Judgment M.P.Verma, J. 1. The petitioner Jagdish Pandey made accusation at Police Station Baghaila (Nokha) in the district of Rohtas against the members of the opposite party that they, in a mob assaulted the petitioner and his other relations and even looted away their guns. The story is that his brother Surendra Pandey when went to his field for irrigation, he noticed that accused opposite party Nos. 1 to 7 had cut the ridge of the field for flow of water. Surendra Pandey objected to it, whereupon opposite party No. 7 hit him with a Barchcha and opposite party No. 4 assaulted him with lathi. Surendra Pandey ran to his house. All the members of the opposite party Nos. 1 to 7 started chasing him. Other members of the opposite party Nos. 8 to 10 also joined in the chase. Surendra Pandey, who could reach his Dalan earlier, told his father, uncle and also his grand father that a mob was following him for assault. Further case of the prosecution is that on hearing from Surendra Pandey, his other relations got ready for an encounter. Surendra Pandey took out a gun and so did his brother Jagdish Pandey. Other got lathi in their hands. The mob by the time came to the Dalan and there was a clash. They all began assaulting Jagdish Pandey, Surendra Pandey and others. It is also their case the accused opposite party No. 10 Nagina Dusadh snatched away the gun, which Jagdish Pandey was holding and some other members of the mob snatched the gun of Surendra Pandey. Some members of the mob also received injuries in the counter attack. Thereafter all of them retreated. Jagdish Pandey had severe injuries and he was removed to Rajpur out-post under Police Station Baghaila, where he gave his fard-beyan on the basis of which a formal F.I.R. was drawn up and the police registered a case. After investigation, there was a charge-sheet against these petitioners and they were committed to the court of session for trial on charges under Sections 307, 147, 148 and also 379 and 452 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as the Code). After investigation, there was a charge-sheet against these petitioners and they were committed to the court of session for trial on charges under Sections 307, 147, 148 and also 379 and 452 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as the Code). The learned Additional Sessions Judge, before whom the case proceeded, by his judgment, dated 11.3.1981 acquitted all the accused opposite party against which, the informant Jagdish Pandey, being aggrieved, has filed this application in revision under Sec.397/401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure with a prayer to set aside the judgment impugned. 2. The learned Advocate Sri K.N. Choubey has argued that the trial Court failed to make a proper assessment of the evidence. It has been contended that the court committed error in discarding the statements of P. Ws. 1, 2, 3 and 4 who are grandfather, father, uncle and son on the sole ground of their being interested in the prosecution case. The court below should have taken into consideration that they had received injuries in the occurrence and so the fact of their being present at the occurrence should not have been disbelieved. It has also been argued that the prosecution has successfully proved that two guns belonging to the informant and P.W. 4 Surendra Pandey were snatched away and it was the duty of the court to have framed charges under the Arms Act against the members of the opposite party, atleast against the snatchers of the guns, for being in possession of the guns without licence. It has also been contended that mere non explanation of the injury found on the members of the opposite party should not have been considered as vital and the only duty cast on the trial court was to weigh the prosecution witnesses with greater care and caution and that there is no absolute proposition to throw out the prosecution story on non explanation of the injuries. In other words it is a case of miscarriage of justice and the judgment stands vitiated, as it was wrong for the court to reject the evidence of the eye witnesses. 3. In the impugned judgment, the trial court has held that whole story is replete with the absurdity. In other words it is a case of miscarriage of justice and the judgment stands vitiated, as it was wrong for the court to reject the evidence of the eye witnesses. 3. In the impugned judgment, the trial court has held that whole story is replete with the absurdity. Episode of snatching the guns was also described to be as absurd and improbable, so much so that according to the court below, the medical evidence was rather compatible with the defence version. The prosecution failed to discharge the onus of explaining the injuries on the accused, which they received in the same occurrence and in absence of the same the court felt doubt in the prosecution version and the evidence of the eye witnesses P. Ws. 1, 2, 3 and 4. In other words, by the judgment impugned, the court below held that as material part of the story was suppressed and the prosecution having not come to court with clean hands, the case failed. 4. I have been taken through the statements of some of the witnesses and I have given my thought over the findings of the trial court. I do not find any absurdity in their approach. As a court of appeal against the order of acquittal, High Court is confined to the case, as made out and proceeded in the court below. The High Court will not go into any and every infirmity, even if there be any, such as, non framing of charge, as has been convassed in this case, because if the court failed to frame a charge, at the proper stage, on the materials on record, the same is well cured by the provisions contained in Section 464 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, unless the petitioner can show that there has been a failure of justice. On the mere finding of the trial court, which led to acquittal of the accused petitioners on the charge of theft of guns, it would be too much to stress that there has been failure of justice on account of omission to frame a charge under the Arms Act against the accused opposite party, for the simple reason, that once the charge of theft is not established there can be no occasion to fasten the accused with criminal liability of holding the same said guns in violation of the Arms Act. 5. 5. The trial court discussed the aforementioned aspects of the case in full detail. True it is that interestedness or relationship may not be. a good ground to discard the statements of a particular witness, all other attending factors must also be considered to find out the trustworthiness. Similarly, some injuries found on a person are just a circumstance to presume that he was present there in the occurrence, if there is such evidence to hold, but injury does not put a stamp on him of being trustworthy and that he is speaking all truth. There may be a case of Suppresio vari and suggestio fain, It is no wonder that even an injured, fellow might narrate a false story how he received injuries. So a court has to exercise judicial caution and care at each step. Here is a case in which guns have been fired by the members of the prosecution party and the trial court has held that the prosecution has not come out with a correct story. It could have been cast in narration of the case by these witnesses and the prosecution version has been disbelieved. I could not see any perversity in the approach of the trial court. In my view, the judgment under revision does not suffer from any such serious infirmity calling for an interference for re-appraisal of the evidence on question of facts once finally concluded in the right perspective. 6. In the result, the revision application fails and is dismissed accordingly.