Judgment :- 1. Rarely does the State, the repository of executive power approach the High Court as a petitioner for relief under its writ jurisdiction. Strong as the arms of the law are, the Court cannot make any distinction between the State and the citizen in the discharge of its duties. 2. A seizure of a tempo van with logs of timber alleged to be involved in forest offences, a subsequent order of confiscation by the Divisional Forest Officer under the Kerala Forest Act, a reversal of his decision by the District Judge in appeal and a consequent direction to release the vehicle has given rise to this writ petition. The State, it is said, is aggrieved by this decision. 3. The State, however, has not filed this original petition. It is filed curiously by the Divisional Forest Officer, whose decision was set aside in appeal. Can this Court countenance his grievance? 4. Assuming the writ petition is maintainable at his instance, is not the District Judge, the Appellate Authority a necessary party in this proceeding for the issue of a writ of certiorari. These two preliminary points deserve serious consideration. 5. The right to confiscate under the Forest Act is vested in the authorised officer, the Divisional Forest Officer. He exercises a quasi judicial function. He has to observe the principles of natural justice, conform to the procedure prescribed under the Act, apply his own mind and then decide on the evidence whether confiscation is necessary in the circumstances of the case. For this purpose he functions as a Tribunal. He has no personal or official interest in the cause. He has to be just and upright; fair and impartial. After he issues the order, he has no more interest in the proceeding. He becomes functus officio as far as the case is concerned. He is the lowest in the hierarchy under the Act. His decision is subject to revision under S.61C of the Act and appealable under S.61D. The District Judge is the appellate authority. Administrative discipline, judicial decorum and the statutory safeguards demand that he abides by the decision in appeal. He cannot ignore or challenge the decision of the appellate authority. Challenge, if any, can be made by other aggrieved persons or authorities; but not by the Tribunal. The District Judge is the appellate authority. Administrative discipline, judicial decorum and the statutory safeguards demand that he abides by the decision in appeal. He cannot ignore or challenge the decision of the appellate authority. Challenge, if any, can be made by other aggrieved persons or authorities; but not by the Tribunal. If he cannot challenge the decision of the appellate authority, he cannot have recourse to writ proceedings to achieve the same object. The decision of the Supreme Court in Bhopal Sugar Industries v. Income Tax Officer, AIR. 1961 SC. 182, is instructive: "Where the Income-tax officer had virtually refused to carry out the clear and unambiguous directions which a superior tribunal like the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal had given to him by its final order in exercise of its appellate powers in respect of an order of assessment made by him, such refusal is in effect a denial of justice, and is further more destructive of one of the basic principles in the administration of justice based as it is on the hierarchy of courts. In such a case a writ of mandamus should issue ex debito justitiae to compel the Income Tax officer to carry out the directions given to him by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. The High Court would be clearly in error if it refused to issue a writ on the ground that no manifest injustice had resulted from the order of the Income Tax Officer in view of the error committed by the Tribunal itself in its order. Such a view is destructive of one of the basic principles of the administration of justice." 6. The Divisional Forest Officer cannot therefore maintain this writ petition at all. If the State has a grievance, it has to figure as the petitioner; but not through the quasi judicial Tribunal, the Divisional Forest Officer constituted under the Act. 7. Moreover, in certiorari proceedings the District Judge, the Tribunal constituted under the Forest Act is a necessary party. It is his order that is being challenged. Without him on the party array, without his records, no writ can issue either. The Supreme Court in Udit Narain Singh v. Board of Revenue, AIR 1963 SC. 7. Moreover, in certiorari proceedings the District Judge, the Tribunal constituted under the Forest Act is a necessary party. It is his order that is being challenged. Without him on the party array, without his records, no writ can issue either. The Supreme Court in Udit Narain Singh v. Board of Revenue, AIR 1963 SC. 786, at 789 observed thus: "It is said that in an appeal against the decree of a subordinate court, the court that passed the decree need not be made a party and on the same parity of reasoning it is contended that a tribunal need not also be made a party in a writ proceeding. But there is an essential distinction between an appeal against a decree of a subordinate court and a writ of certiorari to quash the order of a tribunal or authority; in the former, the proceedings are regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure and the court making the order is directly subordinate to the appellate court and ordinarily acts within its bounds, though sometimes wrongly or even illegally; but in the case of the latter, a writ of certiorari is issued to quash the order of a tribunal which is ordinarily outside the appellate or revisional jurisdiction of the court and the order is set aside on the ground that the tribunal or authority acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. If such a tribunal or authority is not made party to the writ, it can easily ignore the order of the High Court quashing its order, for, not being a party, it will not be liable to contempt. In these circumstances whoever else is a necessary party or not the authority or tribunal is certainly a necessary party to such a proceeding. In this case, the Board of Revenue and the Commissioner of Excise were rightly made parties in the writ petition." These objections rightly taken by Sri. T. C. N Menon are substantial and sound. The original petition as it is filed today, is not maintainable. The Senior Government Pleader Sri. Vasudevan, who appears for the State and who argued at length on the merits, prayed for time to cure the defects. He may file the necessary applications, if he so advised, within two weeks from today. 8. The van has been directed to be released by the District Court. The Senior Government Pleader Sri. Vasudevan, who appears for the State and who argued at length on the merits, prayed for time to cure the defects. He may file the necessary applications, if he so advised, within two weeks from today. 8. The van has been directed to be released by the District Court. The original petition was heard urgently at the instance of the counsel for the respondent, so that final orders could be passed by this Court. That cannot be done now, as the petition in the present form is not maintainable. The original petition itself is liable to be dismissed, but for the fact that the. learned senior Government Pleader wants time to cure the defect. The Government Pleader states that the van will be worth about Rs. 80,000/-. In the interests of justice therefore I direct that the van, which is the subject-matter of the proceedings, will be released to the respondent on his furnishing a Bank guarantee for Rs. 25,000/- and property security for Rs. 65,000/-to the satisfaction of the Conservator of Forests, Trichur. Issue carbon copies of the order on usual terms.