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1983 DIGILAW 238 (RAJ)

Jagjet Kumar v. Smt. Vinod

1983-05-13

K.S.LODHA

body1983
JUDGMENT 1. - Shri Jagjeet Kumar had filed an application under section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act claiming a decree of divorce against his wife, Smt Vinood before the learned District Judge Bikaner. His case was that the marriage of the parties had taken place according to the Hindu rites and custom on November 28 1968 at Mujafarnagar and thereafter the couple resided together at Bikaner till 1975. The case of the petitioner further was that in 1975 Smt. Vinood withdraw from the society of the petitioner without any reasonable cause and had not returned to him for more than 2 years and had thus deserted him. He also alleged that she had taken away valuable worth about Rs. 20,000 when she left the petitioner's place. He alleged that he made efforts to call her back through his relations but not only those efforts failed but the non-petitioner made false accusation of the petitioner being a drunked addicted to gambling and prostitution. According to the petitioner these false allegations by the wife against the husband amounted to cruelty and, therefore, he wanted a divorce his wife on the ground of desertion and cruelty. The application was presented on May 4, 1982. The non-petitioner wife contested the application and denied the allegation of desertion and cruelty. On the other hand she pleaded that it was the petitioner who had himself deserted her and had treated cruelty when she resided with him. He used to drink and under the influence of alcohol beat her. She also alleged that he had the had habits of gambling and his character also doubtful. After framing the necessary issued and taking the evidence of the parties the learned District Judge found that the petitioner had failed to establish both the grounds on which he sought divorce from his wife. He accordingly dismissed the application. The petitioner has therefore now come up in appeal. 2. By order dated April. 18, 1983 the parties were directed to be present in Court on May 9, 1983 so that possibility of reconciliation could be explored. However on that day that Respondent could not come and the learned counsel for the Respondent wanted some time to call her, but the appellant objected to it and clearly stated that them was absolutely no possibility of any reconciliation and that he was not prepared to take the respondent back with him. However on that day that Respondent could not come and the learned counsel for the Respondent wanted some time to call her, but the appellant objected to it and clearly stated that them was absolutely no possibility of any reconciliation and that he was not prepared to take the respondent back with him. In these circumstances the matter was kept for hearing. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record. Now so far as the findings of the learned District Judge that the petitioner had failed to establish either desertion or cruelty on the part of the non-petitioner so the learned counsel for the appellant has candidly not challenged them in any seriousness. He has mainly raised two contentions before me. His first contention is that even in the reply to the application under section 13 as well as in her statement before the Court the non-petitioner respondent has levelled serious allegations against the appellant accusing him of gambling, drinking and prostitution and, therefore, such allegations by themselves must be deemed to be amounting to cruelty on the part of the wife and on that basis alone the appellant should have been granted a decree of divorce. His second contention is that from the circumstances brought on record by both the parties it is beyond doubt that the parties cannot live together and the matrimonial relations have broken beyond repair and in these circumstances the divorce is the only remedy to restore happiness to the parties and, therefore, a decree of divorce should have been granted to the appellant. 4. Having given my careful consideration to these contentions I find myself unable to agree with the learned counsel for the appellant. Now there is no doubt that the non-petitioner wife has alleged that the husband is addicted to drinking, gambling and visiting other women, but merely because these allegations have been raised it cannot be inferred that these allegations are false and in order to prove that such allegations being false the conduct of the wife amounted to mental cruelty towards the husband. It was for the husband to establish that a matter of fact, these allegations were false and such allegations caused him mental agony. It was for the husband to establish that a matter of fact, these allegations were false and such allegations caused him mental agony. Now in this respect the only relevant evidence is that of the petitioner himself and the learned District Judge for valid reasons has refused to place any reliance on the evidence of the petitioner. The learned District Judge has pointed out that the allegations of desertion and cruelty raised by the petitioner are prima facie wrong and the petitioner has knowingly given false evidence. He has pointed out that in the application under section 13 the petitioner has alleged that the couple lived together only up to 1975 and thereafter in 1975 itself the non-petitioner had withdrawn from the society of the petitioner without reasonable cause. But then he entered the witness-box he gave an altogether different statement. There he stated that they lived together till Jan. 1977 and thereafter the non-petitioner went away. Not only this the petitioner went to the extent of stating that the non-petitioner used to tell him that she believed in free sex, such an allegation had not been raised by him in his petition under section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act. The matter does not reap here. In his statement before the Court the petitioner went to the extent of saying that the son of their landlord namely Shri Mamu Pareek. He further states that he had himself seen the non-petitioner sleeping with Mamu Pareek. If, that the petitioner states is the truth he would certainly have made these allegations in the application under section 13, but there is not a single word in this respect in the application under section 13, of the Hindu Marriage Act. Not only this the petitioner states that even after having seen the non-petitioner sleeping with Shri Mamu Pareek he did not turn out the non-petitioner from his house but only tried to make her understand. Such a conduct on the part of the petitioner appears to be wholly unbelievable and therefore the learned District Judge was perfectly justified in holding that the petitioner was not at all a reliable witness. Such a conduct on the part of the petitioner appears to be wholly unbelievable and therefore the learned District Judge was perfectly justified in holding that the petitioner was not at all a reliable witness. The learned Counsel for the appellant, however, submitted that at the time of the filing of the application section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, the petitioner probably was of the view that there may be chance of reconciliation between the parties and, therefore, he did not make such serious allegations against the non-petitioner in that application but when reconciliation could not be made he came out with these allegations. I do not find substance in this contention because if in fact there was any intention on the part of the petitioner to effect a reconciliation he would not have filed an application for restitution of conjugal rights. Further a person who can go to the extent of making such wild allegations against his wife in the evidence cannot be expected to have exercised so much restrict upon himself as to refrain from making such allegations in the application under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act. That being so, I see absolutely no reason to take it different view of the evidence then the one taken by the learned District Judge. It may be pointed out that the evidence of the petitioner far from being corroborated by his other evidence is rather rendered more doubtful by the evidence of his other witnesses inasmuch as P. W. 2 Madan Lal Chauhan who alleges to have gone to the petitioner to bring about a reconciliation between the parties states that the non-petitioner did not level any accusation against the petitioner. Similarly, Shri Chaturbhuj P. W. 3 who was produced in rebuttal of the non-petitioner's evidence had also not only not supported him but has stated that he does not know whether the petitioner is used to drinking and gambling. Of course he states that he had never seen him drinking or gambling. In these circumstances it cannot be said that the allegations of the petitioner being in the habit of drinking gambling etc. made by the non-petitioner are false. The petitioner, therefore, cannot ask for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty on the basis of these allegations. 5. In these circumstances it cannot be said that the allegations of the petitioner being in the habit of drinking gambling etc. made by the non-petitioner are false. The petitioner, therefore, cannot ask for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty on the basis of these allegations. 5. It may be added that in the present case the petitioner who had come forward to ask for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and it was for him to establish that ground. If for the same argument it is assumed that the non-petitioner who had levelled these allegations of drinking, gambling etc. against the petitioner has not been able to establish the same it can not give rise to a presumption that these allegations are false. The inability of the non-petitioner to establish these grounds is some thing quite different from saying that these allegations have been proved to be false. I am, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the learned District Judge was right in refusing the decree of divorce to the petitioner on cruelty. 6. So far as the other contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant goes it may at once he stated that although it may appear that the relation between the parties are very much strained and the matrimonial tie has broken beyond repair, the petitioner is not entitled to a decree unless he is able to bring his case within any of the grounds enumerated under section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act. A decree of divorce cannot be granted merely on the ground that the relations between the parties are very much strained and there is no hope of any reunion between them. It may be observed that if the parties do think that there is no possibility of a reunion they may apply for consent decree of divorce as provided under the Hindu Marriage Act. 7. No other point has been raised before me. 8. For the reasons stated above I find no force in this appeal and hereby dismissed it. In the circumstances of the case I shall leave the parties to bear their own costs in this Court.Appeal dismissed. *******