JUDGMENT K.N. Goyal, J. - The Petitioner Smt. Farzana Bi is a Muslim lady who seeks the assistance of this Court for stopping the further exhibition of the film 'Nikah'. 2. Two grounds have been urged before us. Firstly, the film begins with depiction of nude women showing that women have been suppressed by men. The second ground is that the film shows that a Muslim male cannot remarry his divorced wife unless and until after divorce she has been married with another person and both live as husband and wife and thereafter the second husband divorces her. According to the Petitioner this view of Muslim Law is a misrepresentation of the precepts of holy Quran. This may misguide the public. Such misrepresentation is also hurtful to the sentiments of the Muslim community and as such the misrepresentation comes within the mischief of Section 153A of Indian Penal Code. Continued exhibition of the film containing such misrepresentation is liable to affect public order. 3. We have heard learned Counsel for the Petitioner. 4. The first ground has no substance. Mere showing of nude female form is not necessarily obscene. It has not been alleged that the manner in which the nude pictures appear in the film is such that it is likely to arouse unhealthy lustful thoughts in the minds of viewers. 5. As regards the alleged misrepresentation of Muslim Law, the well-known jurist Tahir Mahmood in his Muslim Law of India (1980 Edition page 134) has this to say on the subject: 6. A divorced woman can freely remarry the same man who has divorced her, except in the following cases: (a) under all schools of Law: when he has divorced her for the third time; and (b) under Hanafi Law: also when he has triply divorced her in a single pronouncement actually meaning thereby three talaqs. 6. In the aforesaid exceptional cases, the woman cannot re-marry the same man. If she does so, the second marriage will be void. 6. In the aforesaid exceptional cases, the woman cannot re-marry the same man. If she does so, the second marriage will be void. However, if the divorced woman in the meanwhile (after iddat, if legally necessary) marries a person "other than her first husband and later this second marriage is also dissolved in any lawful manner, she can now lawfully marry her first husband provided that: (a) the marriage with the second husband was consummated (which fact is to be proved by the woman's statement): (b) following the dissolution of the second marriage she has observed iddat of divorce. 7. The aforesaid restriction on re-marriage between the spouses applies to all cases of dissolution of marriage in whatever form it takes place, except in the following cases under Shafei and Ithana Ashari laws: (a) a Khula or mubara at: (b)annulment of marriage by the wife because of husband's impotency, insanity or inability to provide maintenance. 8. The contention of learned Counsel for the Petitioner is that the view expressed in the film is contrary to the tenets of Islam. So far as matters of religion are concerned, there is often controversy even in the highest religious quarters. Such controversies are endless and cannot be resolved by Courts of law. As observed by Dr. Tahir Mahmood, again at rage 13 ibid: In India the traditional law of the Muslims is to be accepted as it is found in the books of authority. The Courts or the lawyers do not have to locate the principles of law in the Quran or the Sunnat, nor have they to look or arrange for Ijma (Consensus of the Jurists) on any particular issue. 9. The Petitioner is, of course, entitled to her own views in regard to the true interpretation of Quran Sharif on the subject. No one is preventing her from holding or expressing those views. She is free to rebut the view expressed in the film by any public rejoinder. However, the Constitution guarantees freedom of expression to persons holding different views. In the famous words of Justice Holmes "....If there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought-not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought who hate." U.S. v. Schwimmer 279 U.S. 644, 654, 655 (1929). 10. In the famous words of Justice Holmes "....If there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought-not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought who hate." U.S. v. Schwimmer 279 U.S. 644, 654, 655 (1929). 10. Likewise, another famous American Judge Brandeis observed as follows in the well known case of (Miss) Whitney v. Calif, vide The World of Law edited by Epraim London (1960 Edition) at pages 593-598: Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and association. Men fear witches and burned women. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if freedom of speech is practised. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one. 11. The learned Judge quoted the following inspring words of Thomas Jefferson in support of this reasoning: We have nothing to fear from the demoralising reasons of some, if others are left free to demonstrate their errors and especially when the law stands ready to punish the first criminal act produced by the false reasoning; these are safer corrections than the conscience of the Judge. 12. This disposes of the Petitioner's contention that the exhibition of this film is likely to affect public order because of its being offensive to the sentiments of the Petitioner and like-minded persons. Indeed, the same liberal approach was advocated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Raj Kapoor Vs. Laxman, AIR 1980 SC 605 , in which their Lordships observed that freedom of expression was fundamental. 13. The petition is, accordingly, dismissed in limine. 14. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner made an oral prayer for a certificate under Articles 131 and 134A of the Constitution. We are not satisfied that the case involves any substantial question of law of general importance which may require to be decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. As such the certificate prayed for is refused.