H. N. SETH, J. ( 1 ) BY this petition for a writ of habeas corpus, petitioner Hafiz Ansari seeks to question the validity of his detention under Section 3 of the National Security Act (hereinafter referred. to as the Act), authorized by the District Magistrate, Moradabad, vide his order dated 13th of October, 1982. ( 2 ) ON 21st of September, 1982 Police Inspector Dharm Veer Singh, Station Officer, Police Station Mughalpura, Moradabad, lodged a first information report implicating the petitioner in connection with offences under Section 147/353/153-A Indian Penal Code and Section 3 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act. The petitioner surrendered himself before the Chief Judicial Magistrate in connection with the aforesaid case on 12th of October, 1982 and on 13th of October, 1982 he was directed to be released on bail. While directing the release of the petitioner on bail, the Chief Judicial Magistrate also directed him not to enter the city of Moradabad for a period of two months. Before the petitioner could, in pursuance of the order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, be released on bail, be was served with the impugned detention order, grounds thereof and the supporting documents which included a copy of the first information report dated 21st jf September, 1982, general diary entry dated 21st of September, 1982 and the report submitted by the Deputy Superintendent, Local intelligence Unit dated 22nd of September, 1982. ( 3 ) THE grounds of detention served upon the petitioner referred only to following single incident as forming the basis of District Magistrates satisfaction that it was necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to maintenance of public order: On 20th September, 1982 dead body of Qamaruddin was found lying on the bank of Ram Ganga behind lama Masjif. in the city of Moradabad. The discovery of the body caused an atmosphere of distrust, fear and tension in the entire city. Again on the morning of 21st September, 1982 dead body of Hazi Khalil Ahmad was found lying behind lama Masjid. A crowd of about 700-800 which included the petitioner gathered near the dead body and prevented the police from preparing the inquest report. The discovery of the body caused an atmosphere of distrust, fear and tension in the entire city. Again on the morning of 21st September, 1982 dead body of Hazi Khalil Ahmad was found lying behind lama Masjid. A crowd of about 700-800 which included the petitioner gathered near the dead body and prevented the police from preparing the inquest report. With great difficulty the police could manage to move the dead body to lama Masjid from where it wanted to take it on a jeep to the mortuary for postmortem examination. However, the petitioner along with his companions Sultan, Mohd. Fahim, Mohd. Usman, Babu Ahsan, Abdul Hafiz, Salim Pahelwan, Muslim Kukhtar, Babu Ahsan carried the body to Mohalla Parizada. In the way the petitioner was shouting all this is the work of Hindus, we will take the revenge. For each time will take ten lives. Thus the petitioner had by forcibly taking away the dead body from the Police and raising aforementioned slogans infused a feeling of hatred and revenge amongst the Muslims. Such activity of the petitioner created a feeling of fear, terror and tension in the entire city. In connection with this incident crime case No. 246/82 under section 147/353/153-A Indian Penal Code and Section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act had been registered against him. Report of the Local Intelligence Unit dated 22nd September, 1982 mentioned about aforementioned activity of the petitioner which had prejudicially affected the maintenance of public order. In due course, the order for petitioners detention received the approval of the State Government and was confirmed by it. ( 4 ) BEFORE us learned counsel for the petitioner questioned the validity of the order dated 13th of October, 1982 of following grounds: 1. The fact that the petitioner was involved in a single incident referred to in the grounds for his detention, could not be treated as a material on the basis of which the Distinct Magistrate could be satisfied that the petitioner was likely to act in a manner prejudicial to maintenance of public order and that it was necessary to detain him with a view to prevent him from so acting. 2. At the time when the order for petitioners detention was passed, he was already in jail custody, and as such was incapable of acting in a manner prejudicial to maintenance of public order. 2. At the time when the order for petitioners detention was passed, he was already in jail custody, and as such was incapable of acting in a manner prejudicial to maintenance of public order. There is absolutely no explanation in the order as to why detention of the petitioner was considered necessary these in circumstances. 3. The order of detention was passed on considerations other than those mentioned in the order which factually did not exist. 4. In any case the order of detention stands vitiated inasmuch as the District Magistrate had before passing the detention order omitted to consider relevant material. ( 5 ) SO far as the first submission of the learned counsel is concerned, we find no merit in it. The order of detention to be made under the Act is essentially a precautionary measure and it is based on a reasonable prognosis of the future behaviour of a person based on his past conduct judge in the light of surrounding circumstances. Such past conduct may consist of one single act or of a series of acts. But whatever it be, it must be of such a nature that an inference can reasonably be drawn from it that the person concerned would be likely to repeat such acts so as to warrant his detention. It may be easier to draw such inference where there is series of acts evincing the course of conduct, but even if there is a single act, such an inference may justifiably be drawn in a given case. See Debu Mehta v. State of West Bengal. In the instant case, considering the nature of and the manner in which the petitioner is alleged to have participated in the incident of 20-9-1982 anyone could reasonably conclude that even in future the petitioner was likely to indulge in activities directed towards generating the feelings of hatred between Muslims and Hindus and incitement to Muslims to take revenge from Hindus by killing them and thereby disturbing the public order. We are accordingly at opinion that the order for petitioners detention does not stand vitiated merely because the inference that the petitioner was likely to act in a manner prejudicial to maintenance of public order and that it was necessary to detain him with a view to prevent him from so acting was based on a single incident that took place on 20th of September, 1982. ( 6 ) SO far as the second ground for attacking the validity of the order for petitioners detention is concerned; learned counsel for the, petitioner submitted that the object of making an order for detention under the Act is to prevent a person from acting in a manner prejudicial to maintenance of public order. Admittedly when the order for petitioners detention was passed on 13th of October, 1982 he was already in jail custody and was incapable of acing in any such manner so as to endanger public order. He contended that in the circumstances the District Magistrate was not justified in directing petitioners detention. ( 7 ) IN the case of Rameshwar. Shaw v. District Magistrate; Burdwan it was observed thus: As an abstract proposition of law, there may not be any doubt that section 3 (1) (a) does not preclude the authority from passing an order of detention against a person whilst he is in detention or in jail; but the relevant facts in connection with the making of the order may differ and that may make a difference in the application of the principle that a detention order can be passed against a person in jail. Take for instance, a case where a person has been sentenced to rigorous-imprisonment for 10 years. It cannot be seriously suggested that soon after the sentence of imprisonment is pronounced on the person, the detaining authority can make an order directing the detention of the said person after he is released from jail at the end of the period of the sentence imposed upon him. In dealing with this question, again the consideration of proximity of time will not be irrelevant. On the other hand, if a person who is undergoing imprisonment, for a very short period, say for a month or two or so; and it is known that he would soon be released from jail, it may be possible for the authority to consider the antecedent history of the said person and decide whether the detention of the said person would be necessary after he is released from jail and if the authority is bona fide satisfied that such detention is necessary, he can make a valid order of detention a few days before the person is likely to be released. ( 8 ) FOLLOWING the decision in Rameshwar Shaws case the Supreme Court in the case of Biru Mahto v. District Magistrate, Dhanbad observed thus: One can envisage a hypothetical case where a preventive order may have to be made against a person already confined to jail or detained. But in such a situation as held by this Court it must be present to the mind of the detaining authority that keeping in view the fact that the person is already detained a preventive detention order is necessary. The subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority must comprehend the very fact that the person sought to be detained is already in jailor under detention and yet a preventive detention order is a compelling necessity. If the subjective satisfaction is reachable without the awareness of this very relevant fact, the detention order is likely to be vitiated. But as stated by this Court, it will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. ( 9 ) IT is thus clear that the proposition that the order of detention necessarily stands vitiated where at the time of passing the order the petitioner is in detention cannot be accepted as a correct proposition of law of universal application. As pointed out by the Supreme Court, even in such case an order of detention can be passed provided the detaining authority is, on material available to it, satisfied that the petitioner is going to released from custody shortly and that after being so released he is likely to act in a manner prejudicial to maintenance of public order. We find that in the present case, the District Magistrate has in paragraph 6 of his counter-affidavit stated that the impugned order was passed only when after surrendering before the court the petitioner had moved an application for bail and it was apprehended that he was going to be so released. It, therefore, appears that while passing the impugned order the District Magistrate was aware that the petitioner was in jail custody but he apprehended that he was going to be released on bait shortly and that thereafter he would be in a position to indulge in activities prejudicial to maintenance of public order. The impugned order, therefore, does not stand vitiated for the reason that the same was passed at a time when the petitioner was already in jail custody. The impugned order, therefore, does not stand vitiated for the reason that the same was passed at a time when the petitioner was already in jail custody. ( 10 ) COMING now to the third submission of the learned counsel, his case is that a first information report regarding the incident dated 21st of September, 1982 which farmed the subject matter of the ground for petitioners detention, was lodged on the same date (Annexure 5 to the writ petition ). The Local intelligence Unit had reported the aforesaid incident to the Senior Superintendent of Police with copy to the District Magistrate on 22nd of September, 1982 (Annexure 6 to the writ petition) and had prayed that appropriate action may be taken. Even though all the facts which had been recited in the grounds on which the petitioners detention was based, had been brought to the notice of the District Magistrate on 22nd of September, 1982, the District Magistrate did not consider it necessary to take any action thereupon at that stage. It was only when the petitioner had, after surrendering before the court, applied for bail that the Station Officer, Mughalpura submitted another report to the District Magistrate on 12th of October, 1982 (Annexure 4 to the writ Petition) in which the Station Officer described the antecedents of the petitioner thus: Abdul Hafiz who was aged about 35 years had been spoiled because of over indulgence by his parents. He started associating with ruffians and had characters and became accustomed to strong arm tactics for terrorizing members of the public. He was a communal minded person and had been inciting Muslims against persons belonging to other religious. He had actually participated in the communal riot of the year 1980, but because of his fear and terror no one made any report against him. He had, after creating terror in the city of Moradabad, indulged in activities prejudicial to maintenance of public order and be banked upon his gundagardi. After describing the antecedents of the petitioner as aforesaid, the report went on to make a reference to the incident of 21st of September, 1982 and prayed that appropriate orders directing petitioners detention under the National Security Act be passed. After describing the antecedents of the petitioner as aforesaid, the report went on to make a reference to the incident of 21st of September, 1982 and prayed that appropriate orders directing petitioners detention under the National Security Act be passed. It was on the basis of this report, wherein his antecedents had been described, that the District Magistrate decided to pass the impugned order for petitioners detention with reference to the incident of 21st of September, 1982. While passing the order for petitioners detention, the District Magistrate was thus influenced by the antecedents of the petitioner. But then there was absolutely no material on which the District Magistrate could believe that the petitioners antecedents were such as had been described by the Station Officer in his report and the order for petitioners detention, therefore, stands vitiated. ( 11 ) THE District Magistrate has in paragraph 10 of his counter affidavit stated thus: - the deponent had not passed his order on the grounds that the witnesses had not dared to give evidence against the petitioner on account of the terror. While examining the said matter the deponent had also noted these facts contained in the police report but since the police station could not furnish specific instances of petitioners involvement in any case, the deponent did not place reliance on that same. As is clear in the grounds of detention itself, the deponent has specifically referred to the activities of the petitioner on which the deponent felt that the petitioner was potential threat to the maintenance of public order. So far the lapse of three weeks in passing the order of detention is concerned, suffice it to say that the said order was passed only when the petitioner surrendered in the criminal case against him and had moved an application for bail for which there was apprehension of his being released by the court concerned. The case of the District Magistrate, therefore, is that although the antecedents of the petitioner were reported to him by the Station Officer in the report dated 12th of October, 1982, but then he did not take those antecedents into consideration and that he merely recorded his satisfaction on the basis of the incident of 21st of September, 1982 as was recorded to him. According to learned counsel for the respondents, there is no reason to doubt the sworn testimony of the District Magistrate in this regard. Since the antecedents of the petitioner disclosed in the police report dated 12th of October, 1982 had not been taken into consideration by the District Magistrate, the order of petitioners detention cannot be vitiated on the third ground urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner. ( 12 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner, however, contended that the statement made by the District Magistrate that he did not take the antecedents of the petitioner as reported by the Station Officer in his report dated 12th of October, 1982 into consideration, should not be taken on its face value and the circumstances of the case do indicate that he passed the order merely because of recital of such antecedents made by the Station Officer on 12th of October, 1982. He contended that so far as the incident of 22nd of September, 1982 was concerned, it had already come to the knowledge of the District Magistrate when copy of the report made by the local intelligence unit with the request for necessary action was forwarded to him on 22nd of September, 1982, even after receiving the said information the District Magistrate did not choose to pass any detention order against the petitioner while he was still free and had not surrendered before the court. The petitioner eventually surrendered before the Court on 12th of October, 1982 and made an application for being released on bail? It was at this stage that the Station Officer submitted his report dated 12th of October, 1982 in which he had apart from describing the incident dated 21st jf September, 1982 (the facts regarding which incident were already in the knowledge of the District Magistrate) describe the antecedents of the petitioner in the manner described above and requested the District Magistrate to take proper action against the petitioner by detaining him under the provisions of the National Security Act. This according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, establishes that the District Magistrate had decided to direct petitioners detention on the basis of the incident of 21st of September, 1982 merely, because of the manner in which petitioners antecedents had been described by the Station Officer. The submission made by the learned counsel appears to be plausible. This according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, establishes that the District Magistrate had decided to direct petitioners detention on the basis of the incident of 21st of September, 1982 merely, because of the manner in which petitioners antecedents had been described by the Station Officer. The submission made by the learned counsel appears to be plausible. The only reason given by the District Magistrate for explaining the delay of three weeks in making the detention order after the facts regarding the incident of 21st of September, 1982 had been brought to his notice was that he passed the said order only when the petitioner surrendered in the criminal case against him had moved an application for bail for which there was apprehension of his being released by the court concerned. There was, in our opinion, greater necessity for directing petitioners detention in the light of the incident of 21st of September; 1982, before the petitioner had actually surrendered. The explanation offered by the District Magistrate in this regard, therefore, does not appeal to us. In this connection in paragraph 11 of his counter-affidavit concerning other persons who were, like the petitioner, involved in the incident of 21st of September, 1982, the District Magistrate made the following statement: - i is stated that the order of detention was passed against Abdul Ansari and the petitioner as and when they surrendered. It is again incorrect to state that the orders of detention have not been passed against Ahsan and Fahim. The order of detention had already been passed against Fahim and Ahsan also who are absconding and are avoiding their arrest It is thus clear that the fact whether a particular person involved in the incident of 21st of September, 1982 had surrendered or not did not weigh with the District Magistrate (as has been claimed by him in the case of the petitioner) in passing the order for detention under Section 3 of the Act. We are, accordingly, inclined to accept that the District Magistrate was while passing the order for petitioners detention influenced by his antecedents as described by the Station Officer in his report dated 12th of October, 1982. We are, accordingly, inclined to accept that the District Magistrate was while passing the order for petitioners detention influenced by his antecedents as described by the Station Officer in his report dated 12th of October, 1982. In view of the statement made by the District Magistrate in paragraph 10 of his counter affidavit it is clear that there was no material before him on the basis of which he could feel satisfied that petitioners antecedents were such which had been mentioned in the report dated 12th of October, 1982 made by the Station Officer and as such the order for petitioners detention based on facts for which there was no material before the District Magistrate, stands vitiated. ( 13 ) SO far as fourth ground of attack on the order for petitioners detention is concerned, the case of the petitioner is that while granting bail to him the Chief Judicial Magistrate had directed that the petitioner would not enter the city of Moradabad for a period of two months. As by the bail-order the petitioner was directed to remain outside Moradabad, no I question of his disturbing the public order in the city of Moradabad could thereafter remain. As the District Magistrate omitted to consider this relevant fact which had a bearing on the question whether the petitioner was in future likely to act in manner prejudicial to maintenance of public order, for petitioners detention stands vitiated. The case of the respondents in this regard, as set out in paragraph 14 of the counter-affidavit sworn by the District Magistrate, is that he had passed the order for petitioners detention before bail had actually been granted to him by the Chief Judicial Magistrate and as such no question of the District Magistrate being aware that the petitioner was, under the bail-orders to be restrained from entering the city of Moradabad arises. Merely because the Chief Judicial Magistrate subsequently passed the bail order imposing the condition that the petitioner would not remain in the city of Moradabad for two months will not have the effect of vitiating the petitioners detention. The District Magistrate, however, went on to urge that merely because the petitioner could not enter the city of Moradabad it did not mean that he could be deterred from indulging in such activities from outside Moradabad which could result in disturbance of public order and tranquility inside the city of Moradabad. The District Magistrate, however, went on to urge that merely because the petitioner could not enter the city of Moradabad it did not mean that he could be deterred from indulging in such activities from outside Moradabad which could result in disturbance of public order and tranquility inside the city of Moradabad. In the view which we have already taken in-connection with the third submission made by the learned counsel, it is not necessary for us to go into the question whether the petitioners detention stands vitiated for taking into consideration the condition on which he had been directed to be released on bail by the Chief Judicial Magistrate. ( 14 ) IN the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The respondents are directed to release the petitioner from custody forthwith. Petition allowed. .