Hansaria, J.:- Bias is said to vitiate an order. This is on the principle that it is not enough that justice is done, it must be seen to have been done. But what would happen if there be only one disciplinary authority and it is alleged that authority is biased against the delinquent. It is this question which agi­tated the mind of the learned Single Judge who first heard the matter. In view of the importance of the subject, he felt that it is a fit case which should be heard by a Division Bench. Assistance of learned Advocate General was also felt desirable. 2. We have heard the learned counsel of the parties on the question first. It is submitted by the learned Advocate Gene­ral that the doctrine of necessity would operate in such a case and the order in question will not be vitiated on the ground of biasness. This is brought home to us by referring to Halsbury's Laws of England, Professor de Smith's well known work on "Judical Review of Administrative Action" and Birndaban vs. State of U. P., 1973 (7) S. L. R. III. 3. In Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edn. Vol. I), it has been stated in para 73 that if all members of the only tribunal competent to determine a matter are subject to disqualification, they may be authorised and obliged to hear and determine that matter by virtue of the operation of the common law doctrine of necessity. Of course, reference has been made to a decision in footnote I which states that normally the appropriate course of action where members of a tribunal are all disqualified will be to commit the issue to the determination of a different tri­bunal having jurisdiction, if one can be lawfully constituted. 4. Professor Smith has dealt with this aspect at page 243 of the Third Edition under the heading "Exemption From Dis­qualification". It has been stated at page 244 that an adjudi­cator who is subject to disqualification at common law may be required to sit if there is no other competent tribunal or if a quorum cannot be formed without him. The doctrine of nece­ssity is applied in such cases to prevent a failure of justice. It has been stated at page 244 that an adjudi­cator who is subject to disqualification at common law may be required to sit if there is no other competent tribunal or if a quorum cannot be formed without him. The doctrine of nece­ssity is applied in such cases to prevent a failure of justice. As an illustration it has been pointed out that the Judges of a place were held to be required ex necessitate to pass upon the constitutionality of legislation rendering them liable to pay income tax on their salaries. The rule of necessity ought not, however, to be mechanically applied, states the author, if its enforcement would be an affront to justice, and it may be right for a court to scrutinise the actual conduct of the proceedings closely if the rule cannot be wholly circumvented. 5. In Brindaban (supra), a question of bias was raised against the Superintendent of Police. This was met by the Standing Counsel by submitting that the bias could not vitiate the pro­ceedings as the Superintendent of Police was the authority empowered to conduct the disciplinary proceedings. The rule of necessity was mentioned in this regard. The Court observed that when there is only one authority which can conduct the pro­ceedings, and that authority is biased, bias will not vitiate the proceedings. 6. We may also refer in this connection to M. Madhayan Pillai vs. K. A. Balan, AIR 1979 Kerala 120, a Full Bench decision. The case was concerned with a disciplinary proceeding against lecturer of a private College. The management itself was an accurser. On a plea of bias being raised to disentitle the management to conduct or proceed with the enquiry, it was pointed out by the Full Bench that the principle of natural jus­tice that no man shall be a judge in his own cause (nemo judex in causa sua) cannot prevail against an express statutory provision because application of the principle of natural justice in such a case would lead to evisceration of the statutory pro­vision which is not permissible. 7. Being confronted with these high authorities, Shri Deb had to concede that rule of necessity would take care of this aspect, if in fact no alternative arrangement be really possible. 7. Being confronted with these high authorities, Shri Deb had to concede that rule of necessity would take care of this aspect, if in fact no alternative arrangement be really possible. The contention is that in the present case a way out did exist inasmuch as section 554 of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932 visu­alises appointment of more than one person as Administrator in case of supersession of Municipality. We do not think that this provision can really be regarded as such an alternative as to push out the working of doctrine of necessity from operating in the present case inasmuch as to expect the Government to appoint even one additional Administrator to take care of a proceeding initiated against an employee of the Municipality would be an unreasonable demand because appointment of addi­tional Administrator is not a simple matter, and as it is not known when the proceeding would see to its termination, the appointment has to be for long years which may otherwise affect the smooth functioning of the Municipality. 8. Therefore, even if there be any merit in the allegation of bias, on which we express no opinion, the order at hand is one which cannot be said to have vitiated because of any bias on the part of the Administrator in question. We have then to see whether the impugned order of dismissal was bad because of the violation of other principle of natural justice, namely, audi alteram partem. Shri Deb would submit that in the enquiry the petitioner did not get proper opportunity to defend himself inasmuch as the defending officer as desired by him was not made available which caused serious prejudice to the incumbent. The officer so required was Abani Kanta Dutta, who was then Superintendent in the office of District Magistrate, South Tripura. On knowing about this, the Inquiring Officer did write to the District Magistrate on 27.6.73 to direct Shri Dutta to attend the hearing fixed on 9.7.73 (the date 9.9.73 in the letter is apparently a typographical mistake). As Shri Dutta did not appear on 9.7.73 the delinquent was asked if he would like to take assis­tance of any other officer, but no other person was named. A perusal of the file of the Inquiring Officer shows that the proceedings had to be adjourned on 20.6.73 because of the absence of Sri Dutta. As Shri Dutta did not appear on 9.7.73 the delinquent was asked if he would like to take assis­tance of any other officer, but no other person was named. A perusal of the file of the Inquiring Officer shows that the proceedings had to be adjourned on 20.6.73 because of the absence of Sri Dutta. On that day the petitioner stated that the defending officer could not be present in the absence of release order from the District Magistrate, and prayed for time assuring presence of Shri Dutta on 27.6.73 to which date hearing was adjourned. But on the next date as well Shri Dutta did not come which, according to petitioner, might have been due to the fact that Shri Dutta being the Superintendent in the office was tied up with law and order problem. He, therefore, sought for an adjournment which was granted till 9.7.73. As Shri Dutta was not present even on this date and as no other name was suggested by the delinquent to assist him, the Inquiring Officer had no alternative but to proceed as the matter had already been delayed. On these facts, we do not read any failure of affording reasonable opportunity to the petitioner in this regard, nor any violation of rule 14 (8) of the Central Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. 9. The other violation of natural justice consists, as per Shri Deb, in examination of one Gour Gopal Bhattacherjee whose name had not found place in the list of witnesses furnished to the petitioner. Sub-rule (15) of Rule 14 of the aforesaid Rules has conferred a discretion on the Inquiring Officer to examine a non-listed witness. When the discretion is exercised in favour of the disciplinary authority, the sub-rule requires that the delinquent must be given a list of further proposed evidence and three clear days' time to enable effective cross-examination. As Gour Gopal Bhattacherjee was the only further witness to be examined, the requirement of giving the list was satisfied. As the enquiry was adjourned on 9.7.73 till 16.7.73 to enable the petitioner to cross-examine Gour Gopal, the other requirement of sub-rule (15) had also been complied with. Thus, there was no violation of any of the requirements of this sub-rule, or of the general principle of natural justice. 10. As the enquiry was adjourned on 9.7.73 till 16.7.73 to enable the petitioner to cross-examine Gour Gopal, the other requirement of sub-rule (15) had also been complied with. Thus, there was no violation of any of the requirements of this sub-rule, or of the general principle of natural justice. 10. The impugned order cannot, therefore, be held to have been hit by the principle of natural justice or by the aforesaid sub-rules. Shri Deb contends that the order of dismissal was in any case bad as no records have been produced before the Court to show that the same had received the consent or con­firmation of the Government as is required by section 66(2) (iii) of the Bengal Municipal Act. There is no force in this grie­vance as well. First, the order of dismissal dated March 18, 1975, itself states that the punishment had been confirmed by the Government. Secondly, in the affidavit-in-opposition filed on behalf of the respondents it was stated in para 29 that the penalty of dismissal had been confirmed by the Government according to law. In the affidavit-in-reply by the petitioner, statement had not been questioned. As such this must be deemed to have been accepted. Shri Deb, however, states that a petition was filed on 12.3.82 praying that the respondents may be directed to cause production of the alleged consent order and in parti­cular letter No. U.O-30/LSG/75 dated 15.3.75. This application had been filed by stating that the petitioner apprehended that no confirmation had been obtained from the State Government before passing of the impugned order. No order on this petition was obtained. As, however, Shri Deb raised this point while addressing the Court on 23rd February, 1983, the learned Govern­ment Advocate was asked to see if the record could be produced. He informed the Court on 24th that despite a through search in the department the file could not be traced the same being a very old file. He produced a note-sheet emanating from the L. R. and Secretary, Law mentioning this aspect and also stating that as the department in question had been shifted to different places in different buildings, the file might have been misplaced in the course of shifting. 11. He produced a note-sheet emanating from the L. R. and Secretary, Law mentioning this aspect and also stating that as the department in question had been shifted to different places in different buildings, the file might have been misplaced in the course of shifting. 11. This being the position, the non-production of the record, on the face of supporting contemporaneous documents and un-controverted statement in the counter, cannot be taken advantage of by the petitioner to contend that the order of dismissal had not received the confirmation of the Government. The decision in the State of U.P. vs. Chandra Mohan, AIR 1977 SC 2411 referred by Shri Deb in this connection cannot assist the petitioner inasmuch as in that case there were clear and specific allegations of malafide or arbitrariness because of which it was observed that it was necessary for the Government to rebut those pleas by producing all necessary materials. The present is a case far removed from Chandra Mohan. - 12. The next submission made by Shri Deb is that the disciplinary authority exceeded its jurisdiction in holding that even charge No. 1 was established, though the finding of the Inquiring Officer was that this charge had not been proved. A reference to the disciplinary authority's order in this regard shows that he disagreed with the Inquiring officer's finding on charge No. 1, whose gravamen is irregularity in attending office from 1.2.72 to 8.6.72, for two reasons. First, the past conduct of the accused Officer which was sought to be proved through some documents clearly manifested according to the Administrator, that delinquent "regularly irregular in attending office." This aspect had not been considered by the inquiring Officer, but the discip­linary authority felt that the past conduct was quite relevant in coming to a finding as regards charge No. 1. Though a conduct of a person is relevent under section 8 of the Evidence Act, a charge cannot, however, be held established merely because of past conduct. The second ground given by the Administrator in dis-agreeing with the Inquiring Officer is that reliance placed by the latter on the gratting of casual leave by the Executive Officer for leaving the office early on 1.6.72 should not have been given much weight as the Executive Officer was not aware of the background and had sanctioned leave in good faith. Now, there is no denial that the Executive Officer was competent to grant casual leave to the petitioner. The application for casual leave had been put in on 2.6.72 long before the drawing of proceeding, and even before the occurrence which had taken place on 5.6.72 which is the subject matter of the second charge. On these facts no fault can reasonably be found with the Inquiring Officer in having relied on the grant of casual leave by the Executive Officer for some absence on 1.6.72 in holding that charge No. I was not established. 13. We would, therefore, agree with Shri Deb that the peti­tioner could have been punished if at all for his fault covered by charge No. 2 which is of mis-behaviour with the Administrator on 5.6 72 when he had asked the petitioner the reason of the latter's- irregularity in attending office and of leaving the office without permission or intimation on 1.6.72. The allegation is that on the Administrator asking as aforesaid, the petitioner instead of giving any satisfactory explanation started uttering filthy and objectionable language towards the Administrator insulting and maligning him in his office which attracted a crowd consisting of the employees of the Municipality and outsiders. As this charge has been found established, it is submitted by Shri Banerjee for the Municipality that the petitioner could have been dismissed on this score alone. He has referred in this connection to Rule 12(A) of the Agartala Municipal Employees' (Appointment and Con­ditions of Service) Rules, 1971, which permits dismissal in case inter alia where the charge consists of (1) misconduct and (2) breach of discipline. According to the learned counsel, the charge no. 2 showed a serious misconduct on the part of the petitioner inasmuch as even the Administrator was highly misbehaved. Such a conduct has to be viewed with seriousness, states the council, as it involved breach of discipline also. 14. As to what punishment should be awarded for a parti­cular conduct is normally within the demain of the disciplinary authority. A writ court has very limited power to interfere in such a matter. It is not within the jurisdiction of this court in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution to normally substitute its views or discretion in the matter. A writ court has very limited power to interfere in such a matter. It is not within the jurisdiction of this court in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution to normally substitute its views or discretion in the matter. If, however, the punishment can be said to be shockingly dispro­portionate or absolutely unreasonable, the same could be declared bad as in that case even Article 14 may come to the rescue which takes care of arbitrariness in any form. We nave, there­fore, to see whether punishment of dismissal for charge no. 2 can really be said to be such which has to be undone by this court as the fountainhead of justice. 15. Shri Deb referred in this connection to Ramakant Misra vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1982) 3 SCC 346 . That was a case under the Industrial Disputes Act whose section 11A has given jurisdiction and power on the Labour Court and Tribunal to substitute its measure of punishment in place of that awarded by the employer. It was, therefore, stated by the Supreme Court that it shall have to be seen whether the Labour Court or Tribunal had property approached the matter for exe­rcising or refusing to exercise its power under section 11 A. It was held that if a penalty be either disproportionately heavy or excessive, the same has to be regarded as against justice, equity and fair play. After noting the facts of that case which was that the workman had used threatening language, the court held that the extreme penalty of dismissal was not justified; and so it set aside the same and instead ordered for withholding of two increments. 16. We have examined the matter in the light of the afore­said decision to which effect there are other pronouncements as well of the Apex Court. Though it is correct that there is no provision like section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act to govern the case at hand, the ratio of the aforesaid decision is not based on the aforesaid provision alone. What the judg­ment has really laid down is that if the punishment appears on the facts and circumstances of the case as disproportionately heavy or excessive, interference with the same is permissible, indeed required, in order to avoid the charge of vindictiveness. What the judg­ment has really laid down is that if the punishment appears on the facts and circumstances of the case as disproportionately heavy or excessive, interference with the same is permissible, indeed required, in order to avoid the charge of vindictiveness. In this context, it is pertinent to point out that it has been stated in para 6 of the judgment that we have moved far from the days when quantum of punishment was considered a mana­gerial function with the courts having no power to substitute their own decision in place of that of the management. Then, though it is also true that what had happened on 5.6.72 in the present case is more objectionable than what had taken place in Rama Kanta Misra (supra), still one important aspect which cannot be forgotten is that the punishment has been awarded by the very same Administrator against whom there is an allegation of bias. It has already been noted that in a case where the rule of necessity would displace the doctrine of bias, the court has to scrutinize the actual conduct of the procee­dings closely. 17. We have considered the matter impassionately and objecti­vely keeping in view the fact that the petitioner had been in the service of the Municipality from 1952, and apart from facing the present proceeding, his career was without blemish. The statement of the petitioner that he had served the Municipality sincerely, honestly and diligently to the entire satisfaction of the authorities concerned has not been seriously questioned by the respondents. In this background we are called upon to decide whether the penalty of dismissal for charge no. 2 alone can be regarded as reasonable, or does it smack of vengeance on the part of the Administrator. We have given our anxious thought to this aspect and we are of the view that the petitioner was' treated harshly, rather unjustly, in awarding the extreme penalty visualized by the aforesaid Municipal Employees' Rules. There is reason to think that if the matter would have been dealt by any other Administrator than the one who was involved, a different view of the matter would have been taken insofar as the quantum of penalty is concerned. We cannot be oblivious of the human nature as it is. There is reason to think that if the matter would have been dealt by any other Administrator than the one who was involved, a different view of the matter would have been taken insofar as the quantum of penalty is concerned. We cannot be oblivious of the human nature as it is. But then we would think that the case did merit a major penalty, and keeping in view all the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that the penalty of reduction in rank would be the proper punish­ment in this case which would avoid the charge of vindictiveness on the one hand and would meet the demand of justice, equity and fair-play on the other. Accordingly, while setting aside the punishment of dismissal as being disproportionately heavy for the proved charge no. 2, we order that let the petitioner be reduced to the rank immediately below that of the Head-Clerk of the Municipality. 18. While thus ordering alteration in the penalty we are conscious that the usual way of disposal of this case after set­ting aside the order of dismissal would have been to send back the records for fresh determination of the question of appro­priate punishment by the disciplinary authority, but we have refrained from treading the beaten track as the impugned order was passed more than eight years ago and would have only prolonged the life of litigation if we were to remand the case, without real benefit to any of the parties. So, we have substituted our own view of the matter to do complete, quick and effective justice between the parties. In doing so, we have been guided, really felt emboldened, by what has been done and stated not only in Rama Kant Misra (supra), but also in Newabganj Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. vs. Union of India, AIR 1976 SC 1152 , which was followed in Shiv Shankar Dal Mills vs. State of Harayana, AIR 1980 SC 1037 ; State of Kerala vs. T. P. Roshana, AIR 1979 SC 765 ; Ditt. Registrar, Palghat vs. M. B. Koyyakutty, AIR 1979 SC 1060 ; Grindlays Bank Ltd. vs. I. T. Officer, Calcutta, AIR 1980 SC 656 ; Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. vs. Its Mazdoor Sabha, AIR 1980 SC 1896 and Azad Rickshaw Pullers Union vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1981 SC 14 . Registrar, Palghat vs. M. B. Koyyakutty, AIR 1979 SC 1060 ; Grindlays Bank Ltd. vs. I. T. Officer, Calcutta, AIR 1980 SC 656 ; Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. vs. Its Mazdoor Sabha, AIR 1980 SC 1896 and Azad Rickshaw Pullers Union vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1981 SC 14 . One theme which runs through these decisions is that the High Court need not feel oppressed by the technicalities of the rules which governed the issuance of writs in England, to do complete justice between the parties in doing which the Court draws on its inherent powers which we have done in this case. 19. For these reasons, the petition is allowed as indicated above. Parties to bear their own costs.