Judgement K. C. AGRAWAL, J.:- This appeal under Order 43, Rule 1 (w) of the Civil P.C. has been preferred by the Bar Council of India against the judgment of First Additional Civil Judge, Kanpur, dated 14th August, 1975, reviewing an order deciding issue No. 13 against the respondent No. 1. 2. The facts of this case briefly stated are these. Sri Manikant Tewari, respondent No. 1, was enrolled as an Advocate in the Bombay High Court in December, 1946 and after having practised for a short time within the jurisdiction of that Court, he shifted to Kanpur, where, admittedly, he has been ever since practising within the jurisdiction of Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh. On 23rd July, 1962, M/s. Ram Lal and Bros. through Sri Kunj Behari Lal Tandon and Brij Behari Lal Tandon made the complaint of professional misconduct under Section 35 of the Advocates Act against respondent No. 1. The case was referred by the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh to its Disciplinary Committee for necessary action. Respondent No. 1 did not appear on 21st Feb. 1965, when the case was taken up by the Disciplinary Committee. The Committee, however, thought that as his presence was necessary, it adjourned the case, which was fixed thereafter for 1st August, 1965. Respondent No. 1 did not appear even on that date. Having found the respondent No. 1 guilty of professional misconduct, the U.P. Bar Council suspended him from practice for one year. 3. Against this order of the U.P. Bar Council, an appeal was preferred by respondent No. 1 before the Bar Council of India. On 30th April, 1966, the Bar Council of India not only dismissed the appeal of the respondent No. 1 but also modified the punishment by enhancing the period of suspension from one year to five years. The respondent No. 1 appears to have preferred an appeal to the Supreme Court under Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961 against the said Judgment which was dismissed for non-prosecution on 30th March, 1967. The order of the Supreme Court is reproduced below:- "The matter abovementioned being called on for orders before this Court on the 30th day of March, 1967. This Court in the absence of the parties DOTH ORDER that the appeal above-mentioned by and (Sic) prosecution. Witness the Honble Mr. The order of the Supreme Court is reproduced below:- "The matter abovementioned being called on for orders before this Court on the 30th day of March, 1967. This Court in the absence of the parties DOTH ORDER that the appeal above-mentioned by and (Sic) prosecution. Witness the Honble Mr. Koka Subba Rao, Chief Justice of India at the Supreme Court, New Delhi, the 30th day of March, 1967." 4. Challenging the validity of the order of suspension passed by the U.P. Bar Council and that of the Bar Council of India, respondent No. 1 filed Suit No. 176 of 1970. In this suit, he impleaded a number of persons as defendants including those two against whom allegations of mala fides were levelled by respondent No. 1 in petting respondent No. 1 suspended as defendants 16 and 17. The respondent No. 1 had claimed the reliefs of injunction as well as for damages. 5. The suit was contested by the Bar Council of India on a number of grounds. 6. On the pleadings, the Trial Court framed a number of issues. Out of those issues, the two which are required to be mentioned at this stage were issues 5 and 13, which are as under:- "5. Whether defendant No. 16 influenced the decisions of the disciplinary committee of defendants 4 and 8 ? 13. Has court no jurisdiction to try the suit ?" 7. The trial court took up issue No.13 as a preliminary issue. Holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit, this issue was decided against respondent No. 1 on 12-5-1975. Decision of this issue was soon followed by an application for review under Order 47, Rule 1 of the Civil P. C. by the said respondent. The review application was contested by the appellant. By the order impugned by means of this appeal, the Trial Court held that the court had committed a mistake apparent on the face of the record by deciding issue No. 13 against respondent No. 1. In that view of the matter, it recalled the earlier decision and passed the following order:- "The application is allowed, the finding dated 12-5-75 on issue No. 13 and the order of the same date dismissing the suit are reviewed, recalled, set aside and reversed and it is held that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to try the suit. In that view of the matter, it recalled the earlier decision and passed the following order:- "The application is allowed, the finding dated 12-5-75 on issue No. 13 and the order of the same date dismissing the suit are reviewed, recalled, set aside and reversed and it is held that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to try the suit. The parties shall bear their own costs of these proceedings." 8. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated 14th August, 1975, granting review, the present appeal has been filed by the Bar Council of India. 9. A preliminary objection was raised by respondent No. 1 to the maintainability of the appeal. He contended that under Order 47, Rule 7 of the Civil P. C., disregard of provisos (b) and (c) alone can be a ground for an appeal, the present appeal having not been filed for the breach of those provisos (b) and (c), the same is not maintainable. The submission is well founded. 10. Order 47, Rule 7 of the Civil P. C. as it stood at the relevant time, limited the grounds on which an appeal could be filed against granting of a review application. This old sub-rule has been substituted by the present sub-rule (1), by the Civil P. C., (Amendment) Act, 1976. Under clause (w) of Rule 1 of Order 43, an appeal lies from an order under Rule 4 of Order 47 granting an application for review but the scope of such review was limited to the grounds specified in clauses (b) and (c) of sub-rule (7). These sub-rules (b) and (c) did not provide for an appeal against an order granting review which is made on the ground of a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason. This was the view taken by a number of Courts in India. Reference may be made to a Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in M. Agaiah v. M. Abdul Kareem, (AIR 1961 Andh Pra 201). It is not necessary for us to refer to all those decisions excepting referring to one of our Court in Munnu Lal v. Kunj Behari Lal. (AIR 1922 All 206). 11. Reference may be made to a Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in M. Agaiah v. M. Abdul Kareem, (AIR 1961 Andh Pra 201). It is not necessary for us to refer to all those decisions excepting referring to one of our Court in Munnu Lal v. Kunj Behari Lal. (AIR 1922 All 206). 11. Recommending the amendment of the Rule, the Law Commission in its 27th report observed:- "Order XLIII, Rule 1 (w) allows an appeal against an order granting an application for review. But Order XLVII, Rule 7 (1), last sentence, lays down the grounds on which the order can be objected to in appeal. Obviously, O.XLIII, R.1 must be so read as to harmonise with Order XLVII, Rule 7. The position is not clear at present. It may be noted that the High Courts of Calcutta, Patna, Rangoon and Lahore and the Chief Court of Oudh have taken the same view, so that an appeal lies only on the grounds mentioned in that rule. The Bombay High Court held in one case that an appeal is open against the order granting the review quite irrespective of the limitation contained in Rule 7. After this decision the Bombay High Court has deleted clause (w) trim the Rule, so that there is no appeal now, except on the ground mentioned in Order XLVII, Rule 7. This is also the view of the Allahabad High Court. This was the earlier Madras view also, but some doubt has been thrown by observations in a later case." 12. The Law Commission in its 54th Report agreed with the recommendation made by 27th Report and observed: "We agree with the view taken in the earlier Report, namely, that the restriction at present imposed by O.XLVII, Rule 7, on the right of appeal against an order granting review should be removed." 13. From the above, the settled position appears to be that an appeal under Order 43, Rule 1 (w), before the Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1976 only lay on the limited grounds of non-compliance of the provisos (b) and (c) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 7 of order 47. No appeal lay against an order where the review application had been granted on the ground of the mistake apparent on the face of the record. No appeal lay against an order where the review application had been granted on the ground of the mistake apparent on the face of the record. In the instant case, admittedly, there was no breach or noncompliance of clauses (b) and (c) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 7 of Order 47 of the Civil P. C. The appeal was thus not maintainable. 14. Shri S.N. Verma learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that since Order 43, Rule 1 (w) did not place any restriction about the grounds under which such an appeal could lie, the decisions given by the various Courts that the appeal only lay on limited grounds required reconsideration. Order 43, R.1 (w) has to be harmonised with O.47, Rule 7 sub-rule (1) of the Civil P. C. If the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is accepted, sub-rule (1) Rule 7 of Order 47 would become redundant. Such an interpretation of a statute has always been deprecated. Two provisions of law contained in one Act on the same subject should be so interpreted that the same avoids any inconsistency or repugnancy. It Order 43, Rule 1 (w) is read subject to Rule 7; there would be no inconsistency. Such an interpretation would give effect to both and it will result in harmonising the two provisions. To harmonise is not to destroy. We accordingly, find force in the preliminary objection raised by respondent No. 1 and hold that the appeal is incompetent. 15. Relying on sub-section (3) of Section 97 of the Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1976, the learned counsel for the appellant urged that as now an appeal is provided by deleting clauses (b) and (c) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 7 of O.47, this Court should hold that the present appeal is maintainable. We are unable to subscribe to the above submission, Right of appeal is a creature of a Statute and it has to be conferred expressly or to be found impliedly. In 1975, when the present appeal was filed, there was no provision of appeal against an order impugned by means of the present appeal. Hence, the appeal was at that time not maintainable. 16. Sub-section (3) of Section 97 relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant does not apply to an appeal filed before the commencement of this Act. Sub-section (3) has a limited role to play. Hence, the appeal was at that time not maintainable. 16. Sub-section (3) of Section 97 relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant does not apply to an appeal filed before the commencement of this Act. Sub-section (3) has a limited role to play. Resort to sub-sec.(3) of Section 97 is misconceived. 17. Next comes the question whether this appeal should be converted into a revision. 18. Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure confers power of revision on the High Court against an order which is not appealable. Such a revision can be filed as against any case decided by a Court subordinate. The expression "Court subordinate" has been defined in Sec. 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A Civil Judge is a Court subordinate to the High Court. Accordingly, the requirement of the Court against whose order the revision has been preferred is a Court Subordinate is fulfilled. 19. The other requirement is that the order amounted to a case decided. By the Amendment Act 1976, the expression has been defined. Before this, Supreme Court had ruled in S.S. Khanna v. F.J. Dhillon. ( AIR 1964 SC 497 ), that a decision on a preliminary issue relating to maintainability of suit is a case decided. Thus, the two requirements are satisfied. 20. Section 115 of the Civil P. C., however, empowers the High Court to interfere only when an error of jurisdiction has been committed by a court subordinate in arriving at the finding against which the revision is preferred. On the facts and in the circumstances of the present case, it appears to us that as the litigation is pending for the last several years, it is essential in the interest of justice to treat this appeal as revision and decide the same as such. To reject this appeal on the ground of maintainability would mean to call upon the appellant to challenge the impugned order by means of a revision. This will not serve any purpose. 21. Coming to the merits, we find that issue No. 13 relating to jurisdiction was decided against the plaintiff on 12th May, 1975. The court below did not decide the suit. It was, thereafter, that the review application giving rise to the present revision was filed. This will not serve any purpose. 21. Coming to the merits, we find that issue No. 13 relating to jurisdiction was decided against the plaintiff on 12th May, 1975. The court below did not decide the suit. It was, thereafter, that the review application giving rise to the present revision was filed. In this review, the Court below recalled its earlier order dated 12th May, 1975 and held that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to try the suit. The controversy raised in the court below and also before us was that the orders of the U.P. Bar Council and of the Bar Council of India were without jurisdiction and, as such, the Civil Court had jurisdiction to interfere with the same. 22. Learned Counsel for the appellant had challenged the finding of the Court below on the ground that every tribunal or authority has jurisdiction to decide the question of its jurisdiction and even if it wrongly held that it had jurisdiction to decide the case against the Respondent No. 1, the suit was not maintainable. The submission was that a Civil Court does not sit in appeal over an Order or Judgment of the Tribunal in such a matter and, as such the suit was not maintainable. Respondent No. 1, appearing in person, controverted the said contention by submitting that as he had not been given an opportunity to lead evidence and to defend himself in the disciplinary proceedings taken against him, the impugned orders were a nullity and without jurisdiction. He also urged that the Bar Council of India had no jurisdiction to enhance punishment by debarring him from practice for a period of five years in place of one ordered by the U.P. State Bar Council. It is only when a departmental proceeding is null and void that a plaintiff in such a suit could obtain reliefs he had asked for. A suit challenging the validity of the departmental proceeding cannot be treated as appeal from the finding in the departmental proceeding or the punishment inflicted even if these were erroneous. The question whether the party aggrieved by the departmental orders had reasonable opportunity is largely one of fact. It is only when such opportunity is denied and the denial contravenes a mandatory provision of law or a rule of natural justice that it would vitiate the whole proceedings. 23-24. The question whether the party aggrieved by the departmental orders had reasonable opportunity is largely one of fact. It is only when such opportunity is denied and the denial contravenes a mandatory provision of law or a rule of natural justice that it would vitiate the whole proceedings. 23-24. In Ujjam Bai v. State of U.P., ( AIR 1962 SC 1621 ), the Supreme Court quoted (At p. 1629): "A Tribunal may lack jurisdiction if it is improperly constituted, or if it fails to observe certain essential preliminaries to the inquiries. But it does not exceed its jurisdiction by basing its decision upon an incorrect determination of any question that it is empowered or required (i.e. has jurisdiction) to determine." (Halsburys Laws of England 3rd Edn. Vol. 11, page 59,). The Supreme Court held at page 1630 of the aforesaid ruling as follows:- "The characteristic attribute of a judicial Act or decision is that it binds, whether it be right or wrong, an error of law or fact committed by judicial or quasi-judicial body cannot, in general, be impeached otherwise than on appeal unless the erroneous determination relates to a matter on which the jurisdiction of that body depends. These principles govern not only the findings of inferior Courts stricto sensu but also the finding of the administrative bodies which are held to be acting in a judicial capacity. Such bodies are deemed to have been invested with power to err within the limits of their jurisdiction and provided that they keep within those limits, the decisions must be accepted as valid unless set aside on appeal." 25. In the instant case, one of the main points raised in the suit is that the respondent No. 1 had not been given opportunity to which he was entitled. This had been denied in the written statement. Instead of taking evidence for deciding this controversy in favour or against respondent No. 1, the court below assumed that the respondent had had no opportunity and, as such, the suit was maintainable. That was not a correct way of deciding issue No.13. This issue could not be decided in vacuum. The Court should have taken evidence of the parties and decided this controversy afterwards. To us also, it appears that its approach to the controversy was fallacious. That was not a correct way of deciding issue No.13. This issue could not be decided in vacuum. The Court should have taken evidence of the parties and decided this controversy afterwards. To us also, it appears that its approach to the controversy was fallacious. It should have not lost sight of the fact that the validity or adjudication of the Tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that it is incorrect on its merits. Non-compliance with a provision of the Statute must be non-compliance with such fundamental provision of Statute as would make the entire proceedings before the appropriate authority illegal and without jurisdiction. 26. Coupled with this, the most important aspect of the matter was that the appeal had been preferred by respondent No. 1 to the Supreme Court under S.38 of the Advocates Act against the order of the Bar Council of India. In appeal, the Supreme Court was entitled to examine the question of law and also of fact if it so desired. As the respondent No. 1 did not appear in the Supreme Court, the appeal was dismissed in default. This will have the effect of affirming the judgment of the Bar Council of India. After the dismissal of the appeal by the Supreme Court, the question that the decision of the Bar Council of India was illegal had lost all its efficacy. 27. We, however, find that even after deciding issue No. 13 in favour of the plaintiff, the court below would have been required to go into the question of jurisdiction again for deciding issue No. 5. The said issue has been quoted by us above. The Court should have decided the two issues together. Issue No. 13 did not resolve the controversy of jurisdiction in its entirety. Issue No. 5 was on the assertion made in the plaint that the orders of the U.P. State Bar Council and of Bar Council of India were mala fide. This issue should have been taken up and decided along with issue No. 13. The Court below committed an error in not doing so. 28. Issue No. 5 was on the assertion made in the plaint that the orders of the U.P. State Bar Council and of Bar Council of India were mala fide. This issue should have been taken up and decided along with issue No. 13. The Court below committed an error in not doing so. 28. Sri S.N. Verma, learned Counsel for the appellant drew our attention to S.48 of the Advocates Act and submitted that as no suit or other legal proceeding can lie against any Bar Council or any Committee thereof or a member of the Bar Council for any act, the issue No. 5 was bound to be decided in favour of the appellant. S.48 no doubt confers indemnity against legal proceedings but as indemnity is attached only to any act done in good faith, for being act to be in good faith, it is necessary that it must have been done honestly. If the act is not done honestly and a decision maker is personally involved with one of the parties, the decision may not be said to have been made exclusively on the merits. This issue for its decision, therefore, requires the evidence of the parties and it is not possible to adjudicate upon it without the same. 29. In case the act complained against is not honest exercise of discretion, but on the contrary proceeded from malice or a corrupt or of improper motive, the plaintiff may seek relief in a Court of law. No action lies in respect of any mere abuse of jurisdiction of a Court of law. If a Judge does an act in the purported performance of his jurisdictional function and it was within its jurisdiction then any error committed in arriving at the finding will neither make him nor his judgment liable to damages. The Judge would be protected if he had been mistaken in his belief that he had power to act judicially, to such an act done in good faith attaches full immunity. So long as he does his work in the honest belief that it is within his jurisdiction, he is not liable to an action. He may be mistaken in fact he may be ignorant in law. (See Sirros v. Moore, (1974) 3 All ER 776). 30. The above appears to be the settled position with regard to Judges. So long as he does his work in the honest belief that it is within his jurisdiction, he is not liable to an action. He may be mistaken in fact he may be ignorant in law. (See Sirros v. Moore, (1974) 3 All ER 776). 30. The above appears to be the settled position with regard to Judges. The principle behind this should also apply to the members of the Disciplinary Committee who do judicial work while dealing with a case referred to it. This principle of course applies only to a case where he acts in good faith. 31. For what we have said above, we are unable to agree with the finding given on issue No. 13 by the court below both on 12th May, 1975 and 14th Aug., 1975. The issue should have been decided after giving opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence. This was not done. Further, according to our own view, issue No. 13 should have been taken up along with issue No. 5. The decision on both the issues was necessary for deciding the question of maintainability of the suit. 32. Respondent No. 1 had also raised another preliminary objection before us. The same was that as respondents 16 and 17 had died during the pendency of the appeal in this Court, the appeal was liable to be abated. We do not agree with this submission. This appeal has been filed by the Bar Council of India not only for its benefit but for others as well. The result of the appeal will be to the advantage of the heirs of respondents 16 and 17. In fact, this question will have to be considered by the Trial Court while deciding the suit. At common law, by reason of the rule which is expressed it the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona, most actions of tort died with the person, whether person dying was the injured person or the wrong-doer. The exception to this rule was that an action could be sustained against a deceased persons personal heirs and legal representatives in respect of property which had been appropriated by the deceased. Coupled with this, the question would be about the liability of the Bar Council of India and U.P. State Bar Council, even if its members were found to have acted maliciously. Coupled with this, the question would be about the liability of the Bar Council of India and U.P. State Bar Council, even if its members were found to have acted maliciously. We do not wish to express our opinion on these questions and leave them open for judgment by the Court below. 33. We have gone through the written arguments and the rulings cited in them by Respondent No. 1. We have taken them into consideration while deciding the appeal/revision. Most of the decisions relied upon, since, are not helpful in deciding the controversy, we do not consider it necessary to make a reference of those rulings. 34. In the result, the appeal/revision is allowed. The orders of the Court below dated 12th May, 1975 as well as 14th April, 1975 are set aside. The Court below is directed to decide issues 5 and 13 together after giving opportunity to the parties afresh in the light of the observations made above. In the circumstances, the parties, are directed to bear their own costs. Appeal/revision allowed.