Order Padmanabhan, J.: The petitioner M/s.Swadeshi Cotton Mills, Pondicherry has filed this writ petition for a writ of declaration that the provisions of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (for short ‘The Act’) are unconstitutional, void and enforceable. Criminal M.P.No.2290/82 has been filed by the writ petitioner for quashing the proceedings in C.C.No.46 of 1982 on the file of the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Pondicherry, including the orders dated 15-4-1982 and 17-4-1982. The petitioner is a textile mill; which is established more than 150 years ago. According to the petitioner, ever since its inception the effluent from the mills was being let into the municipal sewer, which forms part of the drainage system in Pondicherry. In 1974 the Parliament enacted the Act. The second respondent herein, the Central Board for the Prevention and control of Water Pollution has been assigned the duty to perform the functions under the Act. While so, on 29-4-1976 the second respondent issued a notice to the petitioner stating that the petitioner had not made an application to the Board under Section 25(1) of the Act regarding the discharge of sewage or trade effluent into any stream or well. The notice further called upon the petitioner to show-cause why action should not be taken under the provisions of the Act for non-compliance of Sections 25 and 26 of the Act. Thereafter, the petitioner filed an application on 2-3-1978 for consent of the Central Board for discharging the effluent. On 19-6-1978 the Government of India granted consent to the petitioner for the discharge of the effluent in the municipal drainage till 30-6-1980. The consent was granted subject to the petitioner installing a suitable plant for treatment of the effluent. Thereafter, the petitioner went on applying for time and by an order dated 1-6-1981 the consent was extended upto 31-12-1981 and the petitioner was asked to comply with the conditions of consent on or before 31-12-1981. Finally, again by letter dated 2-1-1982 the second respondent Board directed the petitioner to take immediate action for constructing first stage of treatment plant by 28-2-1982. Since nothing was done by the petitioner, another notice was issued on 22-1-1982 calling upon the petitioner to comply with all consent conditions within fifteen days from the date of the notice. Thereafter, since the petitioner did not comply with the order, the respondent filed an application under Section 33 of the Act. Since nothing was done by the petitioner, another notice was issued on 22-1-1982 calling upon the petitioner to comply with all consent conditions within fifteen days from the date of the notice. Thereafter, since the petitioner did not comply with the order, the respondent filed an application under Section 33 of the Act. On the said application, the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Pondicherry passed an ex parte order of mandatory injunction restraining the petitioner from carrying on production in the factory and form discharging the trade effluents on land or nullah or Municipal drain forthwith till further orders are passed. Thereupon, the petitioner field Crl.M.P.No.427 of 1982 for stay’ of the operation of the order of injunction. The Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate suspended the operation of the order dated 15-4-1981 till 17-5-1982 to enable the petitioner to give a positive undertaking to comply with the terms of the consent granted by the Board. It is in these circumstances, both the writ petition and the criminal miscellaneous petition have been filed by the petitioner. 2. Mr. P. Chidambaram, learned counsel for the petitioner raised the following contentions before us: (i) Inasmuch as the subject of the enactment falls In List II of Schedule VII of the Constitution of India, the Parliament has no power to make laws for the State, except as provided for in Articles 249 and 250 of the Constitution of India, in the submission of Mr. P. Chidambaram the Parliament has passed the enactment in exercise of its powers under Article 252 of the Constitution of India on the basis of resolutions passed by all the Houses of 11 States recited in the preamble of the Act. The word “States used in Article 252(1) can only refer to the States other than Union Territories and, cannot, therefore, take. In the State of Pondicherry, when the enactment has been made by Parliament in pursuance of the powers conferred on It under Article 252(1) it cannot extend it to the Union Territory of Pondicherry. The word “States used in Article 252(1) can only refer to the States other than Union Territories and, cannot, therefore, take. In the State of Pondicherry, when the enactment has been made by Parliament in pursuance of the powers conferred on It under Article 252(1) it cannot extend it to the Union Territory of Pondicherry. Consequently, Parliament has no power to enact a law applicable to the Union Territories pursuant to the power conferred on it under Article 252(1) of the Constitution of India, (ii) Section 33 of the Act is void on the ground that it violates Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India in view of the fact that it confers an absolute power on a Magistrate to pass an order without observing the principles of natural justice; (iii) In any view of the matter no order could have been passed against the petitioner without the petitioner being given an opportunity to show cause that it has violated any of the provisions of the Act. According to Mr. Chidambaram, the prohibition in the Act is against letting in effluenting in a stream or well. 3. We will now proceed to consider the objections of Mr. Chidambaram Seriatim. Article 239 of the Constitution of India deals with ‘Union territories’. Article 239 states: ”(1) Save as otherwise provided by Parliament by law, every Union territory shall be administered by the President acting, to such extent as he thinks fit, through an administrator to be appointed by him with such designation as he may specify. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in Part VI, the President may appoint the Governor of a State as the Administrator of an adjoining Union Territory, and where a Governor is so appointed, he shall exercise his functions as such administrator independently of his Council of Ministers.” Article 239-A(1) “Parliament may by law create for any of the Union Territories of Goa, Daman and Dieu, Pondicherry, Mizoram and Arunachala Pradesh. (a) a body, whether elected or partly, nominated and partly elected, to function as a Legislature for the Union Territory, or (b) a Council of Ministers, or both with such constitution, powers and functions, in each case, as may be specified in the law. (a) a body, whether elected or partly, nominated and partly elected, to function as a Legislature for the Union Territory, or (b) a Council of Ministers, or both with such constitution, powers and functions, in each case, as may be specified in the law. (2) Any such law as is referred to in Clause (1) shall not be deemed to be an amendment of this Constitution for the purposes of Article 368 notwithstanding that it contains any provision which amends or has the effect of amending this Constitution.” Article 239-A was inserted by the Constitution (Fourteenth Amendment) Act, 1962. Article 246 reads thus: (1) Notwithstanding anything in Clauses (2) and (3) Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated the List I in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the “Union List.”) (2) Notwithstanding anything in Clause (3) Parliament and, subject to Clause (1), the Legislature of any State also, have power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the Concurrent List”). (3) Subject to Clauses (1) and (2) the Legislature of any State has exclusive power to make laws for such State or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II in the Seventh Schedule (in the Constitution, referred to as the “State List”). (4) Parliament has power to make laws with respect to any matter for any part of the territory of India not included in a State notwithstanding that such matter is a matter enumerated in the State List.” Article 246 (4) confers a plenary power on Parliament to enact a law for the Union Territory. 4. In Mithan Lal v. State of Delhi Mithan Lal v. State of Delhi (1958) S.C.J. 899: (1959) S.C.R. 445: A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 632 the Supreme Court, while dealing with the power conferred on Parliament under Article 246(4) observed thus: “Under Article 246(4) it is Parliament that has the power to legislate for Part C states, and that power is untrammelled by the limitations prescribed by Article 246, Clauses (2) and (3) and Entry 54 of List II, and is plenary and absolute, subject only to such restrictions as are imposed by the Constitution, and there is none such which is material to the present “question”. Thus, it is seen that Article 246(4) confers a plenary power on Parliament to make laws with respect to any matter for Union Territory or any part thereof. 5. In Satpal and Company v. Lt. Governor Satpal and Company v. Lt. Governor (1979) 3 S.C.R. 651 : (1979) 4 S.C.C. 232 : (1979) Tax L.R. 2486: A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1550 the provisions of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914, which was in force in the Union Territory of Delhi, came up for consideration before the Supreme Court. In that context the power of the President to issue the ordinance for the Union Territory of Delhi was challenged. In that connection, Desai, 3., observed as follows: “The cardinal question around which the various facts of controversy rotates turns upon the competence of Parliament to enact legislation under challenge which would directly impinge upon the competence of the President to issue an Ordinance in the circumstances thereunder mentioned and the power to issue Ordinance is co-extensive with the legislative power of Parliament vide Article 123(3). The question, therefore, is whether Parliament had the power to impose special duty on the import of country liquor in Delhi. In order to avoid the slightest confusion it must be reiterated that the power of Parliament to legislate for Delhi is in question. Article 246(1) confers exclusive power on Parliament to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I in the Seventh Schedule. Sub- article (3) confers similar power on the Legislature of any State with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II. Sub- article (2) confers power both on Parliament and the State Legislature to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III (Concurrent List)”. Then, after referring to Articles 246(4), 248(1) and various entries in the different Lists, the Supreme Court as follows: “Scheme underlying distribution of legislative powers in Part XI, Chapter I and especially Articles 246 and 248 is that except the matters specifically enumerated in List II (State List) in the Seventh Schedule, Parliament's plenary power to legislate extends to all conceivable matters which can be topic of legislation, and even this limitation on its power vanishes when Parliament legislates for part of the territory of India not included in a State….. Under Article 246(4) Parliament has power to make laws with respect to any matter for any part of the territory of India not included in a State notwithstanding that such matter is a matter enumerated in the State List. Power of Parliament thus to legislate with respect to any matter for Delhi, territory not included in a State is unabridged or unfettered by the entries in the State List….8 6. Section is of the Government of Union Territories Act (Central Act XX of 1963) state: ”(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Legislative Assembly of a Union Territory may make laws for the whole or any part of the matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List in Seventh Schedule to the Constitution in so far as any such matter is applicable in relation to Union Territories. (2) Nothing in sub- section (1) shall derogate from the powers conferred on Parliament by the Constitution to make laws with respect to any matter for a Union Territory or any part thereof”. Sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963 is in conformity with Article 246(4) of the Constitution of India. 7. In Union Territory of Pondy v. Mahe Bench Trading Company Union Territory of Pondy v. Mahe Bench Trading Company (1976)2 MLJ.297 cited by Mr. Chidambaram, Veeraswamy, C.J., speaking for the Bench, has observed as follows: “Under Article 239-A(1) and this we have already touched upon, Parliament enacted the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963, by which it provided for a Legislative Assembly and Council of Ministers for the Union Territory of Pondicherry, Section 18 defines the extent of the legislative powers. Subject to the provisions of the Act, the Legislative Assembly may make laws for the whole any part or the Union Territory with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List in the VII Schedule to the Constitution. Subject to the provisions of the Act, the Legislative Assembly may make laws for the whole any part or the Union Territory with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List in the VII Schedule to the Constitution. But, this is subject to the overriding powers of Parliament under sub- section (2) of Section 18 to make laws with respect to any matters for a Union Territory or any part thereof, which is in consonance with under Article 246(4) of the Constitution by which Parliament has power to make laws with respect to any matter for any part of the territory of India not included in a State, notwithstanding that such matter is matter enumerated in the State List. The Union Territory of Pondicherry is not a State, and the Legislature of Pondicherry is not a Legislative Assembly as contemplated by Article 54 or 163”. In the light of the above decision, Mr. Chidambaram could not dispute the proposition that Parliament had the power to make enactment in question for the State of Pondicherry under Article 246(4) of the Constitution of India. 8. However, the bone of contention of Mr. Chidambaram. was that when Parliament has specifically recited in the preamble of the Act that it is exercising the powers conferred on it under Article 252(1) of the Constitution of India in making an enactment, the Court could not assume that the Parliament was conscious of its powers to make an enactment for the State of Pondicherry under Article 246(4) and that consequently the enactment could not be said to be valid so far as the State of Pondicherry is concerned. In this connection learned counsel drew our attention to certain decisions. The first decision is that of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Basavaiah Union of India v. Basavaiah (1979)3 S.C.C. 324 : (1979)3 S.C.R. 802 : A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1415. The question that arose for decision before the Supreme Court was whether the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 was ultra vires of its powers so far as the State of Andhra Pradesh was concerned. The subject matter of legislation was included in List II of Seventh Schedule. The question that arose for decision before the Supreme Court was whether the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 was ultra vires of its powers so far as the State of Andhra Pradesh was concerned. The subject matter of legislation was included in List II of Seventh Schedule. The State Legislatures of eleven States, namely, all the Houses of the Legislature of the States of Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Tirupura, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal considered it desirable to have a uniform legislation enacted by Parliament for the imposition of a ceiling on urban property for the country as a whole and in compliance with Clause (1) of Article 252 of the Constitution passed a resolution to that effect. It is pursuant to this resolution that the Parliament enacted the Act. One of the contentions that was urged before the Supreme Court was that the term ‘legislature of a State’ referred to in Article 252(1) of the Constitution would take in the Governor also. The Supreme Court had no hesitation in rejecting the contention. After an elaborate discussion, the Supreme Court concluded “the Governor in our view nowhere comes in the picture at all in these matters.” One other question that arose for consideration before the Supreme Court in that case was whether the Parliament was competent to enact law in respect of the State of Rajasthan, which was not one of the eleven States that passed the resolution on the first part of Article 252(1). It was contended that the legislature of the State of Rajasthan never authorised the Parliament to enact a law for the imposition of ceiling on immovable properties in that State and, therefore, the Act was stillborn in respect of the State of Rajasthan. In this connection, the Supreme Court observed as follows: “The learned Attorney General, however rightly contends, in the alternative, that the Parliament being invested with the power by resolutions passed under the first part of Article 252(1) by as many as eleven States, to legislate on the subject, i.e., to make a law for the imposition of a ceiling on immovable property, it had the competence to so structure the Act that it was capable of being adopted by other States under the second Part of Article 252(1). A fortitori, the specification of the State of Rajasthan by which the Act may be adopted, as well as the categorisation of the urban agglomerations therein to which it may apply, had to be there. In our considered judgment, the Parliament having been invested with powers to legislate on a State subject, by resolutions, passed by Legislatures of two or more States under Article 252(1), has plenary powers to make suitable legislation. It follows, as a necessary corollary that the Act passed by the Parliament under Article 252(1) can be so structured as to be capable of being effectively adopted by the other States. Article 252(1) undoubtedly enables the Parliament to make a uniform law. The Act so passed would automatically apply to the States the legislatures of which have passed a resolution in terms of Article 252(1), and at the same time it must be capable of being adopted by other States which have not sponsored a resolution, i.e., the non-sponsoring States. The second part of Article 252(1) will be meaningful only if it were so interpreted; otherwise, it would be rendered wholly redundant: To illustrate, if the part of the Schedule relating to the State of Rajasthan is treated as non est, the schedule which forms part of the Act cannot be amended except under Article 252(2), i.e., ‘in the like manner’. We fail the appreciate how two or more States can now pass a resolution for extension of the Act to the State of Rajasthan.”. Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the impugned Act is not beyond the legislative competence of the Parliament in so far as the State of Rajasthan is concerned. We are unable to find anything in this decision of the Supreme Court, which supports the learned counsel for the petitioner. 9. The ratio of the decision of the High Court of Karnataka in T. Khande Rao and Sons v. State T. Khande Rao and Sons v. State A.I.R. 1979 Karn. 71 cited by the learned” counsel for the petitioner reads thus: “Article 252 provides for surrender of delegation of legislative powers that otherwise vests in the State legislatures in favour of the Union Parliament. On such surrender by two or more States and not by any one State, only, the Parliament acquires competence to legislate for the States that have agreed for legislation on such subject. On such surrender by two or more States and not by any one State, only, the Parliament acquires competence to legislate for the States that have agreed for legislation on such subject. It is also open for any other State to adopt such legislation and on such adoption, the consequence that will ensue will be the same as the State that had agreed for that legislation. On the surrender of its legislative power and the Parliament enacting the law thereto, the State Legislature completely and fully looses its power of legislation on that subject. Without such surrender or delegation the Parliament will not be competent to legislates its law alone prevails over an earlier law made by a State Legislature on such a subject and the State Law on the subject which is repugnant to the Central Law become void.” We are equally unable to see how this decision would help the learned counsel for the petitioner. There can be no exception to the proposition of law laid down by the learned Judge of the Karnataka High Court that Article 252 provides, for surrender or delegation of legislative powers that otherwise vests in the State legislatures in favour of the Union Parliament and that on the surrender of its legislative power and the Parliament enacting a law thereto, the State Legislature completely and fully loses its power of legislation on that subject. 10. The decision in T. Rangayya v. State T. Rangayya v. State A.I.R. 1978 A.P. 106 also could not hold the petitioner. Ail that it says is that a law made, by Parliament pursuant to the power surrendered to it under Article 252 prevails over a State law and the provisions of a State law to the extent that they conflict with the Central law are void. It further states that the language of the Article 252 “any Act so passed shall apply to such States”, is peremptory enough to suggest that the Act so passed shall prevail over any other State law. 11. One of the arguments of Mr. Chidambaram based on the above decisions was that when once the Parliament invokes the power under Article 252(1) of the Constitution of India, the State would lose the power to pass laws on the same subject of legislation. 11. One of the arguments of Mr. Chidambaram based on the above decisions was that when once the Parliament invokes the power under Article 252(1) of the Constitution of India, the State would lose the power to pass laws on the same subject of legislation. Consequently, the Parliament would not have applied it mind to enact a law for the State of Pondicherry within the meaning of Article 246(4) of the Constitution of India. This argument cannot be applicable in the case of Union Territory. As has already been pointed out, so far as Union Territory is concerned, the power of Parliament to enact a Jaw even in matters covered by List II is plenary and the power of the legislature of the Union Territory to make a law can only be subject to the plenary power of Parliament to make a law in respect of the said territory. 12. The only other effective contention of Mr. Chidambaram to the validity of the impugned enactment was that the preamble to the Act recites only the powers conferred on Parliament under Article 252(1) and that there is no reference to the power conferred on the Parliament under Article 246(4). In our opinion, it is not necessary for the Parliament to recite the particular provision under the Constitution under which it is enabled to enact laws. When once it is admitted that the Parliament has got a power to make the impugned enactment so far as the State of Pondicherry is concerned under Article 246(4) the enactment cannot stand vitiated by reason of the fact that the preamble does not recite Article 246(4). The necessity to recite Article 252(1) arose because the subject matter of legislation fell within List II of Seventh Schedule in respect of which only the State alone are competent to pass laws, We have already seen that under Article 252 before the Parliament could invoke its power of legislation in respect of a subject found in List II, the Houses of legislatures of two or more States should pass a resolution empowering Parliament for regulating a matter in respect of which it feels desirable that uniform laws should be made. Admittedly as eleven States specified in the preamble had passed resolutions to justify the exercise of the power on making laws applicable to those States in respect of the subjects which fell. Admittedly as eleven States specified in the preamble had passed resolutions to justify the exercise of the power on making laws applicable to those States in respect of the subjects which fell. in List II, Parliament had necessarily to recite the powers conferred on it under Article 252(1) and also the resolution passed by those States. On the other hand, no such resolution passed by the Legislature of the State of Pondicherry is required to clothe the Parliament with the power of making the law so far as the State of Pondicherry is concerned. We, therefore, hold that the impugned legislation is not unconstitutional, void and unenforceable in so far as the Union Territory of Pondicherry is concerned. 13. We then take up the question whether Section 33 of the Act is invalid on the ground that it excludes the application of the principles of natural justice. The principle of natural justice consists of two elements. (1) The party affected by any judicial or quasi judicial or administrative order, which involves civil consequences should be given notice of the case he has to meet (2). He should be afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to defend himself. The rule of natural justice is universally respected and the duty to afford a fair hearing is a “duty lying in every one who decides something”. Only in cases where a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice will the Court be bound not to ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the principles of natural justice are excluded by a statutory provision either expressly or by necessary implication will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. In this connection, we refer to the following observations of the Supreme Court in Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India (1981)1 S.C.C. 664 : 51 Comp.Cas. 210: (1981)2 S.C.R. 533 : A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 818. Chinnappa Reddy, J., observed as follows: “In the language of V.R. Krishna Iyer, J., (Vide (1978) 2 S.C.J. 441: (1978)2 S.C.R. 272 : (1978)1 S.C.C. 405 : A.I.R.1978 S.C. 851: “Subject to certain necessary limitations natural justice is now a brooding omnipresence although varying in its play. Its essence is good conscience in a given situation: nothing more - but nothing else.”. 14. Its essence is good conscience in a given situation: nothing more - but nothing else.”. 14. The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. They can supplement the law but cannot supplant it (per Hedge, J., in (1970)1 S.C.J. 351: (1970)1 S.C.R. 457 : A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 150. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice, then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded, wholly or in part, in the exercise of statutory power, depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provisions conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of the exercise of that power. (See Union of India v. J.N. Sinha, ibid Union of India v. J.N. Sinha, ibid (1971)1 S.C.J. 655: (1971)1 S.C.R. 791 : A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 40. 15. The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are; (a) notice of the case to be met; and (b) opportunity to explain. Thus rule is universally respected and duty to afford a fair hearing in Lord Loreburn's of quoted language, is “a duty lying upon every one who decides something”, in the exercise of legal power. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the alter of administrative convenience or clerity; for, “convenience and justice” - as Lord Atkin felicitously but it are often not on speaking terms “General Council of Medical Education v. Spackman General Council of Medical Education v. Spackman 1943 A.C.627 at p.638. In short, the general principle - as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application - seems to be that where a statute does not, in terms, exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits, then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alterm partem rule at the predecisional stage. Conversely, if the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of a pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature, end no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided, courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless, viewed pragmatically, it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost premptitude. In short, this rule of fairplay “must not be jettisoned save in very exceptional circumstances where compulsive necessity so demands.” The Court must make every effort to salvage this cardinal rule to the maximum extent possible, with situational modifications. But, to recall the words of Bhagwati, J., the core of it must, however, remain, namely, that the person affected must have reasonable opportunity of being heard and the hearing must be a genuine hearing and not an empty public relations exercise.” It is in the light of the above principles, we have to consider whether the observances of the principle of natural justice is excluded by Section 33 of the Act or is implicit in it. Section 33 of the Act reads as follows: ”(1) Where it is apprehended by a Board that the water in any stream or well is likely to be polluted by reason of the disposal of any matter therein, or otherwise, the Board may make an application to a Court, not inferior to that of a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class for restraining the person who is likely to cause such pollution from so causing. (2) On receipt of an application under sub- section (1) the Court may make such order as it deems fit. (2) On receipt of an application under sub- section (1) the Court may make such order as it deems fit. (3) Where under sub- section (2) the Court makes an order restraining any person from polluting the water in any stream or well, it may in that order- (i) direct the person who is likely to cause or has caused the pollution of the water in the stream of well, to desist from taking such action as is likely to cause pollution or, as the case may be, to remove from such stream or well, such matter, and (ii) authorise the Board, if the direction under Clause (i) (being a removal direction for the removal of any matter from such stream or well) is not complied with by the person to whom such direction is issued, to undertake the removal and disposal of the matter in such manner as may be specified by the Court. (4) All expenses incurred by the Board in removing any matter in pursuance of the authorisation under Clause (ii) of sub- section (3) or in the disposal of any such matter may be defrayed out of any money obtained by the Board from such disposal and any balance outstanding shall be recoverable from the person concerned as arrears of land revenue or of public demand.”. We are of the view that Section 33 does not exclude the application of the principles of natural justice. 16. The prohibition under Section 33 is against any person causing pollution of water in a “stream or well” by reason of the disposal of any matter therein or otherwise. Stream is defined in Section 2(j) as including river, watercourse (whether flowing or for the time being dry), inland water whether natural or artificially), sub-terranean waters se, or tidal waters to such extent or, as the case may be, to such point as the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette specify in this behalf. Sections 25 and 26 deal with restrictions regarding discharge of effluent on “stream or well”. Sections 25 and 26 have been amended by the Amending Act 44 of 1978 and the words “sewear or on land” have been added after the words “stream or, well” in both the sections. Section 33 has not been amended by adding the words “sewer or on land”, after the words “stream or well”. 17. Sections 25 and 26 have been amended by the Amending Act 44 of 1978 and the words “sewear or on land” have been added after the words “stream or, well” in both the sections. Section 33 has not been amended by adding the words “sewer or on land”, after the words “stream or well”. 17. Section 33 of the Act confers power on a Magistrate to restrain a person from causing pollution of the water in a stream or well by reason of the dispsosal of any matter therein or otherwise. The Court is also given power, apart from directing a person to desist from taking such action as is likely to cause pollution, to direct him to remove any matter from such stream or well. It further empowers.‘ the Magistrate, in the event of the latter directed not being complied with by the person to whom such directions is issued, to authorise the Board to under -take the removal and disposal of the matter in such manner as may be specified. The Board, in such an event will be entitled to recover all the expenses it may incur from the person concerned as if it was an arrear of land revenue. From the above it is seen that before an order is passed by a Magistrate, he has to be satisfied that a person is causing pollution of water or is likely to cause pollution of water by the discharge of matter in a “stream or well”. These are jurisdictional facts which have got to be established before an order under Section 33 is passed by the Magistrate. The order that may be passed under Section 33 is one which will involve civil consequences on the person against whom such an order is passed. For instance, in the present case the Magistrate has restrained the petitioner from carrying on production which has the effect of bringing the manufacturing process of the petitioner to a grinding halt. It cannot be said that such an order does not prejudice the petitioner or involve civil and penal consequences to the petitioner. It can therefore be safely concluded that before passing an order under Section 33, which may have an adverse effect on the party against whom such an order is passed, the Magistrate is bound to give the concerned person notice and a fair opportunity of being heard. It can therefore be safely concluded that before passing an order under Section 33, which may have an adverse effect on the party against whom such an order is passed, the Magistrate is bound to give the concerned person notice and a fair opportunity of being heard. If a notice is given it will be open to the party to whom notice has been issued, to show that he is not discharging any matter which is polluting or likely to pollutex water in a “stream or well” within the meaning of the definition and that no order under Section 33 can be passed against him. From the setting in which Section 33 appears in the Act, the basis on which an order under Section 33 of the Act can be passed and from the point of view of the consequences that the order may have on the person against whom the order is passed, we have no hesitation in holding that the principles of natural justice are not excluded either expressly or by necessary implication. A Magistrate before passing an order under Section 33 of the Act is bound to observe the principles of natural justice by issuing notice to the affected person and giving him a fair hearing. In this view, we reject the contention of Mr. Chidambaram that Section 33 is void and unconstitutional on the ground that it excludes the principles of natural justice and is therefore arbitrary. 18. The next question that arises for consideration is whether the proceedings in C.C.No.46 of 1982 have to be quashed. As already stated, the second respondent Board filed a complaint before the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate Pondicherry under Section 33 of the Act, against the petitioner. In the complaint, it is merely stated that the petitioner was granted a consent under Section 26 of the Act and the stipulation contained in the consent was that the petitioner would provide for a complete treatment plant on or before 30th June, 1979. The petitioner did not fulfil the conditions of consent. It is in these circumstances the Board asked for an order, restraining the petitioner from carrying on its production and business till it satisfied the directions issued by the Board/complainant under its consent order dated 17-6-1978 and from discharging any trade effluent anywhere through any outlet. The petitioner did not fulfil the conditions of consent. It is in these circumstances the Board asked for an order, restraining the petitioner from carrying on its production and business till it satisfied the directions issued by the Board/complainant under its consent order dated 17-6-1978 and from discharging any trade effluent anywhere through any outlet. On that, without hearing the petitioner, the Magistrate passed an order stating that the petitioner was letting out the effluent through five open drains, which ultimately join the Municipal drain without treating them and thereby causing harm to the human environment and to the acquatic environment. He, therefore, issued a mandatory injunction directing the petitioner from carrying on production in the factory and from discharging the trade effluent on land or nullah or municipal drain forthwith. Before such an order could be passed, the petitioner was entitled to be heard. On receipt of the order, the petitioner filed Crl.M.P.No.427 of 1982 to suspend the operation of the order. The Magistrate suspended the order only for one month from 15-4-1982 to 17-5-1982. We are satisfied that the order passed by the Magistrate is violative of the principles of natural justice. There is a great force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. Mr. P. Chidambaram, that before a mandatory injunction could be issued, the Magistrate ought to have found, as a matter of fact, whether the petitioner was discharging its effluent in a stream or well as defined in Section 33 of the Act. According to the learned Counsel, only such a finding of fact would clothe the Magistrate with the jurisdiction to pass the order of mandatory injunction, and in this case, according to the learned counsel, the Magistrate has passed the order of mandatory injunction directing the petitioner not to carry on production without observing the principles of natural justice. The learned counsel further states that the petition filed by the Board before the Magistrate does not even disclose that the petitioner is discharging the effluent in a stream or well. The petition merely refers to the consent given by the Board to the petitioner and further states that separate action will be taken for disobedience of the consent. The learned counsel further states that the order passed by the Magistrate itself shows that the petitioner discharge the trade effluent only through five open drains which ultimately join the municipal drain. The petition merely refers to the consent given by the Board to the petitioner and further states that separate action will be taken for disobedience of the consent. The learned counsel further states that the order passed by the Magistrate itself shows that the petitioner discharge the trade effluent only through five open drains which ultimately join the municipal drain. That according to the learned counsel would not fall within the mischief of Section 33 of the Act. On the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that apart from the fact that the petitioner is entitled to an opportunity of being heard on the question that whether the order under Section 33 of the Act is liable to be passed against the petitioner, the petition filed before the Magistrate itself does not disclose the necessary ingredient for justifying the order under Section 33 of the Act. We therefore, quash the proceedings in C.C. No. 46 of 1982 including the orders dated 15-4-1982 and 17-4-1982. 19. In the result, we dismiss W.P. No. 5023 of 1982 and allow Crl.M.P. No. 2290 of 1982. There will be no order as to costs. K.B.N. Singh, C.J. and S. Padmanabhan, J. 20. After Judgment has been delivered, an oral prayer has been made of the Central Board for the Prevention and control of Water Pollution praying for certificate under Article 133 of the Constitution against that part of the order of this Court that the principles of natural justice is implicit in Section 33 of Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974. We are not satisfied that in this case, there is any substantial question of law of general importance which in our opinion needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. 21. Hence, the prayer is rejected. R.S.R. ----- Proceeding and orders quashed.