 9. The third ground on which the learned counsel of the petitioner has contended that the prosecution should be quashed is the fact that in his complaint-petition there is no allegation particularly against these petitioners, by name or by designation to have specifically committed any act. It is simply stated in paragraph 16 of the complaint petition in a general way that it is conspiracy with the agents and officials of the Economic Transport Organisation. Since the complainant bad made these petitioners by name as Directors of that Company to have committed an offence, it should have been alleged that it were these persons as Directors particularly who had committed any Act, on the ground of which they can be held guilty for the offence alleged. There is no such assertion in the complaint petition so this ground of the petitioners counsel also appears to have force. 10. It may also be mentioned here that even in the order dated 31.7.1982 by which the learned Magistrate had taken cognizance against six persons who were apparently divided in two categories, according to the complaint-petition Category no (1) those of the Supplier-Company and category No. (2) Those of transport agencies there is nothing in the order taking cognizance as to how the accused of category (2), namely the petitioners appeared prima facie to the Magistrate to have committed the offence of conspiracy or cheating. The learned Magistrate has not taken cognizance against these petitioners of having entered into any conspiracy with the principal offenders, but the order can be construed as to have taken cognizance against the petitioners also for the principal offence of cheating itself. 11. On these grounds I feel that the order taking cognizance against the petitioners is without jurisdiction and that order so far as the petitioners are concerned, is hereby quashed. 12. In the result, the application is allowed and the order taking cognizance against these petitioners is quashed. 11. On these grounds I feel that the order taking cognizance against the petitioners is without jurisdiction and that order so far as the petitioners are concerned, is hereby quashed. 12. In the result, the application is allowed and the order taking cognizance against these petitioners is quashed. The case against others will proceed. Application allowed.