ORDER K.P. Singh, J. - Necessary facts giving rise to the present writ petition are that Gaya Prasad and Ballam were recorded as sub-tenants originally over the disputed plots. In the basic year Shrimati Sheo Dulari, widow of Gaya Prasad and Trijugi Singh, son of Balram Singh were recorded as sirdars. On the death of Smt. Sheo Dulari, the petitioner is claiming title to the disputed plots being her brother's son whereas the contesting opposite party Trijugi Singh claims right to the disputed plots on the basis of survivorship as contemplated by the provisions of S. 175 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. All the consolidation authorities have given judgments against the petitioner. Aggrieved by their judgments the petitioner has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended before me that under the provisions of Oudh Rent Act, 1886, sub-tenancy was not heritable, hence Smt. Sheo Dulari did not inherit from her husband. She was sirdar of the disputed land in her own right. The provisions of S. 174 of the Act were attracted and the petitioner, being her brothers son, was entitled to the disputed plots over her share. 4. Second contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the aforesaid Sheo Dulari was ejected from the disputed plots and she acquired fresh right in the disputed plots on the basis of fresh settlement by the Zamindar, hence the disputed plots became her property and on her death the petitioner would be entitled to the share of aforesaid Smt. Sheo Dulari and the consolidation authorities have patently erred in not recognising the petitioner's claim. 5. Third contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that Smt. Sheo Dulari acquired absolute right in the disputed plots by virtue of the provisions of S. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act and on her death the provisions of section 174 of the Act were attracted to the facts and circumstances of the present case and the petitioner was heir of the aforesaid Smt. Dulari, in view of the provisions of S. 174 of the Act, his claim has been erroneously negatived by the Consolidation authorities. 6. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has tried to refute the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner. 6. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has tried to refute the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner. According to him the impugned judgments of the consolidation authorities are quite in consonance with the the dictum of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in 1976 Rev Dec 149 : AIR 1976 SC 844 , Ram Jiwan v. Phoola hence the impugned judgments cannot be characterised as erroneous. 7. Second submission made on behalf of the contesting opposite party is that the petitioner has utterly failed to prove that Smt. Sheo Dulari was ever evicted from the disputed plots and that the petitioner has utterly failed to prove that any fresh settlement was made with the aforesaid Smt. Sheo Dulari by the Zamindar, of the disputed land. He has stressed that the materials on record are not sufficient to hold that aforesaid Smt. Sheo Dulari was ever evicted from the disputed plots and that any fresh settlement was made with her. Therefore, the contentions of the learned counsel of the petitioner regarding this point should not be entertained as it involves investigation into questions of fact and additional evidence to support the contentions. 8. Third submission made by the learned counsel for the opposite party is to the effect that the provisions of S. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act are inapplicable to agricultural land and since the view of this Court is clear on the point that the devolution regarding agricultural land will be determined according to the provisions of the Act, the petitioner's attack against the impugned judgments based on the provisions of S. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, should not be accepted. According to him the impugned judgments cannot be characterised as patently erroneous in view of the decisions of this Court which hold field at present in this State. 9. In rejoinder the learned counsel for the petitioner has invited my attention to a number of rulings of various High Courts and those of the Supreme Court and has contended that the provisions of S. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act would be applicable and the provisions of S. 172 read with S. 171 of the Act should be struck down so far as they are not in consonance with the provisions of S. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. 10. 10. I have considered the contentions raised on behalf of the parties and I have gone through the rulings cited at the bar. In support of his first contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to the ruling reported in 1942 Rev. Dec. 212 (BR) and 1942 Rev Dec. 436 (BR) and also (1900) 3 Oudh Case 40. The aforesaid cases do not lay down law quite correctly. In 1976 Rev. Dec. 149 : AIR 1976 SC 844 Ram Jiwan v. Smt. Phoola their Lordships of the Supreme Court have indicated that a widow's occupation of tenancy land on the death of her husband would be by way of inheritance only. No doubt Members, Board of Revenue in the cases reported in 1942 Rev. Dec. 212 and 1942 Rev. Dec. 436 have indicated that non-occupancy tenancy in Oudh was not heritable but that view is not in consonance with the observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in 1976 Rev. Dec. 149 mentioned supra. The learned counsel for the petitioner lips not pointed out any provision under the Oudh Rent Act which specifically bars devolution of sub-tenancy right upon the heirs of a sub-tenant. Under the personal law an heir could claim succession with regard to sub-tenancy right if there is no specific provision governing the cases of sub-tenants under a particular tenancy law. This much is clear in the present case that the above mentioned Smt. Sheo Dulari succeeded to her husband Gaya Prasad. On the death of Gaya Prasad the name of Smt. Sheo Dulari was recorded in revenue papers, hence I am not prepared to hold that the aforesaid Smt. Sheo Dulari did not inherit the disputed land from her husband. To my mind the provisions of Section 174 of the Act would not be attracted to the present case on the ground that sub-tenancy right was not heritable and that Smt. Sheo Dulari acquired the disputed plots independently of her husband. Therefore, the petitioner's claim of being an heir of aforesaid Smt. Sheo Dulari in view of the provisions of section 174 of the Act is not acceptable to me in the circumstances of the present case. 11. As regards the second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner my attention has been invited to Annexure "V" attached with the writ petition. 11. As regards the second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner my attention has been invited to Annexure "V" attached with the writ petition. It has been contended that Smt. Sheo Dulari was ejected from the disputed plots and thereafter she acquired fresh right therein. The aforesaid document does not mention the disputed plots, hence conclusively it cannot be inferred that the aforesaid document relates to the disputed land. There is no evidence on record to suggest that any fresh settlement was made with the aforesaid Smt. Sheo Dulari after her ejectment from the disputed land. In this view of the matter I am not prepared to hold that aforesaid Smt. Sheo Dulari acquired any independent right in the disputed plots by virtue of fresh settlement in her favour. I agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the opposite party that the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted as the materials on record are insufficient to support the contention and additional evidence would be required for arriving at some conclusion in this connection. 12. In support of his third contention the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the rulings reported in AIR 1957 Orissa 1, AIR 1960 Punj. 666 (FB), AIR 1964 Punj. 272, AIR 1966 Bom. 64 , AIR 1968 Madh. Pra. 247, AIR 1971 Mys. 151, AIR 1974 Orissa 70, AIR 1977 SC 1265 and AIR 1977 SC 1944 , AIR 1979 SC 993 and AIR 1980 SC 1329 : (1980 All LJ 580). In my opinion none of the above-mentioned rulings directly deal with the question under my consideration. During the course of argument the learned counsel for the petitioner has emphasised that except the view of this Court expressed in AIR 1970 All. 238 , all the High Courts and the Supreme Court have held that the provisions of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act would apply to agricultural land, hence I should hold that the consolidation authorities have patently erred in not considering the provisions of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act and thereafter in not applying the provisions of Section 174 of the Act. In this connection the learned counsel for the petitioner has also suggested that the provisions of Sections 171 and 172 of the Act should be struck down in solar as they are not in consonance with the provisions of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. In support of his contention the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon Article 246 of the Constitution and the rulings reported in AIR 1971 Mvs. 151 and AIR 1974 Orissa 70. 13. The main argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner before ntc was that the Division Bench of this Court in AIR 1970 All. 238 has not considered the provisions of the Indian Constitution and has relied upon the ruling of the Federal Court reported in AIR 1941 FC 72 based on the provisions of the Government of India Act 1935, hence the aforesaid ruling does not lay down correct law and the view expressed in AIR 1974 Orissa 70 should be followed. I think that the learned counsel for the petitioner is not correct in his submissions. The Division bench of this Court has taken into account the provisions of the Constitution of India. The learned counsel for the petitioner referred to Entry no. 7 in the Government of India Act 1935 List 3 which reads as below : "............ Wills, intestacies and succession save as regards agricultural land..". 14. The entry no. 5 in the 3rd list of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution reads as below: "Marriage and divorce, infants and minors, adoption wills, intestacy and succession, joint family and partition, all matters in respect of which parties in judicial proceedings were immediately before the commencement of this Constitution subject to their personal law.". 15. After referring the aforesaid two entries, the learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the Parliament had omitted the phrase "save as regards agricultural land from item no. 5 of the concurrent list of the Government of India Act, 1935, hence it has empowered the Parliament under the present Constitution to make uniform law regarding succession to agricultural land also. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is in consonance with the reasoning's which have appealed to the learned Judges of Orissa High Court in the ruling reported in AIR 1974 Orissa 70 Nidhi Swain v. Khati Dibya. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is in consonance with the reasoning's which have appealed to the learned Judges of Orissa High Court in the ruling reported in AIR 1974 Orissa 70 Nidhi Swain v. Khati Dibya. The learned Judges of the Orissa High Court have not pointed out any mistake in the view expressed by this Court in AIR 1970 All. 238 Smt. Prema Devi v. J.D.C.. They have simply followed the view expressed in AIR 1957 Orissa 1 Smt. Laxmi Devi v. Surendra Kumar Pandey and in AIR 1971 Mysore 151 Basavant Gouda v. Smt, Channabasawwa : It is noteworthy that in AIR 1971 Mysore 151 the learned Judges of that Court have based their judgment upon the ruling reported in AIR 1964 All 165 Shakuntala Devi v. Beni Madhav which has not been followed by the-Division Bench of this Court. Personally I feel that the view expressed in AIR 1970 All 238 is the correct view and the same is binding on me. 16. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Parliament under the Constitution is competent to provide succession regarding all agricultural land is not acceptable to me because the Entry no. 5 in the 3rd List of the 7th Schedule contemplates that on the date of the commencement of the Constitution the person should be governed under personal law, then alone the Parliament could deal with the subjects enumerated in Entry no. 5 of the 3rd List of the 7th Schedule. In this State with regard to certain tenancies the personal law was inapplicable when the Constitution came into force. Therefore, I am not prepared to hold that the Parliament could enact law on the subjects mentioned in Entry No. 5 of the 3rd List of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution regarding all agricultural land. 17. Moreover, Sect ion 4(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 provides as below : "For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that nothing contained in this Act shall be deemed to affect the provisions of any law for the time being in force providing fir the prevention of fragmentation of agricultural holdings or for the fixation of ceilings or for the devolution of tenancy rights in respect of such holdings." 18. Section 14 sub-section (1) of Hindu Succession Act ruts as follows: "Any property possessed by a female Hindu whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner." 19. To my mind S. 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act will apply only in those cases where a Hindu female held the property as a limited owner when the Hindu Succession Act, 1936 came into force. In the present case due to the provisions of the U.P. Z. A. and L. R. Act a female tenure holder had acquired absolute right in the tenancy land, hence the aforesaid provision of Section 14 ( 1) of the Hindu Succession Act would not be attracted to agricultural land in this State. Moreover in view of the provisions of Section 4 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the devolution of tenancy land in this State would not be affected by the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act 1956. I think that bare perusal of Section 4 read with Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act will lead to an irresistible conclusion that the provisions of Hindu Succession Act would not govern the devolution of tenancy right and that a female tenure holder in this State shall not derive any benefit out of the provisions of Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act as she enjoyed absolute right under the provisions of the U.P. Z. A and L. R. Act and she was not limited owner when Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force. 20. In this connection it would be proper to quote the following observations from the ruling reported in AIR 1970 All 238 Smt. Prema Devi v. Joint Director of Consolidation : (at p. 240) : "Under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act which regulated the tenancy rights, there is no provision applying personal law to an of the tenures created under that Act and thus the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act are wholly inapplicable to the land tenures under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act.". 21. The Judges of this Court in Special Appeal No. 784 of 1967 Ram Jag Misir v. Director of Consolidation, through their judgment dated 4.4.1974 have observed as below: ".. 21. The Judges of this Court in Special Appeal No. 784 of 1967 Ram Jag Misir v. Director of Consolidation, through their judgment dated 4.4.1974 have observed as below: ".. But if she obtained an kind of a tenure holder's right under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, either legitimately or even if by treating as trespasser from the date of vesting and so acquiring sirdari right after the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation under Section 210 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, in that situation also the question of applicability of Hindu Succession Act, 1956, is not likely to arise.". 22. In view of the above quotation I think that the provisions of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act would not at all be attracted to the facts and circumstances of the present case under my consideration. It is not disputed that Smt. Sheo Dulari had acquired sirdari right under the provisions of the U.P.Z.A. and L. R. Act, hence the applicability of the provisions of Hindu Succession Act does not arise. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that Smt. Sheo Dulari acquired absolute right in view of the provisions of Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, hence the provisions of Section 174 of the U.P. Z. A. and L. R. Act would be attracted and the petitioner would he her heir is not at all acceptable to me. Since I have arrived at the conclusion that Section 14 (1) of Hindu Succession Act is inapplicable to the facts under my consideration, it is not necessary to deal with the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner that the provisions of Sections 171 and 172 of the U.P. Z. A and L. R. Act are ultra vires as they are inconsistent with the provisions of Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner by placing reliance upon Article 246 of the Constitution is not at all relevant and necessary to be dealt with by me in the circumstance that I have come to the conclusion that the aforesaid Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act will not at all be attracted at least to the agricultural land which was non-transferable tenancy at the commencement of the Constitutions of India in this State. 23. 23. The rulings of the other High Courts applying the provisions of Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, can be easily ignored as they are not in consonance with the views of this Court. The rulings of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, wherein observations have been made regarding the applicability of the provisions of Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act to the agricultural land in this State, are distinguishable and inapplicable to the facts and circumstances under my consideration because in the present case non-transferable tenancy is involved which was not governed by the provisions of personal law at the relevant times and the female tenure-holder was not a limited owner (See 1964 All LJ 197 : AIR 1965 All 1 (FB) Ramji Dixit v. Bhrigunath), hence one essential ingredient for applicability of Section 14 (1) of Hindu Succession Act, 1956, is lacking. No direct case of the Supreme Court has been brought lo my notice wherein it has been observed that the provisions of Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act would apply to non-transferable tenancies held by a - female tenure-holder in this State. The facts and the law involved in the present case are almost similar to the facts and law dealt with by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the ruling reported in 1976 Rev. Dec. 149 : AIR 1976 SC 844 Ram Jiwan v. Phoola. Therefore, I am unable to hold that the impugned judgments of the consolidation authorities in the present case suffer from any error of law, much less patent error of law. 24. In the result, all the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner fail and the writ petition deserves dismissal. Accordingly, I dismiss the writ petition and direct the parties to bear their own costs.