JUDGMENT S.K. Sahgal, C. - These are five references under Sec. 218 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act made by the Addl. Collector, Fatehpur, in a mutation case recommending that the Naib Tahsildar's impugned order dated July 30, 1973 should be set aside and the case remanded for decision afresh. An objection has been filed against the recommendation. 2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that Ram Prasad recorded tenure-holder of different villages has died. Sheo Nandan claimed mutation in his place being the deceased brother's son and filed five mutation applications in respect of each village separately. Smt. Gomti entered contest claiming mutation of her name being the widow of the deceased. The mutation applicant also claimed that Smt. Gomti was not the widow of the deceased because she remarried Dwarika Prasad and was therefore not entitled to succeed the deceased. Both the parties were allowed to idea evidence in support of their case. The Naib-Tahsildar after taking evidence and hearing the parties decided the five cases through a common judgment. He allowed mutation in favour of Sheo Nandan as being the deceased's brother's son, holding that Smt. Gomti had remarried Dwarika Prasad and as such she could not claim mutation of her name in place of Ram Pal, deceased. Smt. Gomti being aggrieved by this order of the Naib Tahsildar went up in revision to the Addl. Collector, Fatehpur, who has made the present reference on the ground that the trial court should not have entered into the question of remarriage and that it should have decided the mutation case on the basis of possession. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for both the parties. The learned counsel for the revisionist stated that the point of remarriage had already been decided by the civil court, therefore the finding of the Naib-Tahsildar to the contrary was irregular and liable to be set aside. He further stated that the finding regarding remarriage given by the Naib-Tahsildar in another mutation case had been set aside by the Board through their order on record, therefore the point of remarriage was not barred by the principle of res judicata. The learned counsel set has supported the reference and urged that the Naib-Tahsildar's impugned order should be quashed. 4. The learned counsel set has supported the reference and urged that the Naib-Tahsildar's impugned order should be quashed. 4. The learned counsel for the opposite party in reply, stated that the judgment and decree of the civil court had not become final being sub-judice in appeal which is pending decision before the High Court. Therefore, he argued, the decree cannot be taken into account. Besides, he argued that the civil court had no jurisdiction on Z.A. property falling under Section 229-B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act because the revenue court is alone empowered to do so. He further stated that in another mutation case it was specifically decided that Smt. Gomti had remarried Dwarika and that in the judgment while quashing the order, the Board had now here held that she had not remarried; therefore, the fact of remarriage stood conclusively proved. The learned counsel urged that the conclusive finding of fact regarding the remarriage of Smt. Gomti in a case to which she was a party is a relevant piece of evidence and has to be taken into account. The learned counsel pleaded that the point of remarriage was in controversy before the Naib-Tahsildar, therefore it was incumbent upon him to decide the issue. Therefore, he urged that the reference made on the score that the Naib-Tahsildar should not have decided the point of remarriage is not warranted by law. He further pointed out that the trail court had decided the point of remarriage which was a question of fact and this was done after detailed examination of the evidence on record. He, therefore urged that such a finding, not being perverse or irregular amounting to miscarriage of justice, cannot be gone into in the present revision and that the reference made on this score is also misconceived and liable to be discharged. 5. I have given careful thought to the contentions of the learned counsel on both sides and perused the record. It may be observed that the learned Additional Collector has questioned the impugned order of the learned Naib-Tahsildar dated July 30, 1973 primarily on the ground that he had not pronounced upon the question of possession. The question of possession is now well-settled under ruling in 1977 R.D. 211, in which it has been held that possession constructively follows title. This ground taken by the learned Addl. The question of possession is now well-settled under ruling in 1977 R.D. 211, in which it has been held that possession constructively follows title. This ground taken by the learned Addl. Collector is therefore no more valid. The other point the learned Addl. Collector has taken is that the learned trial court need not have gone into the question of remarriage of Smt. Gomti widow of the deceased tenure-holder Ram Pal. I am afraid I am unable to understand or sympathise with this view of the learned Addl. Collector as the widow's right to succession and its continuity depends very much on whether she has or has not remarried someone else, vide Sections 171 and 172 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. If, therefore an allegation is made that the claimant widow of the deceased has remarried, the mutation court cannot evade the issue and has to satisfy itself as to whether remarriage has or has not taken place. The learned Naib-Tahsildar was therefore entirely right in attempting to go into the question of remarriage and arriving at a finding thereon. On the question of remarriage, the learned trial curt has examined the matter at considerable length and arrived at the finding that remarriage has in fact taken place. Ordinarily, it should not be necessary to question the finding of the trial court. In the present case, however, we have to take note of the fact that it has been contended forcefully by learned counsel for the revisionist that the finding has been arrived at in disregard of the fact that there is a concurrent finding of the trial court at the level of the Munsif and the Civil Judge holding that remarriage did not take place. I have examined the matter carefully in the light of this contention. It appears that the matter was taken to the civil court with a view to obtaining an injunction in respect of the same land in dispute and a specific issue was framed in the court of the Munsif as to whether Smt. Gomti had remarried after the demise of the deceased tenure-holder. The court of the Munsif came to a definite finding on this issue holding that remarriage had not taken place. The court of the Munsif came to a definite finding on this issue holding that remarriage had not taken place. This was upheld in Naib Tahsildar took place note of these facts but took the view that the civil court's finding was not binding as a second appeal was pending before the Hon'ble High Court. Having taken this view, the learned Naib Tahsildar felt free to rely upon all the other evidence available to him, oral and documentary, and thus arrived at a finding different from that of the civil court. This includes a judgment of Tahsildar, Khaga dated January 17, 1970 in another case in which Smt. Gomti was a claimant to succession of her deceased brother. The question that arises is as to whether learned Naib-Tahsildar was justified in ignoring the concurrent finding of the civil court even when there was evidence to show that a second appeal was pending in the High Court against such decision. It has to be remembered that the revenue courts are dealing with this matter in summary proceedings, the main consideration being that no Khata should remain in the name of a dead person or without any entry, thereby adversely affecting the fiscal interest of the State. It is of course incumbent upon the revenue court to enter the name of the person best entitled in law to succeed, but only to the extent that this can be determining into complicated questions of right and title, which should be settled in a regular suit. In the present case, the civil courts have come to a concurrent finding on the specific issue that has come up before the learned Tahsildar for determination. It is not for a mutation court to wait for a final pronouncement in the matter by the ultimate court of appeal before giving recognition to a civil court decree or judgment. In this case, the record does not show, and the learned counsel on both sides have not brought to the notice of this court anything to indicate as to the fate of the second appeal stated to have been pending in the High Court. From the record all that is known is an appeal was pending for admission on March 17, 1973. It is not even known whether the appeal was admitted. From the record all that is known is an appeal was pending for admission on March 17, 1973. It is not even known whether the appeal was admitted. In view of this, it would not seem right and proper to disregard the concurrent finding of fact arrived at by the civil courts merely because a second appeal has been sought to be filed before a superior civil court. Since there is nothing to show that the civil court's specific and concurrent findings has been upset, it would not be right to ignore it. The learned trial court therefore grievously erred in holding a contrary view, which could result in substantial injustice. 6. In view of the foregoing analysis and partly agreeing with the recommendation of the learned Additional Collector, I set aside the order of the Naib Tahsildar dated July 30, 1973 and direct that the name of Smt. Gomti widow of Ram Pal deceased tenure-holder be entered in the disputed Khata/Khatas as his widow. 7. This order will also govern reference Nos. 118, 119, 120 and 121/L.R./ 1974-75, district Fatehpur.