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1983 DIGILAW 235 (PAT)

Mahendra Kumar Sinha v. Vice Chancellor

1983-09-05

P.S.MISHRA, UDAY SINHA

body1983
JUDGMENT : Prabha Shankar Mishra, J. – The petitioner, a field overseer (agronomy Section) in Rajendra Agriculture University, Bihar, Patna, has moved this court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India against the ORDER :of the Chancellor of the University dated 24.10.1979 (Annexure-1) and the Vice-Chancellor of the University dated 28.6.1979 (Annexure-2) and questioned the validity and legality of his dismissal from service. He has prayed for a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the ORDER :s contained in Annexures 1 and 2. 2. Facts, briefly stated, are that the petitioner, on his appointment as a Field Overseer (Agronomy Section) under the University initially served at Araria from where he was transferred to Katihar on 14.9.1977. On impaction of the accounts of the Irrigations Research Section, Araria, certain acts of omission and commission of the petitioner were noticed upon which on 4.11.1977 the Vice Chancellor (the respondent no.2) issued an ORDER :putting him under suspension pending enquiry into the charges. A resolution of the Vice Chancellor of the University date 27.3.1979 was forwarded to the petitioner by Dr. N.P. Tiwary, Professor and Vice-principal, Bihar Agriculture College, Sabour, on 2.4.1979, along with a communication requesting him to submit within 15 days of the receipt of the resolution a written statement of defence before him and to state whether he desired to be heard in person and to have witnesses, if any, examined on his behalf. Dr. Tiwary also asked the petitioner to meet him on 26.4.1979 at 11 A.M. in the Chamber of Professor of Botany, Bihar Agriculture College, Sabaur. In the resolution (Annexure 5) the Vice Chancellor stated that the petitioner, who was under suspension, was prima facie guilty of acts of omission and commission as set forth in the charges contained in Annexure-A to the resolution and he accordingly resolved to draw up a regular departmental proceeding against him in the manner prescribed in Rule 167 of the Boards Miscellaneous Rules. Dr. N.P. Tiwary was appointed to enquire into the charges and the petitioner was asked to state before the Inquiry Officer whether he desired to be heard in person and have witnesses, if any, examined on his behalf. Dr. N.P. Tiwary was appointed to enquire into the charges and the petitioner was asked to state before the Inquiry Officer whether he desired to be heard in person and have witnesses, if any, examined on his behalf. Charges in four heads alleging misappropriation of Farm-produce, unauthorised occupation of Quarters of the Farm, misbehaviour and misconduct were served upon the petitioner along with the said resolution of the Vice Chancellor and the Communication from the Inquiry officer. The petitioner filed his written statement of defense (Annexure 7) on 30.5.1979 denying the allegation furnishing his explanations to the charges. The petitioner, however, did not state that he wanted to be heard in person and/or to examine any witness in his defence. Dr. Tiwary submitted his report to the Vice Chancellor along with his findings. On 28.6.1979 vide Memo No. 3398 (Annexure 2) of the Director, Administration, the petitioner was informed that vide Office ORDER :O.O.3398/RAV (VC) dated 28.6.1979, the Vice Chancellor dismissed the petitioner from University service with effect from the date of issue of the ORDER :. The petitioner thereafter filed a petition before the Vice Chancellor requesting him to furnish of the Conducting Officer of the Departmental Proceedings (Annexure 6) but the same was not given to him. The petitioner filed an appeal before the Chancellor of the University. The Chancellor obtained the commenter/reports from the Vice Chancellors but fixed no date for hearing of the appeal. The petitioner filed an application on 15.9.1979 before the Chancellor praying for fixing a date for hearing. The Chancellor, however, rejected the petition of appeal of the petitioner vide Memo No. 3343 GS(1) Patna dated 24.10.1979 (Annexure 1). The petitioner has, thereafter, come to this Court. 3. In the return filed on behalf of the Vice Chancellor of the University, respondent no.2, and Dr. N.P. Tiwary, Vice Principal, Sabour Agricultural College, Bhagalpur, respondent no.4 (Inquiry Officer), it has been stated that a number of complaint had been received against the petitioner from. 7 employees of the Araria station regarding misbehaviour, misappreciation, misconduct and dereliction of the duty by the petitioner and the University had constituted a Committee of three senior officers, namely, Shitala Prasad Singh, Assistant Biologist, Sri K.S. Asthana, Assistant Oilseed Specialist and Dr. 7 employees of the Araria station regarding misbehaviour, misappreciation, misconduct and dereliction of the duty by the petitioner and the University had constituted a Committee of three senior officers, namely, Shitala Prasad Singh, Assistant Biologist, Sri K.S. Asthana, Assistant Oilseed Specialist and Dr. Ram Kumar, Professor of Horticulture to go into the details of irregularities as revealed in the inspection report of the account of the Irrigation Research Institute, Araria, as well as other charges leveled against the petitioner. The said Committee was formed by the University by its resolution no. 8973 dated 9.11.1977. All the 17 members of the staff who had made allegation against the petitioner reiterated their allegations before the said committee in their depositions. Copies of their depositions were sent to the petitioner along with memo of charges and he was asked to file his written statement of defence and to state before the Inquiry Officer whether he desired to be heard in persons and whether he wanted witnesses to be examined in his behalf or not. The petitioner, however, chose only to furnish a written statement without stating anywhere that he intended to examine any witness and/or to cross-examine any witness in support of the charges. The petitioner was shown the relevant records and given full opportunity to defend himself. It is admitted that the petitioner asked for the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer, but it is stated that there is no provision to furnish a copy of the findings under the Statutes of the University, as such the same was not supplied to him. 4. Before proceeding, however, to consider the contentions of the learned counsel of the parties a bird’s eye view of the law on the subject seems desirable. The Rajendra Agricultural University has been established by the Rajendra Agricultural University Act, 1971 (Bihar Act VII of 1971). The Statutes framed as specified in Section 35 of the Act were published in the Bihar Government Gazette on 12.7.1976. Rules as to the conduct of the employees of the University, discipline, inquiry, punishment and appeal are provided under Statute 13.9. Penalties divided in two broad heads, namely, minor and major, are prescribed under clause (2) of Statute 13.9. clauses (3) to (8) of Statute 13.9 contain provisions as to the procedure and other particulars as to the imposition of penalty upon a delinquent servant of the University. Penalties divided in two broad heads, namely, minor and major, are prescribed under clause (2) of Statute 13.9. clauses (3) to (8) of Statute 13.9 contain provisions as to the procedure and other particulars as to the imposition of penalty upon a delinquent servant of the University. Clause (3) to (8) of Statute 13.9, however, were amended vide notification no. 5448 dated 28.12.1978. Clause (3) of Statute 3.9, before amendment, provided – “the appointing authority shall be competent to impose any of the punishments mentioned in clause (2), provided that no ORDER :shall be passed imposing any major penalty on University employee unless he has been given an adequate opportunity of making any representation that he may desire to make and such a representation has been duly taken into consideration. Note – In a case in which an University employee has been convicted for an offence involving immoral turpitude and an ORDER :of conviction has become final, ORDER :for dismissal shall be issued forthwith.” After the amendments Clause (3) of Statute 13.9 runs as follows : – “The appointing authority shall be competent to impose any of the punishments mentioned in clause (2), and an authority, subordinate to the appointing authority; namely, Deans, Directors and Principals can impose any minor punishment to Class III and Class IV employees mentioned in sub-clause (a) of Clause (2), and the punishment of censure in the case if empowered to do so by the former. Provided that no ORDER :shall be passed imposing any major penalty on a University employee unless he has been given an adequate opportunity of making any representation that he may desire to make and such a representation has been duly taken into consideration. Explanation. – The full procedure indicated in clause (4) below for a major punishment need not be followed in case of minor punishment. It will be sufficient if the officer concerned is given an opportunity of explaining the charges against him and the explanation so submitted is taken into consideration before ORDER :s are passed.” 5. Explanation. – The full procedure indicated in clause (4) below for a major punishment need not be followed in case of minor punishment. It will be sufficient if the officer concerned is given an opportunity of explaining the charges against him and the explanation so submitted is taken into consideration before ORDER :s are passed.” 5. Clause (8) of Statute 13.9 before amendment contained the following provision : – “After the enquiry against a person has been completed and the punishing authority has arrived at a provisional finding and has proposed is dismissal, removal, compulsory retirement or reduction in the rank, be supplied with a copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer or Committee and be called upon to show cause within a reasonable time which shall not be less than two weeks and not more than one month against the particular penalty proposed to be inflicted upon him. Reply to the show-cause, if any, submitted by the accused employee shall be taken into consideration before final ORDER :s are passed.” After the amendment Statute 13.9, clause (8) now provides : – “After the enquiry against a person has been completed the appointing authority shall consider the report of the Enquiry Officer or Committee along with the evidence adduced during the inquiry and be competent to pass final ORDER :s including the imposition of penalties specified in Clause (2).” 6. It is thus obvious that until amended Statute 13.9 contemplated a full dress enquiry beginning from the communication in writing of the charges to the University servant concerned calling upon him to state whether he admitted the truth of all or any of the charges; what explanation or defence, if any, he had to offer; and, whether he desired to be heard in person; taking or evidence, oral or documentary, in respect of such of the charges as were not admitted, or in respect of the extenuating circumstances; permitting the person charged to cross-examine the witnesses and to examine witnesses in defence; and on completion of the enquiry giving to the employee concerned a notice to show cause against the penalty proposed to be inflicted upon him if the provisional conclusions justified dismissal, removal, compulsory retirement or reduction in the rank. The amendment of clause (8) of the Statute 13.9 has now dispensed with the requirement of a notice to show cause against the penalty proposed to be inflicted. The amendment of clause (8) of the Statute 13.9 has now dispensed with the requirement of a notice to show cause against the penalty proposed to be inflicted. Proviso to Clause (3) of the Statute 13.9, however, gives an impression that even now after the amendment no ORDER :imposing any major penalty on an University employee can be passed unless he has been given an adequate opportunity of making a representation and the representation, if made in taken into consideration. Although a servant of the University is not a member of a civil service, either of Union or of a State or any of Indian Services and a post under the University is not a civil post under the Union or State as contemplated under Article 311 of the Constitution of India, Clauses (3) to (8) of Statute 13.9 made provisions more or less similar to one contemplated under the said Article applicable to an employee of the University. Before the 42nd Amendment, Article 311 provided that a person holding a civil post under the Union or a State or a member of a civil service of the Union of a State or any of Indian Services, shall not be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank by an officer below the rank of the appointing authority and that, “no such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an enquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against hem and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges and where it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose on him any such penalty, until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed, but only on the basis of the evidence adduced during such enquiry.” The 42 Amendment deleted the words, “and where it is proposed, after such enquiry, to impose on him any such penalty, until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed, but only on the basis of the evidence adduced during such enquiry.” It introduced, however, the following provision :– “Provided that where it is proposed after such enquiry to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such enquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed.” Unlike the words, “and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed” introduced by the 42nd amendment in Article 311 of the Constitution, the words in Clause (3) of Statute 13.9 even after the amendment state “no ORDER :shall be passed imposing any major penalty on an University Employee unless he has been given an adequate opportunity of making any representation that he may desire to make and such a representation has been duly taken into consideration.” It is somewhat anomalous that on the one hand the provision for the notice to show cause against the penalty proposed to be inflicted has been repealed and on the other hand a provision to give to the employee concerned opportunity of making representation before the ORDER :imposing any major penalty is made has been retained. One may get the impression that even after the amendment of Clause (8) of Statute 13.9, the requirement of a notice calling upon the employee concerned to show cause against the penalty proposed to be inflicted upon him is necessary. But, is it so ? A closer examination of the relevant provisions in the Statute 13.9 provides the answer in the negative, Clause (4) of Statute 13.9 states – “the ground on which it is proposed to impose any major punishment shall be communicated in writing to the University servant concerned and he shall be required to state within a reasonable time … ……” Clause (5) of Statute 13.9 provides – “If the appointing authority is satisfied that a prima-facie case against the defaulting employee is established, an enquiry shall be instituted by appointing a Enquiry Officer or committee.” Clause (6) of Statute 13.9 provides – “At the enquiry all evidences, oral or documentary, shall be adduced in respect of such of the charges as are not admitted, or in respect of extenuating circumstances, if any, which are pleaded in defence………”. Clause (8) of Statutes 13.9 thereafter says- “after the enquiry against a person has been completed the appointing authority shall consider the report of the Enquiry Officer or Committee along with the evidence adduced during the enquiry and be competent to pass final ORDER :s.” 7. The provisions of the relevant Statutes, quoted above, appear to settle the procedure that at the first instance the delinquent servant shall be served with the ground on which it is proposed to impose any major punishment; if the delinquent employee denies the charges and the appointing authority is satisfied that a prima facie case against the defaulting employee is established, an enquiry shall be instituted by appointing an Enquiry Officer or Committee; and opportunity shall be given to the person charged to cross examine the witnesses and should have such witnesses called as he may wish. After the conclusion of the enquiry no further opportunity need be given to the delinquent employee and the appointing authority may impose the punishment or dismissal, removal, compulsory retirement or reduction in the rank on being satisfied on the basis of the report of the Enquiry Officer or Commission and the evidence adduced during the enquiry. 8. After the conclusion of the enquiry no further opportunity need be given to the delinquent employee and the appointing authority may impose the punishment or dismissal, removal, compulsory retirement or reduction in the rank on being satisfied on the basis of the report of the Enquiry Officer or Commission and the evidence adduced during the enquiry. 8. It is admitted at the Bar that the petitioner is an employee of the University and his case will be governed by Statutes 13.9 Learned counsel for the University has stated that rule 167 of the Boards Miscellaneous Rules has got no application to the case of the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to show any provision under which rule 167 of the Boards Miscellaneous Rules, which are applied to the non-gazetted employees of the government of the State of Bihar, can be applied to a servant of the University. The statement in the resolution of the Vice Chancellor of the University (Annexure-5), under which the proceedings were drawn up against the petitioner making a reference to rule 167 of Boards Miscellaneous rules was/is erroneous. In fact, the Vice Chancellor should not also have appointed the Enquiry Officer under the very resolution under which he directed for the initiation of the proceeding and called upon the petitioner to files his written statement of defence. The scheme as envisaged in the Statute required at the first instance service of the grounds upon the petitioner calling upon him to state whether he admitted the truth of all or any of the charges; what explanation or defence, if any, he had to offer; and whether he desired to be heard in person and only thereafter he could institute an enquiry by appointing an Enquiry Officer or Committee. 9. I cannot desist saying that the Vice Chancellor acted rather hastily and failed to observe the discipline which the Statute expects from a person in his position. 10. Mr. Shyama Prasad Mukherjee, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended before us that there has been no enquiry held as contemplated under Clause (6) of Statute 13.9 in asmuch as the petitioner was not supplied with the copy of the allegations and the documents in support thereof and no witness was examined in course of enquiry to prove the allegations. He has submitted that no opportunity even to inspect the records was provided to him. He has submitted that no opportunity even to inspect the records was provided to him. He has also contended that the charges leveled against him are vague and most of them are unsupported by any material. Mr. Mukherjee has emphasized that language of Clause (6) of Statute 13.9 makes it imperative that all evidences oral or documentary should be adduced at the enquiry in respect of such of the charges as are not admitted, or in respect of the extenuating circumstances, if any. According to him no evidence, oral or documentary, was adduced at the enquiry. As the petitioner was a person charged he was entitled to cross-examine the witnesses and have such witnesses called who could support his defence. No such opportunity was provided to him. 11. Mr. Mukherjee although referred to several cases to support his contention, but a JUDGMENT : of this Court in the case of Bishram Sinha v. The State of Bihar & ors. (1980 B.B.C.J. 227) requires particular mention. Mr. K.B.N. Singh and Mr. S. Ali Ahmad, JJ. considered a contention as to whether a public servant can be pronounced guilty in a departmental proceeding on the basis of the evidence of the witnesses recorded behind his back and held :– Electrical Engineer, Subdivision no. 2, Shri Jamuna Pd. Yadav and Suryabansh, unskilled Khalasi of Sub-division No. 2 were not examined before the enquiry officer. They were really examined at preliminary stage before framing of the charge. Mr. Mallik has urged that the statement of these witnesses was recorded at the preliminary enquiry before framing of the charge having been asked by the petitioner. It was for the petitioner to pray for calling for the witnesses and to examine and cross-petitioner did not examine them and therefore no grievance could be made by the petitioner, that the enquiring officer erred in law in relying on their evidence. We do not find any substance in this contention of Mr. Mallik. It is well settled that if in a department of witness recorded behind the back of a delinquent officer at any earlier stage, is sought to be relied upon, the same should be served on the delinquent officer and an opportunity should be given to the delinquent officer by producing the witness for cross-examination. Mallik. It is well settled that if in a department of witness recorded behind the back of a delinquent officer at any earlier stage, is sought to be relied upon, the same should be served on the delinquent officer and an opportunity should be given to the delinquent officer by producing the witness for cross-examination. The onus in such a proceeding is on the prosecutor to establish the charge against the delinquent public servant and unless it is done consistent with the principles of natural justice, there is no obligation on the part of the delinquent officer to pray for calling for a particular witness for cross-examination, which is squarely the duty of the prosecutor in an enquiry. The matter would have been different, if the petitioner was afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the witness, whose statement was furnished to the petitioner earlier, but he failed to avail of the opportunity. But that is not the position in the instant case. We are, therefore, satisfied that the basic principle of natural justice has not been followed in the instant case, which vitiates the findings against the petitioner regarding charge no.3”. 11. Mr. Mukherjee will be right, on the facts of the present case, in suggesting that the proceeding against the petitioner stood vitiated if witnesses were not either examined at the enquiry or produced for cross-examination at the enquiry or produced for cross-examination at the enquiry by the petitioner. But before saying any thing specifically, I propose to ponder a little more. Provisions as contained in Clauses (4) and (6) of the Statute 13.9 are extensions of the principles embodied under section 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and Article 311(2) of the constitution. Arguments similar to those advanced by Mr. Mukherjee were repeatedly made in cases after cases and the Courts applied the principles suited to the requirements of and in accordance with the facts of each case. The principles which govern a domestic enquiry of the services under a State are (i) reasonable opportunity to the concerned officer to deny his guilt and establish his innocence and (2) reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses produced against him and examine himself or other officials/persons on his behalf. The principles which govern a domestic enquiry of the services under a State are (i) reasonable opportunity to the concerned officer to deny his guilt and establish his innocence and (2) reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses produced against him and examine himself or other officials/persons on his behalf. In the case of State of U.P. v. Om Prakash Gupta ( AIR 1970 S.C. 679 ), it has been pointed out : – “It is true that an enquiry under Section 240 of the Government of India Act, must be conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice. But those principles are not embodied principles. What principle of natural justice should be applied in a particular case depends on the facts and circumstances of that case. All that the courts have to see is whether the non-observance of any of those principles in a given case is likely to have resulted in deflecting the course of justice.” In the same case the Supreme Court has further said : – “This court has repeatedly laid down that the statements of the witnesses taken at the preliminary stage of the enquiry were used at the time of the formal enquiry does not vitiate the enquiry if those statements were made available to the delinquent officer and he was given opportunity to cross examine the witnesses in respect of those statements”. Proceeding further on the subject the Supreme Court in the case of K.L. Shinde v. State of Mysore (AIR 19976 SC 1080) has pointed out : – “Whether or not there is sufficient evidence against a delinquent to justify his dismissal from service is a matter on which this Court cannot embark. It may also be observed that departmental proceedings do not stand on the same footing as criminal prosecutions in which high degree of proof is required. It is true that in the instant case, reliance was placed by the Superintendent of Police on the earlier statements made by the three police constables including Akki from which they resiled but that did not vitiate the enquiry or the impugned ORDER :of dismissal, as departmental proceedings are not governed by strict rules of evidence as contained in the Evidence Act”. In the case of State of Mysore and others v. Shivabasappa Shivappa Makapur ( AIR 1963 S.C. 375 ), it has been said : – “For a correct appreciation of the position, it is necessary to repeat what has often been said that tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions are not Courts and that therefore they are not bound to follow the procedure prescribed for trial of actions in Courts nor are they bound by strict rules of evidence. They can, unlike Courts, obtain all information material for the points under enquiry from all sources, and through all channels, without being fettered by rules and procedure which govern proceedings in Court. The only obligation which the law casts on them is that they should not act on any information which they may receive unless they put it to the party against whom it is to be used and give him a fair opportunity must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case but where such an opportunity had been given, the proceedings are not open to attack on the ground that the enquiry was not conducted in accordance with the procedure followed in Courts.” The Supreme Court considered the contention based upon the observation that, “the evidence of the opponent should be taken in the presence.” In the case of Union of India v. T.R. Varma ( AIR 1957 SC 882 ) and said, “read literally the passage quoted above is susceptible of the construction which the learned Judges have put on it, but when read in the context of the facts stated above, it will be clear that is not its true import. No question arose there as to the propriety of admitting in evidence the statement of a witness recorded behind the back of a party. The entire oral evidence in that case was recorded before the enquiring officer, and in the presence of the petitioner. So there was no question of contrast between evidence recorded behind a party and admitted in evidence against him, and evidence recorded in his presence. What was actually under consideration was the procedure to be followed by quasi-judicial bodies in holding enquiries, and the decision was that they were not bound to adopt the procedure followed in Courts, and that it was only necessary that rules of natural justice should be observed. What was actually under consideration was the procedure to be followed by quasi-judicial bodies in holding enquiries, and the decision was that they were not bound to adopt the procedure followed in Courts, and that it was only necessary that rules of natural justice should be observed. Discussing next what those rules required, it was observed that the person against whom a charge is made should know the evidence which is given against him, so that he might be in a position to give his explanation. When the evidence is oral, normally the examination of the witness will in its entirety, take place before the party charged, who will have full opportunity of cross-examining him. The position is the same when a witness is called, the statement given previously by him behind the back of the party is put to him, and admitted in evidence, a copy thereof is given to the party, and he is given an opportunity to cross-examine him. To require in that case that the contents of the previous statement should be repeated by the witness word by word, and sentence by sentence, is to insist on bare technicalities, and rules of natural justice are matters not of form but of substance. In our opinion they are sufficiently complied with when previous statements given by witnesses are read over to them, marked, on their admission, copies thereof given to the person charged, and he is given an opportunity to cross-examine the.” 12. It thus follows from the discussions above that the primary test will always be to see as to whether the delinquent was given full opportunity to deny the charge and to cross-examine the witnesses and lead evidence if he desired to show his innocence. It is the admitted position that the petitioner was asked to state if he desired to be heard in person and to examine witnesses on his behalf or not. He neither asked for being heard in person nor requested to examine the witnesses on his behalf. Copies of the statement of the witnesses were given to him. Opportunity was given to him to inspect the records and except in respect of one charge made no grievance that relevant materials were not supplied to him. Materials and informations upon which the respondent no.3 proceeded to submit his report were not required to be proved in accordance with the rules of evidence. Opportunity was given to him to inspect the records and except in respect of one charge made no grievance that relevant materials were not supplied to him. Materials and informations upon which the respondent no.3 proceeded to submit his report were not required to be proved in accordance with the rules of evidence. The petitioner had no prejudice whatsoever on this account. It was no part of the duty of the department to ask again and again the petitioner to come to cross-examine the witnesses etc. In my opinion, it in no way deflected the enquiry. 13. Mr. Mukherjee’s contention that the charges are vague or that the allegations in support of the charges and/or the evidence sought to be relied upon were not made known to the petitioner also cannot be accepted. I have pointed out earlier that the charges leveled against the petitioner have been divided into four heads and under each head a brief statement of the allegations against him is incorporated. Specific reference has been made to the material upon which the charge has been based. A contention of this nature can become available only if it is shown by the aggrieved party that he could not/cannot make out as to what the delinquency is and what is the basis of such a delinquency alleged against him. The contents of the memo of charges (Annexure-4) appear to contain sufficient particulars and nothing can be said to be vague or ambiguous. In fact, the petitioner noticed no vagueness or lack of particulars. In the written statement of defence (Annexure-7) he has covered every aspect and except in respect of one allegation of mis-behaviour he made no grievance that the particulars and the relevant records/documents were not made available to him. The petitioner has not been prejudiced in any manner on account of the charges and the allegations not separately served upon him. In fact, there are sufficient materials on the record to show that the petitioner inspected the records before filing his show cause. He was fully acquainted with every such material that was likely to be used against him. 14. The ORDER :of the Vice Chancellor dismissing the petitioner from University service (Annexure-2), however, runs as follows : – “Rajendra Agriculture University, Bihar, Patna – 800014. O.O. No. 3398/RAU (VC) Patna the 28th June 1979. He was fully acquainted with every such material that was likely to be used against him. 14. The ORDER :of the Vice Chancellor dismissing the petitioner from University service (Annexure-2), however, runs as follows : – “Rajendra Agriculture University, Bihar, Patna – 800014. O.O. No. 3398/RAU (VC) Patna the 28th June 1979. Office ORDER : Whereas on a perusal of the findings of the conducting officer as also his explanation in the departmental proceedings drawn against him vide University Resolution communicated in Memo No. 1453 dated 27.3.1979 the undersigned is satisfied that Shri Mahendra Kumar Sinha, Field Overseer (Agronomy Section) Bihar Agriculture College, Sabour, Bhagalpur under suspension is guilty of the following charges which stand proved against him. 1. Misappropriation off Farm produce and 2. Misbehaviour. Shri Mahendra Kumar Sinha is, therefore, dismissed from University service w.e.f. the date of issue of this ORDER :. For the period of suspension undergone by him he will not get any thing beyond the subsistence allowance already drawn. Shri Sinha may be informed accordingly. Sd. (D.P. Singh) Vice Chancellor.” Except stating, “the undersigned is satisfied that………..is guilty of the following charges” there is no discussion of the evidence and/or the reasons for not accepting explanations of the petitioner in respect of the charges. The petitioner was not served with a copy of the findings of the enquiry Office. Although the petitioner applied for a copy of the findings of the Enquiry Officer after the ORDER :dismissing him from service was served upon him, it was not given to him. The respondent nos. 2 and 3 have stated in their counter affidavit that there was no provision to furnish a copy of the findings of the Conducting Officer and as such the findings of the Conducting Officer were not supplied to the petitioner. The respondents did not file any copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer before this Court. The ORDER :dismissing the petitioner from service is not supported by the materials showing the application of mind to the evidence on the record by the Vice Chancellor (the appointing authority). The administrative authorities vested with the power to punish, although acting administratively, are required to conform to the rules of fair play which rules are generally called the rules of natural justice. The administrative authorities vested with the power to punish, although acting administratively, are required to conform to the rules of fair play which rules are generally called the rules of natural justice. As they are required to act in accordance with the rules of natural justice, their exercising powers in this behalf is described as quasi judicial. Like the rules that a person should not act as a judge in a case in which his interests are involved or a person should not be allowed to be prejudicially affected unless he is given an adequate opportunity to be heard, there is a rule now well recognized that a quasi judicial ORDER :must contain explicit reasons and disclose application of mind of the authority concerned. The Vice Chancellor’s ORDER :(Annexure-2) is evidently not a speaking ORDER :. In the background of a suggestion that the Vice Chancellor passed the ORDER :dismissing the petitioner from the University service in conformity with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and/or his ORDER :as contained in Annexure-2 is merely a communication of the conclusions and the reasons thereof may be found in the files, we permitted the learned counsel for the University to produce the records. The file, however, reveals when the Enquiry Officer submitted his report it was first examined by the Director, Administration, and he submitted his detailed analysis to the Vice Chancellor on 25.6.1979. The Director Administration recorded in his report as a conclusion, “thus barring charges no. (ii) and (iv), relating to unauthorised occupation of agriculture and misconduct, the rest off the charges against Sri M.K. Sinha are established and these are serious enough to merit award of the highest punishment i.e. dismissal from service”. The Vice Chancellor thereafter ORDER :ed on 26.6.1979 “formal ORDER :s of dismissal may issue”. The report of enquiry submitted by the respondent no.3, however, concluded on the charge of misappropriation of Farm produce. “Thus it is found that during that period the whole affair was in a mess especially because of negligence and lack of supervision on the part of Shri B.N. Verma, Officer Incharge Station. Even the entries were not properly mad according to the said procedure into the records such as produce register, stock book, cattle feed register etc for which all the concerned staff viz. Even the entries were not properly mad according to the said procedure into the records such as produce register, stock book, cattle feed register etc for which all the concerned staff viz. Sri M.K. Sinha, Sri B.N. Verma, the Store-keeper and the Cattle Feed Incharge are responsible thereby causing loss of Rs. 612/- being the cost of 7,650 Kgs. paddy straw at the rate of Rs. 80/- Ouintal”. True, there is a mention of the name of the petitioner also as one of the persons responsible for the negligence and lack of supervision in relation to this charge, but the discussions of the evidence in the report of the Enquiry Officer give nothing conclusive to hold that he was guilty of any misappropriation of Farm produce. In the analysis of the evidence on the charge of misappropriation of Farm produce the Director, Administration, however, specifically recorded that the petitioner was guilty of the charge. It has to be seen that under the resolution dated 27.3.1979, the Vice Chancellor appointed Dr. N.P. Tripathi, Professor of Botany and Vice-Principal, Sabour Agriculture College, Bhagalpur (Respondent no. 3) and not the Director, administration to hold enquiry. Under the relevant provisions of the Statutes the enquiry report/findings of the Enquiry Officer were/are to be submitted to the Appointing Authority. Under the amended clause (8) of Statute 13.9 the appointing authority was/is required to consider the report of the Enquiry Officer along with the evidence adduced during the enquiry. It is apparent from a perusal of the relevant file that the report of the Enquiry Officer and the evidence adduced during the enquiry were considered not by the Vice Chancellor, the appointing Authority, but by the Director, Administration. The Director, Administration substantially differed from the findings of the Enquiry Officer. His conclusions on the charge of misappropriation of Farm produce went against the petitioner. The Vice Chancellor did not apply himself either to the contents of the report of the Enquiry Officer or to the evidence adduced before him. He allowed his discussion to be influenced by the views and JUDGMENT : of the Director, Administration. The question, could the Vice Chancellor act upon the advice of the Director Administration and abdicate a statutory function of applying his mind to the report of the Enquiry Officer and the evidence adduced during the enquiry can only be answered in the negative. The question, could the Vice Chancellor act upon the advice of the Director Administration and abdicate a statutory function of applying his mind to the report of the Enquiry Officer and the evidence adduced during the enquiry can only be answered in the negative. In a statutory function in which the appointing authority is made a Judge of the fate and future of an employee a material coming from a source not envisaged under the law will be extraneous and irrelevant. The report of the Director, Administration and his views on the evidence and the findings of the Enquiry Officer were/are something not envisaged in the scheme of the rules incorporated in different clauses of Statute 13.9. 15. Learned counsel for the respondents 2 and 3 contended that the Director Administration, is an officer responsible for all matters allotted to the establishment of the University including disciplinary action etc. of all the employees of the University. He drew our attention to the provision in this behalf as contained in the Statute 302 Clause (8) of Chapter III of the University. The said provision states : – “Director Administration-the Director Administration shall be responsible for all matters allotted to the establishment of thee University, e.g. recruitment, promotion, deputation, leave, maintenance of service records, disciplinary action, etc. of all the employees of the University”. According to the learned counsel for the University this should give sufficient jurisdiction to the Director, Administration to submit his comments upon the charges, findings of the Enquiry Officer and the evidence adduced before him. I am afraid, this contention cannot be accepted. There may be some jurisdiction or power given to the Director, Administration in regard to the disciplinary action etc. of the employees of the University. But this cannot entitle him to enter the filed of enquiry unless he comes to act as one of the functionaries under the provisions of Statute 13.9. Statute 13.9 provides for the enquiry to be held either by the Enquiry Officer or Committee and after the completion of the enquiry the appointing authority to consider the report of the Enquiry Officer or Committee along with the evidence adduced during the enquiry. Director, Administration does not fit in the scheme of the rules embodies in the Statute 13.9 unless he is made the Enquiry Officer and/or a member of the Enquiry Committee. Director, Administration does not fit in the scheme of the rules embodies in the Statute 13.9 unless he is made the Enquiry Officer and/or a member of the Enquiry Committee. In the instant case the Director, Administration was not the Enquiry Officer. The enquiry was entrusted to the respondent no.3 under the resolution of the Vice Chancellor (Annexure 5). The Director, Administration could not, therefore, sit to comment upon the report of the Enquiry Officer and give his own findings on the evidence at the enquiry in place of the findings of the enquiry Officer, The Vice Chancellor by merely mechanically acting upon the report of the Director, Administration and his conclusions abducted his statutory function to him. Moreover, the Director’s analysis of evidence is substantially different from that of the enquiry officer. The Vice Chancellor accepting the analysis of the director thus differed from the enquiry report. I do not propose to go any deeper, although I am inclined to think, in such a situation he should have advisedly given to the petitioner opportunity to explain the findings and conclusions of the Director, Administration. I thus find that the Vice Chancellor failed to act in accordance with law. The reasons contained in the report of the Director, Administration cannot be taken to be the reasons in support of the impugned ORDER :of the Vice Chancellor (Annexure 2). This infirmity in the procedure attached to the impugned ORDER :of the Vice Chancellor is such that cannot be ignored. 16. The petitioner applied for a copy of the findings of the Enquiry Officer before invoking the jurisdiction of the Chancellor under section 19(5) of the Rajendra Agriculture University Act, read with Statute 13.9, Clause (10). It is rather unusual for the respondents 2 to 3 to state before this Court that a copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer was not supplied to the petitioner as there is no provision for it. It is always inherent in a fair game not to withhold from a person affected any thing likely to be used against him and/or something that might give support to his cause. The scheme envisaged under Statute 13.9 protects a person proceeded against by an enquiry into the charges leveled against him. It is always inherent in a fair game not to withhold from a person affected any thing likely to be used against him and/or something that might give support to his cause. The scheme envisaged under Statute 13.9 protects a person proceeded against by an enquiry into the charges leveled against him. But the only ORDER :that may be made known to the proceedee is one passed by the appointing authority as a result of the consideration of the report of the Enquiry Officer and the evidence adduced before him. Disposal of the proceeding by the ORDER :passed by the appointing authority may be on the basis of the report of the Enquiry Officer. In a case in which the appointing authority may not find any cause to differ the ORDER :passed by the appointing authority may be deemed to incorporate the reasons for the conclusion/finding of guilt of the University employee proceeded against. In such a situation therefore the delinquent officer must get a copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer as if that report is a part of the ORDER :of the appointing authority. In a case, in which the appointing authority may not accept the conclusions of the Enquiry Officer and may find his own reasons to conclude otherwise, it is imperative, that the appointing authority should make a reasoned ORDER :based upon the evidence taken in course of enquiry. While communicating the ORDER :of the appointing authority in such a case, it may not be necessary to give to the delinquent officer a copy of the enquiry report. When, however, a demand is made by him to furnish a copy of the enquiry report to enable him to find out as to what may have occasioned a different conclusion, it should be furnished to him, lest, he may not complain of violation of the principles of natural justice. The instant case is one which falls in the second category. The report of the Enquiry Officer was not accepted by the appointing authority. In fact, the ORDER :to dismiss the petitioner was based upon the analysis of evidence and conclusions of the Director, Administration. I have no hesitation in holding that the Director Administration is not an authority empowered in any manner to advise the appointing authority in the matter of a disciplinary action in accordance with the provisions of Statute 13.9. In fact, the ORDER :to dismiss the petitioner was based upon the analysis of evidence and conclusions of the Director, Administration. I have no hesitation in holding that the Director Administration is not an authority empowered in any manner to advise the appointing authority in the matter of a disciplinary action in accordance with the provisions of Statute 13.9. The Vice Chancellor was, therefore, required to assign his own reasons based upon the evidence taken in course of the enquiry i.e. the evidence referred to by the Enquiry Officer in his report and kept on the record of the proceeding, and not to act upon the advice of the director Administration. Reasons, as contained in the report of the Director Administration, could not/cannot form part of the ORDER :of the Vice Chancellor. The petitioner could/can know the fact that the report of the Enquiry Officer was not accepted by the Vice Chancellor only if the report of the Enquiry Officer was/is supplied to him. The petitioner was thus prejudiced in his defence and was deprived of a valuable right to attack the ORDER :of the Vice Chancellor before the appellate authority i.e. the Chancellor on the ground that the Vice Chancellor failed to appreciate the evidence and the findings of the Enquiry Officer in accordance with law. Non-supply of a copy of the enquiry report to the petitioner was/is an act which cannot be justified on any ground. 17. The Chancellor (the appointing authority) gave no hearing to the petitioner. A notice however, was given to the Vice Chancellor to show cause. The University’s comment was received by his office and, as it appears from the file shown to us by the learned counsel for the University, the Chancellor’s office placed a note stating, “the reply received from the Vice Chancellor of the University may kindly be seen at page 59-56/C. The case has been thoroughly discussed by the Vice Chancellor in his reply ……In view of the facts reported by the Vice Chancellor, there appears to be no merit in the petition filed by Shri Mahendra Kumar Sinha against the ORDER :s of the Vice Chancellor. The then Chancellor has been pleased to ORDER :on his another petition at page 61/C that a hearing date be fixed with notice to all at an early date. The then Chancellor has been pleased to ORDER :on his another petition at page 61/C that a hearing date be fixed with notice to all at an early date. But notice for hearing was not issued in accordance with the ORDER :s of the Chancellor, who was please to ORDER :that such case may first be examined on the report of the Vice Chancellor. In the circumstances the petitioner filed by Shri Mahendra Kumar Sinha deserves to be rejected, if approved by the Chancellor”. The Chancellor on 18.10.79 ORDER :ed, “in view of the facts of the case, stated above, the petition may be rejected. There is no need for giving opportunity for hearing at this stage”. This was followed by a communication from the Deputy Secretary to the Governor, Bihar, dated 24.10.79, informing the petitioner that the chancellor, after due consideration of the case, was pleased to reject the appeal petition filed before him by the petitioner. No reasons for not accepting the contentions of the petitioner raised before the appellate authority have been stated in the communication from the office of the Chancellor to the petitioner. The Chancellor, who ORDER :ed that there was no need for giving opportunity for hearing to the petitioner, ignored the ORDER :passed by his predecessor in office. The ORDER :dated 15.9.1979 in the file in the pen of the then Chancellor runs as follow : – “The hearing date be fixed with notice to all at an early date”. In a statutory appeal the Chancellor’s ORDER :dated 15.9.79 should not have been ignored in this manner. The Chancellor exercising the appellate power was acting quasi judicially. All norms and requirements of the principles of natural justice were required to be complied with by him. A Division Bench of this Court in the Managing Committee of T.K. Ghosh Academy and another v. The State of Bihar and ors, (1974 B.B.C.J. 15), on a somewhat similar facts, when the predecessor in office of the president of the Board of Secondary Education had decided to hear the appeal but his successor in office recalled the said ORDER :holding that a fresh hearing in the matter did not seem to be necessary, held – “to say the least it was not quite legitimate and proper for respondent no. 3 to drop the matter of further hearing of the appeal when once a view had been by his predecessor that the matter had to be hear further”. The Chancellor thus erred in law in rejecting the appeal of the petitioner without giving a hearing as ORDER :ed previously by his predecessor in office. The dismissal of the petitioner’s appeal without any hearing and without any discussion and consideration of the grounds raised by him was/is a serious infirmity rendering the Chancellor’s ORDER :dated 18.10.79 invalid. 18. To conclude, in my opinion, although there is not merit in the grievance of the petitioner that reasonable opportunity was not given to him at the enquiry, the ORDER :passed by the Vice Chancellor dated 28.6.79 in O.O. No. 3398/RAU (VC), as contained in Annexure 2, is vitiated on account of the Vice Chancellor taking into consideration extraneous and irrelevant comments and reports of the Director, Administration and not considering the report of the Enquiry in accordance with law. The ORDER :of the Chancellor, the appellate authority, which confirmed the illegal ORDER :of the Vice-Chancellor, as contained in Memo No. 3343 GS (1) Patna, dated 24.10.1979 (Annexure 1), is also illegal for the reason that the Chancellor ignored the ORDER :of his predecessor in office and gave no hearing to the petitioner. The Chancellor’s ORDER :is also bad in law for he gave no consideration whatsoever to the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner. These two ORDER :s being illegal and void cannot be sustained. 19. In the result, this application is allowed. The ORDER :of the Vice Chancellor of Rajendra Agriculture University, Bihar in O.O. No.3398/RAU-VC dated 20.6.1979, as contained in Annexure 2, and the ORDER :of the Chancellor of Rajendra Agriculture University, Bihar, as contained in Memo No.3343-GS(1) dated 24.10.1979 (Annexure-1) are hereby quashed. The case is remitted back to the Vice Chancellor to proceed on the basis of the enquiry report of the respondent No.3 in accordance with law. It shall be open to the petitioner to prefer any appeal if the Vice Chancellor’s ORDER :goes against him. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no ORDER :as to cost. It shall be open to the petitioner to prefer any appeal if the Vice Chancellor’s ORDER :goes against him. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no ORDER :as to cost. Uday Sinha – I agree to the ORDER :just passed by P.S. Mishra, J. I am in complete agreement with his views that the ORDER :of the Chancellor for reasons discussed in his JUDGMENT : was invalid and must be quashed. 21. I am also at one that the ORDER :of the Vice Chancellor dismissing the petitioner must be quashed. This conclusion, however, is for my own reasons. I have some difficulty in acceding to the submissions urged on behalf of the petitioner that the ORDER :of the Vice Chancellor is vitiated for the reason that he had looked in to the notes of the Director of Administration before ORDER :ing dismissal of the petitioner. The facts have been elaborately set out by my learned Brother and, therefore, I have no desire to cover the same ground. 22. My reasons for holding that the ORDER :of the Vice-Chancellor dismissing the petitioner must be quashed are hereinafter stated. The Enquiry Officer Dr. N.P. Tiwary had found the petitioner guilty on some counts, but had exonerated him of other charges. The Enquiry Officer held the petitioner guilty of misappropriation of farm wheat. In regard to sale of onions he was found guilty along with B.N. Verma. In regard to deposit of sale proceeds of straw, the Enquiry Officer found the petitioner guilty along with B.N. Verma, Store-keeper and the cattle feeding incharge. In regard to sale of mangoes of the farm, the Enquiry Officer held that the charge against the petitioner remained a matter of doubt. In regard to petitioner’s letting his own cow loose in the farm’s premises, the Enquiry officer held that that charge also remained doubtful. The Enquiry Officer exonerated the petitioner of the charge of unauthorized occupation of quarters. In the category of misbehaviour the Enquiry Officer found the petitioner guilty of putting on Lungi during office hours and using intemperate language in conversation with the Assistant Agronomist Dharam Pal Singh when the latter pulled him up for not being properly dressed. But the Enquiry Officer accepted the charge of misbehaviour with A.R.O. Ramnandan Prasad and beating up Baijnath Mandal and Murli Kamat. But the Enquiry Officer accepted the charge of misbehaviour with A.R.O. Ramnandan Prasad and beating up Baijnath Mandal and Murli Kamat. The charge of petitioner having engaged himself in money lending transactions was found not proved. In short, some of the charges were found established by Enquiry Officer and others were not proved. His enquiry report was submitted to the appropriate authority. In course of office management, the file was put up before Director Administration of the University, as he is responsible for all matters allotted to the establishment of the University, i.e. recruitment, promotion, deputation, leave, maintenance of service records, disciplinary action etc. of all the employees of the University. The Director of Administration scrutinized the report of the Enquiry Officer and the evidence adduced during enquiry. The note shows that he was in agreement with the finding of the Enquiry Officer in regard to mis-appropriation of funds on account of non-deposit of price of wheat and onion of the farm. In regard to sale of strew whereas the Enquiry Officer held the petitioner guilty along with others, the Director of Administration held the petitioner guilty. In my view, the fact that the Enquiry Officer held the petitioner guilty along with others did not indicate that the petitioner was not guilty. Therefore, apparently there is no contradiction between the conclusion of the Director of Administration and that of the Enquiry Officer. In disagreement with the Enquiry Officer the Director of Administration held the petitioner guilty in regard to sale of mangoes of four trees of the farm. The Director of Administration was also of the view that the charge of letting the petitioner’s own cow loose in the farm had also been proved. In regard to charges of misbehaviour, the Director of Administration opined that they had been well established. The finding of the Enquiry Officer in this behalf, in my view, too was rather sketch but that is not the point falling for consideration before me. In regard to charge of money lending also, the Direct of Administration agreed with the Enquiry Officer. From these it will be observed that while agreeing with the finding of the Enquiry Officer on several serious charges the Director of Administration did not agree with him on some counts and held the petitioner guilty on those counts as well. In regard to charge of money lending also, the Direct of Administration agreed with the Enquiry Officer. From these it will be observed that while agreeing with the finding of the Enquiry Officer on several serious charges the Director of Administration did not agree with him on some counts and held the petitioner guilty on those counts as well. In my view, when the Vice-Chancellor passed ORDER :for dismissal of the petitioner after looking into the report of the Director of Administration, he should have given an opportunity to the petitioner to be heard on those counts as well on which the Vice-Chancellor was inclined to accept the note of the Director of Administration holding the petitioner guilty on those charges also which had been held to be not established by the Enquiry Officer. It is true that under the Statute it is not incumbent upon the University to furnish a copy of the findings or to give a second notice calling upon the petitioner to show cause in regard to the punishment to be imposed upon him, but when the Vice-Chancellor was of the view that some other charges not found proved by the Enquiry Officer had also been proved in his view, fairness demanded and that he should have given an opportunity to the petitioner to have his say in regard to those charges. It was not necessary to the Vice-Chancellor to have heard the petitioner, but an opportunity should have been given to him to explain – may be in writing what he had to say about the charges found proved by the Vice-Chancellor although not found proved by the Enquiry Officer. Such an opportunity necessarily entailed furnishing a copy of the enquiry report. The not e of the Director of Administration need not have been furnished, but fairness demanded furnishing a copy of the enquiry report at least. That not having been done, it does show rules of natural justice were infringed. The ORDER :of the Vice-Chancellor, therefore, suffers from an infirmity and must be quashed. 23. I have, however, some difficulty in accepting the submission urged on behalf of the petitioner that the ORDER :of the Vice-Chancellor was vitiated because he had looked into the notes of the Director of Administration. The Director of Administration was there to look into disciplinary matters of the University. 23. I have, however, some difficulty in accepting the submission urged on behalf of the petitioner that the ORDER :of the Vice-Chancellor was vitiated because he had looked into the notes of the Director of Administration. The Director of Administration was there to look into disciplinary matters of the University. A disciplinary report having been received in normal course the report will be received by some clerk. It would be processed, passed through various tables including the Director of Administration. Ultimately, the file would be placed before the Vice-Chancellor with the notings of various officers of the University. To say that the Vice-Chancellor could not have looked into any notes on the file would be rather preposterous. The logical extension of the submission would be that the Vice-Chancellor was expected to receive the enquiry report personally, that he could not ask any information from any functionary of his office and that he was bound pass ORDER :himself without the halt of any of the clerks or the functionaries of the office. A Vice-Chancellor has multifarious functions to discharge. The head of an office is always entitled to assistance from his employees and subordinate functionaries. Instead of the Registrar submitting his note, the Director of Administration in this case submitted his note. I regret the ORDER :of the Vice-Chancellor cannot be held to be vitiated just because he looked into the notes of the Director of Administration. Every file before every head office is put up before him with the notings of his subordinate officers. It is true that the Vice-Chancellor was performing a quasi judicial function in considering the report of the Enquiry Officer, butt that did not warrant him to apply himself to it unaided by any subordinate agency. The State Government being the employer of its officers is required to pass ORDER :s dismissing or retaining any officer. If the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner were to be accepted, the implication would be that the Secretary of a Department-who also must be held to be performing quasi judicial functions would be obliged to pass ORDER :s unaided by any of his subordinates. I regret, I am unable to subscribe to such a view. If a judicial officer is removed from service, the Chief Justice would be precluded from looking into the notings of the Registrar. I regret, I am unable to subscribe to such a view. If a judicial officer is removed from service, the Chief Justice would be precluded from looking into the notings of the Registrar. I regret, I cannot accept the position that the Chief Justice or the High Court discharging quasi judicial function is precluded from looking into the notings of the Registrar. 24. To conclude, the Vice-Chancellor made no mistake in looking into the notes of the Director of Administration, but having formed the opinion that some other charges had also been established, he should have given an opportunity to the petitioner to show cause what he had to say in regard to those charges which had not been found proved by the Enquiry officer. Further while accepting the notes of the Director of Administration I should have expected some indication in the Vice-Chancellor’s ORDER :dated 20.6.1979 that he had considered the enquiry report on the record and set out the charges which he found to have been established. On account of these infirmities, I am in agreement with the ORDER :proposed that the application be allowed. I should only like to observe that I do not expect the Vice-Chancellor to write a well considered JUDGMENT : as a Court of Law would have done, but some indication of what is passing in his mind should be given in the ORDER :passed by him.