( 1 ) ALL these appeals are directed against the order of the learned single judge made in writ petitions Nos. 1017 1019 and 2381 to 2383 of 1983 on 4th of march 1983. The first five appeals are by the STATE OF KARNATAKA and the Secretary to Government and Commissioner for Home Affairs, Government of Karnataka, Bangalore, (hereinafter referred to as ' the Home Secretary ' ). The next five appeals are by the Karnataka State Road transport Corporation, Bangalore (here in after referred to as 'the Corporation') and the last five appeais are by a person who had made applications before the learned single Judge for being impleaded as a party in the writ petitions and whose applications have been rejected by the learned single Judge observing, however, that he was heard as an intervener. ( 2 ) IN the course of this order, only the petitioners in the writ petitions are referred to as the respondents. ( 3 ) THE corporation is a State Transport undertaking as defined in Sec. 68a of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, (hereinafter referred to as ' the Act ' ). The corporation published a draft scheme under Section 68c of the Act, popularly known as ' the Kolar Pocket Scheme. ' the said scheme was approved by the State government on 10th of January 1968. The approved Scheme was duly published in the official gazette by the state government under sec. 68d (3) of the Act on 25th of january 1968. It was modified by the state Government under Section 68e (2) of the Act by a notification published in the Karnataka Gazette dated 11th of January 1980, by substituting a new item for existing item [d] in the schedule thereof. ( 4 ) ON 26th of February 1980, the state Government, in exercise of its powers under Section 68 E [2] of the Act, published a proposal to further modify the Kolar Pocket Scheme. The corporation and various transport operators who were notified of that proposal, were called upon to submit their suggestions and objections, if any therefor, on or before 3rd of April 1980. The corporation and various transport operators who were notified of that proposal, were called upon to submit their suggestions and objections, if any therefor, on or before 3rd of April 1980. The corporation and some of the operators including the respondents and the appellant in the last five appeals, who had submitted their suggestions and objections pursuant thereto it appears, were heard by the then Chief Minister, Sri R. Gundurao, on 15th of June 1982 as required by Section 68e (2) of the Act and rule 8 of the State Transport Undertaking (Karnataka) Rules, 1976. According to respondents, the then Chief Minister, Sri R. Gundu Rao, passed an order on 15th of December 1982 approving the modifications of the scheme as proposed and directed the Home Secretary to take further action in accordance with law. Some of the respondents, through applied for certified copies of the order by furnishing the prescribed fees, they were not furnished with the copies of the same. Though Sri D. P. Sharma, one of the respondents, it appears, gave an application to the Chief Minister on 25th of december 1982 to issue directions to the home Secretary to publish the said order of the Chief Minister dated 15th of December 1982 and another similar application to the Chief secretary, no action was taken to publish the same. This situation, it is stated, led the respondents to file the writ petitions out of which the present appeals have arisen, praying for the issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the Home Secretary to publish the order of the Chief Minister passed on 15th of December 1982 approving the modifications proposed in the notification published on 26th of february 1980, and also for issue of a direction to grant a certified copy of that order. Their case in the writ petitions, stated briefly, is that the statutory duty owed by the state government to publish the modified scheme in accordance with the order of the Chief Minister dated 15th of December 1982, had not been performed. ( 5 ) THE writ petitions were opposed by the appellants on various grounds. It was contended, inter alia, that the respondents had no locus standi to maintain the writ petitions. ( 5 ) THE writ petitions were opposed by the appellants on various grounds. It was contended, inter alia, that the respondents had no locus standi to maintain the writ petitions. The appellants (State and Home secretary) who admitted that the then Chief Minister had passed on order on 15th of Dceember 1982, stated that the same was not issued or published by the Government as required by article 166 of the canstitution. It was their stand that the order of the Chief Minister, which was merely provisional in character, did not acquire finality requiring its publication in the gazette. However, before the same could become the order of the Government the then Chief Minister, who had made the order on 15th of December 1982, having tendered his resignation, there was a change in the government and the new government felt that a proper decision in the matter should be taken by it after hearing all the parties concerned afresh and that, therefore, the order of the out-going Chief Minister taken on 15th of December 1982 was neither issued nor published. It was contended that there was no order of the State government in the eye of law as contemplated by Section 68 E (2) of the act and that as the decision of the Chief minister dated 15th of December 1982 was not a final order of the state government, certified copies of the same could not be supplied. It was, however, submitted that the modification of the scheme under Section 68 E [2] of the act is required to be given due publicity for bringing such modification into effect. At the same time, it was asserted that the decision of the Chief Minister dated 15th of December 1982 being merely provisional or tentative in character, nothing prevents the State Government from taking a proper decision in regard to the proposed modification after hearing afresh the Corporation and the persons likely to be affected. ( 6 ) THE learned single Judge allowed the application of the corporation for being impleaded as a respondent in the writ petitions. But, he rejected the application of the appellant in the last five appeals, for being impleaded as a party, observing, however, that he was heard as an intervener, as stated earlier. ( 6 ) THE learned single Judge allowed the application of the corporation for being impleaded as a respondent in the writ petitions. But, he rejected the application of the appellant in the last five appeals, for being impleaded as a party, observing, however, that he was heard as an intervener, as stated earlier. The learned single Judge, by his order dated 4th of March 1983, allowed the writ petitions and issued a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the State government and the Home Secretary to take all steps within two weeks thereafter, to publish in the official Gazette the modified scheme as per the order of the Cheif Minister dated 15th of December 1982. In view of the direction given by him to publish the modified scheme, the learned single Judge declined to make any direction for furnishing the certified copy of the order of the then Chief Minister. It is the said order of the learned single Judge that is challenged in these appeals. ( 7 ) THOUGH the learned counsel appearing for the appellants in these appeals, raised several contentions in their support, we consider it unnecessary to deal with all of them as the upholding by us of their principal contention, namely, that the decision of the then chief Minister dated 15th of December 1982 not having been communicated or published is merely tentative and provisional in character and as such, the state Government is entitled to reconsider or modify the said decision after giving an opportunity to the corporation and to all persons who, in its opinion, are likely to be affected, is in itself sufficient to decide these appeals. ( 8 ) HOWEVER, before proceeding to examine the principal contention of the appellants, we consider it advantageous to advert briefly to the relevant provis ions of the act and their scope. Chapter IV A of the Act contains special provisions relating to State Transport undertakings. Section 68b of the Act declares that the provisions of chapter IV a and the rules and orders made there under shall have effect not withstanding anything inconsistant therewith contained in Chapter IV of the Act or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law. Section 68b of the Act declares that the provisions of chapter IV a and the rules and orders made there under shall have effect not withstanding anything inconsistant therewith contained in Chapter IV of the Act or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law. Section 68c enables the state Transport undertakings if it is of the opinion that for the purpose of providing an efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated road transport service it is necessary in public interest that road transport services in general or any particular class of such services in relation to any area or route or portion thereof should be run and operated by the State Transport undertaking, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of other persons or otherwise, to prepare a scheme giving all the required particulars and cause publication of such scheme in the official gazette and also in such other manner as the state government may direct, Sub. sec. [1] of Section 6d of the act entitles any person already providing transport 'facilities along or near the area or route proposed to be covered by the scheme, any association representing persons interested in the provision of road transport fecilities recognised by the State government, and any local authority or police authority within whose jurisdiction any part of the area or route proposed to be covered ' by the scheme lies, to file objections to the draft scheme before the state government; and Subsec. (2) provides that after considering the objections and giving an opportunity to the objectors or their representatives and the representative of the State 'transport undertaking to be heard in the matter, the State Government may approve or modify the scheme. Sub-section (3) of Section 68-D provides that the scheme as approved or modified under sub. sec- (2) shall then be published in the official gazette by the State Government and the same shall there upon become final and shall be called the approved scheme and the area or route to which it relates shall be called the notified area or notified route, and that if the scheme reates to any inter-State route it has to be published in the official Gazette with the previous aproval of the Central Government. Section 68e of the Act contains provisions which provide for cancellation or modification of the approved scheme. Sub-sec. Section 68e of the Act contains provisions which provide for cancellation or modification of the approved scheme. Sub-sec. (I) of Sec. 68e confers power on the State Transport unedrtaking to cancel or modify an approved scheme by following the procedure laid down in Sec. 68c and Sec. 68-D, in so far as they can be made applicable, as if the proposal to cancel or modify the scheme was a proposal for a separate scheme. However, the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 6se enables the State Transport undertaking to modify approved scheme without following the procedure laid down in Sec. 68c and Sec. 68d if the scheme relates to any route or area in res- pect of which the road transport services are run and operated by the State Transport undertaking to the complete exclusion of other persons in respect of the following matters, namely :- [a] increase in the number of vehicles or the number of trips; [b] change in the type of vehicles without reducing the seating capacity; [c] extension of the route or area, without reducing the frequency of service; or [d] alteration of the time-table without reducing the frequency of the service. But, sub-section (2) of section 68e empowers the State Government to modify any approved scheme, if it considers necessary in the public interest so to do after giving the Slate Transport undertaking and any other person who, in its opinion, is likely to be affected by the proposed modification an opportunity of being heard in respect of the p: opored modification. Sub-Section [i] of Section 6sf regulates issue of permits to the State transport undertakings after publication of the approved scheme. Sub-section [1a] thereof provides for grant of temporary permits to the State Transport undertaking in respect of routes coveied in a draft scheme for the period intervening between the date of publication of the draft scheme and the date of publication of the approved scheme. Subsection [2] of Section 68f provides that for giving effect to the app oved scheme in respect of a notified area or notified route the State Transport authority or the Regional Transport Authority, as the case may be, may refuse to enteltain any application for grant or renewal of any other permit or reject any such application as may be pending or cancel any existing permit or modify the terms of any existing permit. Section 68ff exprerly piovides that after the publication of the approved scheme in respect of any notified area or notified route the State transport Authority or the Regional Transport Authority as the case may be shall not grant any permit except in accordance with the provisions of the scheme. ( 9 ) BY operation of the provisions of section 68b of the Act, an approved scheme under Section 68d (3) shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in chapter IV of the act or in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law. Such approved scheme, in so far as it pertains to the area or the route covered by it, is law as held by the supreme court in H. C. Narayanappa v. State of Mysore ( AIR 1960 SC 1073 ) in para-12, which reads : in any event, the expression LAW as defined in Art. 13 [3] [a] includes any ordinance, order bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom, etc. , and the scheme fianed under Sec. 68c may properly be regarded as ' law ' within the meaning of Act. 19 [6] made by the State excluding private operaters from notified routes or notified areas, and immune from the attack that it infringes the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 19 [1] [g]. Whereas Sub-section [1] of Section 68e empowers the State transport undertaking to cancel or modify an approved scheme not covered by its provison, by following the p ocedure laid down in Section 68c and 68d, Sub-section [2] of Sec. 68e empowers the state government to modify an approved scheme without following the procedure prescribed in Secs. 68c and 68d, in that it [s. 68e[2] does not contain any express provision requiring it to follow the procedure laid down in section 68c and 68d. If the intention of the parliament was to make the procedure laid down in Sec. 68c and Sec. 68d applicable to the modification of the approved scheme by the State Government under sec. 68c and 68d, in that it [s. 68e[2] does not contain any express provision requiring it to follow the procedure laid down in section 68c and 68d. If the intention of the parliament was to make the procedure laid down in Sec. 68c and Sec. 68d applicable to the modification of the approved scheme by the State Government under sec. 68e [2] as urged on behalf of the respondents, it would not have been difficult for the parliament to make an express provision to that effect, particularly when such a provision had been made in Sec. 68e [1] Hence we are unable to persuade ourselves to the view that the State govenment is required to follow the procedure laid down by Sec. 68 D [3] for modifying an approved scheme under sec. 68e [2] The conditions specified in S. 68e [2] which the State Government is required to fulfil for modifying an approved scheme are [i] that the state Government should from the opinion that it is in public interest to modify the approved scheme and [ii] that it should give an opportunity of being heard in respect of the proposed modification to the State transport undertaking and any other person who, in its opinion, is likely to be affected by the proposed modification. No other express condition, which is required to be fulfilled, is stipulated by Sec. 68e [2] if the approved scheme published under sec. 68 D [3] is law, any modification of the said law under Sec. 68e [2j has also ta be regarded as law. We have already come to the conclusion that the procedure prescrised by Section 68c and section 68d is not required to be followed by the State Government when it proposes to modify the approved scheme under Sec. 68e [2], Therefore, it follows that sub-section [3] of Sec. 68d, which provides for publication in the official gazette of the approved scheme, is not attracted to a modification permitted under Sec. 68e [2], Then, when does a scheme modified under Section 68e [2] becomes operative. The supreme court has held in Harla V. State of Rajasthan ( AIR 1951 SC 467 ) that natural justice requires that before a law can become operative it must be promulgated or published. That was the case of Jaipur opium Act which was neither promulgatedn or published. The supreme court has held in Harla V. State of Rajasthan ( AIR 1951 SC 467 ) that natural justice requires that before a law can become operative it must be promulgated or published. That was the case of Jaipur opium Act which was neither promulgatedn or published. That Act was passed by a resolution of the council of ministers of Jaipur who derived their authority to make a law during the minority of Maharaja of jaipur from a Notification issued by the Crown representative, which did not expressly required the publication of such law to make it operative. Dealing with this question, the Supreme court has observed as follows :"natural justice requires that before a law can become operative it must be promulgated or published. It must be brodcast in some recognisable way so that all men may know what it is; or, at the very least, there must be some special rule or regulation or customary channel by or through which such knowledge can be acqired with the exercise of due and reasonable diligence. The thought that a decision reached in the secret recesses of a chamber to which the public have no access and to which even their accredited representatives have no access and of which they can normally know nothing, can nevertheless affect their lives, liberty and property be the mere passing of a Resolution without anything more is adhorrent to civilised man. It shocks his conscience. In the absence therefore of any Jaw, rule, regulation or custom, we hold that a law cannot come into being in this way. Promulgation or publication of some reasonable sort is essential". Sub-Section [2] of section 68e does not expressly prescribe publication the modification of the approved scheme. If the approved scheme is law, its modification can only be done by law. Therefore, its promulgation or publication in some reasonable way is essential to make it operative. The appellants have also taken the stand that publication of a modification of the approved scheme under section 68e [2] is necessary, to make such modification operative as law. If the approved scheme is law, its modification can only be done by law. Therefore, its promulgation or publication in some reasonable way is essential to make it operative. The appellants have also taken the stand that publication of a modification of the approved scheme under section 68e [2] is necessary, to make such modification operative as law. As the approved scheme is required to be published in the Official Gazette to make it operative as law, on a parity of reasoning, we consider it reasonable to hold that the publication in the official Gazette of a modification of the approved scheme under s. 68e [2] would meet the requirements of Natural Justice regarding promulgation or publication for making it operative as law. ( 10 ) IT was submitted on behalf of the respondents that the decision of the State government under Section 68d [2] of the act approving or modifying the draft scheme published under Section 68c, is a quesi-judicial decision and that therefore the same cannot be reviewed in the absence of conferment of express power under the Act in that regard Reliance in this behalf was placed on the decision of the supreme Court in N. M. T. Co-Operative society Vs. State of Rajasthan ( AIR 1963 sc 1098 ). It was maintained that the decision to modify the scheme under Section 68e [2] is similar to the dacision to be taken byt he State Government under section 68d [2] and that therefore the principle laid down by the Supreme Court relating to approval made there under equally applies to a modification permitted under Section 68e [2]. According to them there being no express provision in the Act permitting review of a decision to modify taken under Section 68e [2], the State government has no power of review and that therefore the decision of the then chief Minister dated 15th of December 1982 cannot be altered or changed by resorting to the process of review. ( 11 ) WE consider it wholly unnecessary to examine the merits of the above controversy as, in our view, the question of reviewing a judicial or quasi-judicial decision can arise only when such decision is pronounced or communicated to the persons concerned. ( 11 ) WE consider it wholly unnecessary to examine the merits of the above controversy as, in our view, the question of reviewing a judicial or quasi-judicial decision can arise only when such decision is pronounced or communicated to the persons concerned. It is so because until a judicial or quasi-judicial decision is pronounced or comunicated to the parties concerned, such decision should be regarded as one which is merely tentative on provisional in character, amenable for change. The Supreme Court, in surender Singh Vs. The Stale of Uttar pradesh (AIR. 1954 SC 194), while dealing with the point as to when a decision of a Court becomes its judgment, held as follows : "11. An important point therefore arises. It is evident that the decision which is so pronounced or intimated must be a declaration of the mind of the Court as it is at the time of pronouncement. We lay no stress on the mode or manner of delivery, as that is not of the essence except to say that it must be done in a judicial way in open Court. But however, when it is done it must be an expression of the mind of the Court at the time of delivery. We say this because that is the first judicial act touching the judgment which the Court performs after the hearing. Everything else up till then is done out of Court and is not intended to be the operative act which sets all the consequences which follow on the judgment in motion. Judges may, and often do, discuss the matter among themselves and reach a tentative conclusion. That is not their judgment. They may write and exchange drafts Those are not the judgments either however, heavily and often they may have been signed. The final operative act is that which is formally declared in open court with the intention of making it the operative decision of the Court. That is what constitutes the 'judgment. ( 12 ) NOW up to the moment the judgment is delivered judges have the right to change their mind. There is a sort of locus paenitentiae' and indeed last minute alterations often do occure. There fore, however much a draft judgment may have been signed before hand, it is nothing but a draft till formally delivered as the judgment of the Court. There is a sort of locus paenitentiae' and indeed last minute alterations often do occure. There fore, however much a draft judgment may have been signed before hand, it is nothing but a draft till formally delivered as the judgment of the Court. Only then does it crystalise into a full fledgd judgment and become operative. . . . . . It is, therefore, clear that the author of a decision has control over his decision until it is pronounced or communicated and can change or alter the same even if he had signed it, before its pronouncement or communication. From this it follows that it would be open to the author of a decision to change his mind and to pronounce a decisipn contrary to the one which he had already prepared and even signed. We are not show any valid reason why the above considerations governing a judicial decision, cannot apply to administrative as well as quasi-judicial decisions. Therefore until an administrative or a quasi - judicial decision is communicated or promulgated, it could only be regarded as provisional and tentative in character and can be changed by its author. In Bachhiltar Singh Vs. State of Punjab ( AIR 1963 SC 395 ) the Supreme Court dealt with the case of a departmental enqu'. ry. There the question for consideration was as to what amounts to an order of State government. The Supreme Court held that before something amounts to an order of the State Government two things are necessary namely : [1] that the order has to be expressed, in the name of the governor as required by clause [1] of article 166 of the Constitution, and [ii] that it has to be communicated. The Supreme Court has observed. Indeed it is possible that after expressing one opinion about a particular matter at a particular stage a Minister or the Council of Ministers may express quite a different opinion one which may be completely opposed to the earlier opinion, Which of them can be regarded as the 'order' of the State government ? Therefore, to make the opinion amount to a decision of the government, it must be communicated to the person concerned. In this connection we may quote the following from the judgment of this Court in the State of Punjab V. Sodhi Sukhade v Singh, air 1961 SC 493 at P. 512 : 'mr. Therefore, to make the opinion amount to a decision of the government, it must be communicated to the person concerned. In this connection we may quote the following from the judgment of this Court in the State of Punjab V. Sodhi Sukhade v Singh, air 1961 SC 493 at P. 512 : 'mr. Gopal Singh attempted to argue that before the final order was passed the council of Ministers had decided to accept the respondent's representation and to reinstate him, and that, according to him, the respondent seeks to prove by recalling the two original orders. We are unable to understand this argument. Even if the Council of Ministers had provisonally decided to reinstate the respondent that would not prevent the Council from reconsidering the matter and coming to a contrary conclusion later on, until a final decision is reached by them and is communicated to the Rajpramukh in the form of advice and acted upon by him by issuing an order in that behalf to the respondent' thus it is of the essence that the order has to be communicated to the person who would be affected by that order before the State and that person can be bound by that order. For, until the order is communicated to the person affected by it, it would be open to the Council of Ministers to consider the matter over and over again and therefore till its communication the order cannot be regarded as anything more than provisional in character. This decision has been followed in the subsequent decision in Kedar Nath Vs. State of Punjab ( AIR 1979 SC 220 ). That was a case pertaining to the confirmation of a Government servant by name K. N. Bahl, who was the appellant. The Minister concerned had stated in his minutes that the adverse entries against the appellant should be expugned and that he should be confirmed on the completion of his period of probation. On that the Chief Minister made an order on 13-2-1958 agreeing with the Ministers note. But the order of confirmation was not issued. On the other hand, the Chief minister made an order subsequently on 29-10-1958 agreeing with another proposal for the reversion of the appellant to his parent department with immediate effect instead of confirming him. On that the Chief Minister made an order on 13-2-1958 agreeing with the Ministers note. But the order of confirmation was not issued. On the other hand, the Chief minister made an order subsequently on 29-10-1958 agreeing with another proposal for the reversion of the appellant to his parent department with immediate effect instead of confirming him. As the earlier decision of the Chief Minister dated 13-2-1958 was not expressed in the name of the Governer and was not communicated to the appellant, it was held that it was only a provisional order which was open to reconsideration by the Chief Minister and did not bind anyone. Coming to the present case, the decision to modify the approved scheme taken by the then Chief Minister on 15th of december 1982 has neither been published nor communicated to any one. Until the said decision was communicated or published, it cannot be regarded as anything but provisional and tentative in character which is amenable to alteration or modification before its publication or communication. After the formation of the new Government, according to the appellants, a decision has been taken to reexamine the matter after giving an opportunity of being heard to the Corporation and to all persons who, in the opinion of the State Government, are likely to be affected, as the decision of the then chief Minister dated 15th of December 1982 in the matter, was only tentative and provisional in character. In our view, the new Government has undoubted power to change or alter the decision the matter. That right of the State Government cannot be defeated by compelling publication of the decision taken on 15th of December 1982. The respondents have not shown any right conferred upon them either under the Act or under any other law which enables them to secure publication of a tentative and provisional decision of the State Government. There is no warrant for imposing such duty or obligation on the State Government. Hence, in our opinion, the respondents are not entitled to obtain a writ of mandamus compelling the State Government to publish the tentative decision of the then chief Minister dated 15th of December 1982, particularly when the State Government has taken a ciecision to re-examine the matter and to taken a appropriate decision after hearing the persons required to be heard 12. Learned Counsel for respondents relied upon a Division Bench decision of the patna High Court in Dilwara Singh vs'. State of Bihar ( AIR 1972 Pat. 162 ) to support their submission that the Communication of the decision of the Government is not necessary to make such decision final. In the first instance, it is necessary to pointout that that was not a case dealing with the State Government's power of modification of an approved scheme under Section 68e (2) as in the present case On the other hand that was a case concerning a draft scheme published under s. 68c in which the then Chief Minister of the Bihar Government had heard the objectors and other affected persons on 18-10-1967 and 24-10-1967 and approved it by his order dated 18-1-1968. It transpired that the Ministry in which the said Transport Minister was a member, went out of office on 25-1-1968 and a new Ministry was formed on 28-1-1968. The new transport Minister passed an order for issue of fresh notices to the objectors to hear the objections and fixed 30-3-1968 as the date of hearing. This new Ministry also fell on 28-3-1968 and a Press Note was issued stating that the hearing was postponed. Thereafter, it appears that even without fixing the next date for hearing the objectors, the scheme, which had been approved earlier on 18-1-1968, itself came to be published in the Gazette on 28-5-1969 under Saction 68 D (3 ). It is that aproved scheme that came to be challenged on the ground that the objectors were not given an opportunity of being heard eventhough notices were issued to them by the successor Government in that regard. The decision of Bachhittar Singh Vs State of Punjab ( AIR 1963 SC 395 ) on which reliance is placed by us, was pressed into service in that case and it was urged that the order dated 18-1-1968 could not have become final unless it was communicated to the objectors. Their lordships of the Patna High Court held that the order which was held to be not effective without communication in Bachhittar Singh's case was entirely of a different kind from the order made under section 68d (2 ). Their lordships of the Patna High Court held that the order which was held to be not effective without communication in Bachhittar Singh's case was entirely of a different kind from the order made under section 68d (2 ). Their Lordships further pointed out that there is no law that the order approving or modifying the scheme, has got to be communicated either to the objectors or to the Corporation. On facts, their Lordships came to the conclusion that the petitioners had. in fact, knowledge of that order and that that was not required to be communicated. This decision, in our opinion, is clearly distinguishable as it does hot deal with the case falling under Section 68e (2) of the act, but deals with a case falling under section 68d of the Act. The scheme of section 68d makes it clear that the decision to approve or modify is required to be taken under sub-section (2) of Section 68d and that the same has to be published under Sub-sec. (3) of Section 68d. When there is such an express provision for communication by way of publication in the Official Gazettee under Sub-Section [3] of Section under of Section 68d, the question of expecting the decision under Section [2] of Section 68d to be communicated to the parties concerned does not at all arise. But, that is not the position in regard to the modification of a scheme under Section 68 E [2]. The decision of the Patna High Court was also relied upon for the proposition that the deci'sion of the State Government under Section 68e [2] is in the nature of a judicial decision and that in the absence of an express provision the same cannot be reviewed. But, we have came to the conclusion that the question of review arises only after a decision is published or communicated. A decision is only tentative or provisional in character until it is published or communicated If a decision is altered by its author before its publication or communication that action cannot amount to review of his decision. Hence, in our opinion, the decision of the Patna High Court cannot also support the second proposition of the respondents. ( 13 ) ON behalf of the respondents, strong reliance was however, placed on the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in William Marbury Vs. Hence, in our opinion, the decision of the Patna High Court cannot also support the second proposition of the respondents. ( 13 ) ON behalf of the respondents, strong reliance was however, placed on the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in William Marbury Vs. James Madison (U. S. Supreme Court rep6rts- 2 Law ED. 1-4 U. S page 135), the facts of that case are indeed very interesting. President Adams signed a commission on 3rd of March 1801 appointing William Marbury as Justice of Peace for the district of Columbia. John Marshal was his Secretary of State. Before the Commission of appointment could be served on William Marbury, Jefferson became the President. Mr. Jefferson ordered his Secretary of State James Madison not to deliver the order of appointment to William Marbury. William Marbury petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel James Madison to deliver the commission. By then John marshall had become the Chief Justice and the matter came before him. He held that Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 which empowered the Supreme court to issue writs of mandamus in cases warranted by the principles of usage of law to any courts appointed or persons holding office under the authority of the United States is void as offending article III of the Constitution. We consequently held that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain Marbury's writ petition for a mandamus. On merits however, he recorded a finding that the Secretary of state Madison had wrongfull withheld the commission but as the Court had no jurisdiction the question of issuing a writ of mandamus to Madison did not arise. This decision was reliedupon by the respondents in support of their contention that the decision having been rendered by the Chief minister on 15th of December 1982 a writ could be issued for publishing the same. Fiftly, it is necessary to point out that the observations of Cheif Justice Marshall are in the nature of obiter. This decision was reliedupon by the respondents in support of their contention that the decision having been rendered by the Chief minister on 15th of December 1982 a writ could be issued for publishing the same. Fiftly, it is necessary to point out that the observations of Cheif Justice Marshall are in the nature of obiter. The Court having come to the conclusion that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition it was wholly unnecessary to go into the question as to whether Madison was required to serve the commission on Marbury, The decision of Chief Justice Marshall is an authority for the law laid down in that case, namely, that if there is confict between an ordinary law and the Contitiution the ordinary Jaw is to the extent of inconsistency void and ineffective. The observations of the Chief Justice Marshall that madison wrongfully withheld the commission of appointment of Marbury have been seriously criticised firstly on the ethical question of Marshall deciding a case which arose out of his own negligence as secretary of State and Secondly on the ground that it was wholly unnecessary to decide that question after having come to the conclusion that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. (See : The American Constitution by c. Herman Pritchett 111 Edition Page 127, and the American Constitutional Law by tresolini and Shapiro III Edition pages 72-74 ). Apart from the fact that the decision of the Chief Justice Marshal! in Marbury vs. Madison has been severely criticised by the American Constitutional lawyers, the question of our deriving sustenance from the same does not arise as several authoritative pronouncements of our own supreme Court on which we have placed reliance for deciding the present case, give us sufficient guidance. ( 14 ) BEFORE concluding, we would like to examine as to whether these are fit cases in which relief should be given under Article 226 of the Constitution of india. Under Section 68e [2] of the Act, the State Government has power to modify the approved scheme after following the Procedure prescribed therein. Even if the decision of the then Chief Minister is published it will not come in the way of the State Government modifying the approved scheme once again by following the procedure prescribed in Section 68e [2]. Under Section 68e [2] of the Act, the State Government has power to modify the approved scheme after following the Procedure prescribed therein. Even if the decision of the then Chief Minister is published it will not come in the way of the State Government modifying the approved scheme once again by following the procedure prescribed in Section 68e [2]. When the State Government has thus the undoubted power which it intends to exercise, the State Government can promptly undo what it may be compelled to do by this Court. The scheme of Chapter IV A of the Act indicates that it is for the State Transport undertaking to come forward with an appropriate draft scheme for approval by the State Government. Once it is approved and published there is further scope for its modification firstly by the State transport undertaking under Section 68e [1] and secondly by the State Government under Section 68e[2]. The power of the State government is only an enabling one which it can exercise at any time after the approved scheme is published if it considers necessary to do so in public interest. It is, therefore, clear that the State Government is not under an obligation to exercise its power of modification under Section 68e [2]. The power to modify the scheme also includes the power not to modify the scheme, vide Malik Ram Vs. State of Rajasthan ( AIR 1961 SC 1575 ). Merely because the S'ate Government initiated steps to modify the scheme it does not follow that it must culminate in the modification and publication of the modified scheme. A work which in its inception, is permissive only cannot become obligatory by part performance. Lord porter said in East Saffolk Rivers Catchment Board Vs. Kent (1941, A. C. 74, 107 ) :- the sole question in the present case is whether the mere under taking of a task which the legislature has empowered an authority to do puts them in the same position as if that task had been imposed as a duty upon them. I agree that it does not", hence, merely because the State Government initiated steps to modify the scheme by publishing a proposal, heard the persons likely to be affected and taken a tentative decision in the matter, it is not obliged to modify the scheme. I agree that it does not", hence, merely because the State Government initiated steps to modify the scheme by publishing a proposal, heard the persons likely to be affected and taken a tentative decision in the matter, it is not obliged to modify the scheme. These are not cases in which the respondents (petitioners in the W. Ps) can assert that they have any legal right of their own which has been infringed in as much as they have not been conferred any right to seek modification of the scheme at the hands of the State Government under Section 68e [2]. Hence, we are of the opinion that these are not fit cases for grant of relief under Articles 226 of the Constitution. ( 15 ) TO sum up, our conclusions are as follows :-[i] The modification of the approved scheme under Section 68 E [2] is law ; [iij The procedure prescribed by Section 68 D is not applicable to modification of the approved scheme under Section 68e 12]. [iii] Having regard to the principles of natural Justice, there being no provision for publication of the scheme modifisd under Section 68e [2], which is law, it is required to be published in the Official Gazette in the same manner in which an approved scheme is published, to make it operative; [iv] The decision taken by the Then chief Minister on 15th of December 1982 to modify the approved scheme under section 68e [2] not having been published or communicated to any person, is only tentative or provisional in character; [v] Any modification of the tentative or provisional decision of the State Government under Section 68e [2] does not amount to review; [vi] The state Government is competent to modify the tentative decision taken by the Chief Minister on 15th of december 1982; [vii] The respondents (Petitioners in the W. Ps) have no legal right to compel the State Government to publish the decision taken by the Chief Minister on 15th of December 1982; and [viii] At any rate, these are not fit cases for grant of relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. ( 16 ) FOR the reasons stated above, all these appeals are allowed, the order of the learned single Judge is set-aside and the writ petitions are dismissed. In the circumstances, parties shall bear their respective costs. WRIT APPEALS NOS. ( 16 ) FOR the reasons stated above, all these appeals are allowed, the order of the learned single Judge is set-aside and the writ petitions are dismissed. In the circumstances, parties shall bear their respective costs. WRIT APPEALS NOS. 298 to 302, 303 to 307 and 349 to 353 of 1983. In our opinion, these are not fit cases for grant of leave to Supreme Court as, no substantial question of law of general importance which requires to be considered by the Supreme Court, arises for consideration in these cases as we have rendered our decision solely based on the decision of the Supreme Court itself. No stay. --- *** --- .