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1983 DIGILAW 236 (GUJ)

SWASTIK TEXTILE ENGINEERING PRIVATE LIMITED v. RAJENSINGH SANTSINGH

1983-12-06

R.A.MEHTA, R.C.MANKAD

body1983
R. C. MANKAD, J. ( 1 ) THE only question which we ate called upon to answer in this petition filed by the petitioner-employer under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is whether the Industrial Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) was justified in directing the petitioner to pay full back wages for the period from August 8/10/1977 to 16 complainants who had filed complaint under sec. 33-A of the industrial Disputes Act 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). ( 2 ) PETITIONER is an engineering establishment employing about 200 workmen. There were many industrial disputes between the petitioner and its workmen which were pending adjudication in the Tribunal. The workmen decided to go on strike and therefore their trade union gave a strike notice dated 5/07/1977 in which it was stated that the workmen should go on strike with effect from 26/07/1977 The workmen went on strike on 26/07/1977 The strike was peaceful and practically all the workmen joined it. It is the case of the petitioner that After the workmen proceeded on strike it placed a notice on the notice board calling upon the workmen to resume their duties. In the final notice the workmen were called upon to resume their duties on 6/08/1977 The workmen decided to call off the strike and their union gave a notice dated 6/08/1977 informing the petitioner that their strike would be called off with effect from 8/08/1977 The workmen reported for duty on 8/08/1977 No workman vas however allowed to resume duty by the petitioner unless he gave a writing to the following effect:i the undersigned do hereby state that at the instigation of some workmen I had joined the illegal strike of the workmen of the factory from 26-7-77. 1 am sorry for the sate. I hereby give an undertaking that henceforth I will act peacefully and tn disciplined manner and I shall not commit similar or any other misconduct. I request the Company that taking this into consideration may be pardoned for my aforesaid misconduct. And the Company may impose any punishment on me and I shall not raise any objection in that regard. I hereby give an undertaking that henceforth I will act peacefully and tn disciplined manner and I shall not commit similar or any other misconduct. I request the Company that taking this into consideration may be pardoned for my aforesaid misconduct. And the Company may impose any punishment on me and I shall not raise any objection in that regard. All the workmen except 16 respondents who were complainants gave statements in the aforesaid form on 8/08/1977 or subsequent thereto before they were permitted to resume their duties The respondents however refused to give such statements and therefore the petitioner did not permit them to resume their duties. After the conciliation proceedings failed the respondent approached the Tribunal by filing complaint under sec 34a of the Act. It was alleged in the complaint that the action of the petitioner in refusing to permit the respondents to resume duty when they reported for duty on 8/08/1977 was illegal and that the petitioner be directed to reinstate them in service with full back wages. ( 3 ) IN its written statement the stand which was taken up by the petitioner was that services of the respondents were not terminated and therefore relationship of master and servant continued Between the parties. Consequently it was submitted that there was no contravention of sec. 33 which would justify filing of the complaint under sec. 33a. It was contended that there was no contravention of sec. 33 and therefore complaint under sec. 33a was not maintainable. Petitioner admitted that industrial disputes between it and its workmen were pending for adjudication before the Tribunal. It was however contended that the workmen had gone on illegal strike from 26/07/1977 with a view to pressurising the petitioner in aceeding to their unreasonable demands. The petitioner therefore called upon its workmen to resume their duties as already stated above. According to the petitioner the workmen W executed writing as stated above were permitted to resume their duties. This writing according to the petitioner was in the nature of an apology for going on an illegal strike. Since the respondents were not ready to tender such apology they were not allowed to resume their duties. According to the petitioner the workmen W executed writing as stated above were permitted to resume their duties. This writing according to the petitioner was in the nature of an apology for going on an illegal strike. Since the respondents were not ready to tender such apology they were not allowed to resume their duties. Petitioner thus in terms conceded that it was on account of the refusal on the part of the respondents to execute the writing of the nature referred to above that they were not allowed to resume their duties It is further submitted that while the dispute was pending before the conciliation officer that is Assistant Commissioner of Labour Ahmedabad the petitioner had agreed not to insist upon the above writing being executed by the respondents and to take the respondents back on work subject to the petitioners right to take disciplinary action against them for having resorted to illegal strike. This stand taken up by the petitioner clarifies the position that no action was taken against the respondents for their having resorted to illegal strike upto the date of filing of the written statement. Petitioner contends that the respondents were not only not willing to accept the condition about reserving its right to take disciplinary action if any against them but insisted upon assurance that no disciplinary action would be taken against them for going on such strike. Is was finally stated in the written statement that the petitioner has not terminated the services of the respondents that they were on the muster roll of the petitioner and that they were free to report for duty whenever they chose to do so. It was submitted that if the respondents apologised for going on strike the petitioner would not take any disciplinary action against them but if they did not apologise the petitioner reserved its right to take disciplinary action against them. ( 4 ) DURING the pendency of the dispute before the Tribunal petitioner agreed to take all the respondents (complainants) back in service and to place them in their original posts and allow them to perform duties which they were performing before going on strike. ( 4 ) DURING the pendency of the dispute before the Tribunal petitioner agreed to take all the respondents (complainants) back in service and to place them in their original posts and allow them to perform duties which they were performing before going on strike. All the respondents were permitted to resume their duties with effect from 14/10/1977 It may be mentioned here that the written statement of the petitioner was filed on 13/10/1977 wherein as pointed out above it was stated that services of the respondents were not terminated and from the next day that is 14/10/1977 the respondents were allowed to resume their duties. Therefore the only question which survived for consideration before the Tribunal was whether the respondents were entitled to wages for the period from 8/08/1977 the date on which they reported for duty after the strike was called off to 13/10/1977 they having resumed their duties with effect from 14/10/1977 ( 5 ) THE Tribunal by its impugned judgment and order held that refusal on the part of the petitioner to permit the respondents to resume their duties when they reported for duty on 8/08/1977 was directly connected with the industrial dispute which was subject matter of Reference (IT) No. 25 of 1975 which was pending at that time for adjudication before the Tribunal. The Tribunal was therefore of the view that the dispute raised before it in the complaint filed under sec. 33a was covered by clause (a) to sub-sec. (1) of sec. 33. The Tribunal further held that even if the dispute before it was not covered by sec. 33 (1) (a) of the Act on the ground that it was not connected with industrial dispute pending before the Tribunal such a dispute would be covered by clause (a) of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 33 of the Act. The Tribunal held that whether or not the pending industrial dispute was connected with the dispute arising out of the complaint filed by the respondent under sec. 33a of the Act the petitioner had no right or authority to dismiss or discharge or punish any workman or to alter their conditions of service to their prejudice except by following the procedure laid down in sub-sec. (1) or sub-sec. (2) as the case may be of sec. 33 of the Act. 33a of the Act the petitioner had no right or authority to dismiss or discharge or punish any workman or to alter their conditions of service to their prejudice except by following the procedure laid down in sub-sec. (1) or sub-sec. (2) as the case may be of sec. 33 of the Act. The Tribunal then proceeded to consider the effect of the writing which each of the respondents was required to execute in order to resume his duties. In that context the Tribunal held that the strike which was described as illegal was not held to be illegal by any competent authority. It further observed that it was neither fair nor legal on the part of the petitioner to insist that its workmen should execute such writing which was in the nature of an unconditional apology and insisting upon execution of such writing amounted to change in the conditions of service of the workmen which existed at the time of commencement of the industrial dispute covered by Reference (11) No. 25 of 1975. It further held that the action on the part of the petitioner in refusing to permit the respondents to resume their duties unless they executed writing amounts to their discharge from service. According to the Tribunal services of the respondents were dispensed with till they were reinstated in service on 14/10/1977 under the directions given by it. The Tribunal held that since the petitioner had not complied with the requirements of sec. 33 (2) (b) the action cannot be held to be justified. In reaching this conclusion the Tribunal took into consideration the fact that none of the respondents was paid wages for one month nor was any application made to the competent authority for obtaining approval of the proposed action of discharging the workmen. In the view which it took the Tribunal held that the complaint filed by the respondents was maintainable under sec. 33-A of the Act. It further held that there was no justification for refusing to allow the respondents to resume their duties with effect from 8/08/1977 The Tribunal therefore held that each of the respondents was entitled to wages for the period; from 8/08/197 7/10/1977 and directed the petitioner to pay such wages to the respondents. 33-A of the Act. It further held that there was no justification for refusing to allow the respondents to resume their duties with effect from 8/08/1977 The Tribunal therefore held that each of the respondents was entitled to wages for the period; from 8/08/197 7/10/1977 and directed the petitioner to pay such wages to the respondents. ( 6 ) AS stated above all the respondents have been allowed to resume duties with effect from 14/10/1977 In fact the stand which was taken up by the petitioner before the Tribunal was that they had never terminated the services of the respondents and that they continued to be in its service. It was in view of this stand taken up by the petitioner and the fact that the respondents were allowed to join their duties with effect from 14/10/1977 that the only question which arose for determination before the Tribunal was whether the Petitioner was justified in refusing to pay wages to the respondents for the period from 8/08/197 7/10/1977 The respondents did not claim wages for the period from July 2 6/08/1977 the period during which the workmen were alleged to be on strike. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that since the respondents had participated in a strike which was illegal the petitioner was justified in withholding wages for the period from August 8/10/1977 This period is admittedly not covered by the period during which the workmen were on strike. The wages are deducted for the period from 8/08/1977 the date on which the respondents reported for duty but were not allowed to resume duty to 13/10/1977 the last day before which they were allowed to resume duties. Respondents were not allowed to join their duties on 8/08/1977 because they refused to pass or execute the writing adverted to above. In other words. they were not allowed to resume duty not because they had gone on illegal strike but because they refused to execute the writing. Therefore the question whether or not the respondents had participated in the strike which is alleged to be illegal recedes into back ground No action was taken against the respondents for participating in the illegal strike. they were not allowed to resume duty not because they had gone on illegal strike but because they refused to execute the writing. Therefore the question whether or not the respondents had participated in the strike which is alleged to be illegal recedes into back ground No action was taken against the respondents for participating in the illegal strike. Now the question is whether there was any justification for the petitioner to insist upon the respondents executing the writing by which they were required to admit that they had proceeded on illegal strike and to pray to be pardoned for the same. There was no specific charge against the respondents that they had participated in an illegal strike. It is true that by a general notice the petitioner had informed all its workmen that the strike resorted to by them with effect from 26/07/1977 was illegal strike and that they should resume their duties immediately. But it cannot be gainsaid that none of the workmen was individually charged for participation in the illegal strike. Since there was no charge for participation in the illegal strike no action or penalty could have been imposed for participation in the illegal strike. In fact the petitioner wanted its workmen to resume their duties. The workmen withdrew the strike and decided to resume work with effect from 8/08/1977 It was in pursuance of this decision that the respondents along with other workman reported for duty on 8/08/1977 However before permitting any workman to resume duty petitioner insisted upon execution of the aforesaid writing. Those workmen who did not execute writing were not allowed to resume duty. Respondents were amongst those workmen W refused to execute writing and it was therefore that they were not allowed to resume their duties. In other words at the cost of repetition it may be stated that it was not on account of their participation in the illegal strike that they were not allowed to resume their duties but it was on account of their refusal to execute the writing that they were not allowed to resume their duties. Non of the workmen is penalised for participating in the strike which is alleged to be illegal. The workmen who had participated in the strike but who had executed the writing were allowed to join their duties. Non of the workmen is penalised for participating in the strike which is alleged to be illegal. The workmen who had participated in the strike but who had executed the writing were allowed to join their duties. Therefore the only conclusion which can be legitimately reached is that the respondents were prevented from joining their duties because they refused to execute the writing. ( 7 ) BY executing writing the respondents were required to admit that they had participated in the strike which was illegal. Besides giving assurance for not participating in such illegal strike in future and seeking pardon for having participated in the illegal strike they were also required to state that it would be open to the petitioner to impose any penalty on them for participating ill the illegal strike that penalty would be binding on them and that they would not question the validity of imposition of such penalty. Even assuming that it was open to the petitioner to take disciplinary proceedings against the respondents for participating in the aforesaid strike we fail to see what right or authority the petitioner had to demand the aforesaid writing from the respondents. By demanding such writing what in effect and substance the petitioner was proposing to do was to hold the respondents guilty and impose punishment upon them without framing any charge or holding any inquiry against them. It is not necessary for us to consider whether or not to as a result of refusal to allow the respondents to join their duties there was termination of their services since according to the petitioner itself services of the respondents were never terminated and that they had continued to be in its service. In fact as pointed out above the respondents have already joined their duties with effect from 14/10/1977 The respondents however have not been paid their wages for the period from 8/08/197 7/10/1977 Since the petitioner was not justified in demanding the writing from the respondents which it did it must be held that it was the petitioner who prevented the respondents from joining their duties when they reported for duty on 8/08/1977 The respondents could not resume duty only on account of unjustified and illegal demand made by the petitioner for execution of the writing. In our opinion the respondents were prevented from performing their duties from August 8/10/1977 on account of the illegal and unjustified act on the part of the petitioner in insisting upon execution of the writing and allowing them to resume their duties only if they executed such writing. Insistence upon execution of the writing and deduction of wages for the aforesaid period amounted to change in conditions of service of the respondents during the pendency of an industrial dispute before the Tribunal. It is immaterial whether or not the industrial dispute had any connection with the dispute arising out of the complaint filed against the petitioner. Withholding of wages also amounted to imposition of penalty and such penalty could not have been imposed except by framing charge and holding an enquiry against the respondents as laid down by the Standing Orders. Insistence upon execution of the writing before allowing the respondents to resume their duties would amount to changing the conditions of service because under the conditions of service they were not bound to execute such writing. Deduction of wages even if it does not amount to penalty does result in change in the conditions of service because the employer has no right to deduct wages if the employee is willing to perform his duties but is prevented from performing such duties on account of the illegal act on the part of the employer. Requirements of sec. 38 have not been complied with while changing the conditions of service of the respondents. In other words the provisions of sec. 33 have been contravened justifying filing of the complaint under sec. 33a of the Act. ( 8 ) IT was urged on behalf of the petitioner that it was open to the petitioner to terminate the services of the respondents or discharge them from service or to deduct their wages for participating in the strike which was illegal. Therefore even if no inquiry was held against the respondents it was open to the petitioner to justify their action of withholding wages for the aforesaid period before the Tribunal. In support of this contention reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in WORKMEN V. MOTIPUR SUGAR FACTORY A. I. R. 1965 S. C. 1803. Therefore even if no inquiry was held against the respondents it was open to the petitioner to justify their action of withholding wages for the aforesaid period before the Tribunal. In support of this contention reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in WORKMEN V. MOTIPUR SUGAR FACTORY A. I. R. 1965 S. C. 1803. As pointed out above deduction of wages is not on account of the respondents participation in any strike which was illegal but on account of their failure to execute the writing. It was because the respondents did not execute the writing that they were not allowed to resume their duties till 13/10/1977 Therefore there is no question of justifying the action of withholding or deduction of wages on account of participation in the so called illegal strike. In the view which we are taking the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court has no application to the facts of the present case. It was then urged that the employer has a right to take assurance from his workman that he would not commit misconduct that he would not indulge in illegal activities etc. and if such assurance is insisted upon by the employer such action cannot be held to be illegal. In this connection reliance was placed on two decisions of the Bombay High Court in (1) INDUSTRIAL TUBE MFG. CO. V. S. R. SAMANT (1981) LAB. I. C. 379 AND (2) MAFATLAL ENGG. WORKS V. ASSOCIATION OF ENGINEERING WORKERS (1983) LAB. I. C. 777. We have already reproduced above the writing which was sought to be taken from each of the respondents. This writing was not merely an assurance for good behaviour but it contained an admission of participation in the illegal strike. The writing also required the workmen to seek pardon of the petitioner and to give an undertaking that he would not question validity of any penalty that petitioner may decide to impose upon him for participation in the illegal strike. It no doubt contains assurance that the workman would not indulge in similar misconduct in future but that was not the only thing which he was required to state. In our opinion the writing cannot be treated as a mere assurance of good behaviour as sought to be urged on behalf of the petitioner. It no doubt contains assurance that the workman would not indulge in similar misconduct in future but that was not the only thing which he was required to state. In our opinion the writing cannot be treated as a mere assurance of good behaviour as sought to be urged on behalf of the petitioner. The above decisions of the Bombay High Court which we need not refer to in detail are therefore of no help to the petitioner. ( 9 ) IN our opinion the Tribunal was right in holding that conditions of service of the respondents were changed to their detriment without complying with the provisions of sec. 33. Petitioner was not justified in withholding and/or deduction respondents means for the period from August 8/10/1977 In our opinion therefore the Tribunal was right in giving directions which it gave and there is no reason to interfere with the order passed by it. ( 10 ) IN the result this petition fails and is dismissed. Rule discharged with costs. Petition dismissed. .