J. D. JAIN ( 1 ) PLAINTIFF No. 1 is a State emporium owned by the State Govt. of Rajasthan, being a Division of the Rajasthan Small Industries Corporation Ltd. plaintiff No. 2. They are engaged in the business of manufacturing, marketing and export of handicrafts, objects of arts and garments etc. M/s. Prince Associates defendant No. 4 is an importer firm of U. S. A. with defendants 5 and 6 as partners therein. They are carrying on their business at St. Paul Minneapolis. On various dates of June 1975, plaintiff No. 1, pursuant to the order placed by defendants 4, 5 and 6 and in accordance with the agreed arrangements between the parties, despatched four consignments of different types of merchandise to be shipped by Pan American World Airways, an I. A. T. A. airline, under their airways bills dt. llth June 1975, 20th June 1975, 25th June 1975 and 30th June 1975 etc. The contention of the plaintiffs is that it was an express condition of shipment that the consignments would be delivered only when the documents were cleared through St. Anthony Park Bank defendant No. 2, which is a banking corporation carrying on the business of banking etc. at Minesota, United States of America. It is further averred that M/s. United Airlines defendant No. 3 is an airline which operates from and to various stations within the United States of America and defendant No. 1 who were the first carriers were to deliver goods to defendant No. 3 for forward shipment to the ultimate destination from the point up to which the airline of defendant No. 1 operated with the express condition that the goods would not be delivered unless so authorised by defendant No. 2. However, on account of collusion between defendants, 1, 2 and 3 on the one hand and defendants 4, 5 and 6 on the other, defendant No. 3 acted wrongly and illegally in delivering the consignments to defendants 4, 5 and 6 without getting clearance from defendant No. 2, Thus, it is contended that defendants 1, 2 and 3 besides, of course, defendants 4, 5 and 6, who failed to pay price of the goods, are liable to re-imburse the plaintiffs to the extent of loss caused to them on account of their wrongful act in delivering the goods to defendants 4, 5 and 6 without the authority of defendant No. 2, who was the consignee under the airway bills. As for defendants 4 to 6, it is contended that they received all the abovementioned four consignments wrongfully without getting the requisite shipping documents cleared through defendant No. 2 and they have not paid price of the goods so far. ( 2 ) THE suit is resisted by defendant No. 1. A written statement was filed on behalf of defendants 4 and 5 also but subsequently there was no appearance on their behalf. Hence, proceedings are ex parte against them. ( 3 ) DEFENDANT No. 1 while admitting that the four consignments in question were booked by them for carriage to St. Paul Minneapolis (USA) has contended that their airline did not operate to serve St. Paul Minneapolis on its routes and as such the consignments in question had to be transferred to some other carriers which operated to the ultimate destination. Accordingly they discharged their contractual obligation under the conditions of contract of carriage by transferring the shipments to different forwarding carriers, namely, (i) United Airlines defendant No. 3, (ii) Western Airlines Inc. and (iii) North West Orient Airlines in good order for carriage to the ultimate destination St. Paul Minnepolis. They assert that the Plaintiffs and their shipping agents M/s. Cox and Kings were well aware of the fact that they did not operate to St. and (iii) North West Orient Airlines in good order for carriage to the ultimate destination St. Paul Minnepolis. They assert that the Plaintiffs and their shipping agents M/s. Cox and Kings were well aware of the fact that they did not operate to St. Paul Minneapolis and that the shipments under the four airway bills in question were to be transferred to some other carrier which operated to the ultimate destination and as such the said arrangement had been made by them purely as an agent of the shipper i. e. the plaintiffs as per condition No. 6 of the conditions of contract of carriage, they point out that the suit is bad for misjoinder and non-joinder of the parties inasmuch as the ultimate liability to deliver the goods lay on the delivering carriers mentioned above and the plaintiffs not having impleaded Western Airlines Inc. and North West Orient Airlines, who were necessary parties to the suit, the same is liable to be dismissed. As for themselves, the stand of defendant No. 1 is that the plaint does not disclose any cause of action against them either under the contract of carriage or under any law for the time being in force. The plaint is, therefore, liable to be rejected as against them. Lastly, it is urged that the suit not having been instituted within a period of two years, as envisaged in the conditions of contract, Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention of Oct. 12, 1929, as amended at the Hague Protocol in 1955 and the rules framed under the Carriage by Air Act, the same is barred by time. They vehemently deny that the consignments in question could not be delivered to defendant No. 4 without the documents having been cleared by defendant No. 2 and urge that M/s. Prince Associates defendant No. 4 was one of the consignees as mentioned in the column "consignees name and address" on the four airway bills. The following issues were raised on the pleadings of the parties : 1. Whether the suit is barred by limitation under the conditions of contract stipulated under the four airway bills in question? 2. Whether the suit is bad for misjoinder and/or non-joinder of parties? 3. Whether the plaint does not disclose any cause of action against defendant No. 1? 4. Whether the suit is barred by limitation under the Carriage by Air Act? 5. 2. Whether the suit is bad for misjoinder and/or non-joinder of parties? 3. Whether the plaint does not disclose any cause of action against defendant No. 1? 4. Whether the suit is barred by limitation under the Carriage by Air Act? 5. Whether the suit is barred by limitation by virtue of Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention of Oct. 12, 1929 as amended at the Hague in 1955. (Note : This issue would also cover the question whether the suit is covered by the said Convention.) 6. Whether the plaint has been signed and verified and the suit filed by a competent person? 7. Whether the plaintiffs entrusted the goods in question for carriage to defendant No. 1 to North St. Paul. U. S. A. ? 8. Whether there was any express condition of contract that the consignments in dispute were to be delivered only when the document would be cleared through the Bank? 9. Whether defendant No. 1 had wrongly and illegally delivered the goods without proper requisite and legally adequate authorisation? 10. Whether defendant No. 1 had completed its contractual obligation under the conditions of contract of carriage as alleged in paragraph 2 of the preliminary objections? If so, its effect. 11. To what amount, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled and from whom? 12. Relief. ( 4 ) ISSUES 1, 4 and 5 : All these issues are closely interlinked because they pertain to the plea of limitation raised by defendant No. 1 on different grounds. So, the same can be conveniently dealt with together. ( 5 ) UNFORTUNATELY neither counsel for the plaintiff nor counsel for defendant No. 1 turned up to address arguments although the case reached for hearing on 4-7-83. The case was listed again on the next following day but even than there was no appearance on behalf of any of the parties. Hence I could not have the advantage of hearing counsel for the parties whose assistance would have been very much appreciated in a case like the present. ( 6 ) THE plaintiffs have placed on record the original airway bills Exs: P5 to P8 which had been issued by defendant No. 1 in respect of the consignments in question. They are couched in identical terms so far as the printed matter is concerned. The conditions of contract are printed on the reverse side of the airway bills. ( 6 ) THE plaintiffs have placed on record the original airway bills Exs: P5 to P8 which had been issued by defendant No. 1 in respect of the consignments in question. They are couched in identical terms so far as the printed matter is concerned. The conditions of contract are printed on the reverse side of the airway bills. Their perusal would show that the carriage of goods was subject to the rules and limitations relating to liability established by what has come to be known as Warsaw Convention as amended by the Hague Protocol, 1955. Condition No. 10 which is sought to be pressed into service by defendant No. 1 runs as follows : " (1) (A ). No action shall be maintained in the case of damage to goods unless a written notice, sufficiently describing the goods concerned, me approximate date of the damage, and the details of the claim, is presented to an office of Carrier within 7 days from the date of receipt thereof in the case of delay unless presented within 14 days from the date the goods are placed. at the disposal of the person entitled to delivery, and in the case of loss (including non-delivery) unless presented within 120 days from the date of issue of the airway bill; (b) Any rights to damages against Carrier shall be extinguished unless an action is brought within two years after the occurrence of the events giving rise to the claim. "( 7 ) INDIA is a signatory to the Warsaw Convention of 1929 which is an international agreement governing the liability of the air carrier in respect of international carriage of passengers, baggage and cargo by air. The Convention also contains detailed provisions regarding documents of carriage. The Warsaw Convention was given effect to in India by the enactment of Indian Carriage by Air Act, 1934 in regard to international carriage. Therefore a diplomatic conference under the auspices of International Civil Aviation Organisation was held at Hague in Sept. 1955 which adopted a protocol to amend the provision of the Warsaw Convention. More than the required number of States (57 countries) have already ratified the Hague Protocol and the passengers travelling between those countries would be having the benefit of the amendments effected by the Hague Protocol to the Warsaw Convention. 1955 which adopted a protocol to amend the provision of the Warsaw Convention. More than the required number of States (57 countries) have already ratified the Hague Protocol and the passengers travelling between those countries would be having the benefit of the amendments effected by the Hague Protocol to the Warsaw Convention. However, in India the Carriage by Air Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) has been enacted to give effect to the Convention for the unification of certain rules relating to international carriage by air signed at Warsaw on the 12th day of October, 1929 and to the said Convention as amended by the Hague Protocol on the 28th day of Sept. 1955. (See preamble to the Act ). Section 4 thereof lays down that the rules contained in the Second Schedule, being the provisions of the amended Convention relating to the rights and liabilities of carriers, passengers, consignors, consignees and other persons, shall, subject to the provisions of the Act, have the force of law in India in relation to any carriage by air to which those rules apply, irrespective of the nationality of the aircraft performing the carriage. Hence, the rules contained in the Second Schedule to the Act have statutory force and will govern the contract in question which indisputably pertains to an international carriage as defined in sub- rule (3) of Rule 1 of the Second Schedule. Rules 17 to 31 deal with the liability of the carrier and, inter alia, prescribe the limits of their liability. Rules 27 and 30 which are germane to the points in issue read as under: "27 (1 ). Receipt by the person entitled to delivery of baggage or cargo without complaint is prima facie evidence that the same has been delivered in good condition and in accordance with the document of carriage. (2) In the case of damage, the person entitled to delivery must complain to the carrier forthwith after the discovery of the damage, and, at the latest, within seven days from the date of receipt in the case of baggage and fourteen days from the date of receipt in the case of cargo. In the case of delay the complaint must be made at the latest within twenty-one days from the date on which the baggage or cargo have been placed at his disposal. In the case of delay the complaint must be made at the latest within twenty-one days from the date on which the baggage or cargo have been placed at his disposal. (3) Every complaint must be in writing upon the document of carriage or by separate notice in writing despatched within the time aforesaid. (4) Failing complaint within the times aforesaid, no action shall lie against the carrier, save in the case of fraud on his part. 28-29. . . . . 30. (1) The right to damages shall be extinguished if an action is not brought within two years, reckoned from the date of arrival at the destination, or from the date on which the aircraft ought to have arrived, or from the date on which the carriage stopped. (2) The method of calculating the period of limitation shall be determined by the law of the Court seized of the case. " ( 8 ) ON a mere juxtaposition of Condition (10) of the contract and sub- rule (2) of Rule 27, it is crystal clear that while the former covers the case of loss of cargo including non-delivery also and requires presentation of a claim to the carrier within 120 days from the date of issue of the airways bills, there is no such stipulation in sub-rule (2) of Rule 27 which requires service of notice in the case of damage to or delay in the delivery of cargo only. The question would, therefore, arise whether this part of the agreement is valid in law and as such binding on the parties. ( 9 ) SECTION 28 of the Contract Act lays down : "every agreement by which any party thereto is restricted absolutely from enforcing his rights under or in respect of any contract by the usual legal proceedings in the ordinary tribunals or which limits the time within which he may thus enforce his rights is void to that extent. " ( 10 ) IT is thus manifest that a party cannot contract himself out of his right to resort to a Court or agree to alter the period prescribed for a suit in the Limitation Act. This section aims at prohibition of agreements which somehow debar a party from seeking redress in a court of law/tribunal by the usual legal proceedings. This section aims at prohibition of agreements which somehow debar a party from seeking redress in a court of law/tribunal by the usual legal proceedings. However, a distinction has been drawn between the extinction/ forfeiture of a right and the loss of a remedy. An agreement which purports to extinguish the liability or stipulates contracting out of liability is not violative of S. 28 of the Contract Act, but it is not permissible to the parties to provide only a special period of limitation or debar a party from enforcing his right altogether. In the words of Scott, C. J. : "section 28, Contract Act, is aimed only at covenants not to sue at any time and covenants not to sue for a limited time. . . . . . . " (See Baroda Spining and Weaving Co. Ltd. v. Satyanarayan Marine and Fire Insurance Co. Ltd. , AIR 1914 Bom 225 (2) at p. 228 ). Only recently this legal proposition has been re-stated by the Supreme Court in the following words: "if under a particular bargain the rights of the parties were extinguished that would not hit the provisions of S. 28 of Contract Act and as such would not be violative of S. 23 of the said Act. But if rights are not extinguished but only the remedies are barred different considerations would apply. "see M/s. M. G. Brothers Lorry Service v. M/s. Prasad Textiles, (1983) 3 SCC 61 : ( AIR 1984 SC 15 ). ( 11 ) THE opening words "no action shall be maintained" of Cl. (a ). Condition 10 does not evidently operate as a release or forfeiture of the rights of the consignor/consignee of the cargo on non- fulfilment of the condition of notice. It simply debars him Irom enforcing his rights under the airway bill. Hence, this condition would be void being violative of S. 28 of the Contract Act. ( 12 ) THAT apart the conndition regarding service of notice in the case of loss (including non-delivery) of the cargo is inconsistent with sub-rule (2) of R. 27 of the Second Schedule. It simply debars him Irom enforcing his rights under the airway bill. Hence, this condition would be void being violative of S. 28 of the Contract Act. ( 12 ) THAT apart the conndition regarding service of notice in the case of loss (including non-delivery) of the cargo is inconsistent with sub-rule (2) of R. 27 of the Second Schedule. Indeed, it impinges upon the said Rule because it imposes an additional obligation upon the owner/consignee to present a claim within 120 days from the date of issue of the airway bill which is meaningless because unless loss occurs no liability arises and more often than not the consignor is not likely to know whether the goods have been delivered or not within that period. In this connection it would be pertinent to allude to R. 23 contained in the Second Schedule which reads as under 23 (1 ). Any provision tending to relieve the carrier of liability or to fix a lower limit than that which is laid down in these rules shall "be null and void, but the nullity of any such provision does not involve the nullity. . . . . . of the whole contract, which shall remain subject to the provisions of these rules. (2 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " ( 13 ) HENCE, to the extent Cl. (a) of Condition 10 of the contract does not conform to R. 27 (2), it must be held to he void. and unenforceable. Reference in this context may be made with advantage to M/s. M. G. Brothers Lorry Service (supra) in which Condition 15 of the way bill which provided, "no suit shall lie against the firm in respect of any consignment without a claim made in writing in that behalf and preferred within 30 days from the date of booking or from the date of arrival at the destination by the party concerned" was held to be void in view of S. 23 of the Contract Act because its object was to defeat the provisions of S. 10 of the Carriers Act. 1865. It was. inter alia. 1865. It was. inter alia. observed by the Supreme Court on the construction of Condition 15 of the way bill that there was no limitation of liability expressed or intended but what was provided was that no suit shall lie against the firm unless a particular claim was made in a particular manner within a particular time. Hence. Cl. (a) of Condition 10 must be held to be void to the extent it requires the consignor/owner to serve a notice within 120 days from the date of issue of airway bill in the case of non-delivery of the consignment. ( 14 ) THE same will not, however, hold good with regard to Cl. (b) of Condition 10 of the airway bill inasmuch as it manifestly operates to extinguish the right of the consignor/consignee to the damages absolutely in case an action is not brought within two years after the occurrence of the events giving rise to the claim. In other words, it spells out the discharge of the defendant from all liability in respect of the plaintiffs claim to damages. Hence, this clause will not hit by the provision of S. 28 of the Contract Act. Needless to say that the liability of the defendant in damages having totally disappeared, the remedy as regards the liability automatically vanishes. Hence, it may be appropriately said that the right of the plaintiff to sue in damages has ceased to exist rather than saying that the suit is barred by limitation under conditions of contract or under the Warsaw Convention or the Act. ( 15 ) BEFORE concluding I may also add that there is no scope for the application of Arts. 10 and 11 of the Limitation Act in regard to carriage by air in view of R. 30 of the Second Schedule (supra) which operates to extinguish the right to damages if action is not brought within two years from the accrual of the cause of action as spelt out therein. These Articles apply to suits for compensation for loss, damage, non-delivery of or delay in delivering goods against the carriers generally but will not apply to suits relating to carriage by air which is specifically covered by the provisions of the Act and the Second Schedule thereto. Hence I find these issues against the plaintiffs. These Articles apply to suits for compensation for loss, damage, non-delivery of or delay in delivering goods against the carriers generally but will not apply to suits relating to carriage by air which is specifically covered by the provisions of the Act and the Second Schedule thereto. Hence I find these issues against the plaintiffs. ( 16 ) ISSUE No. 2 As stated "above, the contention of defendant No. 1 is that its airline did not operate to St. Paul Manneapolis which was the ultimate destination of the cargo and as such they had no option but to transfer the shipment under the four airway bills in question to other airlines, namely, Western Airlines Inc. , North-West Orient Airlines and United Airlines for carriage of the goods to the ultimate destination. It is asserted that they made this arrangement purely as an agent of the shipper/the plaintiff. Consequently the delivery carriers became directly liable to the plaintiffs for non-delivery/wrong delivery, if any, and defendant No. 1 having completely discharged its contractual obligation under the contract was absolved of all liability to the plaintiffs in this behalf. Hence the suit is liable to be dismissed for non-joinder of the delivering carriers who were necessary parties under the circumstances. The suit is also bad for mis-joinder of the parties because having transferred the consignments to the forwarding carriers under the foregoing circumstances defendant No. 1 was no longer liable for any loss/non-delivery of the consignments. ( 17 ) I have bestowed my careful thought and consideration on the contention raised by defendant No. 1. However, on a consideration of the relevant condition of the contract and the provisions of Schedule II to the Act, I am not persuaded to accept this plea. Condition 6 of the contract, which seems to have direct bearing on this point, is reproduced below for ready reference : " (6 ). The goods, or packages said to contain the goods. described on the face hereof, are accepted for carriage from their receipt at Carrier s terminal or airport office at the place of departure to the airport at the place of destination. If so specifically agreed, the goods, or packages said to contain the goods described on the face hereof, are also accepted for forwarding to the airport of departure and for reforwarding beyond the airport of destination. If so specifically agreed, the goods, or packages said to contain the goods described on the face hereof, are also accepted for forwarding to the airport of departure and for reforwarding beyond the airport of destination. If such forwarding or reforwarding is by carriage operated by carrier, such carriage shall be upon the same terms as to liability as set forth in Paras 2 and 4 hereof. In any other event, the issuing carrier and last carrier, respectively, in forwarding and reforwarding the goods, shall do so only as agents of the shipper, owner, or consignee, as the case may be, and shall not be liable for any damage, arising out of such additional carriage, unless proved to have been caused by its own negligence or wilful fault. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,. . . . . . . . " ( 18 ) THE airport of destination mentioned in the airway bill is St. Paul. So, having regard to the very first sentence of this condition, it is crystal clear that there was one single contract for carriage of the goods from this place to St. Paul which was the ultimate destination. There was no specific agreement for forwarding the goods or reforwarding the goods beyond the airport of destination. Apparently, therefore, the second part of this condition will not come into play in the instant case. Even assuming, however, that there was an implied agreement between the parties that the consignment would be delivered to another carrier beyond the point up to which the airline of defendant No. 1 operated it would not absolve defendant No. 1 of its liability for wrong delivery/non-delivery. It is so stated explicitly in the relevant rules contained in Schedule II. Sub-rule (4) of R. 1 provides that: "1 (4 ). Carriage to be performed by several successive air carriers is deemed, for the purpose of these rules, to be one undivided carriage if it has been regarded by the parties as a single operation, whether it had been agreed upon under the form of a single contract or of a series of contracts and it does not lose its international character merely because one contract or a series of contracts is to be performed entirely within the territory of the same State". ( 19 ) AS stated above, contract of carriage in question must be regarded as one for a single operation because it is for transporting the goods from Delhi to the airport of ultimate destination, viz. , St. Paul. Further R. 31 lays down that : "31 (1 ). In any case of carriage to be performed by various successive carriers and falling within the definition set out in sub-rule (3) of rule 1, each carrier who accepts passengers, baggage or cargo is subjected to the rules set out in this Schedules, and is deemed to be one of the contracting parties to the contract of carriage in so far as the contract deals with that part of the carriage which is performed under his supervision. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (3 ). As regards baggage or cargo, the passenger or consignor will have a right of action against the first carrier, and the passenger or consignee who is entitled to delivery will have right of action against the last carrier, and further, each may take action against the carrier who performed the carriage during which the destruction. loss. damage or delay took place. These carriers will be jointly and severally liable to the passenger or to the consignor or consignee. " ( 20 ) ON a combined reading of sub- rr. (1) and (3) of this rule. it is manifest that not only defendant No. 1 but also the forwarding/delivering carriers shall be deemed to be contracting parites to the contract of carriage. Moreover, their liability will he joint and several to the consignor or consignee, as the case may be. In this view of the matter, therefore, it was open to the plaintiffs to have impleaded the other two forwarding carriers, namely. Western Airlines Inc. and North-West Orient Airlines, who were also entrusted with some of the consignments in. question for carriage to the airport of ultimate destination. In view of the fact that they have impleaded United Airlines, who were one of the forwarding/delivering carriers to whom the goods had been entrusted by defendant No. 1 for carriage to St. Paul. Western Airlines Inc. and North-West Orient Airlines, who were also entrusted with some of the consignments in. question for carriage to the airport of ultimate destination. In view of the fact that they have impleaded United Airlines, who were one of the forwarding/delivering carriers to whom the goods had been entrusted by defendant No. 1 for carriage to St. Paul. it would appear that the plaintiffs were not aware of the other forwarding/delivering carriers to whom the goods had been transferred by defendant No. 1 for carriage to the place of ultimate destination. Anyhow that would hardly make any difference because the liability of defendant No, 1 and the forwarding/delivering carriers for the loss/non-delivery of the consignments is joint and several and it would be open to the consignor/the owner of the goods to enforce his right to claim damages against anyone of them. In other words, the liability of the first carrier and the forwarding/delivering carriers can he enforced independently of each other. Non-joinder of the forwarding delivering carriers, therefore, will not be fatal to the suit. On a parity of reasoning it cannot he said to be a case of mis-joinder of parties either because the liability of defendant No. 1 to compensate/pay damages 10 the plaintiffs for the loss non-delivery of goods remains unaffected by the fact that the consignments were transferred by them 10 the other airlines for carriage to the ultimate destination. Union of India v. Amar Singh. AIR 1960 SC 233 . on which reliance has been placed by defendant No. 1. is of no assistance to them because it simply lays down that the authority in the agent, viz. . . receiving carrier must necessarily be implied to appoint the forwarding carrier to act for the consignor during it at part of the journey the goods which is to be covered by the forwarding carrier. However this decision is not an authority on the point that the liability of the receving carrier comes to an end when the consignment is delivered by him to the forwarding carrier for carriage of the goods to the ultimate destination. Hence. the language of R. 31 (3) being explient and clear, the liability of defendant No. 1 to pay compensation damages to the plaintiffs for loss non-delivery of the goods remains unaffected. I his contention therefore. being devoid of any merit. I find issue against defendant. Hence. the language of R. 31 (3) being explient and clear, the liability of defendant No. 1 to pay compensation damages to the plaintiffs for loss non-delivery of the goods remains unaffected. I his contention therefore. being devoid of any merit. I find issue against defendant. ( 21 ) ISSUE No. 3 : The contention raised by defendant No. 1 is two-fold the first being that they having transferred the shipments under the airway bills in question to the forwarding carriers for carriage to ultimate destination, viz. . St. Paul Minneapolis in the same condition in which they had received the consignments they stood discharged from all liability to the consignor because their action in delivering the goods to the forwarding carriers was as agent of the plaintiffs and the relationship between the plaintiffs and the forwarding carriers was that of principal to principal. In other words only the forwarding carriers are liable to indemnify the plaintiffs for the loss sustained by them on account of wrong/non-delivery. I have already dealt with this aspect of the matter at length and as seen above the liability of defendant No. 1 to the plaintiffs to compensate for the loss/non-delivery of goods to the named consignee is not washed off on account of their having transferred the shipments to forwarding carriers and they very much remain liable for the same. Hence, I need not dwell upon this aspect of the matter any more. ( 22 ) THE second contention of defendant No. 1 is that the goods in question had. in fact, been delivered to one of theconsignees named in the airway bills. The plea sought to be put forth precisely is that in the column consignee s name and address" the following two names were given : (1) St. Anthony Park State Bank. (2) M/s. Prince Associates. So. the consignments were rightly delivered to M/s. Prince Associates and the plaintiffs cannot make any grievance of it. ( 23 ) A cursory glance at the airway bills in question would show that the contention sought to be raised is without any basis inasmuch as the relevant column contains the following names. (1) ST. ANTHONY PARK STATE. BANK 2240 COMO AVENUE ST. PAUL MN. . U. S. A (2) NTFY : M/s PRINCE ASSOCIATES 2304 E BURKE AV NO. ST. PAUL M1nn55109. (1) ST. ANTHONY PARK STATE. BANK 2240 COMO AVENUE ST. PAUL MN. . U. S. A (2) NTFY : M/s PRINCE ASSOCIATES 2304 E BURKE AV NO. ST. PAUL M1nn55109. U. S. A. The expression "ntfy" is obviously an abbreviation of the word "notify". It simply meant that M/s. Prince Associates were to be notified about the arrival of the consignments at the airport of destination. However; the consignment was to be delivered to St. Anthony Park State Bank. The-conditions of contract printed on the reverse of the airway bills contain a specific stipulation to that effect in the form of condition 9 which reads as under : " (9 ). Except as otherwise specifically provided in this contract, delivery of the goods will be made only to the consignee named on the face hereof, unless such consignee is one of the Carriers Participating in the carriage, in which event delivery shall be made to the person indicated on the face hereof as the person to be notified. Notice of arrival of the goods will, in the absence of other instructions, be sent to the Consignee, or the person to be notified, by ordinary methods; carrier is not liable for non- receipt or delay in receipt of such notice. " ( 24 ) ON its bare reading it is crystal clear that the delivery of the goods could be made only to the consignee named in the airway bill although notice of arrival of the goods was to be given to the consignee/the person to be noticed. Prima facie, therefore, it would appear that the consignment could be delivered only to St. Anthony Park State Bank whereas notice of arrival of the goods was to he sent to M/s. Prince Associates also. Apparently. therefore, the delivery of the goods (o. M/s. Prince Associates was not warranted by the conditions of airway bill. This issue is, therefore, found against defendant No. I. ( 25 ) TO sum up. in view of my findings on issues 1, 4 and 5, this suit must fail as against defendants Nos. 1 and 3. 1 ( is accordingly dismissed as not maintainable against defendants 1 and 3. Since proceedings against ine remaining detehdants are ex pane. ihe suit he now listed as a short Cause for r\ pane evidence of Ihe plaintiff on 2xlh Sept. iw3.