JUDGMENT Sen, J. 1. This appeal from an original order is at the instance of the defendant No.1 and is directed against an order of remand dated May 31, 1982, passed by the learned Additional District Judge, 7th Court, Alipore, in Title Appeal No. 686 of 1981. The learned Additional District Judge in remanding the suit for re-trial set aside a decree of dismissal of plaintiff's suit, being Title Suit No. 434 of 1979 passed by the learned Munsif, 4th Court, Alipore, under Order 12, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Since the trial court had dismissed the suit under the provision of Order 12, Rule 6 of the Code we must go by the plaint and the case made therein for deciding how far the learned Additional District Judge was right in setting aside such a decree of dismissal of the suit. 2. The plaintiff/respondent No.1 instituted the aforesaid suit for declaration and for injunction. According to the plaintiff the defendant No.1/appellant is the owner of the entire Premises No. 8A, Harish Mukherjee Road, P.S. Bhowanipore, District 24-Parganas. The defendant No.1 let out the said entire premises to one Giridharilal T. Parekh since before 1947 at a monthly rental of Rs. 360/- with a right to sublet any part thereof. Giridharilal in his turn sublet a portion of the said disputed premises on the ground floor (hereinafter referred to as the suit premises) to the plaintiff at a monthly rental of Rs. 150/-. In the year 1955, defendant No.1 instituted Title Suit No. 21 of 1955 against the said Giridharilal for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement. In that suit the plaintiff subtenant was made a party defendant. Pending the said suit on March 31, 1956, the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, came into effect, the earlier Act of 1950 being repealed. On August 21, 1956, Title suit No. 21 of 1955 was dismissed on compromise against Giridharilal and ex parte against the plaintiff. Giridharilal executed a lease for 21 years and continued to remain in possession and enjoyment of the entire Premises No. 8A, Harish Mukherjee Road. The plaintiff continued to enjoy the suit premises as a subtenant under Giridharilal, the rent thereafter having been enhanced to Rs. 200/- per month. Giridharilal died on August 15, 1977, leaving behind the defendant Nos. 2 to 10 as his heirs and legal representatives. The plaintiff continued to enjoy the suit premises as a subtenant under Giridharilal, the rent thereafter having been enhanced to Rs. 200/- per month. Giridharilal died on August 15, 1977, leaving behind the defendant Nos. 2 to 10 as his heirs and legal representatives. The lease in favour of Giridharilal having expired the defendant No. 1 on November 28, 1977, instituted Title Suit No. 410 of 1977. That suit was decreed on August 31, 1979, (the decree being signed on October 31, 1979), as against defendant Nos. 2 to 10. Plaintiff came to know of such a decree for the first time on November 26, 1979. Plaintiff claims that the substancy in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the suit premises having been lawfully created by Giridharilal, defendant No.1 had no right authority or competence to enter into grant a lease for 21 years in favour of Giridharilal to the detriment of the plaintiff and in any event the plaintiff's lawful sub-tenancy could not be defeated or avoided by the said lease, plaintiff being no party thereto. Plaintiff further claimed that although it was obligatory on the part of the defendant No.1 to implead the plaintiff as a party defendant in Title Suit No. 410 of 1977 as he was not made a party, the decree passed therein is clearly inoperative, not binding on the plaintiff and is incapable of execution, inasmuch as, the plaintiff must be deemed to have been elevated to the position of a direct tenant under defendant No.1 since the passing of the said decree in Title Suit No. 410 of 1977. Since such a decree has created a cloud on the plaintiff's lawful status and possession in respect of the suit premises and since there is just apprehension that the defendant No.1 may oust the plaintiff from the suit premises it is necessary that the plaintiff's title as lawful direct tenant should be declared and the defendant No.1 should be restrained permanently from interfering with plaintiff's possession of the suit premises in execution of the decree so obtained by him in the aforesaid suit. 3. On these allegations plaintiff sought for a declaration to the effect “that the plaintiff was a lawful subtenant of the disputed premises and has acquired the status of direct tenant in respect of the disputed premises under defendant No.1 upon termination of tenancy of defendant Nos. 3. On these allegations plaintiff sought for a declaration to the effect “that the plaintiff was a lawful subtenant of the disputed premises and has acquired the status of direct tenant in respect of the disputed premises under defendant No.1 upon termination of tenancy of defendant Nos. 2 to 10 by the decree passed in Title Suit No. 410 of 1977 of this Court on October 31, 1979". He also prayed for permanent injunction restraining the defendant No.1 from evicting the plaintiff from the suit premises on the basis of the decree, as aforesaid. 4. In this suit, the defendant No.1 filed an application inviting judgment on admission under the provision of Order 12, Rule, 6 of the Code on the ground that upon the plaintiff's own case made in the plaint, the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief sought for. That claim of the defendant No.1 was allowed by the learned Munsif when he dismissed the suit upon the plaintiff's own admission on the view that the lease of the plaintiff's landlord not being governed by the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, and the decree passed in Title Suit No. 410 of 1977 being one under the provisions of Transfer of Property Act, the plaintiff would be bound by the decree as a sublessee not being entitled to any protection under the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. The plaintiff preferred an appeal and the learned Additional District Judge took the view that the suit could not have been dismissed on admission since the suit involves several issues which require adjudication. According to the learned Additional District Judge it would be necessary to consider what would be the effect of compromise in the earlier suit and the lease that was entered into between Giridharilal and the defendant No. 1 with a subtenant already on the premises. He was further of the opinion that it would be necessary to consider whether the earlier suit itself would constitute notice under section 16(2)of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, and whether the plaintiff became a tenant directly under the superior landlord under the provisions of the 1956 Act. In that view, he had remanded the suit for rehearing by setting aside the dismissal of the suit under the provisions of Order 12, Rule 6 of the Code. In that view, he had remanded the suit for rehearing by setting aside the dismissal of the suit under the provisions of Order 12, Rule 6 of the Code. Feeling aggrieved, the defendant No.1 has preferred the present appeal to this Court against the said order of remand. 5. Mr. Sinha appearing in support or this appeal has contended that though the plaintiff was a pre-existing subtenant, the 21 years’ lease between his landlord, namely, Giridharilal and the defendant No.1 would under the provision of section 115 of the Transfer of Property Act, have the effect of his continuing as the sublessee. Such sublease would be, however, under a lessee for 21 years but in view of the provision of section 3 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, would not be governed by the provision of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. Necessarily according to Mr. Sinha, the sublease of such a lease under the superior landlord would equally be not governed by the provisions of the said Act and would not enjoy any of the benefits thereunder. Reliance is placed by Mr. Sinha on the earlier decision of this Court in the case of (1) Luxmi Debi Loyalka v. Frank Ross & Co. Ltd. 65 CWN 167. According to Mr. Sinha, the plaintiff has sought for a declaration that he became a direct tenant under the superior landlord by virtue of the decree passed in Title Suit No. 410 of 1977, obviously on the basis of the provisions of section 13(2) and (3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. But according to Mr. Sinha the suit for eviction by the superior landlord against the lessee not being one based on grounds specified in section 13 those provisions can have no application and the plaintiff is not entitled to get any declaration of any right on the basis thereof. Incidentally it has been contended by Mr. Sinha that the learned Additional District Judge should not have remanded the suit for re-trial for consideration of the alleged issues which either did not arise or if arise, those could be decided on the admitted pleading of the plaintiff. 6. The point thus raised by Mr. Sinha has been strongly contested by Mr. Bose appearing on behalf of the plaintiff/respondent. According to Mr. 6. The point thus raised by Mr. Sinha has been strongly contested by Mr. Bose appearing on behalf of the plaintiff/respondent. According to Mr. Bose, the plaintiff being a subtenant since before 1956, and since before the lease for 21 years, he is entitled to the protection under the 1956 Act, the subsequent lease as between his landlord and the superior landlord not being binding on him. In any event, according to Mr. Bose under the provisions of the 1950 Act, the plaintiff acquired a lawful right to become a direct tenant under the superior landlord when the earlier lease by the defendant No.1 in favour of Giridharilal was terminated and a new lease for 21 years was created and that right cannot be forfeited. 7. We have carefully considered the rival contentions put forward before us. In our considered opinion the Older of remand cannot be sustained. In our opinion, the learned Additional District Judge failed to appreciate that the point raised before the Court was that on the facts admitted by the plaintiff in his plaint the plaintiff was not entitled to the relief prayed for. According to the defendant No.1 it is not necessary to controvert any of the allegations made in the plaint or lead any evidence in view of the facts admitted by the plaintiff himself so that the only issue was as to whether in law on such admitted facts the plaintiff could claim a right as a direct tenant under the superior landlord as a result of a decree passed in Title Suit No.410 of 1977 against the heirs and legal representatives of the original lessee Giridharilal. This point was decided in favour of the defendant No.1 by the learned Munsif. The learned Additional District Judge has not held that the learned Munsif was wrong in his conclusion. He simply thought that since the suit involves certain issues which we have referred to hereinbefore, these must be gone into. The issues proposed by the learned Additional District Judge were, if at all, issues as to legal effect of certain facts admitted on the plaintiff's plaint. Therefore, if they were required to be decided they should have been decided by the learned Additional District Judge instead of remanding the suit for re-trial. The issues proposed by the learned Additional District Judge were, if at all, issues as to legal effect of certain facts admitted on the plaintiff's plaint. Therefore, if they were required to be decided they should have been decided by the learned Additional District Judge instead of remanding the suit for re-trial. Such being the position, we are of the opinion that the order of remand is clearly erroneous in law but before we dispose of the appeal we feel it necessary to consider whether the conclusion of the learned Munsif was right or not. We propose to do so became the point so decided is purely it question of law on the facts admitted in the plaint and the same should have been decided by the learned Additional District Judge. 8. The present plaintiff, the sublessee has sought for a declaration that he has become a tenant directly under the superior landlord as a result of the decree dated October 31, 1979 obtained by the superior landlord against his landlord. If the rights of the parties are governed by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, there can be no doubt that no such declaration can be sustained because a decree against a lessee will be binding against a sublessee and the status of a sublessee is never elevated to that of a lessee under the superior landlord by virtue of such a decree. Obviously, therefore the plaintiff has to rely upon the provisions of the Weft Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, and to be more precise upon the provisions of section 13(2), (3), (4) and (5) of that Act. These two provisions are on the following terms: "(2) The substants, if any, referred to in the section 16 who have given notice of their subtenancies to the landlord under the provision of that section shall be made parties to any suit or proceeding for recovery of possession of the premises by the landlord. Provided that except in cases covered by clause (f) or (g) of sub-section (1) no instancy such subtenant unless any of the grounds mentioned in clauses (b) to (e) and (h) apply to him. (3) Save as provided in sub-section (2) and sub-section (4) a decree or order for delivery of possession of any premises shall be binding on every subtenant". 9. (3) Save as provided in sub-section (2) and sub-section (4) a decree or order for delivery of possession of any premises shall be binding on every subtenant". 9. Sub-sections (4) and (5) further provide that where the decree is not passed against the subtenant as well the subtenant becomes a tenant directly under the landlord when the suit is decreed against the principal tenant. 10. Here in the present case it is not the case of the plaintiff that he had served any notice under section 16. Even so, we may assume that the superior landlord being aware of the subtenancy in favour of the plaintiff be deemed to have been served with a notice under section 16(2). But even then in our considered opinion the right to claim a direct tenancy under the superior landlord clearly envisages a decree against the principal tenant under the provision of section 13 and a case where the relationship between the parties is governed by the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. But admittedly upon the plaintiffs own showing the decree that was obtained by the defendant No. 1 against the defendant Nos. 2 to 10 is a decree under the provisions of Transfer of Property Act, which hardly gives any scope for giving rise to any right contemplated by sub-sections (4) and (5) of section 13 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. The mere fact that Giridharilal continued to remain as a tenant governed by the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, from March 31, 1956, till August 21, 1956, with the plaintiff as a subtenant under him could not prevent him from altering his own position by obtaining a lease for 21 years and thus throwing himself out of the protection of the 1956 Act, in consideration for a fixed tenure for 21 years. In the plaint, it is not the plaintiff's case that taking of such a fresh lease constituted any termination of the earlier tenancy, far less that any such termination conferred upon the plaintiff any right to become a tenant directly under the superior landlord. Obviously the plaintiff being a sublessee under the provision of section 115 of the Transfer of Property Act, he continued to remain as such when his landlord in lieu of the previous monthly tenancy adopted a lease for 21 years. Obviously the plaintiff being a sublessee under the provision of section 115 of the Transfer of Property Act, he continued to remain as such when his landlord in lieu of the previous monthly tenancy adopted a lease for 21 years. The plaintiff's landlord having opted out of the 1956 Act, the plaintiff too as a sublessee under him lost all the protection thereunder. This being the position all the four issues which according to the learned Additional District Judge are involved, must be decided against the plaintiff. So far as the 1950 Act is concerned, that conferred no vested right upon a subtenant. Though some observations in a Bench decision of this Court in the case of (2) Ram Khilan v. Radha Rani, 1980 (1) CLJ 197 has been referred to in the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge. These observations have been duly explained by this Court in later two decisions in the case of (3) Hiranmoyee Debi v. Maharaj Kumar S.C. Nandi, 1982 (1) CLJ 229 and (4) Laksmi Rani Das v. Hari Sankar Dutta, 1982 (1) CLJ 350 . It has been clearly pointed out by this Court in the later decisions that the right conferred upon the subtenant under section 12 of that Act could accrue only upon lawful determination of the tenancy in favour of the landlord of the subtenant during the continuance of that Act and not otherwise. Since in the admitted facts there was no such determination in the present case no right did accrue in favour of the plaintiff under the provisions of that Act. Nor was the plaintiffs case so made in the plaint when he sought for a declaration of direct tenancy under defendant No. 1 only as a result of a decree passed against his admitted landlords in the year 1977, after the expiry of 21 years lease. 11. In the result, we must uphold the decision of the learned Munsif that upon the plaintiff’s own admission made in the plaint, the plaintiff is not entitled to any of the reliefs prayed for and the suit, therefore, was rightly dismissed upon his own admission. Hence, this appeal succeeds. 11. In the result, we must uphold the decision of the learned Munsif that upon the plaintiff’s own admission made in the plaint, the plaintiff is not entitled to any of the reliefs prayed for and the suit, therefore, was rightly dismissed upon his own admission. Hence, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and order passed by the learned Additional District Judge, 7th Court, Alipore, dated May 31, 1982 in Title Appeal No. 686 of 1981, being set aside we affirm the judgment and decree passed by the learned Munsif in Title Suit No. 434 of 1970. There will be no order for costs. Since the appeal is disposed of no order is made on the application filed on 18.7.83 and the application stands disposed of. Sanyal, J.: I agree.